Detailed Information on the
Contributions For International Peacekeeping Activities Assessment

Program Managers will discuss and explore ways with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and UN officials to make peacekeeping missions more effective and results-based.

Program managers will continue to work with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other member states to ensure that peacekeeping missions focus on more efficient ways of achieving its goals.

The Department will focus on improving financial management related to this account.

The proposed funding level to OMB or Congress reflects the PART findings that the program purpose is clear.

The State Department will reexamine the efficiency measure for this program and create a new measure if the current measure is deemed inadequate.

Measure: Total assessed UN peacekeeping mission expenditures divided by the total UN peacekeeping mission staff. (The ratio of total mission costs divided by number of staff)

Explanation:UN Peacekeeping reporting period runs from July 1 to June 30 of the following year. The baseline was calculated by dividing the expenditures for July 1, 2006-June 30, 2007 ($5.157 B) by the total number of military contingents and military observers (UN peacekeepers), UN police, and UN formed police (103,658).

Measure: Average rating denoting the degree to which UN Peacekeeping Missions Achieve USG Objectives Stated in the Department's CBJ for the Corresponding Fiscal Year. Missions are rated as 1 = Below Target; 2 = At Target; 3 = Above Target.

Explanation:As a permanent member (with a veto power) of the UN Security Council, the U.S. pursues the adoption of resolutions and the issuance of Presidential Statements that address threats to peace and security in ways that parallel and reinforce U.S. objectives. This includes resolutions that establish "right-sized" UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) that complement the U.S. Government's foreign policy goals, including restoring security in areas of conflict, and promoting post-conflict stabilization. All proposed PKOs are carefully vetted in an interagency policy task force prior to a U.S. vote in the U.N. Security Council. Due to the evolving nature of UN peacekeeping mandates, the practice of extending, terminating, and mandating new missions, the criteria used to evaluate whether or not a mission achieved USG objectives varies. IO will compare the existing missions to a set of objectives as outlined in the CBJ and provide the aggregate score of existing peacekeeping missions.

Measure: Percentage of missions that meet mandate targets. (New measure, added August 2007)

Explanation:Comparison of these missions' accomplishments/results, as evidenced by UN Secretary General reports and US government evaluation of mission performance, to annual PART targets.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The UN Charter notes that one of the goals of the United Nations is "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace..." As a member state of the UN, the USG supports peacekeeping missions approved by the UN Security Council. The CIPA account funds the USG share of assessed expenses of specific UN peacekeeping missions voted in the UN Security Council.

Evidence: UNCharter references to peacekeeping. State Department Budget Documents (BIB, CPD), annual peacekeeping report to Congress, U.S. Participation in the UN Report. UN peacekeeping operations are also included in the USUN MPP for FY2005 and FY2006. State Department Authorization Acts. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: IO FY2006 BPP Assistant Secretary Statement and Regional Stability Goal Paper. An indicator on UN peacekeeping operations was also in the FY2005 IO BPP.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: There is still a need for the UN to create peacekeeping missions, as there is still a need for the international community to collectively take measures to support peace in many countries around the world. CIPA enables the USG to pursue multilateral approaches to our national security requirements for which UN peacekeeping is in the interests of the U.S.

Evidence: UN charter reference to responsibility of member states re: peacekeeping. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml]. State Department budget documents, annual report on peacekeeping to Congress, monthly briefings of Congressional staff on UN peacekeeping operations, Congressional notification on new or expanded peacekeeping operations, U.S. Participation in the UN Report. UN peacekeeping operations are also included in the USUN MPP for FY2005 and FY2006. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: FY2006 IO BPP Assistant Secretary Statement and Regional Stability goal paper. An indicator on UN peacekeeping operations was also in the FY2005 BPP.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: It is the only program of the federal government to pay bills sent to the USG for UN assessed peacekeeping missions. There are no state, local, or private programs to pay these UN peacekeeping assessments. The USG does support voluntary peacekeeping activities, but these are generally in different places than UN missions.

