Detailed Information on the
National Nuclear Security Administration: Safeguards and Security Assessment

Developing material condition status report for Defense Nuclear Security sites main security systems (Alarm systems, access control systems, Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems, etc.) to aid in prioritization of modernization and recapitalization.

Developing site program budget reviews and implement enhancements to the program development and evaluation processes.

Evaluating the effectiveness of contractor oversight processes and refine expectations for Federal oversight of the Security Contractors.

Implementing a flexible, comprehensive, full life-cycle, risk-based cyber program that adequately protects the National Nuclear Security Administration information and information assets; is predicated on Executive Orders, national standards, laws, and regulations and Departmental (where appropriate) and National Nuclear Security Administration orders, manuals, directives, and guidance; and results in a policy-driven cyber security architecture; and ensures that the National Nuclear Security Administration complex complies with the Department of Energy's Defense-in-Depth cyber security strategy and the National Nuclear Security Administration Information Management Strategic Plan.

Evaluating the effectiveness of Site Office Designated Approving Authority Representatives oversight processes and refine expectations.

Implement a more systematic, complex-wide approach to identifying, validating, prioritizing, and managing multi-year projects to improve security effectiveness and resource allocation.

Develop Design Basis Threat implementation plans to prioritize and manage the work and also develop a new measure to track progress in successfully meeting the Design Basis Threat requirements.

Measure: Cumulative percentage of Physical Security reviews conducted by the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OIO) and annual security surveys conducted by Federal Site Offices at the National Nuclear Security Administration sites that resulted in the rating of "Effective" (based on reviews conducted in the past 12 months).

Explanation:: By 2009, achieve an effective rating on 85% of Physical Security reviews.

Measure: Annual average percentage of Cyber Security reviews conducted by the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) at NNSA sites that resulted in the rating of "effective" (based on the last HSS review at each site over 2 Cyber Security topical

Explanation:Annually, achieve an effective rating of 100% of Office of the Chief Information Officer Site Assessment Visits.

Measure: Cumulative percentage of progress, measured in milestones completed, towards implementation of all Design Basis Threat (DBT) policy at NNSA sites.

Explanation:

Measure: Cumulative percentage of Cyber Security Site Assessment Visits (SAV) conducted by the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) Cyber Security Program Manager (CSPM) at NNSA sites that resulted in the rating of "Effective".

Explanation:Annually, achieve an effective rating of 100% of Office of the Chief Information Officer Site Assessment Visits.

Measure: Annual number of NNSA information assets reviewed for certification and accreditation. (New measure, added February 2008)

Explanation:

Measure: Cumulative percentage of completion towards modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration's protective forces in accordance with Tactical Response Force (TRF), as known as "Elite Forces", requirements. (New measure, added February 2008)

Explanation:The "tactical response force initiative" is an effort to betters secure Departmental assets by holding our Protective Force personnel to world-class standards similar to those of traditional elite military ground combat units. Dedicated training elements are being establihsed to maximize individual and unit tactical training opportunities. The size of each site's training element will be determined by line management but should be at least sufficient to support limited scope fore-on-force training activities and must allow for training that emphasizes the protective force's ability to defeat armed adversaries (i.e. focusing on firearms training at the small unit level, and small unit tactics). In addition, posts, assignments, and security plans are being reviewed to ensure the most effecive site-specific tactical postures for denial, interdiction, interuption, and neutralization of the widest possible spectrum of plausible threats. Pending results from the baseline reviews, the targets will be modified in the FY 2010 budget request to reflect the validated baselines.

Measure: Cumulative percentage of completion towards modernization and infrastructure recapitalization goals. (New measure, added February 2008)

Explanation:DNS is introducing new Performance Measures in the FY 2009 budget, in support of complex transformation. DNS is in the process of developing credible targets in support of the Modernization/Infrastructure Recapitalization performance measures. DNS initiated a series of site budget baseline reviews in FY 2007, and will complete a baseline review at each NNSA site during FY 2008. Pending results from the baseline reviews, the targets will be modified in the FY 2010 budget request to reflect the validated baselines.

Measure: Cumulative percentage completion of progress towards modernizing Defense Nuclear Security security systems. (New measure, added February 2008)

Explanation:DNS is introducing new Performance Measures in the FY 2009 budget, in support of complex transformation. DNS is in the process of developing credible targets in support of the Modernization/Infrastructure Recapitalization performance measures. DNS initiated a series of site budget baseline reviews in FY 2007, and will complete a baseline review at each NNSA site during FY 2008. Pending results from the baseline reviews, the targets will be modified in the FY 2010 budget request to reflect the validated baselines.

