















## Executive Summary

### Overview

The U.S. market for medical devices<sup>5</sup> is the largest in the world. At an estimated \$83 billion in 2006, this market represents nearly half the global total and is growing at 6 percent annually – about double the rate of U.S. GDP.<sup>6</sup>

With the advent of microprocessors, miniaturization of electronic circuits, wired and wireless digital networking, and new materials and manufacturing processes, older generations of mechanical and analog electromechanical devices used in patient diagnosis, monitoring, and treatment have largely been replaced by devices and systems based on information technologies across the diverse array of contemporary medical devices. They are often connected to other devices in increasingly complex configurations, potentially creating systems of systems that span scales from tiny (e.g., an ingestible digital camera with real-time video) to ultra-large (e.g., scanning and irradiation equipment and geographically distributed electronic records systems).

The emerging classes of IT-enabled medical devices mark a significant paradigm shift: What used to be essentially passive devices controlled by a human operator are now complex computing systems whose embedded sensors and actuators not only monitor, *but actively control*, critical physiological processes and functions. The embedded computing, sensing, modeling, communications, and deep integration with physical elements and processes allows these new “cyber-physical systems” to achieve levels of functionality, adaptability, and effectiveness not possible with simpler passive systems.

### Government Perspectives

The authors of this report, senior scientists of the NITRD Program’s High Confidence Software and Systems (HCSS) Coordinating Group (CG), point to fundamental scientific and technical challenges posed by the rapidly expanding digital environment in medicine and health care. They identify critical research advances that are needed to enable the design and manufacture of new generations of increasingly complex, interconnected, and interoperating medical device cyber-physical systems that will offer innovative new capabilities and function far more safely, securely, and reliably than today’s medical devices. The authors believe that the key findings and conclusions, while directed at medical devices, relate strongly to other domains of interest to NITRD organizations.

### Key Findings

- Today’s medical device architectures are typically proprietary, not interoperable, and rely on professionals to provide inputs and assess outputs; “families” of such devices also tend to be stove-piped and not interoperable with other “families” of devices.
- In the frequent circumstance that a patient is connected to multiple devices at once, such as in an operating room, clinicians now must monitor all devices independently, synthesize data, and act on their observations, which can be affected by stress, fatigue, or other human factors.
- Medical device architecture is beginning to include wired and wireless interfaces to facilitate networked communication of patient data. But ad hoc efforts to aggregate data across devices designed to operate separately can lead to unintended or accidental results.

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<sup>5</sup> The U.S. medical devices sector includes surgical and medical instruments, orthopedic, prosthetic, and surgical appliances and supplies; dental equipment and supplies; x-ray apparatus, tubes, related irradiation apparatus; electrotherapy and electromedical apparatus; ophthalmic equipment; and in-vitro diagnostic substances. Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 2006, U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce.

<sup>6</sup> Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 2006, U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce.



- The growing interest in such capabilities as home health care services, delivery of expert medical practice remotely (telemedicine), and online clinical lab analysis underscores the central role of advanced networking and distributed communication of medical information in the health systems of the future. Increased R&D focus on the specialized engineering of networked medical device systems is needed.
- Neither past nor current development methods are adequate for the high-confidence design and manufacture of highly complex, interoperable medical device software and systems (“intelligent” prosthetics, minimally invasive surgical devices, implants, “operating room of the future”), which in years to come will likely include nano/bio devices, bionics, or even pure (programmable) biological systems.
- Today’s verification and validation (V&V) efforts are driven by system-life-cycle-development activities that rely primarily on methods of post-hoc inspection and testing; these approaches are inadequate in the face of the diversity and complexity of components and interactions in emerging medical devices and systems.
- Today, scientific principles and engineering foundations are lacking that could enable both the design and assurance of high-confidence medical device cyber-physical systems.

### **Conclusions**

- Clearly, there is a need for rationally designed high-confidence medical device cyber-physical architectures; a strategic focus on R&D in compositional modeling and design is needed to address the open systems needs, respond to technological innovation, and bridge the jointly cyber and physical aspects of this complex systems problem.
- An open research community of academics and medical device manufacturers is needed to create strategies for development of end-to-end, principled, engineering-based design and development tools. Certifying component devices is necessary, but not sufficient; a key area of research needed is the incremental certified composition of certified components.
- Manufacturers will need access to open, formally composable V&V technology that relies on computational models unifying cyber and physical systems to help establish sufficient evidence. A key V&V research challenge is to understand what is meant by the term “sufficient evidence,”<sup>7</sup> its properties, and how this can be accepted in the global economy.
- The HCSS group recommends that a strategic R&D focus on high-confidence networking and IT for the design, implementation, and certification of **open medical technologies** be undertaken, both to meet the goals of cost-effective, improved patient care and to spur innovation that promotes U.S. leadership in biomedical technology.
- To enable the necessary holistic cyber-physical systems understanding, barriers must fall among the relevant disciplines: medicine, discrete and continuous mathematics of dynamics and control; real-time computation and communication; medical robotics; learning; computational models and the supporting systems engineering design, analysis, and implementation technologies; and formal and algorithmic methods for stating, checking, and reasoning about system properties.
- Incentives are needed to enable effective cooperation between government, industry, and academia to build the underpinning standards and networking and information technology frameworks (e.g., testbeds) for developing open, interoperable medical cyber-physical systems.

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<sup>7</sup> See discussion in *Software for Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence?*, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2007. Available at [http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record\\_id=11923](http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11923)

## **The Evolution of Medical Devices**

The U.S. market for medical devices is the largest in the world. At an estimated \$83 billion in 2006, it constitutes nearly half the global total. This market accounts for approximately 4.1 percent of total U.S. health-care expenditures, and it is growing at approximately 6 percent per year – about double the rate of U.S. GDP.<sup>8</sup> The industry is highly diversified, ranging from single individuals working out of their homes to global conglomerates. In the United States, the industry is one the most high-end employers by salary, with more than 350,000 workers in 2006. Of the approximately 8,500 U.S. medical device firms, over 80 percent have fewer than 50 employees.<sup>9</sup> The medical devices produced by this industry are similarly diverse, ranging from digital thermometers to prosthetics, cochlear implants to proton beam therapy systems, and hospital health care systems.

### **Past, Present, and Emerging Medical Device Systems**

As in many industries, the technology in medical devices has evolved in tandem with overall technology innovation and the establishment of engineering best practices, transitioning from vacuum tube electronics to transistor-based electronics and from metal to plastics. Prior to the digital age, medical devices were generally built using analog components in relatively simple designs, with relatively simple user interfaces and limited functionality. The primary method of controlling risk to patients was competent human intervention. Life spans of these devices tended to be rather long, corresponding to the rate of technological change and established business models.

Over the last 20 or so years, designs for medical devices have evolved from analog to digital systems. Today, software, microprocessor, sensor, and actuator technologies are ubiquitous in these devices. Some of the more complex devices can have a million lines or more of code. Most devices contain *embedded systems* that rely on a combination of proprietary, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and custom software or software-of-unknown-pedigree (SOUP) components. These systems are highly proprietary and increasingly dependent on software to provide greater levels of device robustness and functionality. Designs continue to rely, however, on competent human intervention as the ultimate risk-control measure.

An *embedded system* may be thought of as a special-purpose computer system often designed to perform dedicated functions and subject to resource-limitation constraints as part of a mechanical device. Often embedded system programs are implemented in read-only memory and are not intended to be generally reprogrammable. (In contrast, general-purpose computing systems, such as PCs, execute a wide variety of functions and are easily reprogrammed.) Embedded systems are becoming critical in medicine because they increasingly *control* functions of, and communicate with, patients themselves as well as engineered systems. Device life spans are shrinking due to more rapid innovation in enabling technologies and the demand for more robust systems. The pressures of rising health care costs, an aging

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<sup>8</sup> Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 2006, U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce.

<sup>9</sup> Medical Device Industry Assessment, 2008, International Trade Commission, Department of Commerce.

population<sup>10</sup>, and diminishing medical professional resources are also driving health-care providers to seek technological innovations to maintain or improve patient care as efficiently as possible.

## Issues in Current Medical Device Systems

### *Architectures*

Device architectures are highly proprietary, not interoperable, and rely heavily on professionals to provide inputs and assess outputs. Embedded systems are, for the most part, open-loop<sup>11</sup>. Exceptions (closed-loop) tend to be implantable devices such as implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs) or cochlear prosthetics (with soft operational deadlines). Any network communication is largely for the purpose of diagnostic output. Complex instruction set computer (CISC) and reduced instruction set computer (RISC) architectures are commonly used. Multicore and system-on-a-chip (SoC) architectures and flexible reconfigurable architectures, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), are becoming more common in device designs.

### *Development Methods*

Current software development methods range from older methods such as structured programming to object-oriented programming paradigms where objects are instantiated at run-time. Formal methods-based design and analysis are not widely used. Human resource-intensive, system-based verification and validation activities are conducted to demonstrate that a device will perform as intended. Use of static-analysis tools on implemented code is limited. Development platforms do not facilitate integration of hardware, software, and human factors in design, development, and manufacturing.

### *Research Challenges*

- *Platform and implementation technologies are needed that support science- and engineering-based design, development, and certification.*
- *An open research community needs to be established comprising academics and medical device manufacturers to create strategies for the development of end-to-end, principled, engineering-based design and development tools.*
  - Strengths and properties of tools should be easily understood, inherently trustable, and scalable so they can be applied appropriately to the particular task.
  - Tools and the science behind them should be interoperable and complementary.
  - Their results must be trustable relative to some national or international standard to facilitate certification.
- *Additional research is needed to reduce the number of false positives and negatives in commercially available static analyzers.*
- *Formal methods-based design techniques must scale to human resource-intensive processes.* An example is modeling work-flow practices of providers or caregivers.

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<sup>10</sup> The growing elderly population in the United States is viewed as a key influence on the direction of the medical device industry. A Profile of Older Americans: 2007, Administration on Aging, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

<sup>11</sup> “Open-loop” is used throughout this report to refer to systems that lack feedback control; “closed-loop” refers to systems that include feedback control.

In addition to addressing these research challenges, it is important to ensure that a credible “faster, better, cheaper” business case can be made to persuade device manufacturers to change their design and development practices and open markets to new participation.

### **Issues in Emerging Medical Device Systems**

Emerging medical device systems may be characterized as those systems that are pushing the envelope of regulated technology. Examples are closed-loop or networked device systems.

In today’s health care environment, it is common to have a patient connected to several medical devices simultaneously. These devices may be delivering drugs, regulating breathing, or reporting a physiological status. Caregivers must aggregate, analyze, and react to this information in a coordinated way. In the operating room, for example, one may find many devices providing life-supporting functions and multiple medical professionals *interoperating* based on information provided by the various devices (and their own observations). Humans are subject to fatigue, miscommunication, distractions, misinterpretation of information, information overload, and other factors. These factors can combine to contribute to an undesirable patient outcome.

The digital technology found in most medical devices today would make it rather easy (at least conceptually) to collect device information, aggregate it, and either present it to a health care provider for some action or use it to trigger an autonomous action by a device. For example, it is routine to simultaneously display data from pulse oximeters, EKGs, and blood-pressure devices to monitor patients with cardiac problems; devices delivering radiation treatment to a tumor in an organ that moves can sense organ motion and direct a radiation beam calibrated to the movement.

The need to provide health care services in a home care environment, or deliver expert medical practice remotely (telemedicine, emergency response), or perform online clinical lab analysis further underscores the central role of advanced networking and distributed communication of medical information (via electronic health records) in emerging care systems. Adding computing and control mechanisms to the critical medical information communicated (via networking) establishes a fundamental prerequisite to high-confidence cyber-physical medical systems. This must be done in a way that supports the principled development and implementation of systems of medical systems.

### ***Architectures***

Emerging medical device architecture is beginning to provide wired and wireless interfaces to facilitate networked communication of device (patient) data. But as the workshop participants’ report suggests, attempts to aggregate medical data between devices that were designed to operate separately are resulting in unintended or accidental (virtual) couplings.

The device procurement process historically has established “stove-piped families” of proprietary devices that are not designed to interoperate with other “families” of devices. Ad-hoc attempts to integrate provider processes and the families of proprietary devices have resulted in very loosely coupled “stealth” networks that can involve transferring data between devices via memory stick, PDA (Bluetooth and IR communication), barcoding, or other technologies.

*Clearly, there is a need for rationally designed high-confidence medical device cyber-physical architectures.*

To optimize patient care, multiple cyber-physical devices must interoperate together smoothly at a very high level of confidence. Interoperability facilitates and accelerates aggregation of patient information that can be used to improve patient care and treatment outcomes. To that end, we see emerging efforts of health care providers to develop closed-loop interoperable medical systems. The workshop participants' report describes some of the issues involved.

### ***Development Methods***

Neither past nor current development methods are adequate for engineering these complex emerging medical systems. As mentioned in the workshop participants' report, there is a need to be able reliably to compose, not only highly trustworthy systems from diverse components, but also highly trustworthy systems of systems. Medical device design oriented toward a holistic approach that integrates functional, computational, and communication designs in the presence of uncertain patient models in both normal and abnormal conditions is needed.

*It is our view that the emerging development methods must scale across the device industry's entire problem set as well as its diverse development skill levels. The ability for third parties to trust all aspects of design and development results is key to device innovation.*

### ***Research Challenges***

The workshop participants' report identifies a number of important areas for next steps in research for laying the foundation for high-confidence cyber-physical medical devices and systems. Additional areas for consideration are:

- *Synthesizing medical information.* As medical systems evolve into cyber-physical systems, the notions of feedback and interoperability will most likely emulate the practice of medicine itself. This presents significant challenges in encapsulating medical information because different doctors may envision varying treatment regimes for a given patient and doctors in diverse specializations approach medical information differently.
- *QoS guarantees.* Advances are needed in networked embedded-control systems technology so that QoS guarantees at the component level also guarantee performance at the system level. The relative importance of security, privacy, robustness, interoperability, extensibility, and mobility, as well as general patient safety, must be evaluated carefully.
- *Dynamic management of large-scale systems.* The workshop participants' report touched on the notion of dynamic medical-system configurability in the context of plug-and-play (PnP) systems. However, the bounds of the PnP system were not explicitly characterized. One could imagine the system being implemented by a diversity of providers at the local, state, and national (perhaps even international) levels. Managing resources and configurations (including device versions, legacy systems, etc.) implemented in such a varied landscape is truly a grand challenge.
- *Trust in abstractions.* The workshop participants' report identifies the need for more robust means of modeling and formal methods-based checking and verification of medical-device designs. In a more general sense, virtually every step of a development process is based on some level of system abstraction or composition of abstractions. Research is needed to provide a scalable means of being able to trust abstractions and their properties, and their interfaces to other abstractions and concrete equivalents.
- *The security challenge.* While the workshop report identifies medical-device system security as a research challenge, further emphasis is needed to comprehend the full scope of the issue. The notion of medical device system security is in its infancy. This is

because, in general, most medical devices are not connected to a network. However, as noted above, this architectural paradigm is changing. As health care records evolve from paper to electronic media and as this information is used pervasively in medical device interoperation, security issues are going to become critical.

### **Future Medical Devices: High-Confidence Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)**

As technological advances and innovation permit medical device systems to decrease in size while increasing in capabilities, it is reasonable to expect that future devices could evolve into ubiquitous supervisory-control, patient-centric systems performing autonomous, cooperative, and coordinated actions.

#### ***Architectures***

Ongoing research seems headed toward the merging of physiological, biological, engineered, and physical systems for health care that include, for example, biomechanical systems, nano/bio devices, bionics, or even pure (programmable) biological systems. Enabled by advances in both biological understanding and IT, medical devices and systems of the future can be expected to continue the trend towards heterogeneous configurable personalized systems far more capable, and also more complex, than today's.

#### ***Development Methods***

As the architecture of medical systems evolves from the domain of macro- and micro-mechanical systems to nanoscale CPS and biological systems, development methods must fundamentally change. It is likely that a greater dependence on, and trust in, physical and biological models will become necessary.

#### ***Research Challenges***

Methods established for developing CPS must extend and scale to include the integration and interoperation of pervasive physical and biological systems. The areas of technical challenges for research and some drivers include the following:

*Consumer demands and needs:* An already high and still-growing cost is associated with traditional (hospital, clinic) care settings, particularly for interventions that do not demand the resources of a full-service hospital. This has led to increasing interest in alternatives such as home care, assisted living, and commoditized convenient care settings. Such emerging health care venues have the potential to become major consumers of innovative, commoditized, and cost-effective medical and laboratory technologies. A second, perhaps unexpected, driver of innovation is sports, with the growing popularity of sophisticated technologies to measure training effectiveness and athletic performance.

*Networking:* Future computing and networking technologies deployed in medical devices and systems are likely to be interconnected in increasingly complex open systems<sup>12</sup>, with many heterogeneous components. Variation in the configuration of devices will be highly dynamic, determined by both economic and patient-specific medical considerations. This future will depend upon a science and technology foundation that can provide flexible and assured configuration of highly capable real-time, embedded systems with networking, data

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<sup>12</sup> The phrase "open systems" is used to describe systems designed to allow ready interconnection and interoperation with other systems; "closed systems" refers to those designed to be used in isolation.

management, and control technologies. These will be expected to provide situation-appropriate levels of component autonomy, timeliness, cooperative coordination, and supervisory control, as well as high-confidence operation. At the same time, the IT substrate must integrate and manage diverse device requirements, optimize treatment delivery, and remain highly responsive to the rapidly changing requirements of the users – physician, team, and clinical care setting.

