THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE JCPOA

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# What You Need to Know: JCPOA Packet

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THE DETAILS OF THE JCPOA
After 20 months of intensive negotiations, the U.S. and our international partners have reached an historic deal that will verifiably prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

The United States refused to take a bad deal, pressing for a deal that met every single one of our bottom lines. That’s exactly what we got.

**Known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, this deal:**

- Cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon, including a covert pathway
- Ensures sanctions can be snapped back into place if Iran violates the deal
- Puts in place vigorous, intrusive, and unprecedented transparency measures that are necessary to verify that Iran cannot pursue a weapon

The JCPOA is incredibly detailed. Congress is reviewing the JCPOA over a 60-day period. The following lays out the details, in-depth analysis, and public statements on the deal that will ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful moving forward.
Blocking the Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon

This deal cuts off Iran’s ability to pursue a nuclear weapon with plutonium.

The core of Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be removed and filled with concrete so it can never be used again. The United States will be part of the international partnership that will approve the plan to redesign and rebuild the reactor so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium.

For the next 15 years, Iran will not be able to build any additional heavy water reactors; will not be able to accumulate excess heavy water; and will not be able to conduct reprocessing.

Iran will ship out all spent fuel for present and future power and research nuclear reactors for 15 years and has committed to rely on light water for future nuclear reactors.

This deal cuts off Iran’s ability to pursue a nuclear weapon through uranium enrichment.

- **Iran will have to remove two-thirds of its centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium.** All of the pipework that connects these centrifuges and allows them to enrich uranium will be dismantled, removed, and kept under continuous surveillance by the IAEA.

- **For a decade, Iran will only be able to operate roughly 5,000 centrifuges at Natanz.** Iran will not be able to enrich uranium or keep any fissile materials at Fordow for 15 years.

- **For the first decade, Iran will only be allowed to use its first generation, IR-1 centrifuges for enrichment purposes.** It will have to remove its 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA-monitored storage. There will also be strict limitations on research and development. For 10 years, Iran will not be able to produce enriched uranium with any of its advanced centrifuges.

- **Iran will have to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent.** To put that in perspective, Iran currently has enough raw materials to produce about 10 nuclear weapons. When reduced by 98 percent, Iran won’t have enough enriched uranium for even a single nuclear weapon. This cap on Iran’s stockpile will last for 15 years.

- **With this deal, Iran’s so-called “breakout timeline” — the amount of time it would take Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon if Iran breaks its commitments — will be extended from roughly the current 2-3 months, to at least one year during the first decade.**

- **Iran also has a separate “breakout timeline” of at least a year to build an actual warhead capable of delivering a nuclear payload.** This deal goes beyond the Lausanne framework in ensuring commitments against weaponization by Iran, which has committed to not engage in activities, including R&D, that could be related to the development of a nuclear explosive device.
There will be 24/7 monitoring of Iran’s key declared nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, and Arak.

- **International inspectors will have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain** — its uranium mines and mills; its conversion facility; its centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities; and its other declared nuclear sites — critical elements which will be under watchful eye for 25 years. As a result, Iran would need to construct an entire covert supply chain to pursue a covert nuclear weapons program.

- **A dedicated procurement channel** will be established to monitor and approve, on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual-use materials and technology — an additional transparency measure to prevent diversion of sensitive goods to a covert program.

- **Iran has agreed to steps with the IAEA to address the possible military dimensions of Iran’s past program** — or PMD. Iran will not receive sanctions relief until Iran has completed those steps. The IAEA will have appropriate access to Parchin.

- **Going forward, Iran will implement the Additional Protocol**, which ensures the IAEA can seek access to any undeclared suspicious location. Put simply, the IAEA will have access when it needs it, and where it needs it. If the IAEA has concerns, no site will be considered off limits in order to address them and this could include military sites.

- **The JCPOA will also require that Iran grant the IAEA access to any requested locations within 24 days if a majority of our partners agree it is necessary.** This means we can achieve the access IAEA inspectors need if the United States and our European allies are in agreement.

JCPOA is Based on Verification, Not Trust

This deal includes the most comprehensive and intrusive verification regime ever negotiated.
Under the nuclear deal, international inspectors will monitor Iran's nuclear program at every single stage.

IAEA

Continuous Monitoring

Mineralization

Conversion

Enrichment

Fuel Manufacturing

Nuclear Re却ctors

Spent Fuel

Suspicious Locations

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Snapping Back Sanctions on Iran

Iran will not receive any new sanctions relief until it verifiably completes important steps to rollback its program, and we can snap sanctions back into place if Iran violates the deal.

- Reports of a “signing bonus” were false. Iran must complete its key nuclear steps before it begins to receive sanctions relief beyond the limited relief provided for under the JPOA. We anticipate that it will take Iran from 6 months to a year to complete these key steps.

- The JCPOA allows us to snap sanctions back into place if Iran violates the deal.

- Meanwhile, we will be keeping in place other unilateral sanctions that relate to non-nuclear issues, such as support for terrorism and human rights abuses.

- The UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran will be replaced by a new UN Security Council resolution that will last for a decade. For the first decade of the deal, we can snap back these multilateral sanctions if Iran violates the deal — a snapback that cannot be vetoed by Russia or China. In addition, for years 11-15, the P5+1 has agreed to preserve this snapback mechanism if Iran violates the deal.

- This new UN Security Council resolution will re-establish important sanctions restricting the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and keep in place sanctions on ballistic missiles for 8 years and conventional arms for 5 years.

Taken in its entirety, this is the impact the historic JCPOA will have on Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon:
## FAQs: All the Answers on the JCPOA

### Is this a “bad deal”?  
**No. This is a good deal — the JCPOA is strong, verifiable, and long-term.**  

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<th>A:</th>
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<td>No other approach ensures the strict limits and unprecedented inspections we were able to negotiate. The JCPOA cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon. And it ensures the vigorous inspections and transparency necessary to verify that Iran cannot cheat and pursue a nuclear weapon without us knowing and having time to act. It ensures that sanctions can snap back into place if Iran violates the deal. And it is long-term, including significant elements that will be permanent.</td>
<td>You don’t have to take our word for it — ask our allies in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, who have been with us every step of the way at the negotiating table. Ask the dozens of countries that have already come out in support of this deal, the UN, and the Vatican. Ask the numerous former Israeli military, intelligence, and security officials, who are all saying that this deal makes Israel safer. The world supports this deal.</td>
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### Shouldn’t we have just walked away from the table and kept the interim deal in place?  
**The final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) goes leaps and bounds beyond the interim JPOA in terms of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and far-reaching transparency measures.**  

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<td>It doesn’t just halt the progress and roll back key aspects of Iran’s program, as the JPOA did, it requires permanent steps be taken to verifiably ensure that Iran cannot get a nuclear weapon. The Arak heavy water reactor is just one example: Under the JPOA, Iran could not do further work on Arak; under the JCPOA, Iran has to physically remove the core, fill it with concrete, and fundamentally change the design so it won’t be producing plutonium that could be used in a bomb.</td>
<td>The critics were wrong once before. Many who opposed the interim deal have now come around to acknowledging that our negotiators got a good deal. We held out for a deal that met all of our key objectives, and we got it. The deal also includes the most comprehensive verification regime ever negotiated, as well as a means to “snap back” multilateral and domestic sanctions in the event Iran decides to cheat.</td>
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### Did we just take whatever deal we could get, because we wanted this deal too much?  
**If we wanted a bad deal, we could have had one a long time ago. But the President and our negotiators insisted on waiting until Iran made the tough decisions that were needed to get the good deal that we got.**  

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<td>Hundreds of dedicated professionals from the Departments of State, Energy (including our leading national labs), Treasury, the Intelligence Community, and other agencies worked tirelessly over the past few years and more to test every part of this deal and make sure that it did exactly what the President demanded — that it effectively cut off all Iran’s pathways to enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. And we made clear to the Iranians — both publicly and privately — that we would walk away if we could not get a deal that met our objectives.</td>
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Aren’t “anytime, anywhere” inspections the only way to ensure effective verification?

**Q:**

**A:**

No country in the world today permits ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections — this is a false standard that the IAEA does not employ in any country.

But here’s what we do have: a deal that guarantees 24/7 monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities and that ensures timely access to any undeclared suspicious locations, with as little as 24-hour notice or a maximum timeline of 24 days to resolve disputes that could arise over access. Iran knows we can detect nuclear material even if it tried to sanitize a site and we will have eyes on any suspicious facility in case Iran tried to play any cat-and-mouse games.

Why is Iran allowed any uranium enrichment?

**Q:**

**A:**

The “no enrichment” policy under the previous Administration failed. It resulted in Iran going from 164 centrifuges to 19,000 centrifuges.

And you can’t destroy knowledge that a country already has. Iran mastered uranium enrichment long before this Administration began, and our goal was always to prevent Iran from using this knowledge to build a bomb. You can’t sanction (or even bomb) that knowledge away. Our policy is one based in reality – one that will result in fewer centrifuges, not more.

Doesn’t this deal sunset?

**Q:**

**A:**

No. Under this deal as well as under the Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran is never allowed to develop nuclear weapons.

Put simply, under this deal, there is a permanent prohibition on Iran ever having a nuclear weapons program and a permanent inspections regime that goes beyond any previous inspections regime in Iran. This deal provides the IAEA the means to make sure Iran isn’t doing so, both through JCPOA-specific verification tools, some of which last up to 25 years, and through the Additional Protocol that lasts indefinitely. In addition, Iran made commitments in this deal that include prohibitions on key research and development activities that it would need to design and construct a nuclear weapon. Those commitments have no end date.

Won’t this deal create a regional arms race?

**Q:**

**A:**

No, an Iran with a nuclear weapon is what would make the region and the world a more dangerous place.

In reality, walking away from this deal and letting Iran get even closer to a nuclear weapon would make a regional arms race more likely. Any motivation for another Middle East state to have its own nuclear deterrent against Iran would be greater without a deal. In a “no-deal” scenario, Iran’s nuclear program could advance much more quickly without this enhanced transparency — a scenario that is much more likely to spark regional fears of a nuclear-armed Iran.
While some of our P5 partners wanted these restrictions lifted immediately, we pushed back and were successful in keeping them for 5 and 8 more years or until the IAEA reaches its broader conclusion. And even after those restrictions are ultimately lifted, we have strong multilateral and unilateral tools, including sanctions, to continue to restrict Iranian conventional arms and missile-related transfers. We have strong support from the international community on these issues. That combined with the size of the U.S. economy, the power of our financial system, and the reach of U.S. unilateral measures gives us enormous leverage to work with other countries to enforce restrictions on Iranian missile and arms activity. All of the other multilateral and unilateral tools that remain in place are in no way impacted by the JCPOA, in any phase of its implementation.

If we’re lifting the arms embargo in 5 years and missile restrictions in 8 years, doesn’t that mean the U.S. has given up on countering Iran’s destabilizing activities?

**No. These arms and missile restrictions were put in place because of Iran’s nuclear activities. These restrictions will stay in place for years to come.**

While some of our P5 partners wanted these restrictions lifted immediately, we pushed back and were successful in keeping them for 5 and 8 more years or until the IAEA reaches its broader conclusion. And even after those restrictions are ultimately lifted, we have strong multilateral and unilateral tools, including sanctions, to continue to restrict Iranian conventional arms and missile-related transfers. We have strong support from the international community on these issues. That combined with the size of the U.S. economy, the power of our financial system, and the reach of U.S. unilateral measures gives us enormous leverage to work with other countries to enforce restrictions on Iranian missile and arms activity. All of the other multilateral and unilateral tools that remain in place are in no way impacted by the JCPOA, in any phase of its implementation.

Won’t Iran get $150 billion from sanctions relief, and won’t that money go straight toward terrorist activity in the region?

**No.**

First, the $150 billion figure is entirely off base: the Treasury Department estimates that, should Iran complete its key nuclear steps and receive sanctions relief, Iran will be able to freely access about a third of that figure in overseas foreign reserves — a little over $50 billion. Further, we will continue to aggressively enforce sanctions against Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights abuses, missile program, and destabilizing activities in the region. Secondly, money Iran receives from sanctions relief is likely to be directed primarily towards pressing economic needs given the more than half a trillion dollars in investment and government obligations Iran faces. Don’t forget it was these economic needs at home that helped bring Iran to the table, and President Rouhani will be under intense pressure to deliver results at home. Further, a nuclear-armed Iran would be a much greater terrorist threat to the region than an Iran that has access to additional amounts of its own money.

Don’t most Americans oppose this deal?

**No. Most Americans Support the Iran deal.**

According to the July 27 Public Policy Polling: 54% support the Iran deal. According to the July 28 GBA Strategies/J Street Poll: 60% of Jewish Americans want their Member of Congress to approve the deal. According to the July 20 WashPost/ABC Poll: 56% support the deal. According to the July 23 Jewish Journal Poll: 53% of Jewish Americans believe Congress should vote to APPROVE the deal. And the more Americans learn about the deal, the more they like it — a trajectory that makes sense, because this is a good deal for America and for the world.
Our sanctions against Iran were effective because they enjoyed broad, coordinated international cooperation. Iran’s major trading partners and oil customers adhered to our sanctions – at significant cost to themselves – because we offered a genuine diplomatic path forward. It is unrealistic to think that additional sanctions pressure would force Iran to capitulate – and impractical to believe that we could get our international partners to impose such pressure after turning down a deal that they (including the UK, France, and Germany) believe is a good one. Our allies have been clear about this. Consider the UK Ambassador to the U.S. Peter Westmacott’s comment for example: “If we were to walk away or if the Congress was to make it impossible for the agreement to be implemented...then I think the international community would be pretty reluctant, frankly, to contemplate a ratcheting up further of sanctions against Iran.” To walk away would isolate the United States and damage our standing in the world, setting America on an uncertain path without the support of the international community.

**Shouldn’t we just go back to more sanctions?**

The rest of the world will go along with us.

That is a fantasy scenario with no basis in reality.

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**Why didn’t this deal ensure the release of American citizens held in Iran?**

The negotiations have been about one issue and one only: addressing Iran’s nuclear program. We would never want to tie the fate of these American citizens to a political negotiation that we knew may or may not have succeeded.

We will continue to call for the release of Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, and Jason Rezaian, and for Iran’s help in locating Robert Levinson. We will not cease until we bring them home.

**Is the U.S. delisting Qassam Soleimani and the IRGC under the JCPOA?**

No. Qassem Soleimani and other IRGC officials and entities are not being delisted by the United States; They will remain designated because of their support for terrorism and other destabilizing activities.

And all U.S. sanctions pertaining to them will absolutely remain in effect and will be vigorously enforced. The United States will maintain sanctions on the IRGC, the Qods Force, its leadership, and its entire network of front companies – and the JCPOA has no effect on those sanctions whatsoever. Further, these sanctions are much more powerful because they also target third party entities, meaning that foreign banks that conduct business for or on behalf of the Qods Force or Soleimani will risk being cut off from the U.S. financial system. In addition to U.S. sanctions, the E.U. will continue to list Soleimani and the IRGC-QF under other, non-nuclear sanctions authorities.
Did Iran receive a $100 billion signing bonus with this deal?

**No. There is no signing bonus.**

Iran gets nothing until the IAEA verifies it has taken the key nuclear steps outlined under the JCPOA, aside from a continuation of the limited relief it has received under the JPOA for the past 18 months. If and when Iran completes those nuclear steps and is able to repatriate some of its own locked-up money, the Treasury Department estimates that Iran will be able to freely access slightly more than half this amount — a little over $50 billion.

Was America negotiating from a point of weakness?

**No. This was a triumph of American diplomacy and U.S. leadership in the world, backed up, as the President has said all along, by our economic and military strengths.**

The moral authority that comes from making a genuine effort to solve this issue diplomatically kept the international community united with us.

Why are there secret “side” deals that Congress doesn’t know about?

**There are no secret “side” deals between the P5+1 and Iran.**

For the non-public JCPOA documents in our possession, we have provided access to Congress in an appropriate setting. And everything needed to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is spelled out within the JCPOA, which is publicly available for the world to see. Separately, Iran and the IAEA signed an agreement on July 14 on the way forward on PMD. This agreement has two attachments (called “separate arrangements”), one of which is an arrangement for Parchin. These are not public documents. The Administration was not provided them by the IAEA and therefore has not shared them with the Congress.

Has the United States betrayed Israel on the Iran deal?

**No. Our commitment to Israel’s security is ironclad, and this deal is the best way to ensure that Iran will never be able to threaten Israel with a nuclear weapon.**

We won’t for a second take our eye off the ball on any of the anti-Israel actions and rhetoric we see from Iran, and now we can focus on countering those without the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
| **Q:** | Why didn’t the deal stick to the framework announced in Lausanne? |
| **A:** | **It did. In fact, the Lausanne parameters alone already represented a good deal, and the JCPOA goes even further.** Not only meeting every aspect of those parameters but surpassing them. Additional constraints on weaponization, uranium and plutonium metallurgy, other enrichment R&D, use of heavy water which further restricts Iran from gaining even the expertise it would need to develop a nuclear weapon – we got all of this and more in the final comprehensive deal (the JCPOA). |

| **Q:** | Will companies that sign contracts with Iran be able to continue that business even if Iran violates the JCPOA and snapback occurs, because of a “grandfather clause”? |
| **A:** | **No. There is no “grandfather clause” in the JCPOA.** We have reassured our partners that we will not impose sanctions retroactively for business with Iran before snapback occurs, but we have been equally clear with our partners that if snapback does occur, there are no exemptions from our sanctions for long-term contracts. As we always have, we will consult closely with our partners to ensure that Iran would pay the price for non-compliance. |

| **Q:** | Does the deal require the P5+1 to defend Iran’s nuclear program from attack? |
| **A:** | **No. No one has in any way committed to “defend” Iran’s nuclear facilities.** The JCPOA is designed to help bring Iran’s nuclear security and safety practices in line with those used by other peaceful nuclear programs around the world. It’s in the interest of all countries that nuclear material be safeguarded from theft and terrorist attacks, so any training provided by the IAEA or others will be solely for that purpose. |
JCPOA Ensures Timely Access to Iran’s Nuclear Program

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commits Iran to a comprehensive monitoring regime covering all Iranian nuclear activities and will verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Many of these commitments will last decades, and some have no end date. The new access commitments Iran will undertake upon implementation of the JCPOA will provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with appropriate access where needed, when needed to verify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.

Continuous Access to Nuclear Activities. This deal ensures continuous monitoring of Iran’s key declared nuclear facilities. Not only will the IAEA have the right to a constant physical or technical presence in Iran’s primary nuclear sites, Natanz and Fordow, but it will be able to conduct regular monitoring of Iran’s uranium mines and mills and its centrifuge production, assembly, and storage facilities. This means that the IAEA will have surveillance of the entire fuel cycle and supply chain for Iran’s nuclear program. This kind of monitoring makes it exceedingly difficult for Iran to divert materials for clandestine sites without being rapidly detected. Moreover, the establishment of a dedicated procurement channel for Iran's nuclear program will further enable the close monitoring and approval of materials so as to minimize the chances of any diversion to a secret program.

Additional Protocol Authorizes Quick Access to Suspicious Locations. Under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will legally bind itself to implement as a condition of sanctions relief, IAEA inspectors can request access to any location they have reason to suspect relate to undeclared nuclear activities. This is separate and in addition to the continuous access described above at declared nuclear facilities. When requesting access to a suspicious location, standard practice is to provide with 24 hours’ notice, but access can be requested with 2 hours’ notice in certain circumstances. The IAEA verifies through visual observation and environmental sampling that activities at undeclared locations do not include clandestine nuclear activity. These well-established Additional Protocol access procedures apply for over 120 countries, they are state of the art, and they can effectively deter and detect illicit nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol does not exempt military sites.

When in Dispute, Timely Access to Suspicious Locations Guaranteed. If Iran were to deny an IAEA request for access to a suspicious undeclared location, a special provision in the JCPOA would trigger an access dispute resolution mechanism. If Iran and the IAEA cannot resolve the access dispute within 14 days, the issue is brought to the Joint Commission, which then has 7 days to find a resolution. If Iran still will not provide access but 5 members of the Joint Commission (such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union) determine access is necessary, Iran must then provide access within 3 days. We anticipate situations that need the full 24 days of the dispute resolution process will be rare because Iran understands that an failure to cooperate with the IAEA will raise significant suspicions among the P5+1 and potentially lead to a snapback of sanctions.

“Anytime, Anywhere” Inspections Unnecessary. Many of the core facilities Iran would need as part of a covert nuclear weapons program — such as an enrichment production facility, a nuclear reactor, or a uranium metal casting/machining workshop — would be extremely difficult to hide and cannot be quickly dismantled or scrubbed of radioactive evidence. Any suspicious location for which the IAEA requests access would likely already be under constant U.S. observation. The United States would know if Iran tried to play cat-and-mouse games by cleaning out a facility before granting IAEA access.