Measure: Standardize the procurement process and security equipment, such as vehicles, weapons, ammunition across the National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Nuclear Security complex by 2010. (New measure, added February 2008)

Explanation:DNS is pursuing efforts to enhance integration efficiencies across the National Security Enterprise as we deploy the NNSA Complex Transformation initiative. As a part of this effort, we will expand utilization of the Supply Chain Management Center and Strategic Sourcing projects. Acquisition of security technology, ammunition, weapons, security vehicles, and other security equipment are key elements for successful mission execution. To this end, DNS will plan and then execute a project entitled "NA-70 Mission Support Depot," which will be focused on supplying these key mision elements to NNSA at reduced costs and enhanced program effectiveness while ensuring the same hight standards of quality, functionality and reliability. The Program Execution Plan (Phase I) is underway and is scheduled to be completed by the end of August, 2008. Phase 2 (preparation, setup, execution, and management of the Mission Support Depot in accordance with the plan developed in Phase 1) will be funded and executed depending on recommendations and the outcome of Phase 1. The below percentages reflect the implementatio status based upon identified equipment lists and support readiness posture - not necessarily the actual replacement of the identified equipment/items.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose of the Safeguards & Security (S&S) program is clear - to protect National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) personnel, facilities, nuclear weapons, and information from terrorists and other post September 11th threats in a cost-effective manner.

Evidence: Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the NNSA (Feb 02), NNSA Strategic Plan (Feb 03), Atomic Energy Act (amended), 1954

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: The US intelligence community and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have confirmed that there exists a credible and growing threat of attack and espionage against the US homeland and especially nuclear facilities. This post 9/11 threat is defined in the US interagency threat analysis that resulted in the document entitled The Postulated Threat to US Nuclear Weapons Facilities and Other Selected Strategic Facilities published by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Jan 2003. The Department of Energy (DOE) then completed an updated Design Basis Threat (DBT) in May 2003 that sets adversary strengths, capabilities, and tactics thresholds against which the DOE must protect their sensitive assets.

Evidence: Public Law 106-65, dated 10/5/99, Section 3232 and NNSA budget submission. Atomic Energy Act. Site Safeguards and Security Plans. DOE Orders (Series 470). Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the NNSA (Feb 02), NNSA Strategic Plan (Feb 03).

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: No other Federal, state, or local program provides protection for the NNSA's critical weapons research and production assets. While there is some professional overlap with the DOE Office of Security, there are clearly defined roles and responsibilities between DOE and NNSA (i.e. DOE prescribes policy and conducts independent oversight while NNSA is responsible for implementation activities).

Evidence: Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the NNSA (Feb 02), NNSA Strategic Plan (Feb 03), DOE Safeguards and Security Orders (series 470), NNSA Safeguards & Security (S&S) Strategic Plan (Feb 03)

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The S&S program design is a work in progess. The quarterly review process established at Headquarters to oversee the implementation and validate requirements of the new DOE DBT plans could potentially identify significant impacts. The new performance measure on DBT helps track the cost effectiveness of the marginal dollar so S&S managers have a better method to assess S&S cost-performance.

Evidence: Public Law 106-65, dated 10/5/1999, Section 3232 and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) budget submission. General Accounting Office (GAO), DOE Inspector General (IG), and DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) reviews, Iterative Site Analysis (ISA).

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: [[[The Safeguards and Security resource allocation process is improving, but it is still not at the level needed. NNSA decisions still rely greatly on laboratory contractor input and congressional interests.]]] The program's resources are effectively targeted using the following process: Each year in the spring, Office of Nuclear Safeguards & Security Programs sends a request to NNSA sites requesting a fully prioritized listing of their site S&S needs. The compiled listing of prioritized S&S resource (staffing) and funding needs allows NNSA S&S determine how S&S funding is being utilized at field locations to manage risk and provide protection in compliance with National, DOE and NNSA security requirements. This method of data collection allows S&S to track in detail the application of funding for S&S at each NNSA site. NNSA can also track additional funding and resource needs as required. This system for reporting S&S funds expenditures helps ensure that funding requirements and authorizations are being properly utilized.