*Real-Time Physiological Sensing, Control, and Feedback:*

- Sensor fusion: Academic, government, and industry research today is exploring sensors that can be implanted or worn (e.g., attached to clothing), communicating either wirelessly or through networks woven into fabrics, and used for gait analysis, detection of falling, and monitoring for (ab)normal mobility and activity levels. A rapidly growing field of research focuses on environments that can exploit ubiquitous monitoring technologies to make assisted living and home care safer and more capable.

For example, treatment of diabetes has progressed from onerous physiological test-based methods to in-home device-based glucose measurement in patients with infusion pumps. Closed-loop control based on skin-sensing technology is on the horizon. Similarly, many other tests and studies that today are conducted “off-line” using a single or small number of samples sent to a laboratory could give way to online dynamic models obtained from continuous monitoring, which also could yield opportunities for closed-loop control.

- Prosthetics: The growing demand for devices for people with debilitating injuries or disabilities is driving innovation in prosthetics of all kinds. Prosthetic devices increasingly will depend upon sophisticated information and control technology. Biomedical augmentation can be expected to expand with the advent of new biomechanical technologies and new treatment targets, such as in neural and deep brain stimulation, and retinal and cochlear implants. In long-familiar devices such as artificial limbs, hands, or feet, the potential scope for intelligent prosthetics is just beginning to be explored – e.g., the possibility that a patient can control the prosthesis through his or her own patterns of brain activity. Engineered materials and organs such as “smart skin” and an artificial pancreas are becoming realities. If such technologies are to become practical, the variety of challenges for safely and effectively controlling the interaction of the artificial and the biological must be addressed.
- Minimally invasive diagnostic and intervention technologies: The current trend towards less invasive methods for obtaining biometric data and performing surgical interventions can be expected to continue. The risk of infection and collateral injury, as well as patient recovery time and care requirements all can be lowered when large surgical wounds can be avoided. Precision microsurgery is already benefiting from the march of technology, with medical device miniaturization now reaching the scale of micro- and nano-electromechanical systems (MEMS and NEMS). Devices can be snaked through blood vessels to reach areas of the heart that control contraction rhythm. The device can then, for example, perform microsurgery to induce a scar that reduces conductivity and alters the electrical signal to mitigate tachycardia, a common type of arrhythmia. Among the challenges for such devices is to avoid causing damage to the surrounding tissue and to offer precision control in the presence of varying natural motion and events in the complex human biological environment.

- Control and Feedback: Increasingly sophisticated prostheses and therapeutic technologies exemplify systems that must interact well with their users or subjects. If a device has multiple functions, the system must be designed to make sure the user stays aware of, and can appropriately control, the current mode of operation. Otherwise, mode confusion may cause the user to take an erroneous action and potentially induce harm. The interaction of multiple devices operating simultaneously also must not cause hazardous conditions, and must not result in interference that prevents one or another device from properly carrying out an essential function. The patient and operator are in highly dynamic situations, in which dangerous conditions can develop rapidly. Thus the system must provide “natural,” easy-to-understand modes for dealing with rapid changes and must clearly represent to the user the state of the system and the condition of the patient. For many situations, visual feedback will not be possible, and haptic feedback will provide more information.

The large number of biomarkers that may be available to improve understanding of the patient’s condition will be very beneficial from a health perspective, but also may require significant technology support. For example, there may be need for data fusion and synchronization, for example, to achieve correlation of EKG, muscular, and EEG signals in real time. Critical areas for research include:

- Mode confusion causing the user to do the right thing at the wrong time
  - Haptic feedback
  - Actuation (how you actually do what you want to do with the prosthesis)
  - Intelligent prosthetics
  - Data fusion and synchronization (e.g., EKG-EEG correlation where signals might require real-time synchronization)
  - Human in the loop
  - Adaptive control
- Biological and physiological systems: Simultaneous, correlated information about multiple biomarkers can be expected to yield more complete and contemporaneous assessment of a patient’s condition than is generally available today. Research, invention and innovative development are required, however, to give rise to technologies that can fully exploit these new discoveries about disease processes, their physiological manifestations, and the biomarkers that are their best indicators.

From a scientific and technological “push” perspective, progress in biomedical technology inevitably will be propelled by discoveries in biology and medicine; new biosensing and bioactuation inventions; advances in bio and nano materials and structures; the miniaturization, enhanced control, and increasing mobility of technologies such as mass spectrometry, ultrasound, and resonance-based imaging. Many of these are made possible by concurrent advances in the cyber technologies that enable the exploitation and precise control of physical technologies. Biological and medical advances can be expected to open new possibilities for interventions at all levels: system, organ, cellular, molecular, or even atomic.





## **Achieving Certifiably Dependable Medical Device Cyber-Physical Systems**

### **Verification, Validation, and Certification**

Engineers have always been challenged to provide sufficient evidence, through various methods of verification and validation (V&V), that a device or system will perform as intended. History is replete with examples of designs in all industry sectors that failed despite vast expenditures on V&V. It is tempting to say that results today are not much better than those of 20 years ago. However, that would be an arguably unfair statement in light of the orders-of-magnitude growth in complexity reflected in today's engineered systems as compared with those of the past. The fact is that manufacturers are benefiting from many research advances. This progress is reflected in their ability to design ever more complex systems with some measure of dependability.

Many of the V&V efforts to date are driven by system-life-cycle-development activities that rely primarily on methods of inspection and testing. The problem is that many of the inspection activities are "checklist"-based and subject to human factors. Similarly, testing is largely an experimental process, strongly influenced by the availability of development resources and time. Such evidence provides some confidence that a device will perform as intended.

*These methods have worked reasonably well for highly constrained discrete devices that can rely on the notion of competent human intervention as an ultimate means of risk control.*

Evolving the types of medical systems described in this report presents V&V challenges of unprecedented magnitude. The combination of proprietary components and third-party components of unknown pedigree creates a design space representing combinatorial assumptions (environment, timing, computing, control, communication and physical conditions) and design decisions beyond the human ability to fathom. There is an urgent need for end-to-end, principled, engineering-based (automated) design, along with V&V tools that will allow the information produced by one tool to supplement and increase the effectiveness of other tools elsewhere in the development life cycle. The aggregate artifacts of such tools serve to support the establishment of "sufficient" objectively trustworthy evidence that a medical device system will perform as intended<sup>13</sup>.

### **V&V in the Presence of Change**

It is rare that the design requirements for a medical system, let alone any other type of cyber-physical system, can be completely specified at the outset of a development effort. Changes in requirements and design specifications are a fact of life. The challenge is to be able to provide sufficient high-quality evidence that any system design or component change is appropriately accounted for in all system components, such as assumptions, information, timing, risks, etc.

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<sup>13</sup> National Academies Press, *op. cit.*

*To help minimize end-to-end testing, V&V techniques and tools are needed that can establish sufficient evidence that various system components and properties are not affected by a design or component change. A key V&V research challenge then, is to understand what is meant by the term “sufficient evidence,” its properties, and how this meaning can be accepted throughout the global economy.*

## **Certification**

The workshop participants’ report presents several areas of research that can enable the development of dependable medical systems. Further exploration is needed now to identify the kinds of properties and evidence derived from the proposed methods and tools that can serve as a basis for certification.

More generally, there is a need for assuring that the *interface* between design abstractions (e.g., specifications and models) and their concrete counterparts can be assessed for correctness and completeness properties. This need is absolutely critical to making assurance cases that serve to support particular medical system claims.

Safety assurance cases may be characterized as tree structures of claims, arguments, and evidence that support a “top-level” claim. These trees can become very complex. The challenge here, key to the notion of certification, is to abstract this complexity in a manner that can be *trusted* to the same level as the design abstractions and concrete counterparts they represent. The complexity represented in cyber-physical systems presents a particular challenge to assurance case abstraction. Research opportunities to facilitate trustable assurance cases are needed. For example, standard safety case patterns for various design constructs might be established.

*As medical systems become ever more complex, networked, and interoperable, manufacturers will need access to open, formally composable V&V technology that relies on computational models unifying cyber and physical systems to help establish sufficient evidence.*

## **Science and Technology R&D Needs for Designing Certifiably Dependable Medical Device Cyber-Physical Systems**

### **Scientific Foundations for Cyber-Physical Systems**

Today, foundations are lacking that could enable both the design and assurance of medical device cyber-physical systems. Many different facets of these systems will have to be analyzed including the environmental, structural, kinematic, biologic, chemical, and thermal interactions as well as the logical interactions of the controlled device(s) with users, operators, and patient status.

The analytic tools needed for design and certification will need to span the relevant theories in mathematics, dynamics, and control; sensor data fusion and information management; communication; real-time computing; and hardware and systems software platform technology. Unification and interoperation of theories and tools will be needed to support high-confidence development and certification.

Open systems demand interoperability of the constituent components. To date, we do not have open systems foundations for a broad range of medical technologies, a lack that may inhibit the scope of innovation in medicine and biomedical technology.

*Foundations of both development and assurance are needed for open networked control of cyber-physical systems.*

*Foundations for evidence-based design and certification are needed that replace indirect (process- and best practice-based) certification with methods for direct (product-oriented) evaluation and assurance. The growing suite of verification technologies needs to be open and interoperable to enable methods that are appropriate for each assurance task and components that can be easily configured or interchanged.*

### **R&D Needs in Design and Implementation Capability and Infrastructure for Cyber-Physical Systems**

The workshop participants' report recommends research to create new robust, embedded, real-time, networked system infrastructure for medical device software and systems. The workshop identified significant gaps in design and implementation capability to meet the objectives of reliable, privacy-preserving, cost-effective, personalized, and high-quality health care. The gaps were examined further in the subsequent HCMDSS/PnP workshop.

The objectives for improving health care are extremely challenging technically. Current efforts to address interoperability, for example, are at the level of network connectivity. This will not be sufficient. New systems support capability also will be needed to orchestrate the interactions between devices and between devices and human users, and to assure that the device actions can be coordinated and carried out in real time. This is not merely a software problem, but fundamentally involves the control design of devices and systems. Current methods for analyzing issues such as the timing characteristics of software, control performance, hazard analysis, and failure modes and effects cannot simply be applied to the individual components. Composite systems, particularly ones that interact with the

nondeterministic actions of humans, may exhibit unexpected emergent behaviors. New assurance methods will be required to evaluate the new system integration or coordination capabilities and to support the safety and security implications for the interacting devices and the system as a whole.

As noted in the workshop report, today's closed and vertically integrated systems present technical and economic obstacles to rapid uptake of biomedical discoveries and inventions.

*The HCSS agencies recommend that a strategic R&D focus on high-confidence networking and IT for the design, implementation, and certification of **open medical technologies** be undertaken, both to meet the goals of cost-effective, tailored, and patient-specific treatment, and to spur a level of device and systems innovation that can sustain a competitive global role for the U.S. in biomedical technology.*

### **Modeling, Design, and Implementation Technology**

The 2006 workshop report identified research needs in three major areas, including:

- Patient modeling and simulation
- Medical device software development
- Model-based design frameworks

The 2007 workshop extended this discussion to consider highly configurable diagnostic and treatment settings.

Participants in both workshops recommended increased R&D in patient-based modeling that can explain the interactions of organs and systems of the human body. This research would go beyond traditional computational data-analysis methods; it would attempt to build and validate constituent organ and system models that could be used in a compositional modeling environment to represent contemporaneous functioning of systems and the patient as a whole. In embedded software development, the workshops recommend R&D in technology to enable formal and model-based analysis, design, and implementation of open medical-device and system software. These recommendations focus on the need for component-based design and system integration. In the area of design automation, the workshop series presents arguments for developing a model-based tool chain for semantic integration of these systems.

*A strategic focus on R&D in compositional modeling and design is needed to address the open systems needs and to bridge the jointly cyber and physical aspects of this complex systems problem. The aggregate of patient physiology (including functions and pathologies of diverse organs and systems), the medical devices for diagnosis and therapeutic interventions affecting these systems, and the architecture and overall control of the sensing and treatment system constitute a complex system. R&D is needed to resolve fundamental issues underlying the composition and integration of cyber-physical device and infrastructure technologies through semantics-based and model-based tool chains that represent and resolve both logical and physical interoperability. We also concur with the workshop recommendation that a key area of research needed to enable this vision is the incremental certified composition of certified components. This is expected to contribute to both early discovery of problems (hence safer designs and implementations) and higher confidence to support the acceptance of systems by users and regulators.*

## **Infrastructure for Medical-Device Integration and Interoperation**

The workshop series emphasizes the need for infrastructure that supports active fault detection, isolation, and recovery for fail-safe support of systems of devices. *We recommend increased emphasis on R&D that will contribute to more capable technology platforms that monitor their own (possibly distributed) operational status and protect applications from infrastructure-induced failures.*

### ***Networking***

The workshops posited scenarios in which devices cooperate over (possibly wireless) networks to provide treatment and care in new settings. The “operating room of the future” concept, for example, envisions an all-wireless, configurable operating room. Home care would be enhanced by technology to monitor and treat chronic conditions of elderly, convalescing, or disabled patients, and to report any transition to acute care requirements. The workshops outlined needs for “critical infrastructure” that can enable such concepts. Networking that can accommodate configurations of many (often life- or safety-critical) devices is one component of such infrastructure.

Increased emphasis is needed across the networking research landscape on the requirements of distributed devices that must communicate, control, and interact under strict timing, determinism, energy, and (re)configurability constraints. Some progress has been made, but great variation exists across sectors. Commercial standards such as CAN and FlexRay prescribe functionality for real-time networks used in automotive, aviation, and process-control systems. The ARINC 664 standard prescribes a deterministic Ethernet-based databus for aviation. A standard for timed Ethernet, IEEE 1588, is emerging. *Although these standards are broadly relevant, we agree that the need and opportunity exist to address the particular safety, privacy, and security challenges of device networks for preventive, chronic, and acute health care.*

R&D is needed that can contribute to open, non-proprietary interoperability standards and provide advanced capabilities for managing the safety, security, and privacy aspects of communication. This includes the latency and real-time, fault-tolerance, and device registration and configurability requirements imposed in an open medical device network infrastructure that includes wide-area networking. Among the many considerations for medical networks are the potential for electromagnetic frequency (EMF, e.g. radio frequency) interference among wireless devices and between wireless transmitters (e.g., radios, routers) and medical device emissions; network and transmitter contention for energy resources and interactive power management; preservation of network connectivity and quality of service in an active EMF and complex physical environment; time-awareness; and other special requirements such as mobility and active localization.

### ***Real-time Operating Systems and Middleware***

One-size-fits-all operating systems will not suffice for all medical applications, although some industry-specific solutions do exist to address particular issues. For example, ARINC 653 is an aviation standard for real-time operating systems that provides spatial and temporal separation to assure that applications do not conflict in their use of system resources. The workshops identify important gaps. For example, middleware that is based upon best-effort scheduling may meet requirements for electronic health records but not for device-to-device interaction. Plug-and-play may place new demands, such as:

- New principles for virtualization in a complex, heterogeneous physical world
- New services such as schedulers that can accommodate both synchronous and reactive system needs
- Dynamic scheduling with both hard and soft real-time guarantees
- Reconfigurable fault tolerance and redundancy management
- Dynamic support for resource isolation
- Execution control concepts for cooperating, multimodal embedded systems
- Drivers for increasingly complex sensing and actuation devices and platform technologies; device attestation, calibration, and device health monitoring
- Security services that are compatible with real-time and embedded systems requirements
- Network stacks with support for mobility
- Support for new hardware substrates, including reconfigurable hardware and reconfigurable networks
- Distributed coordination services

### ***Real-Time Hardware/Software Platforms***

Trends towards dependence on configurable architectures such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and perhaps eventually multicore system-on-chip (SoC) architectures, where each core is an FPGA, must also be addressed. It will be necessary to certify that implementations provide the specified functionality and satisfy non-functional constraints on properties such as timing, energy consumption, and thermal gain. Resource virtualization can be expected to be an increasing challenge because of the interactive and interdependent operation of the constituent platform configurations. In the much longer term, new computational and networking platforms may be influenced by outcomes from nanotechnology and biomolecular computing research, possibly exhibiting even greater variability that must be masked or controlled.

At the same time, these architectures present new opportunities to support capabilities such as extended built-in self-testing on the hardware platform, system-level device health monitoring, fault isolation and recovery, hardware-level security implementation, and device attestation. New concepts such as timed-instruction-set architectures and delay-insensitive system architectures currently are being explored, in a quest for hardware support that can provide determinism for complex, interactive systems of devices. *Research is needed on additional concepts that seek to advance capability and dependability at the platform level.*

### **Sensing, Control, and Coordination Concepts**

The workshop report identifies closed-loop control of devices as an emerging trend and notes that coordination among multiple devices must be provided. This is a challenge that must be addressed at all levels of a system or configuration of cooperating medical devices. There is some prior research upon which to build. Open control platforms have been explored at a rudimentary level. Distributed control has received substantial attention over the past several years. Hybrid control theory has sought to unify the discrete (logical, switched, or event-driven) aspects of control with the continuous behavior and recurrent control relation of the physical system. Model-predictive control (both conventional and hybrid) has improved the performance and safety of individual systems. Limited mechanisms such as software interlocks have been devised to limit or force concurrent operation of cooperating devices.

However, the challenges of coordinated control in either a vertically integrated or an open plug-and-play setting, where the effects of multiple-device operation are coupled in a human

subject, far exceed the reach of today's science and technology. Compositional abstractions for sensing and control are needed to underpin next-generation supervisory control. A central challenge is to arrange for cooperative control across hierarchies of devices and subsystems, and to do so in the face of diverse and possibly changing configurations. Change may also arise suddenly due to a change in patient status, requiring coordinated response from multiple devices. Some devices may be autonomous and others operated by humans, requiring a mixed-initiative strategy for managing control authority in the system.