Even in the rare circumstance that it took a full 24 days to access a particular undeclared location, IAEA environmental sampling almost certainly would detect the presence of nuclear material. Former nuclear facilities often take years to clean.
IAEA WILL HAVE UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS TO IRAN’S DECLARED NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND TIMELY ACCESS TO UNDECLARED OR SUSPICIOUS LOCATIONS EVEN WHEN DISPUTED BY IRAN

- **NATANZ**
  - Continuous Monitoring
  - Regular Access

- **FORDOW**
  - ✔️
  - ✔️

- **ARAK**
  - ✔️
  - ✔️

- **URANIUM MINING**
  - ✔️

- **URANIUM MILLING**
  - ✔️

- **URANIUM CONVERSION**
  - ✔️

- **CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING**
  - ✔️

- **CENTRIFUGE STORAGE**
  - ✔️

- **UNDECLARED SUSPICIOUS SITE**
  - Access with as little as 24 hours’ notice or within 24 days if access is disputed by Iran

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UNDER OUR DEAL, IRAN CAN'T BUILD A SECRET NUCLEAR BOMB. HERE'S WHY:

IRAN WOULD HAVE TO SECRETLY BUILD, STAFF, AND RUN ALL OF THESE FACILITIES AND CLEAN THEM WITHIN 24 DAYS IF DISCOVERED.

TO BUILD A NUCLEAR BOMB USING:

4 NEW, SECRET FACILITIES WOULD BE REQUIRED

7 NEW, SECRET FACILITIES WOULD BE REQUIRED

IT CAN TAKE 6 MONTHS TO SEVERAL YEARS TO CLEAN JUST ONE OF THESE FACILITIES

WHILE THE WORLD'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND THE IAEA INSPECTORS ARE LOOKING FOR THEM

AND THE IAEA CAN GAIN ACCESS TO ANY SUSPICIOUS SITE WITHIN 24 DAYS, THE QUICKEST TIMEFRAME EVER NEGOTIATED AND NOT POSSIBLE ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE WORLD.

THE BOTTOM LINE: IRAN CANNOT CLEAN ANY OF THESE SECRET FACILITIES IN 24 DAYS. IF IT TRIES, WE WILL KNOW.

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JCPOA Does Not Simply Delay an Iranian Nuclear Weapon

The restriction at the center of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon — is permanent. The end of some commitments in 10-15 years will not re-open the door to an Iranian nuclear weapon. Crucial tools blocking Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities will endure for 20 or 25 years, while others will have no end date. Put simply, this deal has a permanent prohibition on Iran having a nuclear weapons program and a permanent inspections regime that goes beyond any previous inspections regime in Iran.

Iran Is Prohibited from Pursuing or Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Forever. Iran is obligated as a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons, commitments expressly defined in the JCPOA. Any Iranian attempt to design, pursue, build or otherwise seek a nuclear weapon would be an explicit and detectable violation of the NPT. In the event of Iranian non-compliance, the JCPOA will enable the United States to mobilize the international community to take swift action, including snapping sanctions back into place.

JCPOA Has Long-term Limitations on Iran’s Program. Iran’s nuclear program is significantly rolled back in the first decade of the JCPOA. Pursuant to the Additional Protocol, which Iran will legally bind itself to implement as a condition of sanctions relief, Iran has developed an enrichment and R&D plan reviewed by the P5+1. This plan ensures that after the initial decade of the JCPOA, Iran’s program will undergo measured, incremental growth consistent with a peaceful nuclear program. For 15 years, Iran will also have to maintain the 98 percent removal of its stockpile of enriched uranium. In contrast, without the JCPOA, Iran, whose breakout timeline currently is estimated to be 2-3 months, would be free to pursue dramatic increases in its enrichment capacity in the near-term.

Permanent R&D Restrictions Keep Iran Further from a Bomb. Beyond the limits on its peaceful nuclear energy program in the JCPOA, Iran has also committed to not pursue certain research or activities directly linked to the development of a nuclear weapon. These prohibitions include activities related to nuclear explosive modeling, multi-point detonation systems, explosive diagnostic systems, and specialized neutron sources. For 15 years, Iran will not pursue certain types of work with uranium and plutonium metallurgy, which will further restrict Iran from gaining the expertise it would need to develop a nuclear weapon. In fact, without proficiency in this metallurgy, it cannot build a nuclear weapon, regardless of enrichment breakout timelines. Because Iran cannot engage in this preparatory R&D work under the JCPOA, the international community would have a basis to respond at an even earlier stage to indications that Iran had reneged on its commitments and was pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Transparency Measures Improve Chances of Catching Iran Even If Iran Cheats. Many of the key transparency commitments in the JCPOA continue for 20-25 years and in perpetuity. These measures will give the IAEA the ability to verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. For example, the Additional Protocol has a proven track record in 120+ countries. Without the JCPOA, the international community would be less confident we could detect the development of a nuclear weapon.

The United States Would Be In Better Position in the Future If Iran Cheats. If Iran pursued a nuclear weapon after a decade or more of compliance with the JCPOA, the United States would still be able to use every tool that is available today. In fact, we would be in a better position after a decade of transparency because we will have even better insight into Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, the sanctions fatigue that risks undermining the pressure Iran feels today will be gone and a future Iranian transgression of this magnitude would be more likely to prompt renewed, vigorous enforcement and pressure on Iran from key allies and partners and a swift international response.
HOW OUR NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN WILL VERIFIABLY PREVENT IRAN FROM OBTAINING A NUCLEAR WEAPON

THE DEAL INCLUDES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 YEAR</th>
<th>5 YEARS</th>
<th>10 YEARS</th>
<th>15 YEARS</th>
<th>20 YEARS</th>
<th>25 YEARS</th>
<th>FOREVER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENRICHMENT LIMITS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran’s breakout timeline to enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon pushed from 2-3 months to 1 year if Iran breaks its commitments under the deal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENRICHMENT LIMITS</td>
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<tr>
<td>No uranium enriched above 3.67% and stockpile capped at 300kg</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D LIMITS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uranium research and development limited to Natanz facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORDOW LIMITS</td>
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<tr>
<td>No enrichment at Fordow facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIMITS ON REACTORS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No new heavy water reactors or heavy water accumulation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIP OUT SPENT FUEL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arak reactor re-designed and spent fuel shipped out of Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACCESS &amp; VERIFICATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA access and modern monitoring technology will verify all elements of Iran’s nuclear program</td>
<td></td>
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<td>ACCESS &amp; VERIFICATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA will monitor and contain the production, assembly, and storage of centrifuges</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACCESS &amp; VERIFICATION</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA access and monitoring for all uranium mines and mills to ensure no covert diversion</td>
<td></td>
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<td>ACCESS &amp; VERIFICATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation of the Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **U.N. SANCTIONS**
If Iran violates deal, U.N. sanctions automatically snap back for a decade with the possibility of re-imposing sanctions for another 5 years if deemed necessary

- **U.S. AND E.U. SANCTIONS**
If Iran violates any aspect of this deal, the U.S. and E.U. can snap sanctions back in place

WH.GOV/IRAN-DEAL #IranDeal
Tools to Counter Iranian Missile and Arms Activity

The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) arms embargo and missile sanctions on Iran were put in place to pressure Iran to address the international community’s concerns with its nuclear program. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will include lifting the UNSCRs that impose these sanctions after the IAEA verifies that Iran has implemented key nuclear-related measures, but it will also include imposing new UNSCR arms and missile restrictions for a significant additional period of time (five years for the arms embargo and 8 years for the missile restrictions). However, even after these UNSCR arms and missile restrictions on Iran are lifted, we can still rely on a broad set of multilateral and unilateral tools, including sanctions, to continue to restrict Iranian conventional arms and missile-related transfers. The size of the U.S. economy, the power of our financial system, and the reach of U.S. unilateral measures gives us enormous leverage to work with third-party countries to enforce restrictions on Iranian missile and arms activity.

HOW WE’RE RESTRICTING IRAN’S CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE TRANSACTIONS:

- Working with regional partners to ramp up regional interdiction activities
- Joining 100+ countries in helping to limit Iranian ballistic missile-related imports and exports
- Preventing spread of critical missile technology that’d support Iran’s missile program
- Authorizing sanctions on any entity who contributes to missile proliferation
- Keeping sanctions in place against entities connected to Iranian ballistic and cruise missile activity
Multilateral Tools

- We will still be able to rely on a series of other UNSCRs that levy arms embargoes against key areas of concern. Iranian arms transfers to the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militants in Iraq, Hizballah in Lebanon, Libya, and North Korea would thus still violate UNSCRs, and for that reason, could be susceptible to interdiction.

- We will work with the 100+ countries around the world that have signed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to help limit Iranian missile-related imports or exports.

- The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) also plays a critical role in preventing the spread of critical missile technology. The MTCR Guidelines maintain a strong presumption of denial for the transfer of Category I systems, which includes ballistic missiles. We will continue to rely on countries’ adherence to the MTCR Guidelines for transports in support of Iran’s missile program.

Unilateral Tools

- In conjunction with existing UNSCRs and other multilateral authorities, we will also utilize bilateral cooperation with countries in the region to block Iranian access to their territory for activities related to the illicit shipping of arms or missiles. For example, we are already preparing efforts with our Gulf partners — as discussed between the President and Gulf leaders at Camp David in May — to ramp up regional interdiction activities to ensure continued restrictions on Iranian missile and arms activity when the Iran-related UNSCR restrictions are gone.

- Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 authorize U.S. sanctions on foreign persons that materially contribute to the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (including efforts to manufacture, acquire, develop or transfer them), by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern, such as Iran. These authorities also authorize sanctions on any persons that provides material supports to such activities or sanctioned persons.

- The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) of 2006 levies U.S. sanctions on entities connected to Iranian ballistic and cruise missile activity.

- The Lethal Military Equipment Sanctions (2006) provision in the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended, and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (1992) all impose U.S. sanctions on individuals and entities involved in the sale or transfer of goods to Iran that may contribute to Iran’s ability to acquire or develop conventional arms or missiles.

All of these multilateral and unilateral tools remain in place for — and are in no way impacted by — the JCPOA or any phase of its implementation.
Sanctions That Will Remain in Place Under the JCPOA

Below is a summary of the U.S. and U.N. sanctions with respect to Iran that will remain in place under the JCPOA.

1. U.S. Sanctions

Because we will offer relief only from nuclear-related sanctions, a number of U.S. sanctions authorities and designations with respect to Iran will remain in place after Implementation Day, as set out below. This will be accomplished by retaining relevant authorities, including important statutory authorities, the vast majority of Executive orders, and maintaining certain Iranian persons on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).¹

Primary U.S. Sanctions

The Government of Iran (GOI) and Iranian financial institutions — including any property in which they have an interest — will remain blocked by the United States. U.S. persons will continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings with the GOI and Iranian financial institutions.

U.S. persons, including U.S. companies, will continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions with Iran, as well as with Iranian individuals and entities. General prohibitions include: investment in Iran; importing Iranian-origin goods or services; and exporting goods or services to Iran, including clearing U.S. dollars.

U.S. export controls will also continue to apply to controlled U.S.-origin goods and technology anywhere in the world.

Nonproliferation Sanctions:

Statutory sanctions will continue to apply to transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technologies and conventional weapons. These sanctions cover items going to Iran’s missile program as well as any items that would contribute to an Iranian effort to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Statutory sanctions also cover transfers of certain technologies that would contribute to enrichment or reprocessing capabilities or the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material. In addition, U.S. law will continue to provide for sanctions against the transfer of lethal military equipment or advanced conventional weapons to Iran.

Terrorist List Sanctions:

Iran will continue to be listed as a state that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. A number of different sanctions laws are keyed to this list, including restrictions on foreign assistance, arms sales, export of certain sensitive technology and dual-use items, nuclear cooperation, and various financial restrictions.

¹Approximately 32% of all Iran-related designations (over 200 persons) will remain on OFAC’s SDN List after implementation of the JCPOA; these persons will be subject to all applicable primary and secondary sanctions. This group was sanctioned in connection with activities outside the scope of the JCPOA negotiations and associated sanctions relief. The group consists of persons designated in connection with terrorism, human rights abuses, and activities in Syria, and more than 130 persons designated in connection to Iran’s defense industry and ballistic missile program, which includes the IRGC and its network.
**Designation Authorities**

**Missiles:**
Authorities will remain in place to allow the U.S. government to target Iran’s development of missiles and other means to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, Executive Order 13382 and Executive Order 12938, broad counter-proliferation authorities that have been used to designate numerous Iranian-linked targets, would be retained under the JCPOA. More than 130 persons designated pursuant to these authorities for their involvement in Iran’s missile program and proliferation activities will remain designated.

**Terrorism:**
Authorities will remain in place to allow the U.S. government to target Iran’s support for terrorism. For example, Executive Order 13224, a broad terrorism authority that has been used to designate approximately 50 Iranian-linked targets, would be retained under the JCPOA. Targets that will remain designated include Iran’s Mahan Air, Bank Saderat, and the IRGC-Qods Force. We will also continue aggressively employing this authority against Iran-sponsored terrorist groups such as Hizballah.

**Human Rights:**
Authorities will remain in place to allow the U.S. government to target Iran's human rights abuses and censorship activities. For example, we will retain the GHRAVITY Executive Order (Executive Order 13606, April 2012), which targets persons providing information technology to Iran or Syria that could be used by those governments to commit serious human rights abuses. Also remaining in place will be provisions of Executive Order 13553 (September 2010), Executive Order 13628 (October 2012), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) targeting human rights abuses.

**Opposition to Development Assistance:**
Iran’s continued status as a state sponsor of terrorism, moreover, will continue to mean that the U.S. will use its voice and vote in international financial institutions to oppose assistance to Iran.

**Regional Destabilization:**
Authorities will remain in place that allow the U.S. government to target Iran’s efforts to destabilize its neighbors and pursue its desire for regional hegemony. Authorities that will remain include those that target:

- **Syria:** Human rights abuses in Syria (Executive Order 13572, April 2011) and providing material support to the Government of Syria (Executive Order 13582, August 2011). We have used these authorities to target numerous companies and persons involved in such conduct.

- **Iraq:** Threatening the peace, security, or stability of Iraq. We have employed this authority to target IRGC officials and Iraqis with ties to Iran authorities to target numerous companies and persons involved in such conduct.

- **Yemen:** Threatening the peace, security, or stability of Yemen (Executive Order 13611). This authority has been used to target, for example, Iran-backed Houthi militant leaders.

**Secondary Sanctions:**
The United States will also retain secondary sanctions authorities targeting third parties for dealings with Iranian persons on our SDN List, including those designated under our terrorism, counter-proliferation, missile, and human rights authorities. Secondary sanctions target conduct by non-U.S. persons related to sanctioned persons or activities. Anyone worldwide who transacts with or supports individuals or entities sanctioned in connection with Iran’s support for terrorism or development of WMD and missiles—as well as any Iranian individual or entity who remains on our SDN List—puts themselves at risk of being cut off from the U.S. financial system. This includes foreign financial institutions, who would risk losing their correspondent accounts with U.S. banks. Sanctions will also continue to apply to persons who provide Iran with specified weapons, dual use goods and related technologies.
2. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Sanctions

UNSC restrictions on Iran’s purchases and sales of conventional arms and related material and ballistic missile-related items and technology will remain in place for 5 and 8 years, respectively, or until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

There are current UN arms embargoes on the Houthis in Yemen, non-state actors in Lebanon (including Hizbullah), Afghanistan (the Taliban), Iraq (including Shi’a militias), North Korea, and Libya, as well as on several states in Africa.

Sanctions Relief – Countering Iran’s Regional Activities

The U.S. sees Iran clearly for what it is: the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism; a supporter of terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas; a backer of the Asad regime’s brutality in Syria; and a force for instability in Yemen. That is why, regardless of whether or not there is a deal, we will maintain and continue to aggressively enforce our sanctions against Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and destabilizing activities in the region. And, if Iran intensifies these efforts, we — along with our partners — will combat Iran’s interventions.

U.S. support to our regional partners will continue to be key to countering Iranian aggression in the region. That is why we are working to expand our cooperation across the board with regional partners that share our concerns over Iran, as the President agreed with regional leaders at the Camp David summit in May. This effort will strengthen our regional partners across a range of areas, while making clear we will not accept Iranian efforts to spread instability and strengthen its terrorist proxies.

An Unconstrained Iran Would Pose an Even Greater Threat

A nuclear-armed Iran, or an Iran with an unchecked nuclear program, would be able to project even greater power in the region. That is precisely why the President has said we will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. To that end, we reserve the right to take whatever steps necessary to protect America’s security. At the same time, a diplomatic solution is by far the most preferable and sustainable solution. A nuclear deal that effectively cuts off all Iranian pathways to a bomb leaves us far better positioned to address concerns about Iran’s terrorist activities and support for regional destabilization.
Iran Faces Large and Pressing Domestic Spending Needs

Of Iran's approximately $100 billion in overseas foreign reserves, we estimate that, after sanctions relief, Iran will be able to freely access slightly more than half — a little over $50 billion. That is because over $20 billion is dedicated to projects with China, where it cannot be freely spent, and tens of billions in additional funds are effectively non-performing loans to Iran's energy and banking sector that are unlikely to be repaid, at least not in the next few years.

Our sanctions, which we imposed together with the international community, have exacted a major toll on Iran's economy.

Consider:

**Iran needs about half a trillion dollars to meet pressing investment needs, including at least:**

- **Energy**: $170 billion to develop oil and gas potential and replace lost capacity
- **Agriculture**: $100 billion for agricultural rehabilitation, irrigation, and environmental remediation
- **Infrastructure**: $100 billion to complete unfinished infrastructure projects
- **Power**: $50 billion over next seven years to satisfy anticipated demand and invest in renewable energy

**Iran also needs about $100 billion to satisfy pressing government obligations, including unfunded state and military pensions, debts to the domestic banking sector and government contractors, and to plug shortfalls in the National Development Fund.**

**Iran's economy remains 15-20 percent smaller today than it would have been had it remained on its pre-2011 growth trajectory.**

**Even if Iran returns to its pre-2012 growth trajectory, it would take until 2020 for Iran's GDP to reach the level it would have been last year had it not been for our oil sanctions.**

**The $100 billion in Iran's reserves now restricted overseas is unlikely to be repatriated to Iran. As a matter of prudent economic management, Iran will need to keep most of this money overseas to facilitate foreign trade and avoid making its currency too expensive.**

Moreover, the Iranian people — and its leadership — are desperate to see the economic benefits of a deal. Rouhani was elected on a platform of economic revitalization, and faces a political imperative to live up to his promises. In fact, if you look at the released funds from the JPOA, instead of using these funds to support terrorists, Iran mostly used them to buy gold, prop up its currency and hedge against inflation.

It's also important to note that Iran's ability to support terrorism relies less on monetary funds, and more on military and other political influence since terrorism and Iran's other malign regional activities are, unfortunately, not expensive. The constraints on greater Iranian activities in the region are primarily non-financial — and we will continue to raise the costs to Iran of these activities.

**Iran Will Remain Exposed to Our Sanctions and Snapback**

To take meaningful advantage of the sanctions relief, Iran will need to engage with the international community in a way that sustains our significant leverage. Iran will rely on access to the international banking system, to import goods and services and attract foreign capital. As a result, if there is a deal and Iran fails to abide by its nuclear obligations, will be in a position to reimpose enormous pressure.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) exceeds all five benchmarks for a good deal published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s (WINEP) bipartisan group for the Iran nuclear issue. The JCPOA reaffirms U.S. policy to prevent Iran from producing sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon — or otherwise acquiring or building one.