Evidence: Congressional Budget submissions, NNSA Budget Allocations (PPBE budget allocations), NNSA Strategic Plan (Feb 03), DOE S&S Orders (series 470), OA reviews, On-site Federal reviews, NNSA oversight reviews of budget allocations, National Security Presidential Directives.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The NNSA has improved its performance measures from last year and now has a limited number of specific long-term measures to meaningfully assess progress towards achieving the program's purpose. They are: 1) by end of FY 2006 to have full implementation of the Design Basis Threat policy; 2) by 2006, increase the annual percentage of Physical and Cyber Security external Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) reviews at the NNSA sites where an evaluation of "Effective" is achieved to 90%; 3) by 2006, increase the annual percentage of OA findings that have approved corrective action plans in place within 60 days to 90%.

Evidence: Congressional Budget submissions, NNSA Budget Allocations (PPBE budget allocations), FYNSP, NNSA Strategic Plan (Feb 03), DOE Safeguards and Security Orders (series 470), OA reviews, On-site Federal reviews, NNSA oversight reviews of budget allocations

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Yes, these long-term goals are ambitious for the following reasons: 1) DHS hightened security levels make future planning difficult; 2) In order to ensure that our facilities protection is based on the most current threat, ambitious annual milestones and timeframes have been established and approved in order to have full implementation of the DBT by FY2006. These milestones are based on budgetary timelines required to complete large ticket items; 3) Delays in obtaining clearances have far-reaching impacts. Although these are ambitious and challenging targets, detailed planning and external review have validated them as realistic.

Evidence: FY2006 Programming Data (PPBE), FYNSP, performance indicators, NNSA S&S Strategic Plan (Feb 03)

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The S&S program has a specific set of annual measures to meaningfully monitor progress towards achieving the long-term goals. For FY 2006 they are: 1) by end of FY 2006 to have full implementation of the Design Basis Threat policy; 2) 90% of Physical and Cyber Security external OA reviews at the NNSA sites will have achieved an evaluation of "Effective"; 3) 90% of OA findings will have approved corrective action plans in place within 60 days.

Evidence: FY2006 Programming Data (PPBE), FYNSP, performance indicators, NNSA S&S Strategic Plan (Feb 03), Memo on Implementation of the DBT policy (Jan 30, 2004).

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The program has established detailed site by site baselines with specific values for each annual target in which performance can be compared. The S&S Program Management Plan (PMP) Program Execution Guidance (PEG) is issued annually to define the NNSA-programmatic guidance for the upcoming FY. The PEG will reflect PART performance metrics applicable to field. Each sites unique DBT Implementation Plan is monitored through a quarterly reporting process. These targets are ambitious, challenging and will ensure continued improvement of efficiencies.

Evidence: FY05 Programming Data (PPBE) and FYNSP, NNSA S&S Strategic Plan (03), Reference Performance Measures calculation methodology and site-by-site baselines.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: [[[LANL process fouls indicate the M&O contractor is not sufficiently committed to achieving the goals.]]] Partners in this program consist of management and operating (M&O) contractors that operate the government laboratories and production facilities. The contractors meet annually to develop, update, and agree upon annual and long-term targets. Contractor performance is monitored monthly against these commitments and a series of independent annual and bi-annual security reviews are conducted to assess the contractors security performance. Contractor Award fees are tied directly to how well the contractor performs against pre-established award fee criteria. Specifically University of California contract ties security to its award fee.

Evidence: Five Year Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP), SNL Quarterly Technology Development Project Summaries (UCNI), DOD Technical Security Working Group (TSWG) reports, and performance measures. DEAR clause (Dec 2003).

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: OA evaluates NNSA sites bi-annually. Inspector General (IG), General Accounting Office (GAO), and other independent agencies conduct reviews and inspections. The results of all reviews and corrective plans are integrated in a single data base in order to aide in tracking actions to closure.

Evidence: Bi-annual OA reviews, DOE Inspector General (IG) Reviews (10 in previous 2 years), contractor self-assessments, and surveys/surveillances.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The S&S program has demonstrated tremendous improvement over the past year with respect to budget and performance integration. However, it is a hard program to determine how much is enough and what does the marginal dollar buy in terms of security. S&S performance goals with annual targets cascade from the NNSA strategic plan, and also link to supporting milestones, deliverables, and budgets. Program performance measures provide information for the resource allocation decisions made in the annual Programming and Budgeting processes. The Budget and Reporting (B&R) categories for the STA Program are listed and linked to performance metrics. All direct and indirect costs to attain the performance results for the STA Program are reported in the B&R categories. The cost for the NNSA STA Federal employees is carried in a separate STA program direction account/sub-program, as required by the Congress. In the FY 2005 President's Budget, NNSA initiated a budget request format that includes the current 3 years plus 4 additional years of performance and budget information for each program ("GPRA Units") in the mainline budget justification document. Formerly, the outyear funding and performance targets were included in a separate document, the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, provided with the budget request.