In such complex and changing environments, learning technology may hold promise as a means to help in acquiring models of prevailing or changing system dynamics – an important step beyond state estimation. However, suitability, dependability, and certifiability must be established for all technologies intended for use in this complex environment, operating under the real-time and other constraints posed by the dynamic physical and computational context, and including appropriate representation of uncertainty.

## **Assurance Capability**

### **Supporting Technology**

The workshop report emphasizes the need for “design for certifiably dependable systems” to supersede today's process-based, post hoc certification methods. We agree with this finding and that of the National Academies study, *Software for Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence?* The needed technology focus should be support for evaluation capabilities that pervade the design process, not simply support for post hoc evaluation of the system. The production of evidence that the system is properly constructed, functions as intended, and operates safely and securely, is a second key focus. High confidence must be sought through a combination of lightweight (easily useable and sometimes approximate) methods, as well as heavier-weight methods that can deliver rigor and completeness where that is required. *Research is needed to provide a new generation of analysis, synthesis, and composition and integration technology for cyber-physical systems such as medical devices and systems.*

### **Analysis Concepts and Tools**

The view has faded that all verification must be conducted by an automatic or semi-automatic theorem prover, proving “correctness” of the whole system and taking hours or days. Verification technology is making new strides in areas such as lightweight methods for the analysis of software or system before it is executed (“static analysis”) and checking the system for flaws that may violate the software or system specification (“model checking”). Advances have been made in abstraction, such as the construction of simplified behavioral models from software, or the extraction of predicates about properties of a system from lower-level models. Model checking is a generalized technique that is capable of scouring very large state spaces for undesirable conditions and assuring that the system or software cannot reach such conditions. Static analysis and checking techniques for software are achieving rapid advances in capability, and are now widely used for bug-finding and more comprehensive analysis of industrial software.

*We agree with the workshop report that further substantial research is needed to achieve comprehensive end-to-end analysis and checking capability for the wide range of (possibly interacting) properties critical to system performance, behavior, function, safety, and security.*



### ***Synthesis Concepts and Tools***

Much of today's medical software is generated as a by-product of mathematical modeling tools. These tools typically make a rather direct translation of the mathematical formulas in the system simulation into code (usually C code). Code quality is a pervasive concern. Although some modeling systems provide real-time analysis for various hardware platforms, the capabilities are limited and focus on single system requirements. For complex cyber-physical systems, a great deal of software (both application and system software) is required that has nothing to do with the mathematical algorithm. Synthesis of the behavioral and interactive aspects of a system (of systems) currently lags far behind in the level of both scientific understanding and technical support.

### ***Composition/Integration Tools***

To achieve useful technologies based on solid scientific foundations, the current fragmented methods must be replaced by much more expressive and interoperable concepts for component, property, and system representation. Model-based design takes a step in this direction, seeking to produce designs that have rich semantics based on both physical and computational systems concepts. Synthesis tools and the technology base must have a coherent shared semantic interface. However, the class of models (computational, physical, properties) available today is impoverished relative to the systems we are seeking to build.

*As highlighted in the workshop report, research is needed towards open systems interface checking.* This should include tools (e.g., based on static analysis and model checking) that can check the interoperability of components and generate composable evidence for their properties relevant to medical technologies (mutually exclusive or simultaneous operation, non-interference, timeliness). Many of these properties may be broadly applicable to CPS, not only to the medical device domain. Research concepts such as “assume/guarantee” reasoning, which describes the desired behavior of composite systems based upon the constituent subsystems, should continue to be extended to provide “composable evidence” that would integrate both the functional components and the evidence about their individual correct functioning and properties, producing both the designed product and evidence that the composite system is correct.

### **An Open Verification Technology Perspective**

Interoperability of formal reasoning methods has been advanced through a focus on smaller (e.g., property-based) theories that can be combined under a single logical framework. Counterexamples, which can be harvested from failed attempts to prove properties correct, have been found very useful in illuminating problem areas, not only after the system is complete but also during its development. However, much remains to be done. The techniques described above on analysis, synthesis, and integration are individual methods and are not organized for easy, coherent use; nor are their interfaces couched in terms of systems problems. The research community argues (and we agree) that tools both for functional synthesis and analysis of the system and for synthesis of evidence must be integrated semantically. The idea of an “evidential tool bus” has been described that provides for transmission of the synthesis, analysis, and checking artifacts among tools, to be composed at the same time the components themselves are assembled.

### **Evidence-Based Certification Technology**

The research community has proposed a new approach to “scientific certification” or “direct assurance,” in which the critical properties of the product system are formally scrutinized to

the extent possible. Certification is based on evidence produced in this process, ideally evidence that is extracted rigorously using analysis tools, or provided as an adjunct to synthesis or integration in an open verification environment. Active discussion is occurring on the potential use of assurance cases, which are organized collections of claims, arguments, and evidence that establish the safety or security of a system. The FDA held a workshop in February 2008 that brought assurance case experts from FDA and academia together with representatives of industry organizations. The assurance case concept was well received; future meetings are planned to explore its challenges for industry and regulators.

## **Human-Machine Interaction**

Medical devices and systems interact with humans in two ways: humans as operators (“users”) and humans as subjects. Sometimes, the human is both user and subject. We agree with the general view that device and systems technology based on broad classes of subjects are often less effective than those that can be tailored to the individual user. Patient-specific modeling and simulation is needed to enable adaptive and patient-specific therapies. New approaches to designing interfaces are also needed that enable natural interaction and sustain: a) shared human and cyber understanding of the current and possible or predictable states (both normal and failure) of the system, b) agreement on actions that can be taken, and c) sharing of authority between humans and medical devices.

## **A Holistic Cyber-Physical Systems Perspective**

As medical technology moves to smaller scales, where cellular and even molecular dynamics prevail, new opportunities for deeply integrated sensing and control are emerging. At the same time, growing understanding of systems biology may give rise to new strategies for medical technology that exploit computation-driven sensing and control interactions with “systems of systems,” the interacting complex of mechanisms spanning the cellular level up to the organs and macro systems of the human body.

To enable the holistic understanding that researchers and industry will need to build the next generations of medical device cyber-physical systems, barriers must fall that currently divide the underpinning disciplines: medicine, discrete and continuous mathematics of dynamics and control; real-time computation and communication; medical robotics; learning; computational models and the supporting systems design and implementation technologies; and formal and algorithmic methods for checking and reasoning about system properties. Increasingly, multidisciplinary science, engineering, and education practices will be required to deal with the inherent complexity of the advanced medical systems described here and their life-critical technical challenges.



## **Collaboration Challenges and Strategies To Address Medical Device R&D Needs**

### **Federal R&D Interests in Medical Device Technology**

The Federal government has a direct interest in promoting comprehensive examination of the development, deployment, and use of medical technologies. One mission of the FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health is evaluating the safety and effectiveness of medical devices for market, including those that are IT-controlled. The missions of NSF and NIH include supporting short-, medium-, and long-term research and development of bioengineering and medical technology. NSF also supports long-term research in cyber-physical systems, spanning real-time embedded systems, control systems, networking, robotics, devices and materials, software, and assurance methods. NIST's non-regulatory mission – developing and promoting measurement, standards, and technology in concert with industries and research laboratories – affects both research and implementation across all device domains. NIST's Manufacturing and Engineering Laboratory develops and supports performance metrics and standards for manufacturing technology, robotics, and industrial control systems; its Information Technology Laboratory also supports projects relevant to medical software and systems including security, certification, user interfaces, software diagnostics, conformance testing, and network research.

Other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services and its Centers for Disease Control, have broad charges associated with watching over the health and welfare of the nation's citizens. The current Federal initiative for a Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) has the goals of informing clinical practice, particularly in remote areas; interconnecting clinicians to foster collaboration; personalizing health care; and streamlining the monitoring of public health to improve the health of the overall population. The initiative envisions a complete electronic health record (EHR) for every patient at any point of service. The EHR would provide practitioners with the patient's medical history, remind the patient of treatment steps, and track outcomes and quality of health care delivery.

Realizing these systems will require R&D gains on multiple fronts. The Veterans' Administration (VA), for example, has encountered challenges in correctly correlating clinical data and images with patient records, a significant issue because of the immense number of archived images involved. The VA has a particular interest in the unique identification of data and in validating the conformance of medical devices during use, as well as in surgical data and support systems to eliminate "wrong patient," "wrong surgery," "wrong site" situations.

The Department of Defense's Telemedicine and Technology Research Center (TATRC) is involved in all aspects of system integration, demonstration and evaluation of new communications and information systems technologies to improve health care for soldiers and all DoD beneficiaries. Today, TATRC is charged with managing both a general research/development program and specific advanced technology projects in multiple areas including: knowledge engineering; combat trauma training systems; distance learning; computer-aided instruction; medical imaging; medical data fusion and distribution; image-guided therapies; minimally invasive therapies; advanced diagnostic and therapeutic systems; wireless medical systems; teleconsultation systems; robotics; medical modeling and simulation; and physiological sensors.

Other agencies that do not have mission responsibilities for medical applications nonetheless have a keen interest in high-confidence technologies. NSA, for example, has a focus on identifying and addressing crucial issues for the design, certification, and operation of extremely secure and reliable software and systems. NSA's concerns include many of those involved in medical device cyber-physical systems, including the increasing complexity of critical systems, the accelerating product-development cycles due to market pressures, and the effort, time, and cost of certification processes for critical systems.

## **Federal R&D Investments for Medical Device Technology**

Federal research in cyber-physical and embedded systems has been pursued in a variety of programs over the past decade, initially in DARPA's Quorum, Software Enabled Control (SEC), Model-Based Integration of Embedded Software (MoBIES), Program Composition for Embedded Systems (PCES), and Adaptive and Reflective Middleware Systems (ARMS) programs. Some continuing progress has been achieved under the NSF Information Technology Research (ITR), Emerging Frontiers in Research and Innovation (EFRI), and Embedded and Hybrid Systems (EHS) programs, and more recently, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) program; NIST's Advanced Technology Program (now Technology Innovation Program); and DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) programs. Advances through these programs and across the networking and IT landscape place the nation in good position to tackle, through a focused R&D effort, the fundamental challenges in developing high-confidence medical cyber-physical systems that can transform 21<sup>st</sup> century health care.

*We agree with the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology that robust R&D in cyber-physical systems is critical for maintaining U.S. technological and economic leadership in the years ahead.<sup>14</sup> The HCSS agencies have an unprecedented opportunity to collaboratively embark upon a larger-scale strategic effort in this area.*

## **Coordination Challenges**

The following considerations should be addressed in shaping a multiagency Federal research agenda for this effort:

- Agencies differ in their R&D horizons (long-term/short-term/transition and standards), research management strategy (project-oriented programs, large-scale grants-based programs, centers), investment strategies (primarily intramural vs. extramural), funding instruments (contracts, grants), constituency (industry, academia, mixed), and funding allocation timelines (six-month, one-year, multi-year). Matching R&D horizons to agency roles is critical to a successful interagency effort.
- No one agency covers the full spectrum of needed research. Often, the mechanisms for funding a science or technology area reside in many cross-cutting programs or in small programs with highly specific funding constraints and objectives (research programs, advanced technology programs, Small Business Innovation Research grants (SBIRs), NSF's Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship [IGERT], education). Cooperation and coordination among agencies can be used to leverage individual efforts in pursuing larger R&D goals.

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<sup>14</sup> *Leadership Under Challenge: Information Technology R&D in a Competitive World*, President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, August 2007, p. 31.

- A broad mix of research funding strategies appears needed to stimulate innovation and transition. This could be enabled by cooperative efforts and funding strategies that span multiple agencies and programs.

### **University Research**

The current university research portfolio in the areas of real-time and embedded systems, robotics, sensor nets, control theory, adaptive systems, learning and game theories, operating systems and middleware, and formal methods; verification and analysis of embedded systems and software; networking; and engineering of materials, sensors, and other devices is of high quality but limited scale. Further, innovation-driven research occurring at universities is not being adequately tapped by industry. Universities are leading in the development of evidence-based artifacts and measures that would benefit both industry and regulators. The research community, as noted in the HCMDSS workshop report and others, calls for expanded engagement that spans academia, government, and industry.

### **Industry R&D in Medical Device Technology**

Industrial research necessarily is driven by time-to-market concerns; much of its focus is on the development of new medical technologies or improvements in the capabilities of existing devices and systems. Profit margins and economic pressures, such as time-driven return on investments and competition with leading high-technology producers in other countries, such as Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands<sup>15</sup>, tend to focus industry investments on the development of devices that create new market opportunities. Within these constraints, industry efforts continue to produce innovations such as deep-brain stimulation devices. These require large investments for research and prototyping, product development, and safety evaluation. Recognizing both the unique capabilities and the competitive landscape within which industrial entities operate is critical to establishing productive public-private partnerships.

### **Federal-Private Sector Collaboration Issues and Strategies**

Incentives are needed to promote effective cooperation between government, industry, and academia to build the underpinning networking and information technology frameworks for the open, interoperable systems future described here.

New approaches to intellectual property (IP) will be necessary, for example, to enable robust interaction among industry, academia, and government. The establishment of an open experimental platform for use by researchers to investigate technologies for integrating medical device systems could circumvent some of the IP issues. Such a platform would contain design artifacts, including reference models and scenarios about the use of various medical devices, so that researchers could obtain empirical feedback on their ideas about real systems.

It will also be necessary to develop nonthreatening means of accurate error reporting in medical devices and systems. Engineering high-confidence technology requires feedback on its actual use in the intended setting, and errors, anomalies, malfunctions, and the like are essential data points. We are able to report and track device incidents (accidents, malfunctions, apparent problems, and other categories of adverse events) but reporting, tracking, publicizing, and interpreting the root causes of device incidents across manufacturers is problematic due to litigation risks. The use of

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<sup>15</sup> Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 2006, U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce.

aggregate or case-blind data could provide at least limited solutions to these problems. Approaches such as the black box flight recorder used in aircraft and automated system health maintenance strategies (“zero-failure systems”) being explored for automotive and aviation systems also are needed to capture, integrate, and correlate data on medical device and system failures, malfunctions, and degraded operation. These are multidisciplinary and multifaceted problems that would benefit from collaborative engagement by researchers, industry, and government regulators.

### **Testbeds and Other Mechanisms**

Federal agency workshop participants agree with the workshop report that there is a critical need for open-system experimental platforms and standardized research data sets (that include protection for intellectual property) to foster collaboration between academic, industry, and Federal researchers. Also needed are specific mechanisms to foster collaboration. *A study on how best to establish such testbeds, including a plan for implementation, could light the way forward in pursuing this recommendation.*

### ***Other Opportunities for Collaboration***

The following are examples, by category, of challenge problems that would benefit from united efforts to develop exemplary solutions.

#### Models

- Process models from clinicians and their workflows, analyses of change effects, and measures of system quality and performance that can support a systems engineering approach
- Nominal models that specify safe and effective functionality and appropriate use for a class of devices

#### Tools

- Tools supporting compositional analysis, together with component-based designs based upon formal models of medical devices, control algorithms, and workflows of medical practice, and producing design-based evidence that is useful for certification
- Formal, integrated, end-to-end, model-based development frameworks including requirements gathering, specification, design, simulation, and verification and dealing with composition, evolution, and change throughout the product lifecycle

#### Sensing, Monitoring, and Control

- A networked sensing and control system on a mobile distributed population with more than 1,000 nodes
- Configurable communication, sensing, and control systems for specific scenarios such as emergency-room (ER) or geriatric care
- Integrated, portable, preoperative and postoperative monitoring systems for evaluating the medical status of a patient in both traditional and non-traditional points of care
- An integrated health care system of systems architecture for distributed monitoring and control for uses such as hospitals, civilian emergency response, 911, or combat settings, where detailed medical status of patients or victims requiring or under care may be provided to monitoring, dispatch, or command centers

#### Systems

- An initial set of publicly available model application problems and a corresponding suite of coherent protocols designed and rigorously specified and verified for correctness and compatibility

- Medical-device software and systems that can prevent misuse by caregivers, adapt to changing patient conditions, and be safely used in closed-loop situations
- Quality of Service (QoS)-aware, fault-tolerant, certified middleware infrastructure suitable for pervasive use in medical systems of systems, guaranteeing QoS, safety constraints, security and privacy, and assured by validation and certification

VV&C

- Develop medical-practice-driven design and validation, including metrics for usability evaluation and user-centered design methods
- Develop certified components as commodities
- Gain a fundamental understanding of how to design protocols that make certification easier and how to develop an evidence-based, technology-aware certification process
- Reorient the certification process toward component-based certification
- Devise the medical-device equivalent of a “black box” flight recorder with audit capability to trace the circumstances leading up to untoward events

Testbed Standards

- A suite of model interoperability standards
- An assessment of technical deficiencies observed in today’s medical IT devices and systems and identification of design opportunities that would yield improved care























## **Ten-Year Roadmap**

Further out, we would like to see FDA-approved networked medical devices in wide use, with a medical infrastructure that supports the composition and integration of medical-device components while guaranteeing QoS, security and privacy, validation, and certification. In particular, the research and development of MDSS should culminate in—

- The deployment of a fully integrated hospital intensive-care system using distributed monitoring, distributed control, and real-time wireless networks
- The development of FDA-approved certification methods for medical-device software and systems and networked in-home patient monitoring and assistance
- The availability of high-fidelity organ and patient models for design, testing, and validation and model-based frameworks that support component-based modeling, design, testing, and certification using patient models

## DISTRIBUTED SENSING AND CONTROL IN NETWORKED MEDICAL-DEVICE SYSTEMS

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### Introduction

The networking of medical devices for distributed sensing and control occurs at many levels, ranging from dedicated networks of devices for individual patients to wireless networks for monitoring residents in long-term-care facilities. These networks may collect data for off-line analysis, generate alarms when critical conditions occur, or close feedback loops for the controlled delivery of drugs. Networks are increasingly being used to distribute stored medical information for remote diagnosis, such as picture archive and communication systems (PACS) that distribute x-rays and other images. In the future, wireless networks will supply distributed data acquisition and control for patients who are free to live relatively normal lives in their communities. Networking is the essential enabling technology for future advances in monitoring, diagnosis, treatment, and effective responses to acute conditions.