### WINEP Benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring and Verification:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the “IAEA”) charged with monitoring compliance with the agreement must have timely and effective access to any sites in Iran they need to visit in order to verify Iran’s compliance with the agreement. This must include military (including IRGC) and other sensitive facilities. Iran must not be able to deny or delay timely access to any site anywhere in the country that the inspectors need to visit in order to carry out their responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### JCPOA Commitments

<table>
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<th>Done.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The JCPOA ensures both timely and effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to any location in Iran necessary in order to verify Iran’s compliance. Not only will the IAEA have daily access to Iran’s primary nuclear sites, Natanz1 and Fordow2, but it will be able to conduct regular monitoring — using modern technology3 — of Iran’s uranium mines and mills4 and its centrifuge production, assembly, and storage facilities5. This means that the IAEA will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program, as well as be able to continuously monitor the nuclear infrastructure that is removed as a requirement of this deal. In an instance where the IAEA has a question about an undeclared location outside Iran’s declared nuclear program, the IAEA will be able to request access under the Additional Protocol (AP), which Iran will implement as part of the JCPOA. Access under the Additional Protocol will be used by the IAEA to verify at undeclared sites that no unapproved nuclear activity is occurring. Military and other sensitive sites are not exempt from the AP. Above and beyond the AP, the JCPOA has an additional procedure that will effectively require Iran to grant IAEA access to any requested location within a predetermined, limited time period. If Iran denies access through this procedure, it would be in violation of the JCPOA. Moreover, the establishment of a dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will also enable the close monitoring and approval of materials so as to minimize the chances of any diversion to a secret program.</td>
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### Possible Military Dimensions

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<tr>
<td>Iran has agreed to address all of the outstanding issues with regards to PMD in a comprehensive and time-limited manner. The IAEA and Iran together have developed and agreed on this time-limited process through which Iran will address the IAEA’s questions by simultaneously and meaningfully engaging on all of the issues set out in the IAEA Director General’s November 2011 report on PMD. Iran has committed, as a condition of the JCPOA, to provide the information and access the IAEA needs to complete its investigation of PMD and issue its independent assessment. Appropriate access will be given to Parchin. Iran will provide this information and access within the next three months—by October 15th. Sanctions relief will not be provided unless and until Iran completes this process and gives the IAEA what it needs. In addition to addressing past weaponization concerns, the JCPOA also puts into place new commitments by Iran not to engage in select activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINEP Benchmarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Advanced Centrifuges:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The agreement must establish strict limits on advanced centrifuge R&amp;D, testing, and deployment in the first ten years, and preclude the rapid technical upgrade and expansion of Iran's enrichment capacity after the initial ten-year period. The goal is to push back Iran’s deployment of advanced centrifuges as long as possible, and ensure that any such deployment occurs at a measured, incremental pace consonant with a peaceful nuclear program.</td>
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</table>

| **Sanctions Relief:**                                                          | **Done.**                                                                        |
| Relief must be based on Iran’s performance of its obligations. Suspension or lifting of the most significant sanctions must not occur until the IAEA confirms that Iran has taken the key steps required to come into compliance with the agreement. Non-nuclear sanctions (such as for terrorism) must remain in effect and be vigorously enforced. | Under the JCPOA, Iran will only receive additional UN, EU, and U.S. sanctions relief beyond the small level of relief in the Joint Plan of Action once the IAEA verifies that Iran has implemented key nuclear-related measures agreed upon in the JCPOA. U.S. sanctions imposed for non-nuclear reasons will remain in effect and will continue to be vigorously enforced. |

| **Consequences of Violations:**                                                | **Done.**                                                                        |
| The agreement must include a timely and effective mechanism to re-impose sanctions automatically if Iran is found to be in violation of the agreement, including by denying or delaying IAEA access. In addition, the United States must itself articulate the serious consequences Iran will face in that event. | The JCPOA has a procedure that will require Iran to grant IAEA access to any requested location within a predetermined, limited time period. If Iran denies access through this procedure, it would break its JCPOA commitment and sanctions could be snapped back. This includes a mechanism that will allow any member of the P5+1 to unilaterally snap back UN sanctions if there is a violation for the initial 10 years of the JCPOA. Put simply, neither Iran, Russia, nor China — or all 3 together — could block the snapback of these sanctions. There is also a political understanding among the P5 to preserve the snapback mechanism for UN sanctions in Years 11-15. And, the EU and United States can snap back their sanctions at any time if Iran does not meet its commitments. The United States will always retain the ability to take whatever steps necessary to protect America’s security and prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon if it chooses to seek to acquire one. In fact, this deal puts us in a better position to do so, if necessary, in the future. |

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1 JCPOA Annex I, Section P
2 JCPOA Annex I, Section H
3 JCPOA Annex I, Section N
4 JCPOA Annex I, Section O
5 JCPOA Annex I, Section K
6 JCPOA Annex I, Section I
7 JCPOA Annex I, Section Q
8 JCPOA Main Text
9 JCPOA Annex I, Section T
10 JCPOA Annex I, Section G
11 JCPOA Annex I, Section G
12 JCPOA Annex V, Paragraph 14
13 JCPOA Annex I, Section Q
JCPOA: Meeting (and Exceeding) the Lausanne Framework

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. The bold text addresses how the JCPOA performed against these broad parameters. Notably, the JCPOA also exceeded the Lausanne Framework in three broad areas including on weaponization, metallurgy, and a number of enrichment-related issues.

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**THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL EXCEEDED U.S. ORIGINAL EXPECTATIONS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Missing from Lausanne Framework</th>
<th>Violation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No activities that could be used to design and develop a nuclear bomb</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No proficiency in uranium or plutonium metallurgy for 15 years</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship out all 20% enriched uranium that’s not in the Tehran Research Reactor</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA monitors the production and stockpile of all heavy water in Iran</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only light water nuclear reactors for the rest of time in Iran</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No importation of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for 15 years</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No working with other countries to develop uranium enrichment tech for 15 years</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**JCPOA Enrichment Commitments**

**✓ Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA**

Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 9)

**✓ Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA**

Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 9)

**✓ Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA**

Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 12,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 15)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 12)</td>
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<th>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only — into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 12)</td>
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<th>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 12)</td>
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<th>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 12)</td>
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<th>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 12)</td>
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<th>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran will not use its IR-2M, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the PS+1. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 10)</td>
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<td>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</td>
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<tr>
<td>For ten years, enrichment and enrichment R&amp;D will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&amp;D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 14)</td>
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<th>JCPOA Inspections and Transparency Commitments</th>
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<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<td>The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 12, 20, 22)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 21, 22, 23, 25)</td>
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<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<td>Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 21) Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 25)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 9, 12, 22)</td>
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<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<td>A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology — an additional transparency measure. (JCPOA Annex IV, p. 3)</td>
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<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<td>Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 18)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCPOA Reactors and Reprocessing Commitments</td>
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<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 18)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 19)</td>
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<th>JCPOA Sanctions Commitments</th>
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<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments. (JCPOA Annex V, p. 2-3)</td>
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<td><strong>Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA</strong></td>
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<td>U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place. (JCPOA Annex V, p. 2-5)</td>
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Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance. (JCPOA Text, p. 11-13; 17-18)

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency). (JCPOA Annex V, p. 2-3)

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions — those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities — will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution. (JCPOA Annex IV, throughout and Annex V, p. 3-5)

A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments. (JCPOA Text, p. 17-18)

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed. (JCPOA Text, p. 17-18)

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal. (JCPOA Text, p. 10-15)

JCPOA Phasing Commitments

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development — ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1. (JCPOA Text, p. 6-7)

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 9-15)

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years. (JCPOA Annex I, p. 21-22)

Commitment Satisfied in the JCPOA
Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program. (JCPOA Text, p. 3)
WHAT THEY’RE SAYING ABOUT THE JCPOA
National Security Experts and Former Officials

“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran stands as a landmark agreement in deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If properly implemented, this comprehensive and rigorously negotiated agreement can be an effective instrument in arresting Iran's nuclear program and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the volatile and vitally important region of the Middle East.”

– 60 national security leaders and former senior officials

The deal makes it “a lot harder for the Iranians to get a nuclear bomb over the next 10 or 15 years.”

– Former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Sam Nunn

“If I were in the Senate I would vote to support the agreement...Walking away means that the sanctions will dissolve,’ he added. ‘We’ll keep them on but they will not have the same effect and Iran will then be free to proceed to a nuclear weapons and then our choice will be accepting them with a nuclear weapon or war.”

– Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell

“I think it’s a good and important deal. It is a very complicated one that everybody is going to have to study. I welcome the discussion about it because...I think it is historic.”

– Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

“I think the agreement is a strong agreement. I think it prevents Iran from developing a nuclear weapon for at least 10, probably 1 year. I don’t think it depends on trust. I think it's verifiable. If they cheat, we can go to the U.N.”

– Former U.S. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
“The nuclear deal advances western interests. It is a historic step forward for the U.S. and Europe.”

- Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under George W. Bush, Ambassador Nicholas Burns

A group of former diplomats sent a letter to Congress urging members of both chambers not to reject the agreement: “[The deal] does meet all of the key goals required for high confidence that, should Iran violate it and move toward building a nuclear weapon, the international intelligence community and the [International Atomic Energy Agency] will discover Iran’s actions early and in sufficient time for strong countermeasures to be taken to stop Iran’s activities.”

- Signatories include five former U.S. ambassadors to Israel: James Cunningham, William Harrop, Edward S. Walker Jr., Thomas Pickering, and Daniel Kurtzer

**Religious Leaders**

“I welcome the momentous agreement just reached between the United States and its P5+1 partners with Iran. This significant achievement aims to curb Iran’s development of nuclear weapons while allowing them to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. More importantly, this agreement signals progress in global nuclear non-proliferation.”

- Bishop Oscar Cantu, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops

“This patience indicated an enormous desire to find the right answers and, in so doing, to have an important and historic impact, not only on the Middle East, but in a larger sense on the direction of the modern world.”

- Cardinal Theodore McCarrick
Nuclear and Nonproliferation Experts

“I would give it an A." “It’s a damn good deal.”
- Nonproliferation expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Jeffrey Lewis

“The Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action announced earlier today is an important achievement...If fully implemented, the agreement will significantly restrict Iran's ability to produce fissile materials suitable for nuclear weapons for the next decade.”
- Union of Concerned Scientists

“We have a once-in-a-lifetime chance to stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb, without putting a single U.S. soldier in harm's way.”
- Joe Cirincione, Ploughshares Fund

“I’ve read all 159 pages of the deal, and I think it is arguably the most robust, intrusive, multilateral nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated. It's stronger than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which turned out to be an incredible success, protecting us from the spread of nuclear weapons. It’s better than the agreement George W. Bush got with [Libya].”
- Jim Walsh, Research Associate, MIT Security Studies Program

“This is a stunning accomplishment...I've been a part of this business for 40 years at this point, and I've never seen anything that begins to approach the comprehensiveness of this agreement.”
- Thomas Shea, veteran former inspector with the IAEA
Regional Editorials on the Iran Deal

Alabama

Good Faith Needed On Iran Deal

“Of course, Iran is hardly an innocent. Its leaders are theocratic extremists who do not respect democracy or human rights. It is a leading national sponsor of terrorism. Were its ambitions to produce a nuclear weapon to be successful, the balance of power in the Middle East and across the globe would change for the worst. Given this, Tuesday’s announcement that a U.S.-led effort to strike a deal limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions is welcome news if — and it’s a big if — all parties can stick to the terms of the accord. Count as a positive anything that puts off full-scale war and offers at least a chance of a more peaceful world. The United States and its five national partners — Russia, Britain, France, China and Germany — receive assurances that a nuclear Iran is at the very least left to some date in the future. In return, Iran has the crippling financial sanctions that have caused suffering in Tehran lifted.”

– The Anniston Star, 7/14/15

Arizona

Iran Deal A Gamble, But No Deal Would Be Worse

“Obama is convinced the world is better off by transforming Iran from the world’s leader in state-sponsored terrorism into a responsible regional leader. Said Obama: ‘A different path, one of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict, leads to more integration into the global economy, more engagement with the international community, and the ability of the Iranian people to prosper and thrive. ‘This deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction. We should seize it.’ That transformation of Iran — from sponsor of terror to member in good standing in the community of nations — is the great gamble in this agreement. Iran today is arming and organizing terrorists in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Qatar, Somalia and elsewhere. Will an agreement requiring constant engagement with former adversaries, notably the U.S., change Iran? There is no shortage of doubters. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu predicted it ‘will enable [Iran] to continue to pursue its aggression and terror.’ Without an agreement, however, Iran already is pursuing its aggression and terror. It is acting outside the sphere of responsible states. This agreement creates a scenario in which that fundamentalist dynamic might change. Is it guaranteed? Not at all. But none of the doubters have offered a better idea. This is what we’ve got.”

– Arizona Republic, 7/14/15
California

Our Preliminary Assessment Is That, If Its Terms Are Strictly Enforced, The Deal Is Likely To Put Nuclear Weapons Beyond Iran’s Reach For A Decade Or More, A Significant Achievement And Probably The Best Outcome Available

“The underlying question is not whether the deal is perfect. Of course it isn’t. The question is whether it achieves its intended objective: to prevent the Islamic Republic — for a significant period of time — from developing nuclear weapons, launching a regional arms race and forcing the U.S. to consider yet another military operation in the Middle East. That should dominate what we hope will be a robust and reasoned debate over the wisdom of the agreement. Our preliminary assessment is that, if its terms are strictly enforced, the deal is likely to put nuclear weapons beyond Iran’s reach for a decade or more, a significant achievement and probably the best outcome available. But we await more discussion, evidence and analysis.”
– Los Angeles Times, 7/15/15

Still, An Agreement With A Reasonable Shot At Success Is Worth Trying Because The Alternative Is Another War, And That Should Be A Last Resort. America Is Not In The Position Of A Neville Chamberlain, Negotiating From A Position Of Weakness To Avoid Conflict.

“First, no one outside of Iran — and perhaps the loopy North Korean regime — wants Iran to have nuclear weapons. Second, while the U.S. led the negotiations, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union are all participants — and they have a history of not agreeing on much of anything. Finally, this negotiation is not an academic exercise, nor is it operating in a vacuum. Any agreement, good or bad, could have dramatically unpleasant geopolitical side effects. One possibility is a nuclear arms race among Iran’s neighbors — especially the wealthy ones — if they feel the deal isn’t adequate to stop Iran from going nuclear. Still, an agreement with a reasonable shot at success is worth trying because the alternative is another war, and that should be a last resort. America is not in the position of a Neville Chamberlain, negotiating from a position of weakness to avoid conflict. We and our allies in this negotiation have the ability to bomb Iran’s real or suspected nuclear sites into oblivion. We would just prefer not to. But let’s not rushing to judgment on the agreement either way. Let’s resist letting cable news mavens of whatever stripe tell us what to think, do some reading on our own and have an honest discussion with the goal of giving our government guidance on how to proceed.”
– San Jose Mercury News, 7/15/15

“The agreement basically fulfills the mission of decreasing the possibilities for Iran to continue producing nuclear materials at its current pace. It requires many reductions, ranging from uranium enrichment (through significant cuts in its stockpile) to the number of centrifuges. It also establishes a system of strict international oversights, and lifts sanctions gradually as parts of the deal are fulfilled, instead of being immediate as Iran wanted. As was to be expected, a group in Congress that had announced opposition to the deal even when the details were unknown disagrees with it. Publicly, they claim that it endangers Israel and the Arab countries. Privately, the Republican strategy to capture the White House involves an allegedly weak U.S. foreign policy. Because of that, no matter what Obama does, he will be attacked. Israeli lobbying in Washington against the agreement, as seen during a speech that Prime Minister Netanyahu made to Congress, will surely be a factor. Implementation is what will determine the success or failure of the deal, which takes into account these possibilities. In the meanwhile, the agreement deserves a chance.”

– La Opinion, 7/15/15

A Historic Accord On Iran’s Nuclear Program

“With Iran’s track record, President Barack Obama is right that the nuclear pact announced Tuesday must be even stricter. ‘This deal is not built on trust. It is built on verification,’ he said from the White House. The agreement between Iran and six world powers led by the United States is historic. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it a ‘historic mistake’ that would allow Iran to become a ‘terrorist nuclear superpower.’ Supporters, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California, called it a historic accomplishment. ‘This is a strong agreement that meets our national security needs and I believe will stand the test of time,’ she said in a statement.”

– Sacramento Bee, 7/14/15
The Iran Agreement Is Supposed To Help Keep Nukes Out Of The Hands Of Crazies. Denouncing It Without Actually Knowing What Is In It Or Hearing From Military And Foreign-Policy Experts About How It Might Work Is Irresponsible And Dangerous.

“Republicans understandably oppose the president on many fronts, which reflects honest philosophical differences, as well as party politics. But Obama’s support for something does not automatically constitute a logical reason to endorse its opposite. The Iran agreement is supposed to help keep nukes out of the hands of crazies. Denouncing it without actually knowing what is in it or hearing from military and foreign-policy experts about how it might work is irresponsible and dangerous. Opposing the deal because it is not warlike enough is just plain nuts. The neocons who pushed the invasion of Iraq thought the U.S. could not only destroy Saddam Hussein’s regime but remake the country into something reflecting American values. They were wrong, and Americans paid dearly for their hubris. At least, Obama is right not to repeat that error. That some of his critics seem willing to is frightening. The U.S. has been continuously at war in the Middle East for more than a decade. We do not need to attack another, larger Muslim country.”

– Durango Herald, 7/16/15

We’ve Tended To Give The Benefit Of The Doubt To The Administration’s Goals, On The Theory That Economic Sanctions Have Not Deterred Iran And Are Unlikely To Do So In The Future, And Putting Iran’s Nuclear Program On Ice For At Least 10 Years Would Be Progress.

“It’s hard to exaggerate the importance of the nuclear deal with Iran to President Obama’s legacy and indeed the security of the Middle East. If the deal stops ‘the spread of nuclear weapons in this region,’ as Obama insisted Tuesday, it will be a magnificent achievement. But if the deal fails to halt Iran’s pursuit of such weapons, and cheating leads to a regional arms race and war, Obama will become a 21st century version of ‘Peace for Our Time’ Neville Chamberlain. We’ve tended to give the benefit of the doubt to the administration’s goals, on the theory that economic sanctions have not deterred Iran and are unlikely to do so in the future, and putting Iran’s nuclear program on ice for at least 10 years would be progress. But if that is true, it is also why the verification and enforcement elements are so important — and why they should become the focus of Congress in the coming days.”

– Denver Post, 7/14/15
For Those Who Accuse President Obama And Secretary Of State John Kerry Of Caving, The Other Five Partners In This Negotiation Also Had To Approve The Agreement. United States Action Alone Could Not Have Forced Iran To Negotiate. We Had Tried That Since 1979.

“Inspectors will raise issues if they suspect Iran is violating the agreement. Iran will get two weeks to respond. If the inspectors are not satisfied, the United States, its five negotiating partners — Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia — the European Union and Iran have another week to resolve the issue. If Iran is found to be in violation, sanctions could return within 65 days. Analysts also note that it would take just five votes to reimpose the sanctions, so if Iran and its sympathizers, China and Russia, tried to block their return, they could be outvoted by the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and the European Union. For those who accuse President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry of caving, the other five partners in this negotiation also had to approve the agreement. United States action alone could not have forced Iran to negotiate. We had tried that since 1979. The United Nations and the European Union imposed their own sanctions, prompted in large part by the disputed 2009 re-election of Iran’s vitriolic president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The 2013 election of reform-minded Hassan Rouhani provided Obama with an opportunity, and he took it. The agreement will not end the mutual distrust between Iran and the U.S. Americans remember the hostage-taking 36 years ago and our label ‘The Great Satan.’ Iranians remember that the U.S. overthrew their democratically elected leader in 1953 and replaced him with the shah. Since the Islamic revolution, the life expectancy in Iran is longer, its infant mortality is lower and its access to health care is higher. Iran is a country of 80 million people in a region where boil is the constant setting. It makes no sense to distance ourselves...The agreement is progress. If Congress passes legislation to block the deal, Obama should veto it — in the national interest.”