Evidence: NNSA PPBE Guidance Documents, FY2005 Congressional Budget Request, FY2005 Program Decision Memorandum, and FY2006-2009 FYNSP.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The program has taken meaningful steps to correct strategic planning deficiencies by: 1) improving our performance measurement data; 2) updating our response to and implementation of the revised DBT; 3) establishing the S&S PMP to improve budget oversight and change control; 4) conducting budget reviews at each of the NNSA sites. In addition, the NNSA organization has clarified the roles and responsibilities to reinforce managers' accountability and reduce direction from entities outside line management.

Evidence: Long term goals and performance measures, NNSA S&S Strategic Plan, Iterative Site Analysis, PPBE process, Technology Development program, Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Federal personnel conduct Directors and contractors (NSIE) meetings routinely (9/03 and 3/04) as well as annual inspections of each site. Performance information is exchanged to improve performance at all sites. Additional reviews are conducted in selected areas based on current issues. Federal personnel monitor the processing of security clearances. Vulnerability Analysis reviews are used to address site specific issues. Security incidents, corrective action plans, and OA/IG/GAO findings are tracked through to resolution.

Evidence: Annual federal reviews, OA inspection reports, Vulnerability Assessments, IG reports and audits, contractor self-assessments.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Full time federal personnel are assigned specific S&S responsibilities both in the field and at Headquarters. Federal personnel at each site are assigned responsibility for security oversight in specific S&S functional areas. This includes security specialists, security managers and the federal site manager. Federal site personnel assure contractor's performance meets cost, schedule, and performance goals. Contractors are held accountable through the federal contractor award process. Senior department managers are held accountable for meeting performance measures.

Evidence: Annual federal performance appraisal system (Workforce Analysis). Job Task Inventory; Roles, Responsiblities, and Authorities; Program Management Plan; Program Execution Guidance; DBT Implementation Plans, SSSPs, Joule and S&S Information Management System (SSIMS) data bases and Incident Tracking & Analysis Center (ITAC) (in the future). Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual (FRAM).

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: A formal process monitors expenditure of funds based on budgetary allocations. Costed balances are regularly reviewed and adjusted to assure funds are obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purposes.

Evidence: NNSA Work Authorization system documents distribution of funds. The financial information system (MARS) monitors field expenditures to ensure funds are spent as intended.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Continual reviews are being conducted to assure programs are achieving their goals in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Cost-effectiveness is one of the primary measurement tools used to assess the overall effectiveness of contractor performance under the contractor aware fee program. The S&S PMP PEG for FY04 required site offices to set-up cost-effectiveness programs. PEG for FY05 will require them to achieve a savings (2-5%) from their baseline measures.

Evidence: Safeguards & Security is a subset of the overall contractor award fee, competition and acquisition system used in the NNSA. Corrective action plans are created to measure progress.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The NNSA has membership in the DOE S&S working groups, Department of Defense (DOD) working groups and participates in selected security conferences. The NNSA is part of the interagency Nuclear Security Steering Group. NNSA encourages sharing of knowledge among NNSA sites within security limits. NNSA has begun a reinvigorated program with the SSA. NNSA liaison initiatives include: 1) DOE/Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Comparability initiative that reviews S&S policy and implementation; 2) Diplomatic Security Reciprocity initiative with the State Department looking at foreign visit procedures and physical security upgrades; 3) Use of Force Comparability initiative with the Air Force and US Secret Service; 4) Mutual Defense Agreement International Security Program initiated to exchange baseline program information; 5) Physical Security of Weapons Comparability study with DOD.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan (Feb 2002), S&S Plan (03), numerous meetings with NRC. Participation in End-to-end review (2001-2001). Participation in on-going DOE working groups. Conducted NNSA/DOE security directors conference (3/01, 3/02, 5/03, 3/04). National Industrial Security Program (NISP)

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: S&S is covered by DOE's financial management policies, procedures, and practices that meet all statutory requirements. The accounting services for NNSA are provided by DOE and these are free of material internal control weaknesses. The DOE's financial statements have been given a clear audit opinion in 7 of the last 8 years. S&S program staff review accounting reports on a monthly basis to monitor obligations and costs for all projects and sites.