The growth of network applications for medical devices using current commercial off-the-shelf technologies (COTS) has been rapid. Development has been ad hoc, however, focusing on particular applications—with little standardization. Current COTS networks do not provide a sound basis for highly distributed medical-device systems that offer guarantees of security, privacy, robustness, interoperability, extensibility, mobility, and general patient safety. Research is needed to create medical-device networks that have such features, in order to improve health care in multiple dimensions and to enable the rapid dissemination of new sensing and control technologies as they become available. The following sections elaborate on these research needs and challenges.

### What Can We Do Well?

Currently, data can be collected and sent to a variety of devices, such as—

- Implantable devices, such as pacemakers, defibrillators, nerve sensors, and neurostimulators
- Devices for patient monitoring, such as electrocardiogram, pulse oximetry, transcutaneous oxygen, electroencephalogram, pulmonary testing, and spirometry
- Devices for point-of-care testing and monitoring in assisted-living environments

The use of existing COTS network technologies to collect data from such medical devices is growing. Networks are used to log data and provide real-time alarms to attending health care personnel for patients in intensive-care units. EKG monitors for multiple patients are networked to deliver information to a shared database. In assisted-living facilities, monitoring devices are networked in several ways, including wireless networks that monitor ambulatory patients.

Networking is also facilitating in-home health care. Many people have wireless devices that they can use to request immediate assistance in their homes. In-home monitoring systems regularly and automatically deliver data on blood pressure, heart rate, and glucose levels over phone lines to databases that physicians can access. Home monitoring systems are also available to send

alarms for congestive heart failure to emergency response professionals.

In hospitals, raw sensor data is often transmitted over networks, using standards for laboratory information systems, with basic analysis to flag obvious outliers. Networks also play a significant role in emerging systems for therapy and surgery. For example, networks connect sensors, processors, and controllers in radiation therapy systems to perform real-time tumor tracking. Similarly, networks are being used as an alternative to dedicated point-to-point connections of devices in systems for telerobotic surgery.

## **Why Can't We Declare Victory?**

Despite the successes of networking medical devices, they face significant barriers to realizing their full potential. COTS networking technology is typically optimized for bandwidth rather than time delay, making it difficult to optimize the performance of critical real-time feedback loops. For example, one system for the real-time tumor tracking of treatment beam control has to be operated in a degraded mode because its several networked components for signal processing and control provide no timing guarantees.

Also, current systems are fragmented and often incompatible. Although individual devices continue to become more sophisticated, they cannot “talk” to each other. For example, acute-care medicine (including ER, OR, ICU, radiology suites, and anesthesia), which of all medical areas is the best served by networked monitoring, is only now starting to see some data continuity. The lack of standards prevents the integration of information needed to provide the physiological basis for interpreting and acting on the increase in sensing modalities.

Another shortcoming of current networked systems is a lack of significant processing of information. It has been noted that medical systems are now awash in data but are information poor. Monitoring systems deliver data, but human experts need to interpret the data. When interpretation is attempted, it needs to be carefully evaluated. For example, in ICU monitoring systems, false alarms are far too frequent to rely on without extensive human intervention. The ability to glean useful information based on the fusion of data from multiple sources on a network is virtually nonexistent.

The delivery of the correct information will be particularly important in telemedicine, where a network will provide the only direct, real-time information available to the human. Sensor fusion is also needed, to provide correct information to the computer that closes feedback loops. In robotic surgery, for example, the human surgeon must receive haptic feedback, and correct information must be provided to the robotic surgical assistant, which needs precise knowledge of the location and type of tissue in the workspace.

Medical systems must also become more intelligent in the ways they interact with human users. Current devices and systems merely respond to operator inputs in a deterministic way. Beyond simple limit checking, they have little internal monitoring or analysis of the commands they receive. Given the diversity of training and skills of the individuals who will interact with future medical systems, it is important to consider all aspects of the human factors. As medical systems become more sophisticated and automated, they will need the ability to identify the level of knowledge and skill of the operator—and to respond appropriately. For example, when a system receives inappropriate sequences of commands that could be detrimental to the patient, the system should respond by maintaining a safe operating condition and supplying clarifying information to address the possibility of confusion by the user. Self-monitoring networked

devices could adapt to changes in the user over time. As a patient ages, for example, a device might become easier to use by providing more detailed and thorough instructions.

## **Specific R&D Challenges**

For our discussion, we will divide R&D challenges into two categories: component level and system level.

### ***Component Level***

The challenges of interoperability and compatibility are perhaps the most important to address immediately so as to facilitate the development of networked medical devices. We need to create standards, based on sound computational principals, with clear semantics. We need to develop middleware, in order to provide standard interfaces between medical devices and networks. That will make it possible to integrate components at the time of use rather than at the time of design.

Advances are needed in embedded-systems technology so that quality-of-service (QoS) guarantees at the component level can guarantee performance at the system level. The relative importance of security, privacy, robustness, interoperability, extensibility, mobility, and general patient safety must be evaluated carefully. Those issues need to be addressed by heterogeneous teams of computer scientists and health care professionals. The undertaking should begin with the establishment of a clear, mutually understood, shared vocabulary.

Devices must operate safely under all possible fault conditions and must provide appropriate information under all conditions. For example, when devices become disconnected from a network, caregivers often conclude that the devices are faulty. Devices and the network infrastructure must be designed so that in such situations, correct default values are delivered to the system. And the individual devices need to have mechanisms that indicate their states when they are not connected to the network.

Model-based design is a significant trend that facilitates the complete development process for embedded systems—from the capturing of requirements to implementation and deployment. The model-based approach builds partly on precise, formal descriptions that define the embedded system in relation to the domain in which it will apply. The medical domain requires a new formal language to support dialog among clinicians, physiologists, and device designers for the development of medical devices that are founded on a common, integrated framework. This formalization of the domain will also lead to new methods of component-level certification for safety-critical software.

A new model-based approach to the design of medical devices will also make it possible to address the many critical constraints in medicine, including form factor, power limitations, and usability. From an information technology perspective, formalizing the requirements and features of networked medical devices will make it possible to leverage emerging technologies much more quickly than we can today. Such technologies include smart sensors, digital video processing, and new methods of power management, such as harvesting energy from the environment.

### ***Systems Level***

Connecting components into workable, effective medical systems requires advances in system integration technologies. Distributed sensing and control need standards and architectures that make it possible to create networks of diverse medical devices and medical information systems.

The support of real-time critical services must be based on models of end-to-end service that account for the details of sophisticated interconnection technologies.

System-level power management will be a necessary part of the monitoring and control of medical devices for patients beyond the walls of hospitals and health care institutions. Accomplishing the goal will require a full systems engineering approach—one that identifies the parts of the system that must be reengineered to provide the needed QoS for the complex systems of systems that arise in distributed medical monitoring and control.

Research is also needed in medical information and algorithms. Effective systems for model-based monitoring and control must include algorithms for learning and adaptation that adjust parameters appropriately for each patient. Data manipulation schemes must be developed to support the integration of electronic health records (EHR) with information from medical monitoring systems and clinical decision-support systems. Given the rate of innovation in medicine, it is also essential that information management systems are designed to be extensible, so that new types of information can be integrated easily and immediately without requiring any amount of redesign.

System-level research must regard information security and privacy as issues of primary concern. Incorporating support for privacy techniques—such as selective disclosure, auditing the auditors, and encrypted searches—are essential in networked medical systems, because of the safety-critical and personal nature of information. For security and privacy, system-level information authentication schemes need to be developed.

Effective medical monitoring and control can be done at the system level only by drawing on different sources of information to make correct decisions. Besides developing new algorithms to perform sensor fusion for medical applications, research is needed to determine how the diverse sources of information can be used to validate data and even to calibrate distributed equipment. For long-term monitoring, device maintenance can be scheduled by the integrated information system.

Model-based development can help address one of the major human-factor issues: training. Models used for component-level design and system integration could become the basis of sophisticated simulation-based training systems. The use of simulators for training, which is standard in other areas involving complex technologies—such as aircraft and power systems—could reduce the cost of training and could raise the comfort level and acceptance of new networked technologies in medicine.

Human factors also play an important role in the potential for networked monitoring and control in medicine. Systems must be ergonomic, having human-machine interfaces that encourage acceptance by patients and caregivers and that consider the skill sets of the end users. Local control loops and control over networks need to take into account the full implications of possible human intervention. It is also important that systems be designed so as to enhance the capability of medical professionals to provide high-quality care—and not convey the message that the networked information system is attempting to remove the human from the loop.

New methods are also needed to enhance the safety of medical systems. When abnormal conditions occur, a system should provide timely notification to operators, and performance should degrade gracefully rather than abruptly, especially in life-sustaining medical equipment. This capability requires modeling and implementation technologies that naturally support self-monitoring and prioritized functionality, along with real-time response.

To address the several issues described above, new metrics must be developed to measure the capabilities of systems in multiple dimensions and to evaluate the trade-offs between them. These metrics should deal with the distinctive features of the medical domain, including the diversity of the patient population, the complexities of the conditions being monitored and controlled, and variation in the knowledge and skills of the end-user community. These metrics could support run-time operation strategies as well as design-time evaluation.

## Research Strategies and Roadmap

From the discussion above, the following four themes emerge as specifically IT-related research needs:

- **Standards and Architectures.** True interoperability and extensibility for networked medical systems will be possible only when widely accepted standards are embraced. Moreover, an effective infrastructure to support such systems should be built on open-source middleware for distributed systems designed specifically for medical applications.
- **Formal Models.** English-language descriptions of requirements and specifications are too ambiguous for developing networked medical systems. We need a language with formal precision that will eliminate any possibilities for confusion that could arise when clinicians, physiologists, engineers, computer scientists, and others work together to develop safety-critical systems. These formal models can become the basis for the verification and validation of networked medical systems.
- **Model-Based Design Tools.** At both the component and the system levels, effective designs will need model-based tools. Models for the distributed monitoring and control of medical applications must be developed with representations that support the needs of domain experts as well as methods for analysis and implementation.
- **Test Beds.** We need prototype problems that can serve as test beds for pre-competitive research. Problems from the device level to the system level—including critical features of users (clinicians) and patients—must be defined clearly, and examples must be disseminated widely, so that IT specialists can become fully engaged in developing the fundamental technologies.

To create a clear vision for research, we propose a roadmap, with milestones that stretch well beyond the capabilities of current systems. Those milestones, defined in terms of the capabilities of prototype systems, provide a basis for discussion among the many stakeholders in the medical and IT communities.

**Three-Year Milestone:** *A deployed networked sensing and control system on a mobile distributed population with more than 1,000 nodes.* In this system, ambulatory patients will be instrumented with continuous EKG tracers and pulse oximeters, and local closed-loop oxygen bottle control will be implemented. Features to be demonstrated include—

- End-to-end QoS design
- Remote processing of data
- Integration with the EHR system
- Multivendor support with autoconfiguration (“plug and play”)
- Smart sensors and smart alarms (few false alarms)

**Five-Year Milestone:** *Configurable communication, sensing, and control for emergency-room (ER) and geriatric care.* This milestone will have higher bandwidth and more sensing modalities than the three-year milestone. It will introduce additional sensing and control for glucose and insulin. Model-based development tools will provide simulation-based tools for medical training.

This system will feature—

- Point-to-point communication
- Patient localization
- Service discovery and negotiation within the network
- Secure network reprogramming
- Service virtualization
- Enhanced distributed control of local feedback loops

**Seven-Year Milestone:** *Integrated portable preoperative and postoperative monitoring for civilian and combat scenarios.* This wide-area distributed system will include advanced capabilities such as—

- Ambulatory ultrasound monitoring
- Blood vessel graft monitoring
- Remote radiologic evaluation

The system will provide the possibility of real-time dosage adjustment based on remote monitoring and diagnosis. The network will operate in an ad hoc mobile environment with a very high bandwidth and guaranteed QoS for time-critical features. Feedback loops will be closed both locally and remotely, using patient-specific models. Treatment planning will be semiautonomous, and information fusion will provide robust smart alarms.

**Ten-Year Milestone:** The technology roadmap presented here culminates in the following two demonstrations comprising the ten-year milestone.

- A fully integrated hospital acute-care system using distributed monitoring and control
- A demonstration of the impact of long-term deployment of networked in-home patient monitoring and dosage control

These two systems will incorporate all of the advances advocated for distributed sensing and control of networked medical devices, including the application of extensible prototype standards and architectures for future development. The systems will also demonstrate the application of formal models and model-based design tools.

## **Concluding Remarks**

Medical diagnosis and treatment draw on multiple sources of data, ranging from patient records to data supplied by real-time monitors. Current networking technologies have the bandwidth to acquire and deliver the data, but there are many barriers to realizing distributed sensing and control in networked medical-device systems. The barriers include a lack of adequate standards, a lack of effective algorithms to generate important information from the many crucial sources of data, and the unavailability of test data and nonproprietary experimental systems for research and development. The proposed roadmap provides a set of specific aggressive milestones that will drive the basic research and development to realize truly intelligent distributed medical systems in the next ten years.



## MEDICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

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### Introduction

Networks of networked embedded systems create many new possibilities and challenges. The next generation of medical systems is envisioned to be a ubiquitous network of networked systems for secure, reliable, privacy-preserving, and cost-effective personalized high-quality health care. It will be a network that improves the quality of life.

The current system consists of many standalone devices. Even if they are networked, most devices function on their own. For example, a nurse is alerted when a patient's electrocardiogram (EKG) becomes seriously abnormal. Hurrying to the patient's room, however, the nurse might see a contagious-disease warning sign at the entrance and realize that she or he should have put on protective clothing before entering. Memory lapses are common under stress.

In the future, all relevant information—such as the contagious-disease warning and special equipment needs—will be displayed along with the alerts. Thus the EKG machine will no longer be a standalone device and will become an integral part of a network: a network of medical devices and patient management. Patients' medical records and their current state, no matter where they are generated or collected, will be integrated, filtered, and delivered in real time to where they are needed.

During a surgical operation, context information—such as sensitivities to certain drugs—will be automatically routed to relevant devices, such as infusion pumps, to support personalized care and safety management. How the patient's vital signs are reacting to medications and surgical procedures will be correlated to streams of imagery data, selected and displayed in real time and tailored to the needs of medical personnel, such as surgeons, nurses, anesthesiologists, and anesthesiologists. For some particularly difficult stage in an unusual operation, an expert surgeon could remotely carry out the key steps, using remote displays and a robot-assisted surgical machine, avoiding the need to fly across the country to perform, say, 15 minutes of work. Furthermore, data recording will be integrated with storage management so that surgeons can review operations and key findings for longitudinal studies of the efficacy of drugs and operational procedures.

Networks of networked medical devices hold many promises. Besides enhanced operational capabilities derived from integrated devices and medical-information systems, they allow flexible configuration and deployment, and the collection of more accurate and representative data from natural settings for longitudinal studies to support improved health management. They also raise many challenges.

From the perspective of infrastructure technologies (other than networking technologies for connectivity), much remains to be done.

### What Can We Do Well?

Over the past decade, and especially since the development of the World Wide Web, many technologies have been developed to support distributed computing systems. The emergence of

middleware enables and simplifies the integration of components developed by multiple technologies: It provides a consistent set of higher-level network-oriented abstractions that are much closer to application requirements than what is done now. That simplifies the development of distributed and embedded systems. Middleware also provides a wide array of common services—such as name services, logging, and security—that have proved necessary to operate effectively in a networked environment. Successful commercial middleware includes J2EE, CORBA, and .NET. They are the foundation on which many Web-based applications are built.

This raises an interesting question: why don't we use these commercially available technologies to network systems?

## **Why Can't We Declare Victory?**

Current medical devices are mostly standalone subsystems that have proprietary designs. Medical workers often must manually enter data and transfer it between machines. Sometimes, they need to set devices manually, so as to emulate the interlock needed between different devices and actions. So if a patient has medication Y, the limits of delivery X in an infusion pump need to be adjusted to Z. Medical workers also need to mentally correlate many paper records and screen displays from various diagnostic and monitoring machines. The process is time consuming, burdensome, and error prone.

The commercial middleware cited above does help, but it is limited to information management for medical records. Many record formats for patient identification depend on particular designs that their manufacturers provide. They cannot be extracted from their native environments and put into a universal patient identification database. Once we develop a common patient ID standard and migration process, we can readily apply commercial distributed-computing technologies.

Beyond record management, the primary two challenges in the development of integrated medical systems are safety and liability. They are intertwined. Many medication devices are safety critical. The FDA approves each device separately, in a specific application context. If we connect them and something goes wrong, who is responsible? Technically, this is a safety question. In the new interactive environment, how is safety specified? Is it specified correctly? Is it implemented correctly and does it perform as specified? Is there a proper training process for users? Do medical personnel use it correctly?

What makes these questions impossible to answer is that current commercial infrastructure software assumes absolutely no liability and has many known and unknown bugs. The development of a certifiably safe infrastructure for networked systems of medical systems is a long-term R&D challenge that involves not only advanced technologies but also a legally sound certification process.