– Sun Sentinel, 7/15/15
Question But Give Fair Hearing To Iran Pact

“Despite the considerable achievements of the momentous diplomatic pact with Iran unveiled Tuesday — mainly, a surrender of most of that nation’s nuclear-weapons infrastructure for at least a decade — most Americans are bound to have some misgivings and a lot of questions. They should. Still, the agreement deserves an honest hearing, politics aside, from Congress and the American public, and any rush to judgment is premature. That goes for either the immediate embrace of a complicated document of almost 100 pages with a nation that is not trustworthy, or, conversely, the out-of-hand rejection of a deal that the U.S. negotiating team led by Secretary of State John Kerry worked hard to deliver over 22 months of arduous bargaining and occasional shouting matches. Reaching agreement to freeze Iran’s march toward nuclear capability without resorting to war is a credit to the Obama administration’s persistence. But Mr. Obama must still convince the country that this deal will reduce the danger of a nuclear attack by Iran, and that a rigorous inspection program will verify compliance.”
– Miami Herald, 7/15/15

Iran Nuclear Deal Appears Promising

“The historic agreement aimed at crippling Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon has enormous potential to make the world a safer place. But there is much to digest about the deal announced Tuesday with the United States and five other world powers, and Congress should use wisely the 60 days it has to carefully vet the details. It is a review that should be based on national security and our nation’s long-term interests, not political calculations, campaign sound bites or interference from allies such as Israel. The headlines of the accord are promising and the result of months of negotiations. The deal extends the time Iran would need to produce an atomic bomb from two or three months to at least one year, which would give the United States and its allies an opportunity to react if the Iranians broke the agreement. It dramatically reduces Iran’s supplies of enriched uranium and its stockpile of centrifuges used to enrich uranium gas. It forces significant changes in existing facilities that could be used to help produce nuclear weapons. Those would be positive achievements that are certainly better than the status quo.”
– Tampa Bay Times, 7/14/15
**Idaho**

**Negotiations Produced Nuclear Agreement, Not Iranageddon**

“Movies are not real. The characters in movies are not real. John Wayne was not Marion Morrison’s real name. So maybe candidates trying to become the leader of the free world should stop implying that America should be more like John Wayne and just whip those Iranian Ayatollahs into submission. On July 13, after decades of non-communication, years of punishing sanctions, and months of intense negotiations, Iran and America signed an agreement in which Iran will roll back its nuclear weapons development capability in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. The agreement is 80 pages long. Each word has been negotiated. It covers complicated requirements and has serious implications for the future of the Middle East, as well as American-Iranian relations. Congress has approximately 60 days to accept or reject it. Both Iran and the U.S. will see internal opposition. The sanctions brought Iranian negotiators to the table. They found a willing partner in President Obama, who demonstrated his understanding of the community-organizing trope that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies.”

– Idaho Mountain Express, 7/17/15

**Illinois**

**The Long-Awaited Iranian Nuclear Deal Finalized On Tuesday Appears To Be The Very Best – And Most Certainly The Only Realistic – Shot At Preventing Iran From Developing A Nuclear Weapon**

“The long-awaited Iranian nuclear deal finalized on Tuesday appears to be the very best – and most certainly the only realistic – shot at preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. The fine print matters tremendously, of course. Over the next 60 days, Congress must pore over the agreement negotiated with the United States, China, Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany, scrutinizing a deal that the Obama administration promises is built not on trust but on verification. If that basic ideal bears out, and we have confidence it will given the frameworks that preceded it and the nations that negotiated it, Congress must not stand in the way of a historic deal that was unthinkable just a few years ago.”

– Chicago Sun-Times, 7/14/15
After Two Years Of Grueling Negotiations, The Obama Administration Has Finally Pulled Off A Historic Deal With Iran That Resolves — At Least For The Time Being — One Of The Most Pressing Foreign Policy Challenges Facing The World: Concerns That Iran Could Be Building A Nuclear Bomb.

“After two years of grueling negotiations, the Obama administration has finally pulled off a historic deal with Iran that resolves — at least for the time being — one of the most pressing foreign policy challenges facing the world: concerns that Iran could be building a nuclear bomb. The agreement, which curbs Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions that have crippled the country, is far from perfect. No diplomatic compromise ever is. The deal’s biggest flaw is that it curbs Iran’s production of enriched uranium for only a decade. Limits on Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium last slightly longer: 15 years. Nonetheless, this deal is better than the status quo. Iran currently possesses 10,000 kilograms of enriched uranium. Under the deal, the country will be forced to reduce that to 300 kilograms. Iran currently has about 20,000 centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium. Under the deal, it will be forced to dismantle all but 5,000 of them. Without an agreement, Iran would almost certainly return to full-scale uranium enrichment, forcing the United States and its allies closer to a possible military confrontation at a time of great instability in the region.”

– Boston Globe, 7/15/15
If the standard is that no agreement is better than any compromise because Iran can never be trusted, then the only alternative is war. That’s in no one’s interest.

“The only purpose such a demand serves is to make it easier for opponents of an accord to hide behind the idea that the U.S. could have gotten a better deal if it had been willing to walk away from the talks in Vienna. In fact, Mr. Kerry warned that the U.S. was prepared to do just that if the negotiations stalled, and a senior administration official characterized the deal on the table as actually better than the president expected. That, of course, is not the same as saying it’s a perfect deal. No agreement would have been. Whether the U.S. could have gotten an even better deal if it had been willing to hold out longer in Vienna, as Mr. Netanyahu insisted, is ultimately unknowable. On the other hand, the consequences of Congress rejecting the deal Mr. Kerry negotiated are all too easy to imagine. It would almost certainly wreck the international sanctions regime imposed on Iran because other countries would be unlikely to follow the United States’ lead and instead would lift their sanctions unilaterally. That not only would weaken the most important leverage the U.S. has to restrain Iran’s nuclear program, but by releasing billions of dollars into its accounts, it would also put Iran back on a path to a bomb in a greatly strengthened position. That’s in neither our interest nor those of our allies in the region. Republicans are right that we can’t trust Iran, and we shouldn’t. That’s why the U.S. is insisting on a robust inspection and monitoring regime that can respond promptly to evidence of Iranian cheating. We need to thoroughly vet the details of this accord, and we need to examine Iran’s nuclear sites and talk to its scientists who in the past may have carried out weapons research to establish a baseline for their future activities. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the Vienna accord out of hand, as some in Congress appear inclined to do. If the standard is that no agreement is better than any compromise because Iran can never be trusted, then the only alternative is war. That’s in no one’s interest.”

– Baltimore Sun, 7/14/15
Michigan

But Going To War With Iran Would Hardly Provide The Greater Stability Critics Of The Deal Purport To Seek. The U.S. Has Long Held — And Should Continue To Maintain — Close Ties With Israel, And That Nation Opposes This Deal. Yet At This Time, We See No Other Viable Path

“Obama now must seek approval from the U.S. Congress, where Republican lawmakers have already vowed to scuttle the deal. Some are genuinely concerned that it does too little to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Others are spoiling for a military confrontation with Iran, and seem disappointed that this week’s nuclear pact may postpone, or even avert, such a showdown. But going to war with Iran would hardly provide the greater stability critics of the deal purport to seek. The U.S. has long held — and should continue to maintain — close ties with Israel, and that nation opposes this deal. Yet at this time, we see no other viable path. Iran is a sprawling nation with a large economy; marginalizing it is not a sustainable option, and provoking a military conflict with its incumbent rulers would be reckless. U.S. efforts at regime change in Iraq mired us, and that country, in more than a decade of strife, with no end in sight. War is the ultimate failure of diplomacy, British politician Tony Benn once said. Right now, diplomacy holds the greatest promise of success.”

– Detroit Free Press, 7/16/15

Minnesota


“Opinions will vary on the deal announced Tuesday between Iran and the ‘P5+1’ (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China — the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — plus Germany). But all should acknowledge that the beleaguered international system worked as designed in producing an agreement on Iran’s potential nuclear weapons program. Global leaders recognized the threat that a weaponized Iran posed, and through strict sanctions the P5+1 brought Iran into a multilateral negotiating process that resulted in an accord. So a major global challenge was addressed, however imperfectly, without war. Diplomacy produced results. As Congress considers its response over the next 60 days, it should keep in mind that this isn’t just about Iran, but also about maintaining the capacity of the international system to coalesce on critical matters, despite tensions and disagreements on so many other geopolitical issues. Rejecting this kind of engagement will make it much more difficult for subsequent presidents to achieve similar results.”

– Star Tribune, 7/14/15
Missouri

Iran Nuclear Deal Is A Path Away From War

“We have seen what comes of U.S. involvement in Middle East wars — destabilization, new terrorist threats and more war. The pact with Iran announced Tuesday is about diminishing the chances of the United States going to war to stop Iran from deploying a nuclear weapon. To that end, the U.S. and its negotiating partners forged a sound deal. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry should be hailed for a historic achievement. To gain the lifting of international economic sanctions, Iran agreed to surrender 98 percent of its supply of low-enriched uranium and to remove two-thirds of its nuclear centrifuges — technology that spins uranium into the concentrated form that could produce a nuclear explosion. Iran also agreed not to seek or possess highly enriched uranium for at least 15 years. Significantly, it consented to full-time monitoring of every aspect of its nuclear program.”

– Kansas City Star, 7/14/15

Nebraska

Perhaps The Most Important Thing To Keep In Mind Is That Without A Deal, Iran Will Be Free To Develop Its Nuclear Program Without Any Restrictions. Iran Has Everything It Needs, Including Skilled Scientists.

“The only real question that needs to be answered on the Iran deal is whether the world is a safer place with it, or without it. Because the world is violent, and things often are not what they seem, the question is extraordinarily difficult to answer. It’s unfortunate that too many members of Congress had their minds made up before the details of the agreement were announced, and before the deal could be evaluated... Perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is that without a deal, Iran will be free to develop its nuclear program without any restrictions. Iran has everything it needs, including skilled scientists. Informed guesses range from months to years on how quickly Iran could create a nuclear weapon. If the deal is what the Obama administration claims, it will slow that process, for example, with new limits on how many centrifuges the country can operate to purify nuclear material.”

– Journal Star, 7/16/15
The Nuclear Deal With Iran Is A Calculated Risk That Is Decidedly Worth Taking

“The nuclear deal with Iran is a calculated risk that is decidedly worth taking. The risk is that by lifting potent economic sanctions, it will strengthen Iran’s sputtering economy, empowering an avowed enemy of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. That is enough for both Israel and some Sunni Arab states to oppose the agreement, and it is a valid concern that President Obama will have to address as Congress debates this over the next few months. Iran and its proxies are defending the brutal Assad regime in Syria, provoking Sunni-Shiite tensions in places like Yemen, and supporting terrorists groups that are devoted to the destruction of Israel, including Hamas and Hezbollah. And this agreement focuses solely on the question of nuclear arms; it makes no demand that Iran change its behavior in the region. But critics of the deal tend to ignore two hard realities. One is that Iran is well along on the path to building nuclear weapons, and will surely acquire them if this agreement is rejected. Even if sanctions are kept in place, a nuclear Iran would be far more dangerous.”

– Star-Ledger, 7/15/15

The Criticisms Center More On What The Treaty Doesn’t Do Than What It Does, And On The More Existential Idea That You Don’t Make Deals With An Enemy. But This Deal Is In Fact Remarkable For What It Didn’t Have To Do To Accomplish Something Of Paramount Importance To The U.S. And The World.

“The criticisms center more on what the treaty doesn’t do than what it does, and on the more existential idea that you don’t make deals with an enemy. But this deal is in fact remarkable for what it didn’t have to do to accomplish something of paramount importance to the U.S. and the world. It doesn’t normalize relations between the two countries. Obama noted Iran’s ongoing support of terrorism and its funding and use of proxies such as Hezbollah to destabilize parts of the Middle East. He stressed that U.S. sanctions over human-rights violations and other issues will continue...It’s far from perfect, but it makes the world safer than it would have been. And maybe more important, it shows the potential for finding areas of shared interest and collaboration even between opponents.”

– Las Vegas Sun, 7/26/15
An Iran Nuclear Deal That Reduces the Chance of War

“The final deal with Iran announced by the United States and other major world powers does what no amount of political posturing and vague threats of military action had managed to do before. It puts strong, verifiable limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon for at least the next 10 to 15 years and is potentially one of the most consequential accords in recent diplomatic history, with the ability not just to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but also to reshape Middle East politics. The deal, the product of 20 arduous months of negotiations, would obviously have provided more cause for celebration if Iran had agreed to completely dismantle all of its nuclear facilities. But the chances of that happening were effectively zero, and even if all of Iran’s nuclear-related buildings and installations were destroyed, no one can erase the knowledge Iranian scientists have acquired after working on nuclear projects for decades.”

– New York Times, 7/14/15

The Deal Provides Some Hope Of Preventing Iran From Becoming A Nuclear Nation That Could Threaten The Middle East And, With That, The World

“Here is the fundamental question regarding the nuclear deal struck this week with Iran: Are the United States, Israel and the rest of the civilized world better off with it or without it? Upon reflection the answer seems clear: The deal provides some hope of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear nation that could threaten the Middle East and, with that, the world. It is not in any way guaranteed to do that and no one should expect that it will without rigorous enforcement of all its moving parts. To paraphrase one of Ronald Reagan’s most famous aphorisms: Don’t trust; verify. An agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear capability offers the only path – short of military action – to what all say they want, which is to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of a government that has repeatedly shown itself to be erratic and untrustworthy.”

– Buffalo News, 7/17/15
**North Carolina**

**Despite GOP, Israeli Critics, The Iran Deal Is A Good One**

“From Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham to other Republican presidential candidates, the reaction to the Obama administration’s deal to get Iran to curb its ambitions for nuclear arms has been uniformly negative. It’s sad, in a way, that whether it’s a judicial nomination or a nuclear arms treaty, the GOP response is utterly predictable. Part of the reaction from Graham and other GOP presidential aspirants is explained in their need to appeal to the Republican right-wing base. And, it’s an opportunity to pander to Israel, which Graham went over the top in doing, calling the treaty ‘akin to declaring war on Israel.’ Netanyahu believes any discussion with anyone other than Israel is a threat to his country. But the truth is, this is a good deal. It is not perfect, and it is time-limited (Iran will not be able to build beyond a limit on enriched uranium for 10 years) but it is preferable to war, which seems to be the Republican alternative. President George W. Bush’s shoot first, ask questions later approach didn’t work well, and thousands of Americans perished in Iraq and Afghanistan. And any kind of attack on Iran would inflame the entire Mideast, possibly drawing Americans into another prolonged and deadly confrontation.”

– The News & Observer, 7/15/15

**Ohio**

**We Give Nothing Up By Testing Whether Or Not This Problem Can Be Solved Peacefully,’ Obama Said. He’s Right.**

“Selling the deal to a skeptical Congress is critical but U.S. officials remain optimistic that its long-term advantages will become obvious -- including the significance of an accord involving not just Iran, but also Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the European Union reaching consensus on a way forward in a highly dangerous region of the world. ‘This agreement will withstand the test of scrutiny in the next days,’ Kerry said confidently. Obama argues the deal closes off no future options for U.S. or U.N. action but rather promises -- if successful -- to move Iran further away from nuclear weapons capability with the added safeguards of the inspections and transparency that allow us to monitor the Iranian program.’ ‘We give nothing up by testing whether or not this problem can be solved peacefully,’ Obama said. He’s right.”

– Cleveland Plain Dealer, 7/15/15
The Agreement Reflects A Calculated And Necessary Risk: Better To Make A Credible Effort At Checking The Nuclear Ambitions Of Iran For A Decade Than Test The Alternative And Likely Fallout

“Will Iran keep its word? From the start, these talks have been about an exchange. Iran backs away from seeking nuclear weapons. The United States and the other countries ease the punishing economic sanctions they have imposed. What the agreement says is that no relief will come until Iran has moved to limit uranium enrichment, converted the Arak plant, provided for transparency and supplied information about its past pursuit of nuclear weapons. More, provisions outline how sanctions would ‘snap back’ if Iran violates the accord. The agreement is not perfect, by any measure. Neither does it reflect the president and other leaders somehow giving away the store just to get a deal. The negotiations were long because they were tough. The agreement reflects a calculated and necessary risk: Better to make a credible effort at checking the nuclear ambitions of Iran for a decade than test the alternative and likely fallout. So, be suspicious and skeptical. It also bears mentioning that relations with Iran, in a bad place for 35 years, have little chance of improving without such a start.”

– Akron Beacon Journal, 7/15/15

Pennsylvania

We Give Nothing Up By Testing Whether Or Not This Problem Can Be Solved Peacefully,’ Obama Said. He’s Right.

“Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush spoke for many opponents of the agreement to restrict Iran's nuclear weapons development. It's 'appeasement,' he said, evoking the abandonment of Czechoslovakia that emboldened Hitler. But those critics might consider the other side of that coin. Isolation of Germany following World War I, and the resulting resentment it produced among Germans, were major factors in Hitler's rise to power. The Iran agreement indeed is not perfect, thus reflecting the real-life conditions that led to it. It makes Iran a 'nuclear-threshold state,' meaning that it probably would be able to develop a nuclear weapon towards the end of the agreement, in about 15 years. But anyone who thought that Iran was going to abandon its nuclear capability was unrealistic. This agreement commits Iran to reducing its potential nuclear material stockpile by 98 percent and diminishing its capacity to produce that fuel by about two-thirds, and to allow independent inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The provisions increase the period that it would take to produce a weapon from about three months to about a year.”

– The Times-Tribune, 7/15/15
Deal Worth The Effort

“The seven-nation agreement aimed at halting Iran’s progress toward a nuclear arsenal has been criticized as merely delaying the inevitable, but that ignores the value of delay. Delay can buy valuable time to shape relationships and make better deals that might prevent the apparently inevitable from ever happening. Ultimately, the success of the pact won’t be decided by those who negotiated it or the leaders of the countries they represented. It will be decided by the people of Iran, who have endured years of economic sanctions imposed on their repressive regime to reach this point. It will be up to the Iranian people to let the ayatollahs who rule their country know in no uncertain terms that they don’t want an atomic bomb if it means going back to the shortages and deprivations the sanctions caused.”

– The Philadelphia Inquirer, 7/15/15

Is The Agreement Perfect? Certainly Not, But It Is Far Better Than Allowing Iran To Fester In Dangerous Isolation.

“The ball actually will be in the court of Democrats. Once Congress has the accord in writing, it has 60 days to review it. Mr. Obama has promised to veto any measure that would scuttle the deal, so persuading his fellow Democrats to go along will be key in preventing an override. The response so far has been cautious. Even a rejection by the United States, however, would not necessarily mean the entire agreement would be scrapped. China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom all are parties to it, so the Iranian market could be opened to their companies and investors even without the United States. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon praised the accord, and the U.N. Security Council is expected to vote as early as next Tuesday on a resolution that spells out the steps toward lifting sanctions. Is the agreement perfect? Certainly not, but it is far better than allowing Iran to fester in dangerous isolation.”

– Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 7/15/15
Tennessee

It Is Also A Beginning That Congress Should Recognize And Work To Help America And The Other Nations Involved Build Upon.

“A group of six nations led by the United States reached a historic accord with Iran on Tuesday. The agreement — to significantly limit Tehran’s nuclear ability for more than a decade in return for, after five years, lifting international oil and financial sanctions — is, in President Barack Obama’s words ‘not built on trust — it is built on verification.’ It is also a beginning that Congress should recognize and work to help America and the other nations involved build upon. The deal comes after 20 months of negotiations. A New York Times review of the 109-page agreement shows that the United States preserved — and in some cases extended — the nuclear restrictions it sketched out with Iran in early April in Lausanne, Switzerland... The current stockpile of low enriched uranium will be reduced by 98 percent, most likely by shipping much of it to Russia — a portion of the deal that seems less than reassuring since Russia is a longtime supplier of military equipment to Iran. Nonetheless, Iran's lowered stockpile limit, combined with a two-thirds reduction in the number of its centrifuges, would extend to a year the amount of time it would take Iran to make enough material for a single bomb should it abandon the deal and return to a race for a weapon, according to analysts. By comparison, those analysts say Iran now could complete its bomb in two to three months.”

– Chattanooga Free Press, 7/15/15

Texas

The Iranian Deal Is Less Than Perfect, But It Will Delay Any Iranian Nuclear Weapon And Was The Best Deal That Could Be Negotiated — Which Makes It As Perfect As Possible For The Times.

“The Iranian deal is less than perfect, but it will delay any Iranian nuclear weapon and was the best deal that could be negotiated — which makes it as perfect as possible for the times. This deal was not negotiated between the U.S. and Iran alone. It involved other major world powers and represents as close to unanimity on any issue these ‘partners' have arrived at in many a year. That is a milestone in and of itself. There is simply no viable alternative. Holding the international coalition together indefinitely for negotiating or sanctions is unrealistic. Iran will not totally dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, and the knowledge to build a bomb cannot be erased in any case. The aim of dismantling was a nonstarter. But the agreement will require Iran to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and reduce also the number of centrifuges that can be used to do that enriching.”

– San Antonio Express-News, 7/17/15
Utah

Utah’s Elected Officials Should Have The Smarts, And The Political Capital, To Explain To Us That The Hope For Progress That Obama Has Tried To Build With This Pact May Be The Best We Can Reasonably Hope For. Unless They’d Rather Go To War.

“Sadly, the Utahns in Congress were quick to condemn the deal. Chaffetz called it ‘totally unacceptable.’ Rep. Chris Stewart said, ‘It just makes me mad.’ Hatch objected, ‘Any deal that removes sanctions without robust means of ensuring the regime’s disarmament and compliance ... is worse than no deal at all.’ A claim that there is an obvious better choice, something both effective and feasible that Obama somehow missed, can only be predicated on the belief that the United States is omnipotent and has, or can ever hope for, the power to bend rich and technically advanced sovereign nations to our will. Utah’s elected officials should have the smarts, and the political capital, to explain to us that the hope for progress that Obama has tried to build with this pact may be the best we can reasonably hope for. Unless they’d rather go to war.”