Evidence: DOE Financial Management Orders; NNSA PPBE Guidance Documents located on the NNSA web-site

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Management deficiencies identified are resolved through corrective action plans, which are analyzed and tracked by Headquarters. NNSA has begun S&S budget and program reviews to not only determine the budget, but also to validate that the tactics and deployment of personnel are cost-effective and that funds are being spent on actual S&S needs. New Chief Security Officers have been appointed for the 3 weapons laboratories and 1 of the production plants to bring experienced managers into the S&S field. In addition, NNSA has established three independent review groups: one focus is on S&S professional development programs, another on physical security issues, the third on management at a specific NNSA site. The report of the first group has been finalized and an Action Plan is in development.

Evidence: Specific corrective action plans are created for each review with a tracking system to ensure tracking to resolution. Results of corrective action plans are provided by the sites to the federal oversight office and then to the inspecting activity (for DOE related activties). Independent review such as Science and Security in the 21st Century are tracked as DOE-wide issues and resolutions briefed at senior levels. Ongoing IG Reports, and GAO Reports from March 2003. SSSPs for sites provide credible evidence of scheduled goals. DOE Management Challenges.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: There have been no successful breaches of physical security perimeters by terrorists or criminals. The annual performance measurements were chosen to reflect the measures that indicate this protection will be maintained at a high level. S&S has significantly improved program performance measures since last year. The following are prior year results for the new measures that demonstrate the program has made adequate progress in achieving most of our long-term goals: 1) A series of quarterly reports on the progress of DBT implementation plans has been implemented. The first reports were received April 2004; 2) Physical and cyber security OA assessments at NNSA sites that resulted in a rating of "Effective" for FY 2003 were 78%; 3) OA findings that had approved corrective action plans in place within 60 days of the final report date or by the OA required date for FY 2003 were 33%.

Evidence: Federal assessments of contractor performance, OA reports, GAO report of March 2002. GAO Management Challenges

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: There have been no successful breaches of physical security perimeters by terrorists or criminals. High-level management attention to the Management Challenges initiative are resulting in close scrutiny by both HQ and field managers to achieve corrective action plans (CAPs) and their timely closure. The following information is based on FY2004 year-to-date data compared with FY2003 baselines: 1) based on the requirements of the new DBT implementation schedule, NNSA sites have plans that were submitted, reviewed and approved by Feb 2004 as required. First quarterly reports are due April 2004. 2) Only 3 out of 7 OA assessments have been performed in FY04. Awaiting results for future OA assessments scheduled and expect to be on target with our annual goal of 80% "Effective" ratings. 3) CAPs for 3 recent OA assessments are currently on track to be completed within established timeframes. 4) Based on past 2 year's performance, percentage of Headquarters personnel receiving annual security education and awareness training via technology-based programs will be 100%.

Evidence: Site reviews, Independent Assessment reviews, GAO report of March 2002

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The program shows improved cost efficiencies through: 1) The NA-55 PMP PEG for FY04 required site offices to set-up cost-effectiveness programs. PEG for FY05 will require them to achieve a savings (2-5%) from their baseline measures. 2) Progress is being made to identify expeditious ways to shorten the clearance process to clear more protective force officers resulting in decreased overtime. 3) Anticipated cost avoidance of up to $800k per year in manpower due to a security upgrade. 4) The newly instituted continual surveillance program increases efficiency, using fewer resources with a better useful product. 5) DBT implementation plans will ultimately reduce security costs through cost avoidance measures (i.e. hiring less guards) and by reducing expensive compensatory measures now in place. 6) Human capital management program includes training to increase employee productivity.

Evidence: Federal assessments of contractor performance, OA reviews, GAO report of March 2003

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: There is no real direct comparability with other facilities that do weapons manufacturing. However, DOD and NRC do similar civil and military applications. The NNSA works closely with both the DOD and the NRC. The measures and targets are in excess of any other known S&S program in the government. Recent new analysis shows that the program performs at a high level and compares very favorably to other activities with similar responsibilities. There have been no successful breaches of physical security perimeters by terrorists or criminals.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan, GAO reports of March 2002 and 2003, DOD End-to-End review, DOE/NNSA/NRC Comparability Study.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The OA inspection, an independent assessment group reporting directly to the Secretary of Energy, routinely assesses and evaluates NNSA S&S protection, using DOE issued requirements and policies. In addition, recent GAO reports indicate significant progress toward the performance measures. In the most recent report, May 2003, the GAO notes that 'despite the problems some contractors have had in preparing root cause analyses, corrective action processes in 2002 at all 7 (reviewed by GAO) sites showed that some sites are making progress.' While the information in the report was dated, i.e. the review was conducted from December 2001 through April 2003, it notes that many efforts have already made marked progress.

Evidence: OA independent inspection Reports, GAO report of March 2002 and March 2003; GAO report on Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage its Safeguards and Security Program, May 2003.