Before we can have a certifiably safe medical network infrastructure, safety-related actions should be limited to computer-aided actions that are closely supervised by medical personnel as an intermediate step in its evolution. Even with this modest goal, we still have a way to go, because the current distributed infrastructure is a best-effort system whose real-time reliability and security cannot be ensured.

In the following sections, we will take a more detailed look at each of the challenges.

## Specific R&D Challenges

### ***Designing for Certification***

Many medical devices are safety critical and must be certified. At present, the FDA approves medical devices. Certification is desirable but needs R&D to make it possible for medical-device software and systems. Thus, it is important to develop a standards-based infrastructure of certifiable networked medical devices so that we can reduce the costs of development, approval, and the deployment of new technologies and devices.

Certification cannot be an afterthought. We must develop technologies for the specification and the design of verifiable and certifiable medical devices. Certification includes devices' operational environments. In future integrated medical-device and medical-information systems, the application contexts might be quite dynamic. The development of technologies that can formally specify both application contexts and device behaviors is a major challenge for the vision of certifiable plug-and-play medical devices.

It will be vital that researchers work with medical and regulatory agencies to ensure compliance with safety requirements. In addition, they will need to work with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and other standard-setting entities to develop voluntary market-driven certification for (1) interoperability and compatibility standards and (2) quality-of-service (QoS) standards—such as real-time fault tolerance, privacy, and security.

Two challenges in this area are—

- How to develop evidence-based safety certification technologies and processes, including technologies for specification and verification and validation
- How to develop open-standard-based compliance specification, verification and validation technologies, and processes for interoperability and QoS properties

### ***Quality of Service***

End-to-end QoS is an important concern in the operation of medical devices. This section discusses key QoS attributes.

### ***Managing Safety and Criticality***

From operating room to enterprise system, different devices and subnetworks have different levels of clinical criticality. Data streams with different time sensitivities and criticality levels may share many resources of the hardware and software infrastructure. How to maintain safety in an integrated system is a major challenge that consists of many research issues:

- How to develop a safety interlock for the operation of interacting devices
- How to manage the flows of data streams that have different criticality on the same network
- How to mediate and manage the interactions of devices that have different criticality. How to authorize and authenticate. Who can talk to whom?
- How to support the fail-safe operation of individual devices
- How to ensure that erroneous data is contained and does not cascade
- How to specify, design, and verify the safety and efficacy of networked medical systems in the presence of device hardware failures and software errors

## **Security and Privacy**

Medical systems pose new challenges in security and privacy. For example, a patient may need to upgrade software that detects pacemaker arrhythmias using EMF (electric and magnetic fields)-based methods but that is impervious to EMF-based attacks. Emergency personnel may need to access private data on demand anywhere and anytime, especially in wireless environments. We need a better understanding of requirements for security and privacy in medical systems. These are some key aspects of that understanding:

- How to develop a new model of security and privacy tailored to medical needs
- How to develop a modular and flexible architecture that incorporates and evolves technologies for security and privacy
- How to develop cost-effective solutions appropriate to the medical environment

## **Interoperability**

Interoperability has been a major challenge in integrating medical devices from different manufacturers. When a device uses data supplied by other devices, what is involved is not only the format of the data but also the context in which to interpret the data. For example, is the blood pressure measured when the patient wakes up in the morning but is still in bed—or after a workout, or after taking medication? Here are important interoperability challenges:

- How to specify the interface both for the format of medical data and for context information needed to interpret the data
- How to specify, design, and verify the properties and compliance of interoperable hardware and software interfaces that go beyond the data format
- How to develop a standard of unique patient (record) identifiers to support the integration of devices from different manufacturers
- How to represent environmental assumptions implicitly embedded in code and make them machine checkable and user friendly
- How to support the evolution of technologies and maintain interoperability between old and new devices

## **Real-Time and Scheduling Guarantees**

Many medical devices operate in real time with different time constraints and different sensitivities to delays and jitters. In the envisioned network of networked medical devices, many types of real-time and non-real-time data traffic will share the same computing and communication resources. How to ensure the proper scheduling of real-time traffic is an important concern, and here are some of the challenges:

- What should be the policies of resource allocation and scheduling that ensure predictable end-to-end timing constraints and interoperability
- How to provide time-zone abstractions that can support monitoring and control loops that have differing time constraints, such as 5 milliseconds, 10 milliseconds, and 100 milliseconds
- How to support consistent views and actions between distributed and collaborating medical devices within given timing constraints
- When network equipment fails and a system is overloaded, how to ensure that deadlines for critical real-time data streams are met

## ***Medical Information Management***

Integrating the operation of medical devices with nationwide medical-information management will give us a better understanding of the effectiveness of medical procedures and provide the right context for treating patients. We need to build in support for integrated medical-information management:

- How to perform the recording, correlation, and analysis of event sequences
- How to provide real-time context awareness for the proper operation and management of medical devices and information
- How to conduct real-time, context-aware alarm processing, filtering, and delivery (at present, false alarm rates are far too high)
- How to integrate with enterprise systems to support record management and long-term studies
- How to manage high-volume data intelligently. Aspects include—
  - User-friendly real-time data collection, filtering, fusion, and delivery
  - Support for storage networks and data mining
  - Capability for TiVO replay during surgery
  - Visualization of massive data sets

## ***Wireless Medical Infrastructure***

Wireless networking is an important enabling technology. To provide secure and reliable real-time communication, however, we face many challenges, including—

- How to exploit ultra-wideband (UWB) technologies
- How to improve interoperability and protect against interference
- How to improve security, reliability, and schedulability
- How to support mobility, including programming abstractions that manage mobility
- How to integrate with the wired infrastructure

## **Research Strategies and Roadmap**

In developing a high-assurance medical infrastructure, the priority is to create a system-engineering framework that integrates component technologies with certification technologies. It will be a grave mistake to develop different technologies in isolation. Although it is not overly difficult to develop protocols for safety, security, and real-time reliability and privacy in isolation for particular application contexts, those protocols sometimes interfere with one another unexpectedly when they are used together in different contexts.

### ***Three-Year Roadmap***

To create a coherent body of technologies that are certifiably safe, we must first gain a deep understanding of the context of medical applications. It is difficult to develop effective technologies without knowing the constraints. Three years from now, we would like to see—

- An initial set of publicly available model application problems that allow researchers to understand user requirements and to test their ideas
- An initial suite of coherent QoS protocols designed and rigorously specified and verified for correctness and compatibility

- An initial set of experimental prototypes demonstrating the feasibility of new QoS and wireless technologies

### ***Five-Year Roadmap***

We would like to see short-term technologies enter clinical trials. Examples are standards-based compliance specification, verification, and validation technologies and processes for interoperability and QoS. In addition, we should focus on the theoretical and engineering foundations for system engineering aspects of medical infrastructures. In five years, we would like to see—

- Network timing abstraction methods that support monitoring and control loops with multiple timing constraints, ranging from 1 millisecond to seconds to minutes.
- Integration technologies for medical devices that have different QoS requirements into a network-centric system of systems, including management systems for medical information and networked devices in an operating room
- Fundamental understand on how to design protocols that make certification easier and how to develop an evidence-based, technology-aware certification process

### ***Ten-Year Roadmap***

In 10 years, we would like to see FDA-approved networked medical devices in wide use, with medical infrastructures supporting the composition and integration of medical-device components while guaranteeing QoS, security and privacy, validation and certification.

- How to model and reason about the interactions between protocols for safety, interoperability, real time, reliability, security, and privacy
- How to design protocols that are compatible rather than interfere with one another
- An evidence-based and technology-aware certification process defined for approval of medical device software and systems by regulating agencies

## PATIENT MODELING AND SIMULATION

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### Introduction

Convincing successes in other fields—such as aerospace, chemical plants, and the automotive industry—confirm the value of modeling. Among the benefits we see are novel product developments, increased safety parameters, cost effectiveness in development phases, and ultimately a higher rate of regulatory approval.

Patient models exist and evolve over five levels of the spatial scale. At each scale, the models involve heterogeneous structures and physical processes, and each model evolves over time. On the atomic and molecular level—at the angstrom scale—the models are manifest in biochemical and genetic systems. At the next level, the cellular level, models are actively being generated and investigated. These two levels are integrated into models of organ structure and function. Organ models are then integrated into models of whole-body function. At the highest level, societal interactions are modeled, where the models must accommodate the uniqueness of each patient and also must permit the aggregation of populations.

In the medical-practice domain, we anticipate that high-level modeling will result in improved health care, with better outcomes and a higher quality of care. We also anticipate that modeling will provide better use of health care dollars, with improvements in prevention, intervention, and maximal value and utilization of the electronic health record (EHR).

In product development, an argument can be made that patient modeling is a highly efficient tool in developing devices. The reasons are multifold. Among them: human studies are expensive; and device manufacturers need models for sophisticated protocols and the effective execution of procedures, planning, monitoring, and control. Currently, however, the barriers to developing specific models are high.

In training and professional certification, patient modeling provides outstanding opportunities for patient education and guidance in clinical decision-making.

In research, patient modeling offers a rich investigative platform on which to develop a wide variety of tools and techniques.

### What Can We Do Well?

Functions and operations that patient modeling communities do well are found at the ends of the modeling spectrum. For example, although many parameters in enzymatic reactions have yet to be determined, the mathematical modeling of enzyme reaction kinetics is well established. Even reactions that follow stochastic rules are tractable with high-performance computing.

Another advanced example of patient modeling is found in medical imaging. When used properly, imaging has clearly been shown to be clinically cost effective and to have positive measures of outcome. Examples include seizure focus ablation, arrhythmia focus ablation, image-guided biopsies, and radiation therapy mapping. Imaging is also an important component at the procedural level, providing training environments and programs that are otherwise

unavailable, costly, or dangerous. Some systems are already in use, indicating the potential for commercial success.

Remarkable advances in patient modeling have been made over the past five years at the subcellular level. For example, transcriptional analyses of a wide variety of diseases have been enabled by the rapid accumulation of microarray data coupled with the explosion of genome sequencing data. More complete mapping of the metabolome in various normal and disease states is accumulating as well. These data have been complemented by new techniques in data mining, analysis, and integration. Finally, modeling of the epidemiology of disease is a mature discipline, with well-developed tools and algorithms.

Convincing preliminary data shows that physiology-based modeling is effective. The critical-care domain and the intraoperative domain are two areas in which physiologic modeling is widely used. These areas are driving the development of even more sophisticated modeling software and devices. It is anticipated that the home-care and institutional-care markets will be the next to rely heavily on sophisticated patient modeling software and devices.

Patient models are the focus of a number of national and international funding agencies. Large government-funded programs have begun to support the development of tools necessary for patient modeling, and some already exist. For example, the Physiome project and the DARPA BioComp program support development at the biochemical, genetic, and cellular levels. The ITK open-source NIH-funded image processing toolkit (<http://www.itk.org/>) focuses on tools for modeling at the organ and whole-body levels.

Other government programs in this realm are NASA's "digital astronaut" project, which is in the planning stage, and DARPA's Virtual Soldier project (<http://www.darpa.mil/dso/thrust/biosci/virtualsoldier.htm>).

## **Why Can't We Declare Victory?**

**Patient models involve heterogeneous structures**—atoms, molecules, cells, organs individuals, societies—**and physical processes that evolve in time and space**, posing difficult computational problems. We will call this the *multiscale/multistructure* problem.

**Patient models must be accessible to a wide variety of communities.** Fully integrated models must be available to large and heterogeneous communities, including practitioners, investigators, device developers, and regulators. Those communities are not tightly integrated; they do not generally participate in the same meetings; they do not share journals; and they are spread across industry, government, and even different departments in academic centers. We will call this the *communication* problem.

**Mechanisms need to be developed to share data, models, tools, and results.** The interoperability of models and the maintenance of privacy are two of the most challenging problems facing the field. In addition, both commercial and academic institutional barriers limit the sharing of data and tools. In the academic domain, the reward systems of appointments and promotions continue to rely heavily on independent contributions to knowledge creation and communication (research and teaching), although a number of national initiatives, such as the NIH Roadmap, address this issue. Commercial success clearly depends on resolving the issues of sharing, interoperability, and privacy. We will call this the *interoperability* problem.



**Ultimately any patient model**—whether molecular or societal—**is an abstraction of the real situation.** Therefore it is imperative to understand the theoretical possibilities and limitations of each domain-specific abstraction. This is the *abstraction* problem.

**Improved computational techniques for assessing clinically relevant variability in measurements are needed.** This is the *variability* problem.

**Experimental validation of models using ex-vivo and biomimetic materials and systems, animal models, and clinical data is needed.** This is the *validation* problem.

## Specific R&D Challenges

Besides the six challenges mentioned above, we face least two infrastructure challenges:

- Patient models need ongoing research and support.
- Issues of policy—privacy, security, and legal and regulatory issues—must be investigated and recommendations developed.

## Research Strategies and Roadmap

We suggest that the six challenges be initially attacked in two groups of three and that the following strategies and roadmap be developed:

**Multiscale/multistructure, data variation, and abstraction** problems. These challenges have been recognized as important and to some extent are funded by a number of government research agencies, including NSF, NIH, and DARPA. We recommend that participants in the relevant programs at each agency meet as the focus of a working group in a national symposium to review progress and define future directions with high-confidence medical devices and systems.

**Communication, interoperability, and validation** problems. We recommend that these challenges be addressed by developing a series of demonstration cases. To build the foundation for an open-source environment that (1) addresses issues of ontology, (2) includes links to available models, data, and device sources, and (3) develops protocols for validation, we recommend the creation of a “Knowledge Portal,” consisting of a human anatomical atlas and a protocol manual, over the next two to five years.

Extensive data for the atlas exists, and new data may be readily available. The Veterans Affairs system already employs computerized medical systems, so the VA may be an excellent source of new data. The atlas should combine information from multiple patients and generate a coordinate system to “place” each patient. It should be searchable and should be able to generate statistical analysis. Ideally, the atlas would then be used to help predict outcomes based on individual characteristics and statistical outcomes. The atlas could help device companies to project the range of scales and sizes necessary for clinically useful devices.

The protocol manual would consist of detailed written descriptions of specific interventions, along with metrics to evaluate each intervention.

### ***Three-Year Roadmap***

Develop common ontologies:

- Descriptions of blood vessel branching for predicting cardiovascular surgery outcomes
- Descriptions of activities of daily living for safe performance in the home by the elderly

## **Five-Year Roadmap**

- Develop statistical and analytical tools to analyze “on the fly” randomized trials
- Develop risk analysis tools that link procedures to outcomes
- Develop statistical methods for characterizing variability, abnormality, and anatomical variance
- Build multidisciplinary academic and industry teams for the production of high-confidence medical devices that will develop work plans; prioritize specific models; carry out preclinical and clinical trials to validate models and publish results of those studies; support the FDA approval process for the model and for medical-device validation; and maintain the model and support device manufacturers that use the model for FDA submissions

Although the above seem like complicated tasks, there is an existing example. The SRI/Stanford consortium consists of seven medical-device manufacturers to develop a model of a femoral artery stent. The consortium does data acquisition and modeling, and publishes the work, and the work product can be used for certification. Companies buy in and get prepublication data.

We recommend that the FDA, NSF, NIH, and NIST encourage public-private partnerships among academia, industry, and government.

Funding, privacy, security, and legal and regulatory issues are high-level, cross-cutting issues for the entire HCMDSS community. They should be addressed by an executive committee with representatives of academia, federal funding and regulatory agencies, and industry.

## **Concluding Remarks**

Successful patient modeling will require the solution to a massive problem of information fusion and analysis. But the payoff to solving the problem is enormous. It will lead to better patient care at every level: better clinical results, better disease prevention, and, in principle, better use of costly medical interventions and potentially scarce resources. Fortunately, interest in the problem is intense across a wide range of biomedical, commercial, patient advocate, and regulatory communities. The challenge now is to integrate and channel that interest so that each community can contribute to the solution, recognizing that there is new knowledge to be generated, communicated, and implemented—knowledge that in the end could have a profound impact on the fabric of life represented in better personal and public health.

## MEDICAL-DEVICE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

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### Introduction

Many medical devices are, essentially, embedded systems. As such, software is often a fundamental, albeit not always obvious, part of a device's functionality. This means that any safety and regulatory requirements for medical devices necessarily involve the verification and validation of software-based systems. Exactly how to accomplish that is a major question, particularly because devices and systems are becoming increasingly complicated and interconnected. We may already have reached the point where testing as the primary means to gain confidence in a system is impractical or ineffective.

Further, the lack of uniform standards in the engineering of medical-device software leads to many deficiencies, such as the lack of precise system specifications. Both lacks inhibit even the best testing approaches and make it difficult for domain experts (cardiologists, neurosurgeons, and so forth) to ascertain whether a device will perform appropriately—even if it has been thoroughly tested. The lack of standards goes beyond software engineering practices and development technologies. Although the physician who performs an operation must be licensed, the developers who create the software used in the devices have no licensing requirements. Thus it is especially important that designs and software both be subjected to rigorous analysis. Such analysis is fundamental to effective and efficient testing, the analysis of systems-of-systems, and the determination and mitigation of risk.

In today's medical-device industry, embedded software and applications are often designed and developed by medical specialists—not by experienced software engineers. Although medical specialists are sometimes effective and experienced programmers, they often lack the software design expertise that has been developed in software engineering over the past 40 years. Typically, shortcomings in software analysis and design lead to rigid software and nonstandard platforms that are not resilient to change. The lack of resilience ultimately reduces the operational life of the underlying applications.