– Salt Lake Tribune, 7/17/15

West Virginia

Diplomacy Over War

“Without quite declaring it openly, top Republicans have clamored for America to plunge into war with Iran, just as the previous GOP administration ruinously plunged into war with Iraq. Now, thank heaven, the Obama administration has won a victory that prevents another bloodbath. The treaty negotiated by Secretary of State John Kerry will let international inspectors verify that Iran’s nuclear power program is doing nothing that might put an atomic bomb into the hands of suicidal terrorists, or governments.”

– Charleston Gazette-Mail, 7/15/15
“After persistent diplomacy and tough sanctions, the international community has delivered a historic deal with Iran...It has required leadership, courage and determination on both sides. Now we must ensure that this deal is fully implemented.”

- UK Prime Minister David Cameron

“You have to come back to the alternatives. If we had walked away from this negotiation and not made compromises, I think we would then see a nuclear-armed Iran”

- UK Prime Minister David Cameron

“This is well beyond what many of us thought possible even 18 months ago and a good basis for what I believe could be a very good deal...”

- British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond
“If you kill this deal, what is the alternative? I find that the response to that question is deeply unsatisfying, because all of the alternatives, in my judgment, are worse.”

- Peter Westmacott, British Ambassador to the U.S.

**France**

The agreement had put an end to “one of the most serious and longest crises on nuclear proliferation.” It also aimed, he said, to provide “more peace and stability in the Middle East.”

- French Foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius

**Germany**

The agreement provides a “realistic chance of overcoming one of the most difficult international conflicts through diplomatic means” and brings much closer the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons

- German Chancellor Angela Merkel
China

“The achievement of a comprehensive agreement on Iran firmly defends the international regime of non-proliferation and is a rewarding experience for resolving international disputes through negotiation, as well as a positive signal to the world,”

- Xi Jinping, Chinese President

Russia

“We are confident that the world today breathed a sigh of relief.”

- Russian President Vladimir Putin
“Without an agreement, Iran will be free to do as it pleases, while the sanctions regime will anyway crumble, as many of the world’s countries will rush to Tehran to sign profitable contracts.”
- Efraim Halevy, Ex-Mossad Chief

“[W]hen it comes to Iran’s nuclear capability, this [deal] is the best option...When negotiations began, Iran was two months away from acquiring enough material for a bomb. Now it will be 12 months.”
- Ami Ayalon, former head of Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security service
Other World Leaders

“I warmly welcome the historic agreement in Vienna today and congratulate the P5+1 and Iran for reaching this agreement. This is testament to the value of dialogue.”

- Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General, United Nations

“It is undoubtedly the most important diplomatic achievement for years.”

- Carl Bildt, Former Prime Minister, Sweden

“The agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme is viewed in a positive light by the Holy See...”

- Rev. Federico Lombardi, Vatican spokesman

“This agreement makes everyone better-off.”

- Martin Schulz, European Parliament President

“We have established a very clear timetable. We have identified measures. And more importantly, Iran has a strong incentive to implement this roadmap.”

- Yukiya Amano, IAEA Director General
“We are currently in talks with the American government regarding these details, but [the deal] seems to have achieved these objectives.”

- Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir

“This deal is important not only for the world, but for the region.”

- Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid Bin Mohamed Al-Attiyah

Jordan welcomed the agreement Iran and world powers have reached over Tehran’s nuclear program and noted that the agreement will hopefully “have a positive effect on all states in the region.”

- Jordan’s Ambassador to the UN, Dina Kawar.

“The government of the Republic of Korea welcomes the agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, reached between the P5+1....and Iran in Vienna on July 14”

- Korean Foreign Ministry
Public statements of support from the following 92 countries:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, UK, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
LETTERS AND STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT
Statement by National Security Leaders on the Announcement of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

July 20, 2015

We applaud the announcement that a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been reached with Iran to limit its nuclear program. We congratulate President Obama and all the negotiators for a landmark agreement unprecedented in its importance for preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran.

Though primarily a nonproliferation agreement, the JCPOA has significant implications for some of America’s most important national objectives: regional stability in the Middle East, Israel’s security, dealing with an untrustworthy and hostile nation, and U.S. leadership on major global challenges.

This JCPOA will put in place a set of constraints and monitoring measures that will help to assure that Iran’s nuclear program will be for peaceful purposes only. Major U.S. objectives have been achieved: uranium enrichment limited to 3.67 percent and only at the Natanz plant; the Arak reactor will be re-designed to minimize the amount of plutonium produced and Iran is barred from separating plutonium and all spent fuel will be removed from Iran; a 98 percent reduction in Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium for 15 years; unprecedented surveillance of nuclear activities and control of nuclear related imports; a two-thirds reduction in the installed centrifuges for ten years; constraints on research and development of advanced centrifuges. The agreement will set up a highly effective multilayered program to monitor and inspect every aspect of Iran’s nuclear supply chain and fuel cycle, including continuous monitoring at some sites for 20-25 years, and permit inspections on short notice. We have followed carefully the negotiations as they have progressed and conclude that the JCPOA represents the achievement of greater security for us and our partners in the region.

We acknowledge that the JCPOA does not achieve all of the goals its current detractors have set for it. But it does meet all of the key objectives. Most importantly, should Iran violate the agreement and move toward building nuclear weapons, it will be discovered early and in sufficient time for strong countermeasures to be taken to stop Iran. No agreement between multiple parties can be a perfect agreement without risks. We believe without this agreement, the risks to the security of the U.S. and its friends would be far greater. We have also not heard any viable alternatives from those who oppose the implementation of the JCPOA.

We, the undersigned, have devoted our careers to the peace and security of the United States in both Republican and Democratic Administrations. U.S. presidents and Congresses over the past 20 years have joined in a bipartisan policy of sanctioning and isolating Iran to prevent a nuclear weapon. There was bipartisan understanding that when the Iranians indicated a readiness to talk the U.S. would lead the negotiations to test Iran’s seriousness. Indeed the Corker-Cardin legislation, which was approved this past spring by an overwhelming bipartisan vote in both the House and Senate was signed into law by the President, defines the review process that the Congress will use over the coming months. Members of both political parties can deservedly take credit for bringing us to this moment.
We welcome the discussion that will unfold over the merits of this agreement. We urge members of Congress to be closely involved in the oversight, monitoring and enforcement of this agreement. As Congress was so diligent and constructive in pressing forward the highly effective sanctions regime that helped get Iran to the table, it must now play a key role in the implementation of the agreement which they helped bring about. Congressional approval will eventually be required to lift sanctions under the agreement. Arrangements now need to be made to assure that Congress is a full partner in its implementation.

Those who advocate rejection of the JCPOA should evaluate whether there is a feasible alternative for better protecting U.S. security and more effectively preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The consequences of rejection are grave: the unraveling of international sanctions; U.S. responsibility for the collapse of the agreement; and the possible development of an Iranian nuclear weapon under significantly reduced or no inspections. A rejection of the agreement could leave the U.S. with the only alternative of having to use military force unilaterally in the future.

We call on the Administration to place the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in a strategic context: assuring our partners in the region that the United States remains fully committed to their defense and to countering any destabilizing Iranian actions in the region. We also call on the Administration, with the express support of the Congress, to make clear that it will remain the firm policy of the United States, during the agreement’s initial 10 to 15 years as well as after key restrictions expire, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by all available means.

We will join in a bipartisan effort to formulate a balanced and objective assessment and implementation of this agreement. We are committed to building an effective strategy for its full implementation. This effort will be critical in view of the agreement’s significance for the protection of the security of the U.S. and its friends and for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Amb. (ret.) Morton Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and Ambassador to Thailand and Turkey
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, U.S. National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Advisor
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Ambassador to Greece
BGen. (ret.) Stephen A. Cheney, U.S. Marine Corps
Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund
Amb. (ret.) Chester A Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Amb. (ret.) Ryan Crocker, Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon
Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator and Senate Majority Leader
Suzanne DiMaggio, Director of the 21st Century Diplomacy Project at New America
Amb. (ret.) James Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and Secretary of State’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Amb. (ret.) Stuart E. Eizenstat, Deputy Treasury Secretary and Department of State’s Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Leslie Gelb, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control at the Department of Defense
Morton H. Halperin, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State
Lee H. Hamilton, U.S. House of Representatives and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Amb. (ret.) William C. Harrop, Ambassador to Israel and Inspector General of the State Department
Gary Hart, U.S. Senator and Special Envoy to Northern Ireland
Stephen B. Heintz, President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Amb. (ret.) Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Ambassador to Iraq, Korea, Poland, and Macedonia
Amb. (ret.) Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative
James Hoge, former Editor, Foreign Affairs Magazine
J. Bennett Johnston, U.S. Senator
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, U.S. Senator
LTG (ret.) Frank Kearney, U.S. Army
Amb. (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Ambassador to Israel and Egypt
Carl Levin, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
Amb. (ret) John Limbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran
Amb. (ret.) Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Ambassador to China and Director of State Department Policy Planning
Amb. (ret.) William H. Luers, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Venezuela
Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Jessica T. Mathews, Director of the Office of Global Issues of the National Security Council
George J. Mitchell, U.S. Senator and Senate Majority Leader
Amb. (ret.) William G. Miller, Ambassador to Ukraine
Amb. (ret.) Richard W. Murphy, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Vali Nasr, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Dean of Johns Hopkins University SAIS
Richard Nephew, Director for Iran, National Security Council and Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the Department of State
Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chair, and Chairman National Intelligence Council
Paul O'Neill, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
Admiral (ret.) Eric Olson, U.S. Navy and Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
William Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Amb. (ret.) Thomas Pickering, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, United Nations, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan
Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Platt, Ambassador to Pakistan, Philippines, and Zambia
Joe R. Reeder, Deputy Secretary of the Army and Chairman of the Panama Canal Commission
Donald W. Riegle, U.S. Senator
William Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration and President National Foreign Trade Council
Amb. (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research and Ambassador to China, Indonesia, and Singapore
Barnett R. Rubin, Senior Adviser to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Gen. (ret.) Brent Scowcroft, U.S. National Security Advisor
RADM (ret.) Joe Sestak, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs
Gary Sick, National Security Council Member for Iran and the Persian Gulf
Jim Slattery, U.S. House of Representatives
James R. Sasser, U.S. Senator and Ambassador to China
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of Policy Planning, the Department of State
Mark Udall, U.S. Senator
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas A. Veliotes, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia and Ambassador to Egypt and Jordan
Amb. (ret.) Edward S. Walker, Jr., Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates
James Walsh, Research Associate at MIT's Security Studies Program
Col. (ret.) Lawrence Wilkerson, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State
Timothy E. Wirth, U.S. Senator
Amb. (ret.) Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs and Ambassador to India, Egypt, the Philippines and Zambia

* The signers of this statement were either former senior officials of the U.S. government or prominent national security leaders who have not held senior government positions. The positions listed after the names of the former government officials are senior posts held while in office. The positions listed after the names of those who were not from the government are listed with their current position.
Letter to the President from over 100 former American Ambassadors on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Program.

Dear Mr. President:

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran stands as a landmark agreement in deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If properly implemented, this comprehensive and rigorously negotiated agreement can be an effective instrument in arresting Iran’s nuclear program and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the volatile and vitally important region of the Middle East. Without your determination and the admirable work of Secretary of State Kerry and his team, this agreement would never have been reached.

As former American diplomats, we have devoted much of our lives to ensuring that the President had available the best possible diplomatic approaches to dealing with challenges to our nation’s security, even while recognizing that a strong military is essential to help the President and the Congress to carry out their duties to protect the nation and its people. Effective diplomacy backed by credible defense will be critically important now, during the period of inspection and verification of Iran’s compliance with the agreement.

The JCPOA touches on some of America’s most important national objectives: non-proliferation and the security of our friends in the Middle East particularly Israel. Ensuring the cooperation and implementation of this agreement by a hostile nation will require constant, dedicated U.S. leadership and unflagging attention.

We recognize that the JCPOA is not a perfect or risk-free settlement of this problem. However, we believe without it, the risks to the security of the United States and our friends and allies would be far greater. We are satisfied that the JCPOA will put in place a set of constraints and inspections that can assure that Iran’s nuclear program during the terms of the agreement will remain only for peaceful purposes and that no part of Iran is exempt from inspection. As with any negotiated settlement, the most durable and effective agreement is one that all sides will commit to and benefit from over the long term.

We support close Congressional involvement in the oversight, monitoring and enforcement of this agreement. Congress must be a full partner in its implementation and must evaluate carefully the value and feasibility of any alternative that would claim better to protect U.S. security and more effectively to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In particular, Congress must give careful attention to evaluating whether alternatives would be more or less likely to narrow the options for resolving this issue without the use of force.

In our judgment the JCPOA deserves Congressional support and the opportunity to show it can work. We firmly believe that the most effective way to protect U.S. national security, and that of
our allies and friends is to ensure that tough-minded diplomacy has a chance to succeed before considering other more costly and risky alternatives.

With respect,

Amb. (ret.) Diego C. Asencio, Ambassador to Colombia and Brazil
Amb. (ret.) Adrian Basora, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
J. Brian Atwood, Administrator of USAID and Under Secretary of State for Management
Amb. (ret.) William M. Bellamy, Ambassador to Kenya
Amb. (ret.) John R. Beyrle, Ambassador to Russia and Bulgaria
Amb. (ret.) James Keough Bishop, Ambassador to Niger, Liberia and Somalia
Amb. (ret.) Barbara K. Bodine, Ambassador to Yemen
Amb. (ret.) Avis Bohlen, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control
Amb. (ret.) Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security
Amb. (ret.) Stephen Bosworth, Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
Amb. (ret.) Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia
Amb. (ret.) Kenneth C. Brill, Ambassador to the IAEA, UN and founder of the U.S. National Counterproliferation Center
Amb. (ret.) Kenneth L. Brown, Ambassador to Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana
Amb. (ret.) A. Peter Burleigh, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Greece and NATO
Amb. (ret.) James F. Collins, Ambassador to the Russian Federation and Ambassador at Large for the New Independent States
Amb. (ret.) Edwin G. Corr, Ambassador to Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador
Amb. (ret.) William Courtney, Commissioner, Bilateral Consultative Commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
Amb. (ret.) Ryan Crocker, Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon
Amb. (ret.) James B. Cunningham, Ambassador to Israel, Afghanistan and the United Nations
Amb. (ret.) Walter L. Cutler, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Tunisia
Amb. (ret.) Ruth A. Davis, Ambassador to the Republic of Benin and Director General of the Foreign Service
Amb. (ret.) John Gunther Dean, Ambassador to India
Amb. (ret.) Shaun Donnelly, Ambassador to Sri Lanka
Amb. (ret.) Harriet L. Elam-Thomas, Ambassador to Senegal
Amb. (ret.) Theodore L. Eliot Jr., Ambassador to Afghanistan
Amb. (ret.) Nancy Ely-Raphel, Ambassador to Slovenia
Amb. (ret.) Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense and Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Amb. (ret.) Robert Gallucci, Ambassador at Large
Amb. (ret.) Robert S. Gelbard, President’s Special Representative for the Balkans
David C. Gompert, former Acting Director of National Intelligence
Amb. (ret.) James E. Goodby, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Security and Dismantlement, and Ambassador to Finland
Amb. (ret.) Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Ambassador to Turkey
Amb. (ret.) Brandon Grove, Director Foreign Service Institute
Amb. (ret.) William Harrop, Ambassador to Israel, Guinea, Kenya, and Seychelles
Amb. (ret.) Ulric Haynes, Jr., Ambassador to Algeria
Amb. (ret.) Donald Hays, Ambassador to the United Nations
Amb. (ret.) Heather M. Hodges, Ambassador to Ecuador and Moldova
Amb. (ret.) Karl Hofmann, Ambassador to Togo
Amb. (ret.) Thomas C. Hubbard, Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
Amb. (ret.) Vicki Huddleston, Ambassador to Mali and Madagascar
Thomas L. Hughes, former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Amb. (ret.) Dennis Jett, Ambassador to Mozambique and Peru
Amb. (ret.) Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia
Amb. (ret.) James R. Jones, Ambassador to Mexico and formerly Member of Congress and White House Chief of Staff
Amb. (ret.) Theodore Kattouf, Ambassador to Syria and United Arab Emirates
Amb. (ret.) Richard D. Kauzlarich, Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Amb. (ret.) Kenton W. Keith, Ambassador to Qatar
Amb. (ret.) Roger Kirk, Ambassador to Romania and Somalia
Amb. (ret.) John C. Kornblum, Ambassador to Germany and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Amb. (ret.) Eleni Kounalakis, Ambassador to Hungary
Amb. (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Ambassador to Israel and Egypt
Amb. (ret.) Bruce Laingen, Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran (1979)
Frank E. Loy, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs
Amb. (ret.) William Luers, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Venezuela
Amb. (ret.) Princeton N. Lyman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Amb. (ret.) John F. Maisto, Ambassador to Organization of American States, Venezuela, Nicaragua
Amb. (ret.) Jack Matlock, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Amb. (ret.) Donald F. McHenry, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Amb. (ret.) Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Ambassador to Colombia, and at Large for Counterterrorism
Amb. (ret.) William B. Milam, Ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh
Amb. (ret.) Tom Miller, Ambassador to Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina
Amb. (ret.) George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador to Benin, Senegal
Amb. (ret.) Cameron Munter, Ambassador to Pakistan and Serbia
Amb. (ret.) Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Amb. (ret.) Ronald E. Neumann, Ambassador to Afghanistan, Algeria, and Bahrain
Amb. (ret.) Thomas M. T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Canada and Ambassador to Greece
Phyllis E. Oakley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Amb. (ret.) W. Robert Pearson, Ambassador to Turkey
Amb. (ret.) Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affair
Amb. (ret.) Pete Peterson, Ambassador to Vietnam
Amb. (ret.) Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, United Nations, El Salvador, Nigeria and Jordan
Amb. (ret.) Joan M. Plaisted, Ambassador to the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Kitibati
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Platt, Ambassador to Pakistan, Philippines, and Zambia
Amb. (ret.) Anthony Quainton, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic security or Director General of the Foreign Service
Amb. (ret.) Robin L. Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia
Amb. (ret.) Charles A. Ray, Ambassador to Zimbabwe and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs
Amb. (ret.) Arlene Render, Ambassador to The Gambia, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire
Amb. (ret.) Julissa Reynoso, Ambassador to Uruguay
Amb. (ret.) Francis J. Ricciardone, Ambassador to Egypt, Turkey, the Philippines, and Palau
Amb. (ret.) Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary for Europe and Canada and Counselor of the Department
Amb. (ret.) Peter F. Romero, Assistant Secretary of State
Amb. (ret.) Theodore Sedgwick, Ambassador to Slovakia
Amb. (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, Ambassador to China and Indonesia
Amb. (ret.) William A. Rugh, Ambassador to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates
Amb. (ret.) Janet A Sanderson, Ambassador to Algeria and Haiti
Amb. (ret.) Teresita C. Schaffer, Ambassador to Sri Lanka
Amb. (ret.) Howard B. Schaffer, Ambassador to Bangladesh
Amb. (ret.) Raymond G. H. Seitz, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Amb. (ret.) John Shattuck, Ambassador to the Czech Republic
Amb. (ret.) Ronald I. Spiers, Ambassador to Pakistan, Turkey and Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs
Amb. (ret.) Patrick Nickolas Theros, Ambassador to the State of Qatar
Arturo A. Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. (ret.) William J. Vanden Heuvel, Deputy Permanent United States Representative to the United Nations
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas A. Veliotes, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Amb. (ret.) Richard N. Viets, Ambassador to Jordan
Amb. (ret.) Edward S. Walker, Jr., Ambassador to Israel, Egypt and United Arab Emirates
Amb. (ret.) Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Ambassador to Peru
Amb. (ret.) Melissa Wells, Ambassador to Estonia, DRC-Congo, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau
Amb. (ret.) Philip C. Wilcox Junior, Ambassador at Large for Counter Terrorism
Molly K. Williamson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Defense, and Commerce
Amb. (ret.) Frank Wisner, Ambassador to India, Egypt, the Philippines and Zambia, and Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs
Amb. (ret.) John Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation
Amb. (ret.) Kenneth Yalowitz, Ambassador to Belarus and Georgia

* All the above signers have retired from the US Government and the positions listed after their names are some of those held while in office.
Atlantic Council

JULY 17, 2015

Atlantic Council Iran Task Force Voices Support of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) While Urging Vigilant Implementation

The Iran Task Force of the Atlantic Council supports the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) announced in Vienna this week and applauds the bold intent and intense efforts of President Barack Obama and his team of diplomats and scientists who worked so hard to bring it to fruition.