Along with the software-quality issue, research evidence suggests that the “frequency and consequences of medical device use errors far exceed those arising from device failures” (<http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/humanfactors/important.html>). This in turn suggests that techniques for *user-centered design* have not yet made a significant impact on medical-device design. Surveys reveal that medical-device manufacturers give variable attention to usability issues in device design. Also, modern medical practice continues to see dramatic increases in the already enormous amount of knowledge that clinicians must absorb and use. Medical devices often demand detailed knowledge of increasingly sophisticated and often fragile science and engineering. The trend reduces the probability that clinicians will understand the inner workings and essential mental models that underlie the technologies used in complex medical devices.

### What Can We Do Well?

Recent years have ushered in many improvements in the technology and processes of software

development. Even relatively simple tools and platforms, such as modern IDEs (integrated development environments), promote certain best practices (such as source revision controls) and are suitable for medical devices and systems.

Increasingly, manufacturers worldwide have adopted disciplined processes—such as those offered by the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) project—to help improve, assess, and sustain the quality of their products, along with their engineering, management, and methods of quality assurance. Those advances can have a great impact on the quality of medical devices, although they are not sufficient. Further research advances are necessary.

### ***Medical Devices vs. Avionics Systems***

A natural question is the extent to which the standards and practices used in avionics systems apply to software for medical devices. Although the two domains share the need for safety-critical software, their standards and practices have large differences. Perhaps the most striking is the almost complete lack of regard, in the medical-device software domain, for the specification of requirements. Those in the medical-device community often say, in essence, “We don’t need requirements in developing medical devices.”

Although such statements may seem startling, business models and incentives for medical devices lead to the development of highly proprietary technologies. This decreases the interaction among development teams and diminishes the perceived value, at least in the short term, of specifying requirements. It also presents a significant barrier to academic researchers’ participation in medical-device technology—in sharp contrast to their participation in avionics.

Other technical metrics, such as availability and mean time to failure, also seem to be largely absent or appear only in diminished form in the development of medical-device software.

Culturally, the sense is that medicine is a “people-intensive” activity that necessarily has highly complex and individually tailored workflows. Although software is a critical enabler of those workflows, it is often viewed as a minor contributor to failures in the system, failures that can happen in many ways. So although information technology is a key enabler to lowering the cost and improving the quality of patient care, the software quality itself is not perceived to be, and in fact may not be, the single most critical issue.

It is unclear whether differences between avionics and medical-device software will continue to be significant. The development of each medical device as a separate “stovepipe” seems untenable for the future. Thus we anticipate that the development of medical devices will use practices much more familiar to the safety-critical software community, particularly as medical-device systems are used more and more in closed-loop situations—in which medical-device systems adapt to changes in patients’ conditions without caregiver intervention.

### **Why Can’t We Declare Victory?**

The current state of the practice in medical-device software has several key problem areas. These are the most critical:

#### ***Poor Quality of Software and Software Architectures***

The development of complex safety-critical software is the subject of much research in the computer science and software engineering communities. Even so, numerous IT-based medical systems have clearly identified faults that can be addressed without any advances in research. In some cases, easy technical solutions exist, but other barriers (usually nontechnical) prevent their

application. Often those barriers involve the lack of standards, of interoperability, and of metrics in the field. Issues with legacy systems also hamper progress.

One system, for example, has a problem in which a Web form for one patient was automatically—and incorrectly—filled in with information for a different patient, most likely because of an interaction with “cookies” in the Web interface. In other cases, specific networking failures arise.

In still other cases, the faults lie in poor technical standards for interfaces and architectures. For example, the bar-coding system of the Bar Code Medication Administration (BCMA) lacks a uniform standard across blood suppliers. Furthermore, the bar-code tags themselves are physically unreliable. Those problems, coupled with faulty or incompatible bar-code readers, have led directly to patient deaths.

As yet another example, the identification system of the Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine standard Health Level 7 (DICOM/HL7) is neither standardized in the industry nor properly implemented in deployed devices. This has led directly to the loss of medical records.

Some of those problems have immediate technical solutions that repair the faults and defects. But because they are legacy systems, applying the technical solutions poses many practical difficulties, even if the device manufacturers are made aware of the solutions. Furthermore, the market may or may not offer incentives to apply the solutions.

And so in each case, we have situations where specific algorithms and technical solutions may be known to the research community. How to apply them in the real world is a major question.

### ***Feature Creep***

Industry perceives that the market demands more and more features. This “feature creep” not only increases risk and complicates use but also leads to software interactions that are hard to specify and even harder to analyze. The result is that no one, not even the developers, understands how the systems behave.

Even in the research community, the value of testing and techniques for validation in the face of new features is poorly understood. Furthermore, developers lack metrics for reliability and usability, making it impossible to assess the costs and benefits of various validation approaches.

### ***Usability Problems***

Workflows and operations have become overly complicated because of the proliferation of devices and technologies. That proliferation has provided clear benefits to the quality and cost of patient care. But it can introduce significant and often unnecessary complications to hospital procedures. And it can lead to situations that are confusing to caregivers (such as task overload) and unacceptably perilous to patients.

Practitioners describe being on a “gadget treadmill,” with constantly changing workflows and increasing distractions in the operating room. Some practitioners report difficulty knowing whether the operating room has been fully “switched on.” In one OR, a nurse had the responsibility of making sure that the room was ready to go and that the operation could proceed, but the nurse was so focused on entering data that the main procedure was almost an afterthought! Such intensive distraction necessarily puts some patients in peril.

Beyond having to understand how to operate numerous devices, we see reported issues with version skew—situations where a device has two, three, or even more versions, whose

interactions cause a system or network failure. Finally, when something fails, medical devices often have no audit capability, or “black box,” that permits a post-mortem analysis of the failures.

### **Lack of Knowledge Sharing**

“Knowledge saves lives” is a clear refrain in the medical community. Data can be transformed into information, and information into knowledge. IT is thus a key enabler, because even simple advances such as faster data entry can have a measurable impact on the number of lives saved. The sharing of information is hampered by the lack of interoperability standards and technologies and by confusion over privacy regulations, specifically the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

Aggravating the problem is the medical-device industry’s proprietary nature. Each medical device or system is developed largely on its own, with little regard to the sharing of critical information across systems. Manufacturers seem to have clear commercial incentives *against* standardization, which presents yet another barrier to information sharing.

### **Lack of a Systems Engineering Perspective**

Integrating technology into the clinical environment—which includes practitioners, workflows, and specific devices—often lacks a holistic, systems perspective. Many medical devices are designed, developed, and marketed largely as individual systems or gadgets. Device integration, interoperability, and safety features are not considered during development, acquisition, or deployment.

The situation is not unique to medical devices. In both research and development, the tendency is to look at systems in isolation, ignoring how well they will work in a larger setting. Workflow issues, including people and clinical procedures, could be reengineered to make safer and more optimum use of some technologies, but that is rarely considered.

The lack of a systems perspective results not only in safety problems but also in lost opportunities for exploiting advances in information technology. One issue that is in dire need of progress and for which there are exemplars in other industries is version skew. The automotive industry, for example, uses analysis and modeling tools that help manage version skew, but similar tools have not been widely adopted by the medical-device industry.

## **Specific R&D Challenges**

Medical and assistive devices must be dependable. Dependable devices work as intended, are highly available even when not well maintained, and do no harm when they fail or are misused. Devices should also be customizable and easy to use, upgrade, and maintain.

Although those criteria apply to many domains of software application, we find that some research challenges and needs are either specific to medical devices or deserve additional emphasis compared with other domains. We summarize the challenges below.

### **Formal and Model-Based Analysis, Design, and Implementation**

Methods of software engineering that are increasingly applied in other application domains go a long way toward improving the quality of software-centric systems. The methods range from relatively informal (though still disciplined) process models to rigorously formal methods based on mathematics and logic. One unifying theme is formal modeling.

At the relatively informal end of the spectrum, modeling languages such as the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and development methods such as Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) confer an important level of discipline and organization on the software design process. That discipline facilitates the early discovery of design problems and helps ensure that independently developed components work well together.

Although model-based approaches are normally applied to standard application software, experience shows that they also benefit embedded systems. But two features of medical systems—and of embedded systems in general—stand in the way of realizing the full potential of model-driven development. Correctness requirements for medical systems often include detailed operational requirements. Thus, commonly used modeling languages such as UML, which concentrate on a system's structural properties, fall short of the design needs. To make matters even more complex, medical devices work in complicated, dynamically changing environments. Without adequate modeling of the environment, it is impossible to make the model-based design of medical systems reliable. Also, the safety-critical nature of medical embedded devices requires a higher degree of validation than most software engineering processes provide.

Therefore, some amount of formal verification and validation needs to be at the core of modeling technology for medical software. We need modeling methods that naturally support operational specifications and enable rigorous verification; we need to incorporate those methods into existing design processes. The quest for such modeling techniques and practical formal methods will probably be the biggest challenge to design of software-based medical systems in the future.

### ***Medical Practice–Driven Design and Validation***

Like a sound foundation for integration, better tools and environments as described above can help us *build systems right*. Equally important is *to build the right system*, as pointed out by Wears and Berg in their March 2005 *Journal AMA* article “Computer Technology Still Waiting for Godot.” The authors suggest that the root cause of errors such as the medication errors introduced by physician order-entry systems is that “the pattern of [IT] use is not tailored to the workers and their environment.”

Although research has been performed on iatrogenic injuries (caused by a doctor or other caregiver), researchers rarely investigate medical errors involving poor device design. Besides patient injury, poor design causes other maladies, such as reductions in treatment efficiency and effectiveness, excessive training or maintenance costs, stress and confusion for users, and other attending complications. Any study based on patient harm, however, will vastly underestimate the systemic consequences and costs of poor integration and interface design. Specific usability challenges for overcoming those issues include the following:

- **Metrics for usability impact.** Studies have shown that, for example, the average software program has 40 design flaws that result in lost productivity. But little work has been done on the impact of medical-device design. We need studies and data collection methods to better understand the impacts and costs of poor and suboptimal device design.
- **Capture and dissemination of usability guidelines.** A wealth of literature exists on design principles for medical devices. But the knowledge is often relatively useless because it lacks information that attaches principles and guidelines to usability contexts. In addition, many guidelines are rarely updated. Given the fast pace of technological change, we need dynamic methods that capture and disseminate emerging knowledge.
- **User-centered design methods.** Adhering to even the best usability guidelines and

principles is not sufficient to guarantee appropriate device design. Diverse usability settings dictate that designers must work closely with users to match device design with specific practices and conditions of use. User-centered design methods have been created for design stages including requirements and inception, summative evaluation, end-user support, and post-release instrumentation and maintenance. What is missing is a means to unify those methods so as to better understand usability phenomena. In addition, existing user-centered techniques are not designed to address issues stemming from complex interacting systems (systems of systems) comprising users, devices, and use environments.

- **Diverse contexts of use.** User interface design is difficult partly because interfaces are influenced by many situational variables. They include environmental context (such as offices visits, surgery, and emergency room), user populations (doctors, nurse practitioners, nurses, anesthesiologists), devices (internal, monitoring, analysis), interface type (device controls, screens, handhelds), and interaction type (selection sequences, parameterization, programming), to name a few. Design methods must therefore have the flexibility to accommodate the highly diverse and situation-dependent nature of interface design.
- **End-user programming and customization.** Interface diversity is a direct reflection of the diversity of individuals and their medical conditions. Medical devices are designed with varying levels of end-user customization, from setting up parameters to tailoring environments involving forms of end-user programming that individualize therapies carried out by medical devices. As devices become more flexible, the potential for error increases. Medical-device interfaces must be designed to minimize and avoid life-threatening errors and parameter-setting combinations by, for example, detecting anomalies or outliers in parameters and making sure that programming directives do not break parameter invariants.

Clearly, we must adopt the user-centered approach, which calls for considering users (including caregivers, patients, and service personals) throughout the acquisition, design, implementation, and evaluation of requirements. Research is needed for user-centered design and quality assurance, including the creation of a library of user scenarios, user models, and their environments in the context of medical devices and systems based on real data. We also need standards similar to the International Standards Organization's ISO 13407 (User-Centered Design Process) to guide user-centered derivation of requirements and design and evaluation against the requirements.

### ***Achieving User-Centered Designs for Medical Devices***

Many techniques for modeling and analyzing user-interfaces are well known and have been investigated in various domains. But medical-device software is unique in many respects and brings concerns about safety and dependability that have not been adequately researched. We need empirical investigations so that we can better understand those specialized needs.

For example, it is important to ensure that at every step in a medical intervention, the supporting medical software reflects a valid state. At design time, standard medical procedures should be modeled in such a way that the use of the software is understood and documented. This may require development of workflows and use cases for medical procedures—and some efforts have been started in that direction. Later, preoperative models should be used in real time to confirm the steps necessary during the medical procedure. Monitoring approaches of this sort should also incorporate support for error-handling and fault tolerance. With solutions to these challenges, effectiveness of medical processes for common procedures can be evaluated and enhanced.



We also need state-based control standards, mechanisms, and diagnostic tools for medical software. Those items will help connect the actions in a medical operation with the corresponding actions of the supporting software. In addition, we need general validation approaches and real-time diagnostic tools to support preoperative and postoperative procedures. As a next step, general validation models should be investigated to validate medical processes during medical procedures.

Because context is vitally important to the development of high-confidence user interfaces, collecting and analyzing field data are crucial. Research is needed on technologies that capture not only data from laboratory studies, surveys, and interviews but also data from the field on operational software. Software instrumentation and profiling techniques, for example, could capture how users supply incorrect information and interact erroneously with devices.

### ***Component-Based Design and System Integration***

Contemporary software development emphasizes components that have clearly specified application programming interfaces (APIs). A static API for a software component such as a Java library class consists of all the (public) methods, along with the types of input parameters and returned values that the component supports. This promotes a clear separation between the specification of the component and its implementation. Such static APIs can be enforced using type systems of programming languages. But although type systems are indispensable, they offer only a partial solution to designing bug-free software, because they do not capture constraints on resources, real-time guarantees, and other quality-of-service aspects. Consequently, they offer little assistance in “system” integration. This is an important issue, not only for being able to derive system-level performance and correctness guarantees, but also for being able to assemble components cost-effectively.

The interface for a device that interacts with a patient must incorporate information about timing delays and continuous parameters such as threshold levels. Capturing the notion of quality-of-service abstractly, and having mechanisms that can enforce the adherence to interfaces and that can check compatibility between interfaces, is already an emerging and challenging trend in research on embedded systems. The additional concerns with medical practice-driven design and formal analysis increase the need for advanced research. On the other hand, by identifying key component types relevant to medical devices, we open new opportunities to apply what is already known. Providing an impetus to the research community to understand and address the issue is a critical need.

### ***Open-Research Test Beds***

Today we have open-research platforms that provide highly effective support for the widespread dissemination of new technologies and even the development of classified applications. The platforms also provide test beds for collaborations involving both researchers and practitioners. One spectacular example is the Berkeley Motes system with the TinyOS operating system.

The medical-device community could benefit from the existence of such open-research platforms. They would enable academic researchers to become engaged in directly relevant problems while preserving the need for proprietary development by the industry. (TinyOS facilitates academic input even on government-classified technology, which is an example of what is possible.)

Taking steps to enable the creation of such test beds should be considered immediately.

## **Research Strategies and Roadmap**

To achieve assurance guarantees for medical devices, we need a paradigm shift—one that includes a formal approach to design, implementation, and analysis. Model-based and formal methods have been successful in targeted applications such as microprocessor designs. Recently, formal verification tools have fully analyzed and verified a number of low-level (device-driver level) and embedded avionics applications. We believe that the same success is feasible in the domain of medical devices. Such an approach would comprise the following steps:

1. Define requirements of the system in a mathematically precise notation.
2. Design a high-level model of the control algorithm for the medical device.
3. Design a high-level model of the environment in which the device will operate.
4. Subject the device model, together with the environment model, to powerful analysis techniques, such as simulation, optimization, and verification.
5. Either generate code automatically from the device model or verify that hand-written code is consistent with the model.

### ***Three-Year Roadmap***

In view of these R&D challenges, it seems clear that research needs are not just in information technology but in something that is much more multidisciplinary and involves a systems approach. It includes significant computer science along with biomedical engineering, device manufacturing, and the care process.

- Develop open, experimental platforms and standardized research data sets to foster collaboration between academic, industry, and industry
- Extract models from clinicians and their workflows, analyze change effects, measure system performance, and so on, to support a systems engineering approach
- Academia, industry, and the government should work together to address the technically straightforward, well-known deficiencies in today's medical IT systems. Specific examples are universally unique identifiers for medical-information objects and standardized bar-code technologies in blood bank applications and administration.

### ***Five-Year Roadmap***

In five years, it should be possible to perform experimental evaluations of the effectiveness of integrated systems:

- Develop medical practice-driven design and validation, including metrics for usability evaluation and user-centered design methods
- Device component-based designs and systems-integration-based formal models of medical devices, control algorithms, and workflows of medical practice
- Create open-research test beds to disseminate new technologies and develop a set of applications

### ***Ten Years***

In ten years, we expect to have model-based techniques for producing complex integrated systems cost-effectively. The integrated systems will be subjected to quantifiable assurance measures that can be the basis for certification:

- Develop model-based validation and certification of systems of medical device systems
- Develop medical-device software and systems that can prevent misuses by caregivers, adapt to changing patient conditions, and can be safely used in closed-loop situations

## FOUNDATIONS FOR INTEGRATING MEDICAL-DEVICE SYSTEMS AND MODELS

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### Introduction

Medical technology is in the midst of a profound technological revolution. On the one hand, advances in computing have led to the development of novel diagnostic and therapeutic equipment and procedures, ranging from advanced imaging machines to minimally invasive surgical techniques and implantable heart devices. On the other hand, low-cost computing equipment and improved software have enabled the automation of many administrative aspects of health care, including hospital management and insurance-claim processing. The result has been operational efficiencies that open the door for the delivery of lower-cost, higher-quality care.