This Task Force has worked for five years on Iran-related issues and has accumulated a great deal of knowledge, insight and understanding of these issues from Iran’s internal political developments to the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy, with a special focus on the challenges raised by Iran’s nuclear program. We have held more than fifty seminars and other events with a wide-range of experts and published more than a dozen issue briefs and reports, including a groundbreaking 2013 study that has informed US policy and that we hope will continue to do so going forward.

At the same time we support the JCPOA, we believe it is necessary to view the agreement with a clear-eyed, realistic perspective, wishing for the best outcome but also being prepared for less-favorable scenarios given past Iranian conduct. We hope that our colleagues in Congress will share this objective with a non-partisan appraisal of the agreement.

It is our hope that Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany will fully comply with their pledges in the JCPOA. On Iran’s side, these include its
promises to satisfy the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, its acceptance of the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its pledge to turn away permanently from any temptation to acquire a nuclear weapon, not just during the term of the agreement but after its expiration. We also hope that the large sums of money that will come to Iran following the lifting of sanctions will be used for internal development and the betterment of its citizens, not for further support for groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

It is also a requirement that the U.S. government be vigilant against any obstruction of IAEA inspections of declared or suspect sites and recognize the difficulty of “snapping back” sanctions if there are violations. We believe it is critical that the US government take actions to deal with the significant opposition to this agreement from our closest Arab allies in the Middle East and from Israel, which views an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat. The US government, working with its European allies, must act urgently to insure that the JCPOA does not ignite a new nuclear arms race in the volatile Middle East, and that the end of the multilateral conventional arms embargo and missile embargo on Iran in five and eight years respectively does not threaten American interests in the region or those of our allies. The United States must provide our allies with the means necessary to defend themselves against threats from Iran and its proxies. Iran must also know that the United States views Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon during or after the expiration of the JCPOA as unacceptable, and will take all actions necessary to assure against this contingency.

Still, we come to the conclusion, even in a worst or most likely a mixed case scenario, that this agreement is better than the alternatives if the JCPOA is rejected. We would be left with only a military option, which may be necessary if Iran actually marches toward a nuclear weapon.

We believe that additional sanctions are not likely to produce a significantly improved agreement. The reason is that we already have the most extensive, comprehensive sanctions ever exacted against a country in peacetime, and there are few others available to the United States. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the European Union, China and
Russia, whose cooperation in imposing sanctions has been critical to getting Iran to seriously negotiate and make the significant compromises embodied in the JCPOA, would support additional sanctions in the absence of Iranian misdemeanor. Even during the sanctions period, Iran continued to increase the number of centrifuges, to work on more advanced centrifuges, and to begin a plutonium facility at Arak.

Most important, with no agreement, there would be no significant reduction in Iran’s 19,000 installed centrifuges; no redesign of its Arak reactor; no intrusive IAEA inspections; and no elongation of its breakout period from several months to a year.

As a result, this Task Force supports the administration and the implementation of the JCPOA, while urging special vigilance against any violations of its terms.

Letter to Congressional Leadership from Former Under Secretaries of State and former American Ambassadors to Israel on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

July 27, 2015

Dear Speaker Boehner and Minority Leader Pelosi:

As former United States ambassadors to Israel and former Under Secretaries of State, we have worked throughout our careers to strengthen and deepen the bonds between the United States and Israel. Our firm instructions in every administration we served, reflecting American national interests and values, were to help assure Israel’s well-being and safety.

It is our commitment to this enduring objective of American policy that motivates us now to write in support of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by the five permanent United Nations Security Council members plus Germany (P5+1). We are persuaded that this agreement will put in place a set of constraints and monitoring measures that will arrest Iran’s nuclear program for at least fifteen years and assure that this agreement will leave Iran no legitimate avenue to produce a nuclear weapon during the next ten to fifteen years. This landmark agreement removes the threat that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to the region and to Israel specifically.

We acknowledge that the JCPOA does not achieve all of the goals its current detractors have set for it. But it does meet all of the key goals required for high confidence that, should Iran violate it and move toward building a nuclear weapon, the international intelligence community and the IAEA will discover Iran’s actions early and in sufficient time for strong countermeasures to be taken to stop Iran’s activities. No agreement between multiple parties can be perfect or without risks. We believe that without this agreement, however, the risks will be much higher for the United States and Israel. We see no fatal flaws that should call for the rejection of this agreement and have not heard any viable alternatives from those who oppose the implementation of the JCPOA.

Those who advocate rejection of the JCPOA should assess carefully the value and feasibility of any alternative strategy to meet the goal of better protecting the security of the U.S. and Israel and more effectively prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The consequences of rejection are grave: U.S. responsibility for the collapse of the agreement; the inability to hold the P5+1 together for the essential international sanctions regime and such other action that may be required against Iran; and the real possibility that Iran will decide to build a nuclear weapon under significantly reduced or no inspections. The rejection of this agreement could lead to the U.S. having to use military force without the support of other allies and without the understanding of the international community.
Because there is so little trust that Iran will remain in full compliance with the agreement, the U.S. must remain alert and continue to monitor Iran’s actions carefully. The President and Secretary Kerry have made clear that the U.S. and others will take all steps necessary to assure that Iran does not violate its commitments including to enrich enough highly enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon. If the extensive monitoring and verification system in the JCPOA is carried out faithfully, then a greatly restrained Iran will be unable to pose a credible military threat to Israel. Additionally, decades of constant American support of Israel’s security requirements now assure that Israel’s well-known and fully understood strategic military capabilities are far superior to those of Iran. This should remain the case in the future.

The Administration must make clear that it will remain the firm policy of the United States during the agreement and beyond, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by all necessary means.

During the implementation period of the JCPOA, it is essential that Israel remain assured by the Administration of the enduring and unequivocal American commitment to its security and well-being. The prevention of a nuclear-armed Iran must remain a highest priority of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

R. Nicholas Burns, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Ambassador to NATO
James Cunningham, former Ambassador to Israel
William Harrop, former Ambassador to Israel
Daniel Kurtzer, former Ambassador to Israel
Thomas R. Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and former Ambassador to Israel
Edward S. Walker Jr., former Ambassador to Israel
Frank G. Wisner, former Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
July 14, 2015

United House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative:

As Chair of the Committee on International Justice and Peace of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, I welcome the momentous agreement just reached between the United States and its P5+1 partners with Iran. This significant achievement aims to curb Iran’s development of nuclear weapons while allowing them to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

More importantly, this agreement signals progress in global nuclear non-proliferation. In January 2015, Pope Francis said, “I express my hope that a definitive agreement may soon be reached between Iran and the P5+1 Group regarding the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and my appreciation of the efforts already made in this regard.”

Since 2007, our Committee on International Justice and Peace, reflecting the longstanding position of the Holy See, has urged our nation to pursue diplomacy to ensure Iran’s compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For years, we have supported dialogue and a negotiated resolution of the conflict in collaboration with international partners.

It is no small achievement that the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China, Germany and France have reached this agreement with Iran. We hope that the full implementation of the agreement will gradually foster an environment in which all parties build mutual confidence and trust, so that progress will be made toward greater stability and dialogue in the region. In that spirit, our Committee will continue to urge Congress to endorse the result of these intense negotiations because the alternative leads toward armed conflict, an outcome of profound concern to the Church.

The United States and its international partners have taken a remarkable step with Iran in reaching this agreement. We encourage Congress to support these efforts to build bridges that foster peace and greater understanding. In the words of Pope Francis, may the negotiated framework “be a definitive step toward a more security and fraternal world,” a goal we all share.

Sincerely yours,

Most Reverend Oscar Cantú
Bishop of Las Cruces
Chairman, Committee on International Justice and Peace
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510  

Dear Senator:  

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Sincerely yours,  

Most Reverend Oscar Cantú  
Bishop of Las Cruces  
Chairman, Committee on International Justice and Peace  
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON IRAN
State Floor

THE PRESIDENT: Today, after two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not -- a comprehensive, long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

This deal demonstrates that American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change -- change that makes our country, and the world, safer and more secure. This deal is also in line with a tradition of American leadership. It’s now more than 50 years since President Kennedy stood before the American people and said, “Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.” He was speaking then about the need for discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which led to efforts to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons.

In those days, the risk was a catastrophic nuclear war between two super powers. In our time, the risk is that nuclear weapons will spread to more and more countries, particularly in the Middle East, the most volatile region in our world.

Today, because America negotiated from a position of strength and principle, we have stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region. Because of this deal, the international community will be able to verify that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not develop a nuclear weapon.

This deal meets every single one of the bottom lines that we established when we achieved a framework earlier this spring. Every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off. And the inspection and transparency regime necessary to verify that objective will be put in place. Because of this deal, Iran will not produce the highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium that form the raw materials necessary for a nuclear bomb.

Because of this deal, Iran will remove two-thirds of its installed centrifuges -- the machines necessary to produce
highly enriched uranium for a bomb -- and store them under constant international supervision. Iran will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for the next decade. Iran will also get rid of 98 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium.

To put that in perspective, Iran currently has a stockpile that could produce up to 10 nuclear weapons. Because of this deal, that stockpile will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single weapon. This stockpile limitation will last for 15 years.

Because of this deal, Iran will modify the core of its reactor in Arak so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. And it has agreed to ship the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor. For at least the next 15 years, Iran will not build any new heavy-water reactors.

Because of this deal, we will, for the first time, be in a position to verify all of these commitments. That means this deal is not built on trust; it is built on verification. Inspectors will have 24/7 access to Iran’s key nuclear facilities.

*Iran [Inspectors] will have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain -- its uranium mines and mills, its conversion facility, and its centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities. This ensures that Iran will not be able to divert materials from known facilities to covert ones. Some of these transparency measures will be in place for 25 years.

Because of this deal, inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location. Put simply, the organization responsible for the inspections, the IAEA, will have access where necessary, when necessary. That arrangement is permanent. And the IAEA has also reached an agreement with Iran to get access that it needs to complete its investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s past nuclear research.

Finally, Iran is permanently prohibited from pursuing a nuclear weapon under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provided the basis for the international community’s efforts to apply pressure on Iran.
As Iran takes steps to implement this deal, it will receive relief from the sanctions that we put in place because of Iran’s nuclear program -- both America’s own sanctions and sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. This relief will be phased in. Iran must complete key nuclear steps before it begins to receive new sanctions relief. And over the course of the next decade, Iran must abide by the deal before additional sanctions are lifted, including five years for restrictions related to arms, and eight years for restrictions related to ballistic missiles.

All of this will be memorialized and endorsed in a new United Nations Security Council resolution. And if Iran violates the deal, all of these sanctions will snap back into place. So there’s a very clear incentive for Iran to follow through, and there are very real consequences for a violation.

That's the deal. It has the full backing of the international community. Congress will now have an opportunity to review the details, and my administration stands ready to provide extensive briefings on how this will move forward.

As the American people and Congress review the deal, it will be important to consider the alternative. Consider what happens in a world without this deal. Without this deal, there is no scenario where the world joins us in sanctioning Iran until it completely dismantles its nuclear program. Nothing we know about the Iranian government suggests that it would simply capitulate under that kind of pressure. And the world would not support an effort to permanently sanction Iran into submission. We put sanctions in place to get a diplomatic resolution, and that is what we have done.

Without this deal, there would be no agreed-upon limitations for the Iranian nuclear program. Iran could produce, operate and test more and more centrifuges. Iran could fuel a reactor capable of producing plutonium for a bomb. And we would not have any of the inspections that allow us to detect a covert nuclear weapons program. In other words, no deal means no lasting constraints on Iran’s nuclear program.

Such a scenario would make it more likely that other countries in the region would feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear programs, threatening a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world. It would also present the United States with fewer and less effective options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
I've been President and Commander-in-Chief for over six years now. Time and again, I have faced decisions about whether or not to use military force. It's the gravest decision that any President has to make. Many times, in multiple countries, I have decided to use force. And I will never hesitate to do so when it is in our national security interest. I strongly believe that our national security interest now depends upon preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon -- which means that without a diplomatic resolution, either I or a future U.S. President would face a decision about whether or not to allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon or whether to use our military to stop it.

Put simply, no deal means a greater chance of more war in the Middle East. Moreover, we give nothing up by testing whether or not this problem can be solved peacefully. If, in a worst-case scenario, Iran violates the deal, the same options that are available to me today will be available to any U.S. President in the future. And I have no doubt that 10 or 15 years from now, the person who holds this office will be in a far stronger position with Iran further away from a weapon and with the inspections and transparency that allow us to monitor the Iranian program.

For this reason, I believe it would be irresponsible to walk away from this deal. But on such a tough issue, it is important that the American people and their representatives in Congress get a full opportunity to review the deal. After all, the details matter. And we've had some of the finest nuclear scientists in the world working through those details. And we're dealing with a country -- Iran -- that has been a sworn adversary of the United States for over 35 years. So I welcome a robust debate in Congress on this issue, and I welcome scrutiny of the details of this agreement.

But I will remind Congress that you don't make deals like this with your friends. We negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet Union when that nation was committed to our destruction. And those agreements ultimately made us safer.

I am confident that this deal will meet the national security interest of the United States and our allies. So I will veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of this deal.
We do not have to accept an inevitable spiral into conflict. And we certainly shouldn’t seek it. And precisely because the stakes are so high, this is not the time for politics or posturing. Tough talk from Washington does not solve problems. Hard-nosed diplomacy, leadership that has united the world’s major powers offers a more effective way to verify that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Now, that doesn’t mean that this deal will resolve all of our differences with Iran. We share the concerns expressed by many of our friends in the Middle East, including Israel and the Gulf States, about Iran’s support for terrorism and its use of proxies to destabilize the region. But that is precisely why we are taking this step -- because an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be far more destabilizing and far more dangerous to our friends and to the world.

Meanwhile, we will maintain our own sanctions related to Iran’s support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program, and its human rights violations. We will continue our unprecedented efforts to strengthen Israel’s security -- efforts that go beyond what any American administration has done before. And we will continue the work we began at Camp David to elevate our partnership with the Gulf States to strengthen their capabilities to counter threats from Iran or terrorist groups like ISIL.

However, I believe that we must continue to test whether or not this region, which has known so much suffering, so much bloodshed, can move in a different direction.

Time and again, I have made clear to the Iranian people that we will always be open to engagement on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. Our differences are real and the difficult history between our nations cannot be ignored. But it is possible to change. The path of violence and rigid ideology, a foreign policy based on threats to attack your neighbors or eradicate Israel -- that's a dead end. A different path, one of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict, leads to more integration into the global economy, more engagement with the international community, and the ability of the Iranian people to prosper and thrive.

This deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction. We should seize it.
We have come a long way to reach this point -- decades of an Iranian nuclear program, many years of sanctions, and many months of intense negotiation. Today, I want to thank the members of Congress from both parties who helped us put in place the sanctions that have proven so effective, as well as the other countries who joined us in that effort.

I want to thank our negotiating partners -- the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, as well as the European Union -- for our unity in this effort, which showed that the world can do remarkable things when we share a vision of peacefully addressing conflicts. We showed what we can do when we do not split apart.

And finally, I want to thank the American negotiating team. We had a team of experts working for several weeks straight on this, including our Secretary of Energy, Ernie Moniz. And I want to particularly thank John Kerry, our Secretary of State, who began his service to this country more than four decades ago when he put on our uniform and went off to war. He’s now making this country safer through his commitment to strong, principled American diplomacy.

History shows that America must lead not just with our might, but with our principles. It shows we are stronger not when we are alone, but when we bring the world together. Today’s announcement marks one more chapter in this pursuit of a safer and more helpful and more hopeful world.

Thank you. God bless you. And God bless the United States of America.

END
Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Preamble and General Provisions

- The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

- Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.

- This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.

- A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA.

- The IAEA will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council.

- The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran.

Nuclear

Enrichment, Enrichment R&D, Stockpiles

- Iran’s long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes.

- Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring.  
  (Note: Iran currently has about 19,000 IR-1 and advanced IR-2M centrifuges installed)

- Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%.  
  (Note: Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, Iran enriched uranium to near 20%)
• Iran will refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material at Fordow for 15 years.  
(Note: Iran currently has about 2,700 IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow of which about 700 are enriching uranium)

• Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology center.

• 1044 IR-1 machines in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of those six cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle.

• During the 15 year period, Iran will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF₆ or the equivalent in other chemical forms.  
(Note: Iran currently maintains a stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched UF₆)

• All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring.

**Arak, Heavy Water, Reprocessing**

• Iran will design and rebuild a modernized heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enrichment up to 3.67%, in the form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and instructional purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium.

• Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research with enhanced international cooperation including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.

• There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years.

• Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors.

**Transparency and Confidence Building Measures**

• Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17 b) of the Additional Protocol.

• Iran will fully implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear program.
• Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the above voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out by the JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measure and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.

• Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities.

• Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

Sanctions

• The UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA will terminate all the provisions of the previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions.

• The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all the nuclear related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V.

• The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with the JCPOA, of the sanctions specified in Annex II, to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed upon related measures by Iran as specified in Appendix V.
  (Note: U.S. statutory sanctions focused on Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile activities will remain in effect and continue to be enforced.)

• Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all the nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate or modify to effectuate the termination of sanctions specified in Annex II.

Implementation Plan

• Finalization Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
• Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect.

• Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States takes the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V.

• Transition Day is day 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

• UN Security Council resolution termination day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day.

**Dispute Resolution Mechanism**

• If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under the JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 can do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus.

• After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to ministers of foreign affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus.

• If the issue has still not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and / or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

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PRESS AVAILABILITY ON NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN

John Kerry
Secretary of State
Austria Center

Vienna, Austria
July 14, 2015

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good afternoon everybody. I want to begin by thanking you, as others have, for your extraordinary patience. I know this has been a long couple of weeks for everybody, including, above all, the press, who have waited long hours during the day for very little news, and we're very grateful for your patience. This is an historic day, but for me, it's an historic day because it represents the first time in six weeks that I've worn a pair of shoes. (Laughter.)

Today, in announcing a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the United States, our P5+1 and EU partners, and Iran have taken a measurable step away from the prospect of nuclear proliferation, towards transparency and cooperation. It is a step away from the specter of conflict and towards the possibility of peace.

This moment has been a long time coming, and we have worked very hard to get here. A resolution to this type of challenge never comes easily—not when the stakes are so high, not when the issues are so technical, and not when each decision affects global and regional security so directly. The fact is that the agreement we've reached, fully implemented, will bring insight and accountability to Iran's nuclear program—not for a small number of years but for the lifetime of that program. This is the good deal that we have sought.

Believe me, had we been willing to settle for a lesser deal, we would have finished this negotiation a long time ago. But we were not. All of us—not just the United States, but France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, China, and the EU—were determined to get this right. And so we have been patient, and I believe our persistence has paid off.

A few months ago in Lausanne, we and our international partners joined Iran in announcing a series of parameters to serve as the contours of a potential deal. Experts and commentators were, in fact, surprised by all that we had achieved at that point. After three more months of long days and late nights, I'm pleased to tell you that we have stayed true to those contours and we have now finally carved in the details.

Now I want to be very clear: The parameters that we announced in Lausanne not only remain intact and form the backbone of the agreement that we reached today, but through the detail, they have been amplified in ways that make this agreement even stronger.

That includes the sizable reduction of Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium and the number of centrifuges that it operates.
It also guarantees that Iran’s breakout time – the time it would take for Iran to speed up its enrichment and produce enough fissile material for just one nuclear weapon – that time will increase to at least one year for a period of at least 10 years.

And contrary to the assertions of some, this agreement has no sunset. It doesn’t terminate. It will be implemented in phases – beginning within 90 days of the UN Security Council endorsing the deal, and some of the provisions are in place for 10 years, others for 15 year, others for 25 years. And certain provisions – including many of the transparency measures and prohibitions on nuclear work – will stay in place permanently.

But most importantly, this agreement addresses Iran’s potential pathways to fissile material for a bomb exactly as we said it would – with appropriate limitations and transparency in order to assure the world of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

Now, let me explain exactly how it will accomplish that goal.

To start, the participants have agreed Iran will not produce or acquire either highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium for at least the next 15 years, and Iran declares a longer period of intent.

Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium – which today is equivalent to almost 12,000 kilograms of UF6 – will be capped at just 300 kilograms for the next 15 years – an essential component of expanding our breakout time. Two-thirds of Iran’s centrifuges will be removed from nuclear facilities along with the infrastructure that supports them. And once they’re removed, the centrifuges will be – and the infrastructure, by the way – will be locked away and under around-the-clock monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Uranium enrichment at Natanz will be scaled down significantly. For the next 15 years, no uranium will be enriched beyond 3.67 percent. To put that in context, this is a level that is appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research, but well below anything that could be used possibly for a weapon.