At the same time, the national dialog on health care continues to focus on the inexorable rise in costs and on concerns about the quality of care. The press lauds advances in standalone diagnostic and treatment systems—and rightly so. But systemic inefficiencies in health care delivery grossly inflate costs and contribute to avoidable medical errors that degrade patient care.

Those inefficiencies are primarily caused by a lack of mechanisms to create integrated medical systems that coordinate the collection of information and the delivery of medical services. The health of all Americans would benefit greatly from research into technologies that support the seamless and secure sharing of health information; enable the integration of hospital-based monitoring, diagnostic, and therapeutic devices; and provide capabilities for remote monitoring and the treatment of chronic disease.

The technical recommendations in this chapter derive from a core observation: The systems of medical devices needed to implement the data-sharing and distributed-care delivery described above are impossible to build in a cost-effective, timely manner. This stems largely from an ad hoc approach to designing, developing, and deploying such systems. There is a pressing need for well-understood models, theories, and tools for reasoning about medical-device interfaces, the composition and integration of systems from component devices, and systems of systems that support the predictive analysis of end-to-end system properties that are important to medical applications. Among those properties are—

- Efficacy
- Safety
- Security
- Privacy
- Traceability
- Confidence

### What Can We Do Well?

This section characterizes the state of the art for medical-device and medical-system integration and modeling in terms of technologies used in three types of integration scenarios:

- 1. Medical-information systems.** Such systems manage patient and caregiver information. The integration of such systems is intended to reduce the overhead and risks associated with information management.
- 2. Point-of-care-based monitoring, diagnostic, and therapeutic device and systems.** These systems are typically overseen by medical experts. They are involved in the treatment of specific patient disorders. Integration issues include individual device design (Will a device perform according to requirements? Is a device easily and appropriately integratable with others) and system design (Will one device interfere with another? Can system behavior be easily inferred from the properties of an individual device?).
- 3. Extramural monitoring, diagnostic, and therapeutic devices and systems.** These systems may be home based or implanted and thus are beyond the immediate control of medical personnel. Integration issues include the ones mentioned above for hospital-based systems. Other issues involve the delivery of information from these systems to caregivers in a manner that is timely and secure, and that respects privacy.

### **Communication Standards**

Efforts to develop integration frameworks for medical devices and systems have focused on defining communication protocols and data-format standards for medical data. Some standards have focused on specific areas in medicine, a prominent example being the DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard for medical imaging. DICOM defines a format for digital storage of images independent of imaging technology. It is in widespread use.

Other work has focused on issues related to the exchange of medical data among medical-information systems. For example, the mission of the Health Level 7 (HL7) standards organization is *“To provide standards for the exchange, management and integration of data that support clinical patient care and the management, delivery and evaluation of healthcare services. Specifically, to create flexible, cost effective approaches, standards, guidelines, methodologies, and related services for interoperability between healthcare information systems.”* Standards developed by HL7 include the Version 2.5 Message Standard, which defines message formats and protocol standards governing patient control (admission, discharge), order entry (dietary, pharmaceutical), financial management, and the like. According to the HL7 Web site (<http://www.hl7.org>), Version 2.5 is the most widely implemented communication standard in the world. As part of the Version 3 Message Standard, HL7 has developed the Reference Information Model (RIM) for clinical and administrative health care data.

Other standards bodies have focused on point-of-care communication protocols. The IEEE 1073/ISO 11073 specification, for example, defines rules for connecting bedside devices so that they can exchange data. The standard includes components for a variety of medical devices, such as respirators, defibrillators, and electrocardiographs. The IEEE 1073 Web site (<http://www.ieee1073.org>) refers to 1073 as the basis for plug-and-play medical-device systems.

At present, no widespread standards exist for so-called extramural medical devices. The main reason is the relatively recent emergence of a wide variety of such devices that improvements in power consumption have enabled. Improved radio and infrared technology makes the communication of data from devices to external medical equipment feasible, but data standards have yet to be developed. Similarly, we know of no standards governing communication between point-of-care systems and medical-information systems. Although communication and

data standards exist, the bulk of clinical and administrative information remains encoded either on paper or in proprietary computer systems.

### ***Standards and Regulations for Medical-System Development***

The development of medical devices and systems is a safety-critical undertaking. Faulty devices can endanger patients' well being and even lives. Most efforts aimed at improving the development of such devices have taken the form of standards and regulations governing best development practices.

The IEC 60601 family of standards is a case in point. The standards specify requirements for electrical medical devices (defined as those that have at most one connection to a power main and that transmit energy to a patient). They contain general information about electrical shock, radiation, and fire hazards as well as device-specific guidelines for electrical safety. The FDA recognizes IEC 60601 as a consensus standard and advises development organizations that adhering to the standard provides reasonable assurances of electrical safety.

The ISO 13485 standard for quality-management systems defines rules for assessing how robust a medical-device developer's quality-assurance processes are. The standard is an adaptation of ISO 9001 (a general quality-management system) for the medical industry and reflects the industry's considerable regulatory concerns. The revised Quality System Regulation (21 CFR 820, Oct. 7, 1996) (QSR) is also based on the ISO 9001 and ISO 13485 quality-system standards.

Other standards deal with risk management for medical devices. Emblematic is ISO 14971, which defines the components of a medical-device risk-management process, including policy development, training, and techniques such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA), standard techniques for determining root causes of system failures.

Other governmental bodies have established regulatory frameworks to ensure medical-device quality. Of particular note are the Medical Device Directive (MDD, European directive 93/42/EEC), and guidelines for active implantable medical devices (90/385/EEC). These standards and regulations deal with individual medical devices, not systems of devices.

### ***Design, Development, and Validation Technology for Software***

As in other industries, the development of software for medical devices and systems remains largely a systems-based, standards-driven, document-intensive process. Standards such as those mentioned in the previous section are used to organize development organizations and to manage risk. The testing of device software is done primarily at the system level, using test benches containing hardware and software components. For radiological devices, "phantoms"—bags of fluid each about the size of humans, with sensors for measuring radiation exposure and the like—are used as mockups of human bodies to assess safety and performance.

Some organizations are beginning to use model-based design and development. Examples are use-case modeling of requirements for information systems and computer-assisted surgery, and state machines to model infusion pumps and implanted cardiac devices. Such technologies are rarely mentioned in standards documents, which points to their immaturity in the medical arena.

## **Why Can't We Declare Victory?**

The state of the art in medical-device and medical-system integration consists of two key components: low-level data-transfer protocols and standards, and standards and regulations specifying best practices for device development. Most medical information remains spread

throughout hospitals and caregivers' offices and in insurance-company files. Patient bedsides consist of an array of devices connected, if at all, by cables that are easily disconnected and cause hazards. Operating rooms contain a hodgepodge of equipment and displays that can overwhelm medical personnel with data. Implanted devices suffer from recalls and operate in an information vacuum. After insurance paperwork, the first form a patient completes when visiting a doctor is still a medical history, which the patient may or may not recall. The transfer of data from the point of care to patient records still relies on human intervention.

Compare this situation with the following scenario. Everyone has an electronic health record (EHR) containing a complete account of his or her health history and current insurance information. That information can be queried by caregivers—no more haphazard history taking—and medical devices themselves, which could provide additional safety interlock features based on a patient's history. Bedside devices would communicate wirelessly—no cables—and could be configured to forward collected data automatically to a patient's medical record. Access to patient records would no longer be a bottleneck to consultations among caregivers. An operating room would feature a single integrated display for all equipment in the room, which would communicate with the display wirelessly—no cables to trip over—and would record information in “black boxes” for subsequent review of poor outcomes. Implanted devices and wearable monitoring equipment could record information in a patient's EHR, making it available for caregivers' review.

That vision represents a radical departure and entails significant investment in the research areas listed below. The benefits to human health, however, would offer a many-fold return on the investment.

## **Specific Research Challenges**

Realizing the vision described above will require substantial research into technologies for medical-device and medical-system integration. The technologies are described below.

### ***Electronic Health Records (EHR)***

One backbone of the preceding vision is an accurate and complete electronic health record. Significant technical challenges confront the development of such a record, because of the extremely personal nature of individual health information and the many institutions that would need access to some, but not all, of the information. To be widely adopted, EHRs must be secure (to prevent unauthorized tampering) and provide privacy guarantees, so that control may be exercised over who has access to different components. In addition, EHRs must contain audit-trail mechanisms to record who has seen what. At the same time, those mechanisms must be minimally intrusive and must support incorporation of legacy health data, such as paper records.

### ***Plug-and-Play Network Devices***

Another enabling technology for the aforementioned vision is the development of plug-and-play networking technology for medical devices. Plug-and-play capability is needed to ease the setup of integrated point-of-care and extramural arrays of medical devices that communicate with a patient's electronic health record.

Devising the technology would require addressing concerns about privacy, security, safety, regulations, and technology. In hospital settings, for example, networks would form and reform frequently, as patients are admitted and discharged. Technology for the rapid formation of ad hoc networks needs developing. At the same time, authentication mechanisms would be needed to

ensure that a device is on the correct network—and not, say, incorrectly attached to the one next door. Communication among devices would need to be made more secure than current wireless technology supports, and the problem of incorporating legacy devices must be addressed. Regulatory approaches ensuring the safety of open networks would need to be developed. Finally, for portable and implanted devices, plug-and-play technology would need to minimize power consumption, implying the need for low-power-consumption communication protocols.

### ***Ergonomic and Ease-of-Use Issues in Human-Device Interfaces***

The integration of devices in a care-giving setting requires careful attention to considerations of human factors—especially in extramural settings, where nonprofessionals would interact with devices. Issues of mode confusion and data fusion (combining data from various sources into a coherent form) will also need to be addressed, as point-of-care facilities become more complex and begin to resemble cockpits in airplanes.

### ***Monitoring and Post-Intervention Analysis***

In the integrated medical-device and medical-system setting considered here, faults and errors will occur: Devices will fail; caregivers will make mistakes; networks will crash. To cope with such problems, technologies must be developed for error handling, fault tolerance, fault diagnosis, and fault isolation in ad hoc wireless networks. “Black-box” standards—similar to those in aircraft—should be developed so that when systems do fail, lessons can be learned and responsibility assigned.

### ***Component-Based Design and Validation***

The technologies outlined in the previous sections will find use only as long as integrated systems of medical devices can be cost-effectively safe, robust, and secure. Current design and validation mechanisms for medical systems generally do not support open systems that share data while guaranteeing end-to-end privacy and security. Technologies for lifting reasoning about such properties from the single-device, single-component level to integrated component-based systems must be developed, most likely via notions of safety and security interfaces that would specify the safety and security properties that a component guarantees. Design patterns and service-oriented computing paradigms tailored for medical applications, with their specialized mix of security and privacy concerns, must also be built, and standardized modeling paradigms for open systems of communicating medical devices should be devised, so that “virtual” device networks can be built and simulated for validation purposes. Such simulation models would also be useful in training personnel.

To further support such virtual validation activities, accurate control-theoretic patient models must be developed so that medical-device model behavior can be simulated and assessed before trials on humans. Models of caregiver behavior should be developed for devices so that close-loop modeling of device, patient, and caregiver can be undertaken. Such simulations would yield useful information about likely caregiver errors in using devices, and that information could be used to improve user interfaces to devices and lower the likelihood of device misuse due to caregiver error. To guide subsequent system testing and risk analysis, we need to develop methods to quantify residual risk from virtual validation activities—how accurate are the data derived from simulations, and how can the analysis be used to focus efforts in subsequent clinical-trial testing? Strategies for in-vivo test planning based on virtual testing would open the door for additional efficiencies. Issues of data integrity and integration must also be studied. Efficient techniques for converting models into executing systems must be developed.

## **Open Experimental Platforms**

The final component of an effective research program would be an open experimental platform for use by researchers investigating technologies to integrate medical systems and devices. Such a platform would contain design artifacts, including reference models and scenarios about the use of different medical devices, so that researchers could obtain empirical feedback on their ideas about real systems. An open experimental platform would be vital to the success of the research program, because concerns about intellectual property would otherwise preclude the sharing of device and system information.

## **Research Strategies and Roadmap**

This section offers roadmaps for the research program outlined in the previous section.

### **Three-Year Roadmap**

The goal in the first three years will be to begin developing conceptual frameworks for two core issues: the security and privacy of medical data.

- Reference models for privacy and security should be developed, with a view toward defining the stakeholders (such as patients, caregivers, insurance providers, and government) and the levels of access and control they have on patient information.
- Precise mechanisms for specifying the safety and security properties of medical software components must be developed, and use cases and reference models for standard medical devices such as infusion pumps, radiological devices, and cardiac devices must be elucidated. That software work will entail adapting software-design notations to medical purposes.
- Control-theoretic models of human biological processes should be developed, and work on caregiver modeling initiated.

### **Five-Year Roadmap**

The next phase of the research program will involve the development of tools and methods for technical support of the conceptual framework mentioned above. (The conceptual framework will continue to evolve.) Specifically—

- Technologies will be developed for electronic health records that enforce the privacy and security policies for medical data.
- Techniques for establishing end-to-end safety and security properties of systems based on component properties will be defined, and prototype automated tool support implemented.
- Protocols for ad hoc secure networks of medical devices will also be defined, to ensure adherence to the security and privacy policies of medical data by collected data.
- Virtual validation environments for medical devices, based on models of devices, human biology, and caregiver behavior, will be developed, and pilot studies will be conducted on the medical-device information contained in the developing open experimental platform.
- Human-factors studies for medical-device interfaces will be initiated.
- Service-oriented paradigms and design patterns for medical-device integration will be defined, and prototype tool support for the design of medical-device control systems begun.



## ***Ten-Year Roadmap***

The final phase of the research effort will focus on further developing the technologies and major case studies:

- Implementations of electronic health records will be assessed empirically for utility and safety.
- Improved control-theoretic models of human biological and physiological processes will enable a more thorough analysis of systems of medical devices, allowing the efficient development of multifunctional systems that enable the coordinated treatment of disorders with multiple causes (such as diabetes-induced heart disease).
- Clinical trials will allow the quantification of residual risk in virtual, simulation-based validation approaches to medical-device systems, and as a result the virtual validation approaches will be refined.
- Service-oriented design paradigms for medical systems will be codified, and design and validation tool support for them will be developed.
- Secure, ad hoc networking protocols for medical applications will be implemented in both hardware and software, laying the basis for a commercial market for medical-device middleware.
- Human-factors studies will feed into this work so that systems of medical devices can be assembled easily, and with user interfaces providing maximum support for caregivers and patients responsible for their use.

## VERIFICATION, VALIDATION, AND CERTIFICATION

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### Introduction

Verification and validation (V&V) tasks required for the approval of medical devices play a significant role in enabling the FDA to carry out its mandate of approving only “safe and effective” medical devices. Many industry observers believe that we are approaching the limits of reliable device V&V processes. As devices grow more and more complex and rely much more on embedded software to achieve critical functionality, existing methods are being challenged. The results: higher development costs for manufacturers, longer time to market, and increased chances of device failure—with associated recall or liability costs.

Today, V&V activities account for as much as half the cost of bringing devices to market. Moreover, it is important to consider the effectiveness and already high costs of verification, validation, and certification in the context of rapid advances in technology that have fundamentally changed the way many informational, financial, and scientific services are provided. Although technological advances have contributed to a steady increase in the quality of health care, and although V&V processes have for the most part been able to keep pace, we now seem to be on the cusp of the types of revolutionary changes in the domain of health care systems that have transformed other sectors of nation’s infrastructure and economy.

For example, pervasive networking will enable the integration of national networks, regional health care centers, local hospitals and clinics, the offices of primary-care physicians, home computing, and body-area networks. And as generations of technology-savvy health care consumers enter retirement, they will embrace—and even demand—sophisticated home health care monitoring, treatment, and record systems integrated with national information databases (such as prescription drug information systems) and local hospital and primary-care systems.

Although these envisioned innovations hold great promise, they will render current V&V processes obsolete. Unless new certification technologies are developed and unless V&V processes undergo a paradigm shift, innovation will be stifled, because manufacturers and regulators will find the V&V of systems too costly—or we will see dramatic increases in security breaches and harmful incidents due to device malfunction.

### What Can We Do Well?

**Designing bug-free software** is difficult—especially in complex devices that may be used in unanticipated contexts. Existing practices have worked as well as they have because industry V&V personnel and regulators take their jobs seriously.

We know how to develop and regulate **standalone and embedded medical devices** that have moderate complexity and are based on mature technology. In such cases, the domain is generally well understood, and the technology provides a level of confidence because the evolution of devices is incremental.

Wallace and Kuhn, in “Lessons from 342 Medical Device Failures,” clearly indicate that many failures could be prevented just by systematically employing known quality assurance techniques.

Industry seems to perform the following V&V activities reasonably well:

- Gathering requirements
- Coding
- Testing
- Performing hazard analysis

In particular, collective knowledge and experience within large, well-established companies aid the effort necessary to prepare for validation activities.

The adoption of state-of-the-art techniques for software development is not uniform across the industry. Some companies are beginning to incorporate advanced design techniques into their development processes. Guidant, for example, uses rich modeling tools and product-line architectures to develop its pacemaker software. Clean-room software engineering and modeling have also had some success.

**Automated tools** for V&V activities—ranging from homegrown configuration management systems to static analysis tools—can have wide-ranging benefits. They can raise overall quality by reducing the risk of human error in applying quality assurance techniques and by reducing the time and effort needed to apply the techniques. A reduction of time and effort can free up resources that can be applied to obtain greater and denser coverage of code and to encourage innovation and technological advances by speeding up time to market.

## Why Can't We Declare Victory?

Despite the pluses listed in the previous section, existing technology faces many challenges:

- **Lack of Tools that Automate Certification Tasks.** Generally, we know how to perform activities such as writing requirements, prototyping, and testing, but we need to perform them more accurately and in a more automated way. We also need to achieve greater cross-leveraging of techniques and artifacts—that is, we need to create architectures and processes that allow the information produced by one tool to supplement and increase the effectiveness of other tools. Currently, almost all tools are standalone tools and are not context aware.
- **Large-Scale, Complex Devices Stress Current Best Practices.** We are still challenged by large-scale, complex devices, such as proton therapy facilities. For these types of devices, the validation procedures and test cases can number in the hundreds of thousands. The burden of validation—in time and costs—slows the time to bring devices to market. Engineers often feel overwhelmed by complexity.
- **Limited and Ad Hoc Systems Integration.** We are able to integrate products developed by a single manufacturer. But in a clinical environment, people are incorporating devices from different manufacturers, and technical personnel must be trained to recognize potential incompatibilities.
- **Inability to Capture and Model Clinical Environments and Processes.** The correct operation of many devices relies on assumptions about the clinical environment or process in which the devices will be used. We are experiencing device failures due to unexpected interferences between devices and environments. Clear specifications of environmental

assumptions and processes are needed. Formal models are preferred because they would enable tool integration.

- **Lack of Component-Based Approaches to Certification.** Current V&V procedures focus on approving complete devices or systems—not components of systems. The emphasis is on end-to-end testing against device requirements. No regulatory mechanism allows reusable, individually deployable components or infrastructure to be certified in a way that reduces overall certification costs when the components are used in larger systems.
- **Inadequate Coverage of Security Issues in Certification.** In today’s V&V of devices, security issues are almost never considered. Yet the increasing blending of devices, medical records, telemedicine, and home, local, regional, and national networks will make security a central concern in the certification of future systems.
- **Widely Varying Knowledge and Training Across Vendors.** Although some device vendors use state-of-the-art development practices and quality assurance techniques, many are uninformed about best practices for techniques such as test case generation, testing to different coverage metrics, and capturing requirements. Indeed, studies have concluded that the nature of many reported device faults indicates that known practices may have been misused or may not have been used at all. Moreover, clinical engineers receive little formal training—they gain knowledge through experience.
- **Device Interference and Poor Integration.** Industry is doing fairly well at integrating products developed by a single manufacturer (such as Varian’s Linac, used in concert with imaging devices and treatment planning systems). As the benefits of system integration are realized, however, and as integration mechanisms become commonplace in other domains, such as the highly successful and widely used universal serial bus (USB) from the personal-computer domain, the number of attempts to connect and integrate devices is increasing significantly. Such integrations are largely proceeding ad hoc, with little or no documentation and no systematic training.

## **Specific R&D Challenges**

Based on the assessment presented above, we now lay out specific R&D challenges associated with certification.

### ***Formulating Requirements***

The development process begins by formulating requirements. The requirements formulation phase is the most important and one of the most-challenging-to-execute phases of development for medical devices.

We need technologies that support more automated and rigorous methods of eliciting and capturing requirements as described by experts in their respective domains. We also need technologies that can leverage requirements, including technologies that—

- Directly perform semantic querying or simulation of use cases
- Derive test cases more effectively and automatically from requirements
- Generate visualizations and natural-language descriptions from requirements
- Generate artifacts and reports needed for certification directly from requirements

Not only must we capture requirements that are appropriate; we must also automate capabilities for assessing and evaluating requirements.

## ***Modeling and Formalizing Clinical Environments and Processes***

One trend in the practice of medicine is a proliferation of sophisticated devices in complex environments where exceptions are the norm. We must develop a more rigorous approach to capturing, visualizing, and reasoning about clinical environments and processes. In particular, research should address the following questions:

- How do we incorporate variability in clinical environments?
- Can we mine rigorous descriptions of processes, workflows, and so forth to guide the development of device requirements or detect problematic device interaction in a clinical environment?
- Can we use those models to clarify goals and focus the tasks to achieve more rigorous clinical validation?

## ***Benefiting from Automated Tool Support***

The FDA has relied on device manufacturers to validate the tools they use to develop their devices. Generally, manufacturers accomplish this by validating that a finished device performs as intended and by making sure that tool patches are up to date. But the scope of the validation process is limited. As devices become more complex and interconnected, more attention will need to be paid to tools' comprehensiveness and trustworthiness. We have opportunities to borrow from other industry sectors. For example, the FDA might recognize tools from the aviation domain that have been DO-178B certified or that conform to European MISRA coding and compiler standards.

Moreover, the lack of integration or synergistic interplay between tools and the encompassing development process means that some potential benefits of automated tool support are unrealized. Tools could be enhanced with standardized reporting formats that the FDA recognizes and that could support automated querying and auditing by FDA regulators—greatly increasing regulators' efficiency and accuracy.

## ***Reorienting Procedures Toward Component-Based Certification***

The development of component-based software—software that has individually deployable and reusable components—can reduce software development costs. Some vendors are effectively developing large-scale software systems by using *product-line* methods, in which the cost of developing *families* of similar systems is reduced by identifying commonalities across all systems in a family and then developing common components. Current development trends, along with the need to support emerging plug-and-play devices, provide a clear mandate to develop component-based approaches to certification.

## ***Developing Safety-Critical Middleware***

Closely tied to component-based certification and the use of product lines is the need for high-assurance and safety-critical middleware. Middleware is system software that resides between applications and the underlying operating systems, network protocol stacks, and hardware. It is often described as the “glue code” or “plumbing” that hooks multiple applications together and routes data and information transparently between different back-end sources of data.

The development of sophisticated plug-and-play devices, devices integrated through networks, and systems of systems as in operating rooms of the future will all require reusable infrastructure code that deals with the complexities of distributed systems. Middleware technology such as Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) provides a development solution.

Unfortunately, most middleware implementations use complex object-oriented design patterns that are difficult to validate. We need safety-critical middleware implementations, which vendors are reluctant to pursue because of an uncertain market. Changes in regulatory guidelines might encourage the production of safety-critical middleware.

### ***Certifying in the Presence of Change***

Obtaining certification for upgrades or changes to already “certified” products is costly and error prone. Many failures occur because of the inadequate recertification of modified devices. The state of the art for medical device recertification does not include the use of tools from programming language and software engineering—such as program slicers, dependence analysis, and impact analysis—that could be applied to determine exactly which sections of a software implementation are affected by modifications to code and to requirements.

Researchers should pursue more sophisticated techniques for dependence analysis, which could help determine the impact of changes. Potential examples are techniques that manage certification artifacts and automatically detect where rework in the presence of change is necessary. FDA recognition of tools that perform impact analysis and traceability could reduce the effort needed for retesting and recertification.

### ***Monitoring Deployed Devices***

We are able to report and track device “incidents,” but reporting, tracking, publicizing, and interpreting the root causes of device incidents across manufacturers is problematic. We need to incorporate some notion of a “flight recorder” black-box reporting mechanism to gather data about events. Some devices, such as the Varian Linac, already incorporate “flight recorder” technology. Research is needed into runtime monitoring approaches that can be used in real-time embedded systems to gather event and fault data from medical devices. Statistical and sampling-based approaches to mining data collected from devices are also important.

### ***Moving from Process-Driven Approval to Evidence-Based Certification***

FDA device approval centers on a *process-driven* approach, in which manufacturers obtain approval by showing that they have carried out established quality assurance techniques such as code coverage, manual code inspections, and test cases. The approach often fails to account for innovations in development and verification techniques and does not encourage them. Moreover, as systems become more complex, we expect that best-effort processes will increasingly fail to catch subtle errors.

Research is needed into the alternate paradigm of an *evidence-based* approach, championed by John Rushby in his HCMDSS position paper, “Goal-Based Certification for Medical Devices.” Instead of seeking to provide evidence that a process has been planned for and followed, the evidence-based approach seeks to generate independently verifiable evidence that a system satisfies its requirements. An example of a certification process based on an evidence-based or goal-based approach is the UK Defense Standard 00-56.

### ***Formalizing Environment Models and Assumptions About Context***

Device manufacturers often work under the assumption that devices will be used in certain fixed, step-by-step processes and will have no interaction with other devices. But when devices are used in environments that differ from those envisioned by the manufacturers, the devices often

behave in unanticipated ways. An example is patients who have characteristics that deviate significantly from the norm (such as severely obese patients).

The state of the art relies on resolving undocumented and unanticipated interactions on the fly and in an ad hoc manner. Specifically, constraints on interactions are not captured in the validation process. As the number of devices in a clinical environment increases, and as the sophistication of devices and their connectivity methods (such as wireless Internet and Bluetooth radio) increases, clinical technicians will become overwhelmed with the task of assembling a safe and effective environment. Formalized models are needed of clinic environments, clinical processes, and assumptions made about the contexts in which devices will be deployed.

### ***Dealing Effectively with the Certification of Security***

Security-related research is needed in the following areas:

- Specification formalisms for specifying security properties at the level of system requirements, designs, and implementations
- Tools and techniques, such as those based on static analysis and lightweight theorem-proving, that can help verify that implementations satisfy specifications for security
- Regulatory guidelines, architecture recommendations, and techniques for security certification (Common Criteria and software architectures, for instance), to achieve standards such as the Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture

## **Research Strategies and Roadmap**

It is likely that individual research teams can make progress in addressing the R&D challenges described above. Yet overall research progress and an exchange of ideas about research approaches, domain knowledge, and the effectiveness of competing techniques will be significantly hampered unless we can create significant infrastructure to support research on high-confidence medical devices.

Specifically, we need an infrastructure that facilitates interaction between device vendors and academic researchers. Researchers will be better able to address certification challenges facing V&V technologies if they have a detailed understanding of the certification process. Currently, researchers understand little about the certification process, and it makes little sense for them to engage in research about tools and techniques to aid certification or to propose changes in certification techniques without such an understanding.

These are two ideas to help researchers deepen their understanding of the certification process:

- FDA and industry hold training workshops on the review and approval process using example artifacts.
- FDA or industry performs a mock “red team” review process for products and artifacts developed by researchers. For example, the FDA or industry personnel could review medical device software built by academic researchers to demonstrate their V&V approaches. The review would use the same processes and standards that are applied to actual device submissions to the FDA.

The most important advances will come from the establishment of a research infrastructure, such as one or more open experimental platforms (OEP) for medical devices. An OEP is a publicly available test bed. In this instance, the OEP would provide realistic and complete examples of the following artifacts for a specific medical device:

- Requirements (including hazard analysis)

- Implementation or partial implementation
- Results of fault analysis, test cases, and other V&V activities
- Examples of material that would be submitted to the FDA for device approval

The OEP should also include a list of challenge problems, written by FDA and industry for academic researchers, that target areas on which researchers should focus. Strong consideration should be given to having national funding agencies contract with device vendors to—

- Develop OEP artifacts and challenge problems as described above
- Field questions from academic researchers
- Help evaluate tools and techniques that academic researchers have produced for realistic products and in realistic development settings

### ***Five-Year Roadmap***

The five-year roadmap involves the further development and maturation of tools that can provide automation for V&V and certification activities, including an initial exploration of V&V, the development of V&V techniques, and a demonstration of their usefulness. It would include the following steps:

- Develop an OEP for medical devices
- Apply existing process modeling languages to model clinical environments and processes
- Develop suites of sophisticated requirements for capturing, simulating, and querying requirements
- Incorporate more tools into the certification effort (adding value)
- Certify development tools (analysis and traceability tools) to reduce the burden of certification and recertification
- Enhance conventional formal method tools (static analysis and model-checking) to produce a variety of artifacts, including test cases and natural-language description of traceability steps
- Demonstrate the pervasive use of model-based development techniques with automated reasoning for—
  1. Component conformance to interfaces
  2. Component capability based on checking interface capability
  3. End-to-end reasoning of system behavior
  4. Managing, integrating, and automatically generating certification artifacts

### ***Ten-Year Roadmap***

The ten-year roadmap focuses on refining tools for use by manufacturers and regulatory agencies, including component-based certification, reuse of certification assets, and reuse of “precertified” high-assurance middleware and other infrastructure:

- Reorient the certification process toward component-based certification
- Develop certified components as commodities
- Arrive at the pervasive use of secure, QoS-aware, fault-tolerant, certified middleware
- Achieve integrated, end-to-end, model-based development frameworks dealing with composition, evolution, and change
- Effectively demonstrate the metrics and other items necessary to change industry and regulatory practices
- Establish a wide body of interoperability standards
- Build more sophisticated tools for compositional analysis
- Design tools for compositional hazard analysis



## Appendix 4 Acronyms Used in Workshop Participants' Report

**AHRQ** - Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

**API** - application programming interface

**CDRH** - Center for Device and Radiological Health (FDA)

**CIMIT** - Center for the Integration of Medicine and Innovative Technology

**CISC** - complex instruction set computer

**CORBA** - Common Object Request Broker Architecture

**COTS** - commercial off-the-shelf

**CPS** - cyber-physical systems

**CSIA** - Cyber Security and Information Assurance

**DARPA** - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

**DICOM/HL7** Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine standard Health Level 7

**DCS** - Digital Control System

**DO-178B** - defines the guidelines for development of aviation software in the U.S. [<http://www.linuxworks.com/solutions/milaero/do-178b>]

**EEC** - European Economic Commission

**EHR** - electronic health record

**EKG** - electrocardiogram

**EMF** - electromagnetic field

**ER** - emergency room (of a hospital)

**European Directive 93 and 42 EC** - harmonized standard for medical devices [<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/standardization/harmstds/reflist/meddevic.html>]

**FDA** - U.S. Food and Drug Administration

**FPGA** - field programmable gate array

**GDP** - gross domestic product

**HCSS** - High Confidence Software and Systems

**HCMDPCS** - High Confidence Medical Device Cyber-Physical Systems

**HCMDSS** - High Confidence Medical Devices, Software, and Systems

**HEC** - High End Computing

**HHS** - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

**HIPAA** - Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

**HL7** - Health Level 7, one of several American National Standards Institute (ANSI) -accredited Standards Developing Organizations that produces standards in the clinical and administrative healthcare arena [<http://www.hl7.org/>]

**ICD** - implantable cardiac defibrillator

**ICU** - intensive care unit

**IEC** - International Electrotechnical Commission, an international standards and conformity assessment for government, business, and society for all electrical, electronic and related technologies [<http://www.iec.ch/>]

**IEC 60601** - a family of standards that specify requirements for electrical medical devices

**IEEE** - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

**IEEE 1073/ISO 11073** - an IEEE/ISO standard that defines rules for connecting bedside devices so that they can exchange data

**ISO** - International Standards Organization

**ISO 9001** - a standard for a general quality-management system

**ISO 13407** - a standard for a user-centered design process

**ISO 13485** - an ISO standard for quality-management systems that defines rules for assessing the robustness of a medical-device developer's quality-assurance processes

**ISO 14971** - an ISO standard that defines the components of a medical-device risk-management process

**IT** - information technology

**ITK** - Insight Toolkit, an open-source software toolkit for performing registration and segmentation [<http://www.itk.org/ItkSoftwareGuide.pdf>]

**J2EE** - Java 2 Platform Edition - defines the standard for developing multitier enterprise applications [<http://java.sun.com/j2ee/overview.html>]

**LSN** - Large Scale Networking  
**MDA** - model-driven architecture  
**MDD** - Medical Device Directive (e.g., MDD 93/42/EEC)  
**MD PnP** - Medical Device Plug-and-Play  
**MEMS** - micro-electromechanical systems  
**MILS** - Multiple Independent Levels of Security [[http://www.ois.com/MILS/mils-1.asp#what\\_mils](http://www.ois.com/MILS/mils-1.asp#what_mils)]  
**MISRA** - EU-based Motor Industry Software reliability Association  
**NCO/NITRD** - National Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development  
**NEMS** - nano-electromechanical systems  
**NIH** - National Institutes of Health  
**NIST** - National Institute of Standards and Technology  
**NITRD** - Networking and Information Technology Research and Development  
**NSA** - National Security Agency  
**NSTC** - National Science and Technology Council  
**NSF** - National Science Foundation  
**ONCHI** - Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology  
**OEP** - open experimental platform  
**OR** - operating room  
**PACS** - picture archive and communication systems  
**PC** - personal computer  
**PCA** - Program Component Area  
**PnP** - plug and play  
**QoS** - quality of service  
**QSR** - Quality System Regulation (21 CFR 820, Oct. 7, 1996) - based on the ISO 9001 and ISO 13485 quality-system standards  
**R&D** - research and development  
**RIM** - Reference Information Model  
**RISC** - reduced instruction set computer  
**SCADA** - supervisory control and data acquisition  
**SEW** - Social, Economic, and Workforce Implications of IT and IT Workforce Development

**SOC** - system on a chip  
**SOUP** - software of unknown pedigree  
**TATRC** - U.S. Army Telemedicine & Advanced Technology Research Center  
**TinyOS** - An open-source operating system designed for wireless embedded sensor networks  
**UML** - Unified Modeling Language  
**USB** - universal serial bus  
**UWB** - ultra-wideband  
**V&V** - verification and validation  
**V&V&C** - verification, validation, and certification

## Appendix 5 Workshop Series Rosters

### HCMDSS/MD PnP WORKSHOP 2007

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## Appendix 6

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We look forward to continuing this fruitful nationwide collaboration toward truly high-confidence cyber-physical systems for 21<sup>st</sup> century health care.

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