For the next 10 years, Iran has agreed to only use its first-generation centrifuges in order to enrich uranium. Iran has further agreed to disconnect nearly all of its advanced centrifuges, and those that remain installed will be part of a constrained and closely monitored R&D program – and none will be used to produce enriched uranium.

Iran has also agreed to stop enriching uranium at its Fordow facility for the next 15 years. It will not even use or store fissile material on the site during that time. Instead, Fordow will be transformed into a nuclear, physics, and technology research center – it will be used, for example, to produce isotopes for cancer treatment, and it will be subject to daily inspection and it will have other nations working in unison with the Iranians within that technology center.

So when this deal is implemented, the two uranium paths Iran has towards fissile material for a weapon will be closed off.

The same is true for the plutonium path. We have agreed Iran’s heavy-water reactor at Arak will be rebuilt – based on a final design that the United States and international partners will approve – so that it will only be used for peaceful
purposes. And Iran will not build a new heavy-water reactor or reprocess fuel from its existing reactors for at least 15 years.

But this agreement is not only about what happens to Iran’s declared facilities. The deal we have reached also gives us the greatest assurance that we have had that Iran will not pursue a weapon covertly.

Not only will inspectors be able to access Iran’s declared facilities daily, but they will also have access to the entire supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program, from start to finish – from uranium mines to centrifuge manufacturing and operation. So what this means is, in fact, that to be able to have a covert path, Iran would actually need far more than one covert facility – it would need an entire covert supply chain in order to feed into that site. And to ensure that that does not happen without our knowledge, under this deal, inspectors will be able to gain access to any location the IAEA and a majority of the P5+1 nations deem suspicious.

It is no secret that the IAEA also has had longstanding questions about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. That is one of the primary reasons that we are even here today, and we and our partners have made clear throughout the negotiations that Iran would need to satisfy the IAEA on this as part of the final deal. With that in mind, Iran and the IAEA have already entered into an agreement on the process to address all of the IAEA’s outstanding questions within three months – and doing so is a fundamental requirement for sanctions relief that Iran seeks. And Director Amano announced earlier this morning that that agreement has been signed.

Now, our quarrel has never been with the Iranian people, and we realize how deeply the nuclear-related sanctions have affected the lives of Iranians. Thanks to the agreement reached today, that will begin to change. In return for the dramatic changes that Iran has accepted for its nuclear program, the international community will be lifting the nuclear-related sanctions on Iran’s economy.

And the relief from sanctions will only start when Tehran has met its key initial nuclear commitments – for example, when it has removed the core from the Arak reactor; when it has dismantled the centrifuges that it has agreed to dismantle; when it has shipped out the enriched uranium that it has agreed to ship out. When these and other commitments are met, the sanctions relief will then begin to be implemented in phases.

The reason for that is very simple: Confidence is never built overnight. It has to be developed over time. And this morning, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif expressed his hope that this agreement can be a beginning of a change of the interactions between Iran and the international community.

That is why none of the sanctions that we currently have in place will, in fact, be lifted until Iran implements the commitments that it has made. And some restrictions, including those related to arms and proliferation, will remain in place for some years to come. And I want to underscore: If Iran fails in a material way to live up to these commitments, then the United States, the EU, and even the UN sanctions that initially brought Iran to the table can and will snap right back into place. We have a specific provision in this agreement called snapback for the return of those sanctions in the event of noncompliance.

Now, there will be some who will assert that we could have done more – or that if we had just continued to ratchet up the pressure, Iran would have eventually raised a white flag and abandoned its nuclear program altogether. But the
fact is the international community tried that approach. That was the policy of the United States and others during the years 2000 and before. And in the meantime, guess what happened? The Iranian program went from 164 centrifuges to thousands. The Iranian program grew despite the fact that the international community said, “No enrichment at all, none.” The program grew to the point where Iran accumulated enough fissile material for about 12 – 10 to 12 nuclear bombs.

I will tell you, sanctioning Iran until it capitulates makes for a powerful talking point and a pretty good political speech, but it's not achievable outside a world of fantasy.

The true measure of this agreement is not whether it meets all of the desires of one side at the expense of the other; the test is whether or not it will leave the world safer and more secure than it would be without it. So let’s review the facts.

Without this agreement or the Joint Plan of Action on which it builds, Iran’s breakout time to get enough material – nuclear material for a weapon was already two to three months. That’s where we started. We started with Iran two months away with enough fissile material for 10 bombs. With this agreement, that breakout time goes to a year or more, and that will be the case for at least a decade.

Without this agreement, Iran could just double its enrichment capacity tomorrow – literally – and within a few years it could expand it to as many as 100,000 centrifuges. With this agreement, Iran will be operating about 5,000 centrifuges for a fixed period of time.

Without this agreement, Iran would be able to add rapidly and without any constraint to its stockpile of enriched uranium, which already at 20 percent was dangerous and higher than any of us were satisfied was acceptable. With this agreement, the stockpile will be kept at no more than 300 kilograms for 15 years.

Without this agreement, Iran’s Arak reactor could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium each year to fuel two nuclear weapons. With this agreement, the core of the Arak reactor will be removed and filled with concrete, and Iran will not produce any weapons-grade plutonium.

Without this agreement, the IAEA would not have definitive access to locations suspected of conducting undeclared nuclear activities. With this agreement, the IAEA will be able to access any location, declared or undeclared, to follow up on legitimate concerns about nuclear activities.

There can be no question that this agreement will provide a stronger, more comprehensive, and more lasting means of limiting Iran’s nuclear program than any realistic – realistic alternative. And those who criticize and those who spend a lot of time suggesting that something could be better have an obligation to provide an alternative that, in fact, works. And let me add this: While the nations that comprise the P5+1 obviously don’t always see eye-to-eye on global issues, we are in full agreement on the quality and importance of this deal. From the very beginning of this process, we have considered not only our own security concerns, but also the serious and legitimate anxieties of our friends and our allies in the region – especially Israel and the Gulf States. And that has certainly been the case in recent days, as we worked to hammer out the final details.
So let me make a couple of points crystal-clear: First, what we are announcing today is an agreement addressing the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program – period – just the nuclear program. And anybody who knows the conduct of international affairs knows that it is better to deal with a country if you have problems with it if they don't have a nuclear weapon. As such, a number of U.S. sanctions will remain in place, including those related to terrorism, human rights, and ballistic missiles. In addition, the United States will continue our efforts to address concerns about Iran's actions in the region, including by our providing key support to our partners and our allies and by making sure we are vigilant in pushing back against destabilizing activities.

And certainly, we continue to call on Iran to immediately release the detained U.S. citizens. These Americans have remained in our thoughts throughout this negotiation, and we will continue to work for their safe and their swift return. And we urge Iran to bring our missing Americans home as well.

And we also know there is not a challenge in the entire region that would not become worse if Iran had a nuclear weapon. That's why this deal is so important. It's also why we met at Camp David with the Gulf States and why we will make clear to them in the days ahead the ways in which we will work together in order to guarantee the security of the region. The provisions of this agreement help guarantee that the international community can and will address regional challenges without the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Second, no part of this agreement relies on trust. It is all based on thorough and extensive transparency and verification measures that are included in very specific terms in the annexes of this agreement. If Iran fails to comply, we will know it, because we're going to be there – the international community, through the IAEA and otherwise – and we will know it quickly, and we will be able to respond accordingly.

And before closing, I would like to make – I would like to say thank you to some folks who really made a difference in the course of all of this. And I want to begin by thanking my president, President Obama, who had the courage to launch this process, believe in it, support it, encourage it, when many thought that the objective was impossible, and who led the way from the start to the finish. The President has been resolute in insisting from the day he came to office that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, and he has been equally – equally strong in asserting that diplomacy should be given a fair chance to achieve that goal.

I want to thank my Cabinet colleagues – excuse me – for the many, many contributions that they have made – Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, Defense Secretary Ash Carter, the entire DOD – the department, but I especially want to thank my partner in this effort who came late to the process but has made an essential contribution to our achievement of this agreement, and that is Energy Secretary Ernie Moniz, who has put many long days here in Switzerland – here and in Switzerland – during these negotiations and, frankly, whose background as a nuclear scientist just proved to be essential in helping us, together with former foreign minister and Vice President Salehi, to be able to really work through very difficult issues, some of the toughest and technical issues.

I want to thank the members of Congress – my former colleagues – for their role in this achievement, particularly in designing and passing sanctions legislation that did exactly what the UN resolution set out to do, and that is bring Iran to the table in order to negotiate. It helped us achieve the goal of these negotiations, and I appreciate their counsel and I look forward to the next chapter in our conversations. Whatever disagreements might sometimes exist, we all agree on a goal of a Middle East where our interests are protected and our allies and our friends are safe and secure.
And I want to especially thank my friend and my exceptional colleague, the Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, who has piloted – (applause) – she has led our team, which you can tell is still pretty enthusiastic, notwithstanding the long stay – and she has really done so with just an amazingly strong will, with a clear sense of direction, very steady nerves, hardly any sleep – and she’s been doing that for several years, folks, with amazing periods of time away from home and away from family. She and our absolutely brilliant, tireless team of experts and diplomats have done an absolutely incredible job, and frankly, they deserve the gratitude of our nation. (Applause.) I also want to thank those who’ve served on the U.S. negotiating team in the past who were not here for the close but who were indispensable in helping to shape this negotiation – particularly former Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, Jake Sullivan, who were absolutely essential in the earliest days.

I also want to thank my counterparts from every other delegation. All of the political directors were absolutely stunning in this. It’s been a privilege of my public service to be able to work with the teams that I have worked with here and in the other cities we’ve been. Our counterparts have made absolutely critical contributions to this. This was a team effort. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius; British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond; Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov; German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier; and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

I also want to thank the high representatives of the EU, there’s several – Javier Solana, Dame Cathy Ashton, and her successor, Federica Mogherini, who helped shepherd these past weeks in such an effective way. I also want to thank her deputy to the high representative, Helga Schmid, who, together with Wendy, they just formed an incredible unity, and they facilitated and guided our talks with enormous dedication and skill.

All of these leaders and the legion of aids who contributed countless hours to assisting us really set a new standard for international cooperation and hard work. And the fact that we have stood together and maintained our unity throughout these 18 months lends enormous weight and credibility to the agreement we have forged, but it also offers everybody a sign of possibilities, a sign of encouragement for those who believe in the power of diplomacy and of negotiation.

Thank you also to the Government of Austria, which has very generously hosted this last round of talks – perhaps for a bit longer than it may have expected – (laughter) – and it has also hosted countless rounds before this one, so they’ve made a very special contribution to this. And I’ll tell you, all the police and the folks in the hotels and everybody in Austria, Vielen dank. We thank you for a really remarkable welcome. (Applause.)

I want to thank the other nations that have hosted these talks – this has been sort of a traveling circus – in particular Switzerland, Oman, Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, and my home country, the United States.

And I am particularly grateful – we are particularly grateful, all of us, to the sultan of Oman, for his very personal engagement and support for the possibility of an agreement. He and his government were there to help every step of the way.

And I finally want to express my deep respect for the serious and constructive approach that Iran’s representatives brought to our deliberations. The president of Iran, President Rouhani, had to make a difficult decision. We all know the tensions that exist. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, a tough, capable negotiator, and patriot, a man who fought every inch of the way for the things he believed, and sometimes these were heated and passionate exchanges. But he and
his team, while tough, always professional, always dedicated to finding solutions to difficult problems. And we were, both of us, able to approach these negotiations with mutual respect, even when there were times of a heated discussion, I think he would agree with me at the end of every meeting we left with a smile and with a conviction that we were going to come back and continue the process. We never lost sight of the goal that an agreement could bring and the best long-term interests of all concerned.

Now, we are under no illusions that the hard work is over. No one is standing here today to say that the path ahead is easy or automatic. We move now to a new phase – a phase that is equally critical and may prove to be just as difficult – and that is implementation. The 109 pages that we have agreed upon outline commitments made on both sides. In the end, however, this agreement will live or die by whether the leaders who have to implement it on both sides honor and implement the commitments that have been made.

There is reason to be optimistic. In January of last year, we took the first step by adopting the Joint Plan of Action. Man, were we told by skeptics that we were making a mistake of a lifetime – that Iran would never comply, that this was a terrible agreement. But you know what? They were dead wrong. All sides met their obligations. The diplomatic process went forward. And we are already nearing almost two years of Iran’s compliance, full compliance, with the agreement.

The entire world has a stake in ensuring that the same thing happens now. Not only will this deal, fully implemented, make the world safer than it is today, but it may also eventually unlock opportunities to begin addressing regional challenges that cannot be resolved without this kind of an agreement being in place in the first place. The past 18 months have been yet another example of diplomacy’s consummate power to forge a peaceful way forward, no matter how impossible it may seem.

Obviously, every country that has been at the table over the past 18 months has had its own domestic perspective to consider. The United States is no exception. Back home, the future of Iran’s nuclear program has long been the focus of a lot of debate, and I have absolutely no doubt that debate is going to become even more intense in the coming days. I’ll tell you what, we welcome the opportunity to engage. These are vitally important issues, and they deserve rigorous but fact-based discussion. I’ve heard more talk in the last days about concessions being made and people racing. We have not made concessions. Lausanne is more than intact. And the facts are what should define this agreement.

From the start, President Obama and I have pledged that we would not settle for anything less than a good deal – good for Americans and good for our partners, our friends, our allies, good for the future of the Middle East, and good for the peace of mind of the world. That is what we pursued and that is what we insisted on through long months of hard negotiations, and that is precisely what we believe we have achieved today.

I will just share with you very personally, years ago when I left college, I went to war. And I learned in war the price that is paid when diplomacy fails. And I made a decision that if I ever was lucky enough to be in a position to make a difference, I would try to do so. I believe this agreement actually represents an effort by the United States of America and all of its member – its colleagues in the P5+1 to come together with Iran to avert an inevitability of conflict that would come were we not able to reach agreement. I think that’s what diplomacy was put in place to achieve, and I know that war is the failure of diplomacy and the failure of leaders to make alternative decisions.
So we have a chance here and I hope that in the days ahead that people will look at this agreement hard for the facts that define it and that we will be able to fully implement it and move forward.
When President Obama took office, he faced an Iran that had mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, had constructed a covert uranium enrichment facility inside a mountain, was on its way to installing nearly 20,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment, was developing advanced centrifuges and was building a heavy-water reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium. If Iran wanted to develop a nuclear weapon, it was already well down that road and the international community had little insight into its program. Against this backdrop the president vowed never to let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon.

The deal reached in Vienna this month is not only the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon, it is the only durable and viable option for achieving this goal. This comprehensive diplomatic resolution has the unified support of the world’s leading powers. It extends the time Iran would need to develop a nuclear weapon, provides strong verification measures that give us ample time to respond if Iran chooses that path, and takes none of our options off the table.

Specifically, the deal blocks each of Iran’s possible pathways to producing fissile material for a nuclear weapon: the highly enriched uranium and the plutonium production pathways, as well as the covert pathway. This deal is based on verification, not trust. Before obtaining significant relief from economic sanctions, Iran must roll back its enrichment, its research-and-development and its stockpile of enriched uranium. To preclude cheating, international inspectors will have unprecedented access to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, any other sites of concern and its entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium production to centrifuge manufacturing and operation.

If Iran fails to meet its responsibilities, sanctions will snap back into place, and no country can stop that from happening. If Iran tries to break out of the deal altogether, the world will have a longer time period — a year compared with two months — to respond before it could produce a bomb. We also will have the moral authority that comes from exhausting all diplomatic options.

Is this a good deal for the United States and for global security? Consider the facts.

Without this deal, Iran could double its capacity to enrich uranium in a short time. With it, it must reduce that capacity immediately and sharply.

Without this deal, Iran could continue to rapidly develop advanced centrifuges. With it, its program will be significantly constrained.

Without this deal, Iran could expand its existing stockpile of enriched uranium. With it, that stockpile will be reduced by 98 percent, and it will be capped at that level for 15 years. Iran will
also be required to get rid of its 20 percent enriched uranium, which is most of the way to bomb material.

Without this deal, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium each year for one to two nuclear weapons. With it, Iran will not produce any weapons-grade plutonium.

Without this deal, Iran could take the steps necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. With it, Iran is prohibited from pursuing any of these steps.

If the international community suspects that Iran is cheating, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can request access to any suspicious location. Much has been made about a possible 24-day delay before inspectors could gain access to suspected undeclared nuclear sites. To be clear, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours’ notice under the Additional Protocol of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which Iran will implement under this deal. This accord does not change that baseline. In fact, the deal enhances it by creating a new mechanism to ensure that the IAEA gets the required access and sets a firm time limit to resolve access issues within 24 days. This mechanism provides an important tool for ensuring that Iran could not delay indefinitely.

Most important, environmental sampling can detect microscopic traces of nuclear activities even after attempts to remove evidence. Iran’s own history provides a good example. In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran, and negotiations dragged on as Iran tried to remove evidence. But even after six months, tests revealed nuclear activity despite Iran’s attempt to cover it up.

The plan approved in Vienna does not expire — it is indefinite. Some provisions will be in place for 10 years, others for 15, and still others for 20 or 25. But the transparency requirements and Iran’s most fundamental obligation — to preserve the peaceful nature of its nuclear program — are permanent.

Meanwhile, economic sanctions will remain intact until Tehran has met its key commitments, which include removing the core of its reactor at Arak, disconnecting and locking away some 13,000 centrifuges and shipping most of its enriched uranium out of the country.

For the United States to back away from this deal would be a historic mistake. We would be isolated from our partners, face an unraveling sanctions regime and give Iran the unconstrained ability to push ahead with its nuclear program.

We recognize that Iran remains a threat to stability in the Middle East. That danger is precisely why this deal is so necessary and why we fought so hard for the multilateral arms embargo to remain in place for five years and the embargo on ballistic missiles for eight. U.S. sanctions related to terrorism, human rights and missiles will also continue.

A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to our allies in the Middle East, as well as to the United States and the international community. By taking this threat off the table, this deal makes it far less complicated to address the many other problems that we have with Iran’s regional actions.
President Obama has said clearly that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. Neither sanctions nor military action can guarantee that outcome. The solution is the comprehensive diplomatic deal reached in Vienna.
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Committee, friends and former Colleagues – I appreciate the chance to discuss with you the comprehensive plan that we and our P5+1 partners have developed with Iran regarding the future of its nuclear program.

I am joined by the two Cabinet Secretaries whose help was invaluable in reaching this deal—Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and Energy Secretary Ernie Moniz.

I want to thank all of you for the role that Congress has played in getting us to this point and particularly for this committee’s hard work in enacting sanctions that achieved their purpose--by bringing about serious, productive negotiations with Iran.

From the day those talks began, we were crystal clear that we would not accept anything less than a good deal – a deal that shuts off all of Iran’s pathways towards fissile material for a nuclear weapon and resolves the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.

After 18 months of intense talks, the facts are also crystal clear: the plan announced last week in Vienna is the good deal we have sought.

Under its terms, Iran must get rid of 98 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium, two-thirds of its installed centrifuges, and the existing core of its heavy-water reactor.

Iran will be barred from producing or acquiring both highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium for at least the next 15 years.

Iran will be subject to the most comprehensive and intrusive verification and transparency measures ever negotiated – so that if Iran cheats, we will know it quickly and be able to respond accordingly. And many of these measures will be in place not just for 10 or 15 or 20 years, but for the lifetime of Iran’s nuclear program, which will enable us to verifiably ensure it remains exclusively peaceful.
Remember that, two years ago, when our negotiations began, we faced an Iran that was enriching uranium up to 20 percent at a facility built in secret and buried in a mountain, was rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium, had installed nearly 20,000 nuclear centrifuges, and was building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium at a rate of one to two bombs per year. Experts tabbed Iran’s so-called breakout time – the interval required for it to have enough fissile material for a bomb – at two to three months.

This is the reality we would return to if this deal is rejected – except that the diplomatic support we have been steadily accumulating in recent years would disappear overnight.

Let me underscore – the alternative to the deal we’ve reached isn’t a better deal – some sort of unicorn arrangement involving Iran’s complete capitulation. That’s a fantasy – plain and simple.

The choice we face is between a deal that will ensure Iran’s nuclear program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and wholly peaceful – or no deal at all.

If we walk away from what was agreed in Vienna, we will be walking away from every one of the restrictions we have negotiated, and giving Iran the green light to double the pace of its uranium enrichment, proceed full speed ahead with a heavy water reactor, install new and more efficient centrifuges, and do it all without the unprecedented inspection and transparency measures we’ve secured.

If we walk away, our partners will not walk away with us. Instead, they’ll walk away from the tough multilateral sanctions regime they helped us to put in place. We will be left to go it alone and whatever limited economic pressure from sanctions would remain would certainly not compel Tehran to negotiate or to make any deeper concessions. They would instead push the program ahead potentially forcing military conflict. And we will have squandered the best chance we have to solve this problem through peaceful means.

Make no mistake: we will never accept a nuclear-armed Iran. But the fact is that Iran has extensive experience with nuclear fuel cycle technology. We can’t bomb that knowledge away. Nor can we sanction that knowledge away. Remember that sanctions did not stop Iran’s nuclear program from growing steadily, to the point it had accumulated enough low enriched uranium that, if further enriched, could be used to produce about 10 nuclear bombs.
The truth is that the Vienna plan will provide a stronger, more comprehensive, and more lasting means of limiting Iran’s nuclear program than any realistic alternative.

And to those who are thinking about opposing the deal because of what might happen in year 15 or 16 – remember that, if we walk away, year 15 starts tomorrow – and without any of the long-term verification or transparency safeguards that we have put in place to ensure that we prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Over the past week, I’ve spoken at length about what, exactly, this deal is. But I also want to make clear what this deal was never expected or intended to be.

This plan was designed to address the nuclear issue alone, not to reform Iran’s regime, or end its support for terrorism, or its contributions to sectarian violence in the Middle East. Those are all issues about which we remain deeply concerned and will continue take real steps, which is why we are upholding our unprecedented levels of security cooperation with Israel; why we are working so closely with the Gulf States and continue to maintain a robust military presence in the region and countering Iran’s destabilizing activities; why we will keep striving to prevent terrorist groups – including Hamas and Hezbollah – from acquiring weapons; and why U.S. sanctions related to human rights, terrorism, and ballistic missiles will remain in place. It is also why we will continue to press Iran for information about the missing and for the immediate release of Americans who have been unjustly detained.

The fact is, there is not a challenge in the entire region that wouldn’t become much worse if Iran had a nuclear weapon – and that’s exactly why this deal is so important. Its provisions will help us to address the full range of regional challenges without the looming threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

That outcome cannot be guaranteed either by sanctions alone or – on an enduring basis – by military action. The only viable option is a comprehensive diplomatic resolution of the type reached in Vienna. That deal will make our country and our allies safer. It will ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains under intense scrutiny. And it will ensure that the world community is united in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear activities are and remain wholly peaceful. It is a good deal for the world – a good deal for America – and it richly deserves your support. Thank you.  

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Written Testimony of Jacob J. Lew, Secretary of the Treasury
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
July 23, 2015

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, thank you for the opportunity to speak today about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Iran, a historic deal that will ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. A foreign policy decision of such significance deserves careful, detailed, and public analysis and hearings like this one are central to that review. I am confident that a full and fair debate on the merits will make it clear that this deal will strengthen our national security and that of our allies.

Secretary Kerry and Secretary Moniz have detailed how the deal effectively cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon and ensures the inspections and transparency necessary to verify that Iran is complying. I will focus on describing how the international sanctions coalition that the United States and our partners built over a nearly a decade — combined with hard-nosed diplomacy and a credible military deterrent — allowed us to secure far-reaching and unprecedented nuclear concessions from Iran. I will also discuss the nature of the sanctions relief contained in this deal, and how the JCPOA is structured to maintain pressure on Iran to fulfill its commitments. Finally, I want to describe the powerful sanctions that will remain in place to counter a range of malign Iranian activity outside of the nuclear sphere — most notably its active support for terrorism, its ballistic missiles program, destabilizing regional activities, and human rights abuses. The Administration will continue to wield these measures in a strategic and aggressive manner and will work with our allies in the region to coordinate and intensify the impact of these tools.

The Impact of Sanctions on Iran’s Economy

Iran would not have come to the negotiating table were it not for the powerful array of U.S. and international sanctions. These sanctions made tangible for Iran’s leaders the costs of flouting international law, cutting them off from world markets and crippling their economy. The U.S. government — Congress and the Executive Branch — stood at the forefront of this effort across two administrations, successfully pushing for four tough UN Security Council resolutions and deploying a web of new and far-reaching U.S. sanctions that ultimately persuaded the Iranian leadership, after years of intransigence, to come to the table prepared to roll back its nuclear program.

To see the impact of these sanctions, consider that Iran’s economy today is around 20 percent smaller than it would have been had Iran remained on its pre-2012 growth trajectory. This means that even if Iran returns to that pre-2012 growth rate, it would take until 2020 for Iran’s GDP to reach the level it would have been last year absent sanctions.

Our sanctions have cost Iran more than $160 billion since 2012 in oil revenue alone. Iran’s oil exports were cut by 60 percent, and have been held at those reduced levels for the past two years. And Iran’s designated banks, as well as its Central Bank, were cut off from the world. Since 2012, Iran’s currency, the rial, has declined by more than 50 percent. Its inflation rate reached as high as 40 percent, and remains one of the highest in the world.
We have maintained this pressure throughout the last eighteen months of negotiations. During the negotiation period alone, our oil sanctions deprived Iran of $70 billion in oil revenue. And Iran’s total trade with the rest of the world remained virtually flat.

The international consensus and cooperation to achieve this sanctions pressure was vital. While views on Iran’s sponsorship of groups like Hizballah and its interventions in places like Yemen and Syria differ markedly around the world, the world’s major powers have been — and remain — united that Iran cannot be allowed to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. That unity of purpose produced the UN Security Council resolutions and national-level sanctions in Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Canada, and many other jurisdictions. In all of these cases, the sanctions aimed to deliver a change in Iran’s nuclear behavior, while holding out the prospect of relief if Iran addressed the world’s concerns about its nuclear program.

**Sanctions Relief under the JCPOA**

As you have heard from Secretaries Kerry and Moniz, the JCPOA closes off all of Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons capability and, critically, gives us the access to ensure compliance and the leverage to re-impose sanctions if Iran breaches the deal. Should Iran fully comply with the terms of the JCPOA, and should the IAEA verify this compliance, phased sanctions relief will come into effect.

To be clear, about 90 days from now when the JCPOA goes into effect, there will be no immediate changes to UN, EU or U.S. sanctions. Iran will not receive any new relief until it fulfills all of the key nuclear-related commitments specified in the deal, thereby pushing back its breakout time to at least one year. Until Iran does so, we will simply extend the limited JPOA relief that has been in place for the last year and a half.

Should Iran fulfill all of the necessary conditions, we will have reached what it is known as “Implementation Day,” and phased relief will begin. At that time, the United States will suspend nuclear-related secondary sanctions. These are the sanctions that primarily target third-country parties conducting business with Iran — including in the oil, banking, and shipping sectors. Relief from these restrictions will be significant, to be sure. But a number of key sanctions will remain in place. Our primary trade embargo will continue to prohibit U.S. persons from investing in Iran, importing or exporting most goods and services, or otherwise dealing with most Iranian persons and companies. For example, Iranian banks will not be able to clear U.S. dollars through New York, hold correspondent account relationships with U.S. financial institutions, or enter into financing arrangements with U.S. banks. Iran, in other words, will continue to be denied access to the world’s largest financial and commercial market.

The JCPOA makes only minor allowances to this broad prohibition. These include allowing for the import of foodstuffs and carpets from Iran; the export on a case-by-case basis of commercial passenger aircraft and parts to Iran — which has one of the world’s worst aviation safety records — for civilian uses only; and the licensing of U.S.-owned or controlled foreign entities to engage in activities with Iran consistent with the JCPOA and U.S. laws.
The United States will also maintain powerful sanctions targeting Iran’s support for terrorist groups such as Hizballah and its sponsors in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quds Force; its destabilizing support to the Houthis in Yemen; its backing of Assad’s brutal regime; its missile program; and its human rights abuses at home. Just this week, Treasury sanctioned several Hizballah leaders, building on designations last month that targeted the group’s front companies and facilitators. We will not be providing any sanctions relief to any of these lines of activity and will not be delisting from sanctions the IRGC, the Quds Force, or any of their subsidiaries or senior officials.

I also want to emphasize that secondary sanctions imposed by Congress will continue to attach to these designations, providing additional deterrence internationally. For example, a foreign bank that conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction with Iran’s Mahan Air or Bank Saderat will risk losing its access to the U.S. financial system. These sanctions will continue to be in place and enforced; they are not covered by the JCPOA.

Snapback

While our focus is on successfully implementing this deal, we must guard against the possibility that Iran does not uphold its side of the deal. That is why, should Iran violate its commitments once we have suspended sanctions, we have the mechanisms ready to snap them back into place. For U.S. sanctions, this can be done in a matter of days. Multilateral sanctions at the UN also can be re-imposed quickly, through a mechanism that does not allow any one country or any group of countries to prevent the reinstitution of the current UN Security Council sanctions if Iran violates the deal. So, even as Iran attempts to re-integrate into the global economy, it will remain subject to sanctions leverage.

Countering Iran’s Malign Activities

As noted above, Iran’s malign activities continue to present a real danger to U.S. interests and our allies in the region, beyond the nuclear file. I have heard some argue that, until Iran ceases these activities, sanctions relief is premature, and that funds that Iran recovers could be diverted to these malign activities. I understand the concern well — no one wants to see the world’s foremost sponsor of terrorism receive any respite from sanctions. But it is Iran’s relationships with terrorist groups that make it so essential for us to deprive it of any possibility of obtaining a nuclear weapon. The combination of those two threats would raise the specter of what national security experts have termed the ultimate nightmare. If we cannot solve both concerns at once, we need to address them in turn. The JCPOA will address the danger of Iran’s nuclear program — lowering the overall threat posture and freeing us and our allies to check Iran’s regional activities more aggressively, while keeping our sanctions on support for terrorist activity in place. By contrast, walking away from this deal and seeking to extend sanctions would leave the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism with a short and decreasing nuclear breakout time.

None of this is to say that we view the sanctions relief Iran will receive if it complies with the JCPOA with indifference. As the agency with primary responsibility for sanctions against Iran over the last three decades, we are keenly aware of its nefarious activities in the region and have invested years in devising and implementing sanctions to frustrate its objectives.
That said, in gauging the impact of lifting these restrictions, we should be measured and realistic. These funds represent the bulk of Iran’s foreign reserves — they are the country’s long-term savings, not its annual budgetary allowance, and as a matter of financial management, Iran cannot simply spend them. Of the portion that Iran spends, we assess that Iran will use the vast majority to attempt to redress its stark economic needs. President Rouhani was elected on a platform of economic revitalization and faces a political imperative to meet those unfulfilled promises. Iran’s needs are vast — President Rouhani faces well over half a trillion dollars in pressing investment requirements and government obligations. And Iran’s economy continues to suffer from immense challenges — including perennial budget deficits, rampant corruption, and one of the worst business environments in the world. Put simply, Iran is in a massive hole from which it will take years to climb out.

In any event, we will aggressively target any attempts by Iran to use funds gained from sanctions relief to support militant proxies, including by continuing to enhance our cooperation with Israel and our partners in the Gulf.

**Conclusion**

The JCPOA is a strong deal — with phased relief in exchange for Iranian compliance and a powerful snap-back built in. Backing away from this deal, on the notion that it would be feasible and preferable to escalate the economic pressure and somehow obtain a capitulation — whether on the nuclear, regional, terrorism, or human rights fronts — would be a mistake. Even if one believed that continuing sanctions pressure was a better course than resolving the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, that choice is not available.

The UN Security Council and our partners around the world agreed to impose costly sanctions against Iran for one reason — to put a stop to its illicit nuclear program. If we changed our terms now and insisted that these countries continue to impose those sanctions on Iran, despite the availability of a diplomatic solution to its nuclear program, they would balk. And we would be left with neither a nuclear deal nor effective sanctions. It is unrealistic to think that additional sanctions pressure would force Iran to totally capitulate — and impractical to believe that we could marshal a global coalition of partners to impose such pressure, after turning down a deal that our partners believe is a good one.

The terms of this deal achieve the purpose they were meant to achieve: blocking Iran’s paths to a nuclear bomb. That is an overriding national security priority, and its achievement should not be put at risk — not when the prospect of an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program presents such a threat to America and the world.
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached between the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States) and Iran.

The JCPOA prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, provides strong verification measures that give us ample time to respond if Iran chose to violate its terms, and takes none of our options off the table.

America’s leading nuclear experts at the Department of Energy were involved throughout these negotiations. The list of labs and sites that provided support is long, including Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the Kansas City Plant.

These nuclear experts were essential to evaluating and developing technical proposals in support of the U.S. delegation. As a result of their work, I am confident that the technical underpinnings of this deal are solid and the Department of Energy stands ready to assist in its implementation.

This deal clearly meets the President’s objectives: verification of an Iranian nuclear program that is exclusively peaceful and sufficient lead time to respond if it proves otherwise. The JCPOA will extend for at least ten years the time it would take for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a first nuclear explosive device to at least one year from the current breakout time of just two to three months.

Let me take a moment to walk through how the JCPOA blocks each of Iran’s pathways to the fissile material for a nuclear weapon: the high enriched uranium pathways through the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, the plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor, and the covert pathway.
Iran will reduce its stockpile of up-to-5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride, which is equivalent now to almost 12,000 kg, by nearly 98 percent to only 300 kilograms of low (3.67 percent) enriched uranium hexafluoride, and will not exceed this level for fifteen years. In particular, Iran will be required to get rid of its 20 percent enriched uranium that is not fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. This is important because excess 20 percent enriched uranium could be converted into feed for centrifuges, which would be about 90 percent of the way to bomb material.

Iran’s installed centrifuges will be reduced by two thirds, leaving it with just over 5,000 operating centrifuges at Natanz – its only enrichment facility – under continuous IAEA monitoring. For the next 10 years, only the oldest and least capable centrifuges, the IR-1, will be allowed to operate.

Iran has an established R&D program for a number of advanced centrifuges (IR-2, IR-5, IR-6, IR-8). This pace of the program will be slowed substantially and will be carried out only at Natanz for 15 years, under close International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. Iran will not pursue other approaches to uranium enrichment.

The underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow will be converted to a nuclear, physics, and technology center where specific projects such as stable isotope production are undertaken. There will be no uranium enrichment, no uranium enrichment research and development, and no nuclear material at the site at all for 15 years. In cooperation with Russia, Iran will pursue a limited program for production of stable isotopes, such as those used for medical applications. And the IAEA will have a right to daily access at Fordow as well.

All of these reasons taken together establish the one year breakout timeline for accumulating high enriched uranium.

In addition, Iran will have no source of weapons-grade plutonium. The Arak reactor, which according to its original design could have been a source of plutonium for a nuclear weapon, will be transformed to produce far less plutonium overall and no weapons-grade plutonium when operated normally. All spent fuel from the reactor that could be reprocessed to recover plutonium will be sent out of the country, and all of this will be under a rigorous IAEA inspection regime.

This deal goes beyond the parameters established in Lausanne in a very important area. Under this deal, Iran will not engage in several activities that could
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including multiple point explosive systems. These commitments are indefinite. In addition, Iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium (or its alloys) metallurgy for fifteen years. Because Iran will not engage in activities needed to use weapons grade material for an explosive device, an additional period can be added to the breakout timeline.

To be clear, this deal is not built on trust. It is built on hard-nosed requirements that will limit Iran’s activities and ensure inspections, transparency, and verification. To preclude cheating, international inspectors will be given unprecedented access to all of Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and any other sites of concern, as well as the entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium supply to centrifuge manufacturing and operation. And this access to the uranium supply chain comes with a 25 year commitment.

The IAEA will be permitted to use advanced technologies, such as enrichment monitoring devices and electronic seals. DOE national laboratories have developed many such technologies.

If the international community suspects that Iran is trying to cheat, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location. Much has been made about a 24 day process for ensuring that IAEA inspectors can get access to undeclared nuclear sites. In fact, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours’ notice under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will implement under this deal. This deal does not change that baseline. The JCPOA goes beyond that baseline, recognizing that disputes could arise regarding IAEA access to sensitive facilities, and provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a short period of time so that the IAEA gets the access it needs in a timely fashion — within 24 days. Most important, environmental sampling can detect microscopic traces of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the nuclear material.

In fact, Iran’s history provides a good example. In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran suspected of undeclared nuclear activities. Negotiations over access to the site dragged on for six months, but even after that long delay, environmental samples taken by the IAEA revealed nuclear activity even though Iran had made a substantial effort to remove and cover up the evidence. This deal dramatically shortens the period over which Iran could drag out an access dispute.
The JCPOA will be implemented in phases — with some provisions in place for 10 years, others for 15 and others for 20 or 25 years. Even after 25 years, key transparency measures, such as the legal obligations Iran will assume under the Additional Protocol, remain in place indefinitely as part of its adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime.

In closing, I want to acknowledge the tireless work of the negotiating team, led by Secretary Kerry. The U.S. multi-agency delegation worked together collegially and seamlessly, and the E3/EU+3 displayed remarkable cooperation and cohesion throughout this complex endeavor. The continued cooperation among leading nations, in particular the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and the EU, is crucial to ensuring that Iran complies with the JCPOA so as to avoid the re-imposition of a major international sanctions regime.

This deal is based on science and analysis. Because of its deep grounding in exhaustive technical analysis, carried out largely by highly capable DOE scientists and engineers, I am confident that this is a good deal for America, for our allies, and for our global security.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to answering your questions.
DAVID CAMERON, PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, IS INTERVIEWED ON NBC’S “MEET THE PRESS”

JULY 19, 2015

SPEAKERS: DAVID CAMERON, PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

CHUCK TODD, NBC NEWS HOST

[*] CHUCK TODD, NBC NEWS HOST: On Friday I was joined by the head of one of those powers, a key advocate of the agreement, British Prime Minister David Cameron. I started by asking him, why he decided to sign off on this deal.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

DAVID CAMERON, PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN: Because I think it's so much better than the alternative. I think that if there wasn't a deal, I think we would face Iran with a nuclear weapon and that would have given a terrible choice to the West by enabling that, allowing that to happen or a very difficult decision to take military action.

So this is the better outcome. It keeps Iran away from a nuclear weapon. It's a successful negotiation for the Allies and I think we should be proud of a good deal done.

Now, of course, there will be those that complain about details of the deal but fundamentally, this is the toughest set of proposals put in place, verification put in place, inspection put in place than I think we've seen in any of these sorts of negotiations.

I think it is a good deal. It was right to get on with it. And the sanctions pressure worked. And I think that's all to the credit to the U.S. administration, to Barack Obama but also the action taken in Europe, too.

TODD: Well, a lot of the criticism that's coming here in the United States and from some of key Middle East allies of both Great Britain and the United States -- I'm talking Israel and Saudi Arabia in particular -- is that this deal did not demand any other behavior changes in Iran outside of their nuclear weapons program.

It didn't demand changes in what they're doing in Syria, what they're doing in Yemen, essentially the influence that -- their undue influence that they're trying to exert in the Middle East. Why not include all that?

CAMERON: Well, this deal was about the nuclear issue. And I think the right way to conclude the deal was to make it about the nuclear issue.

But you know, we shouldn't be naive or starry-eyed in any way about the regime that we're dealing with. And I'm certainly not. I spoke to President Rouhani yesterday and said that we want to see a change in the approach that Iran takes to issues like Syria and Yemen and to terrorism in the region. And we want a change in behavior that should follow from that change.

We're not starry-eyed at all, and I'd reassure our Gulf allies about that but actually taking the nuclear weapon issue off the table -- that is a success for America and Britain and our allies and we should be clear about that.
TODD: Isn't the -- there was one expert here named Richard Haas said his biggest concern is if Iran does comply with the deal for this reason, he believes if Iran complies with the deal then in 15 years they can have a nuclear weapon. What do you say to that? CAMERON: Well, I don't believe that's right. Actually, this deal says that it's never acceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Obviously, the time frame for which the safeguards are in place and the inspection is in place is for a particular period of time but the deal actually says it's not acceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon.

But again, what we've done is make sure the timeline for them possibly getting a nuclear weapon has gotten longer not shorter.

TODD: Prime Minister Netanyahu and many people in Israel do not believe this makes them safer. Everybody in the United States on the Obama administration has argued it does. I heard you argue that it does, too. Why is he wrong and you guys are right?

CAMERON: Well, I quite understand the concerns of people living in Israel. You would if you had to deal with the terrorism of Hamas and Hezbollah, if you had the threats to your country and you know what a threat Iran has been to your country. So I fully understand their concerns.

But I would say to my friends in Israel, including the Israeli Prime Minister, look, the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran -- that is now off the table. And I think that's a success.

TODD: David Cameron, Prime Minister of Great Britain. Thanks for coming on MEET THE PRESS, sir.

CAMERON: Thank you.