Evidence: President's budget will show that no other federal program exists to pay UN assessments for peacekeeping missions. Annual appropriations acts. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: FY2006 Assistant Secretary Statement and Regional Stability goal paper.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Inherent in a multilateral framework is the fact that the end result is a compromise among member states and other relevant parties. The USG does not vote in favor of peacekeeping missions that are not believed to be the most effective and efficient way of maintaining peace. The mandate of the mission and its ability to most effectively operate, though, is a compromise among member states and other relevant parties. In addition, a complicating factor is that the funding availability must conform to the U.S. budget process which requires a long lead time that does not always allow for flexibility in meeting fast changing events in trouble spots. There is no evidence that there is a better way to approach multilateral peacekeeping activities.

Evidence: Annual Peacekeeping Report and Annual UN Voting Report. UN membership voting information also available, [ http://unbisnet.un.org]. Because the U.S. can veto any peacekeeping mission, this guarantees that we cannot be assessed for a UN peacekeeping mission that the President's interagency process has judged ineffective, inefficient, or not consistent with U.S. national security interests. By virtue of the fact that we voted for a peacekeeping mission, we believe that the overall U.S. national interests are effectively and efficiently served.

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: The CIPA program funds only pay for specific UN peacekeeping missions authorized by the UN Security Council where such authorizations are subject to U.S. approval or veto. Every mission has a different mandate (some are broader with development and humanitarian assistance included while some are narrower and focused on more traditional peacekeeping functions) based on the needs in the country. The USG only makes payments to specific UN accounts set up for the specific peacekeeping missions. The UN then makes funds available to missions to support the activities in the mandate.

Evidence: Performance Report for UN missions in Congo, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone. Bills and receipts of payment from the UN for specific missions.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: Long-Term Goal and associated measures and targets documented in the PART and BPP (specifically, closing peacekeeping missions that have achieved their objectives) reflect an outcome-based focus directly tied to the Department's strategic goal of Regional Stability. While there appears to only be one long-term goal on the Measures tab, this is actually a representation of the long-term goals for each peacekeeping mission.

Evidence: Annual Peacekeeping Report to Congress. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: FY2005 and 2006 BPPs. Regional Stability Goal Paper.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Our target is to close out by 2007 nearly 40% of the peacekeeping missions extant in 2002 despite pressures to the contrary. This rate of closure will require close attention to mission activities and UN planning to sunset missions that have achieved their objectives.

Evidence: The Annual Peacekeeping Report and in the U.S. Participation in the UN Annual Report [www.state.gov/p/io/conrpt/]. SYG reports to the UNSC [www.un.org]. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: FY 2006 BPP Regional Stability Goal Paper.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: Annual targets documented in the PART and BPP reflect an outcome-based focus directly tied to the purpose of the program and demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals. The specific targets for each mission are held off-line, as they are sensitive.

Evidence: SYG reports [www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html], independent reports by U.S. and other Member States, reports from U.S. Embassies in region of conflict. Refer to BPP goals. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: FY 2006 BPP Regional Stability Goal Paper.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Our annual targets are directly tied to major events in the life of each peacekeeping mission and directly reflect USG national security interests. Given the extreme difficulty of achieving peaceful resolution of problems, many of which have their roots in centuries of unresolved conflict, in many of the most extreme, difficult, and hostile environments, meeting targets of this magnitude is highly ambitious.

Evidence: SYG reports on peacekeeping operations [www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html]. State Department Annual reports on Peacekeeping and UN Voting Practices [www.state.gov/p/io/conrpt]. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: FY 2005 and 2006 BPP's Regional Stability Goal Papers.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: USG partners (NSC and OMB) participate in setting these goals and monitoring results by clearing often crosshatched instruction cables and congressional notifications on peacekeeping. The UN and other member states do not explicitly agree to USG goals. The UN's Secretary-General (SYG) produces reports as directed by the UN Security Council indicating progress and results related to the specific peacekeeping mission established by the UN Security Council. Staff at USUN review these documents and communicate USG views on performance in formal and informal sessions. Any peacekeeping mission's mandate will include the key elements that are reflective of the USG goals, which are communicated to, negotiated with and voted on by all members of the Security Council.

Evidence: UN Resolutions establishing/renewing UN peacekeeping mission mandates [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html]. Reports by the UN Secretary General on each peacekeeping mission [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/]. Annual Report to Congress on Peacekeeping. Special analyses of selected peacekeeping missions prepared by the Department of State for the NSC-chaired interagency group.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: GAO conducts approximately one review per year that focuses on various aspects of UN peacekeeping. In 2003, a report was conducted on the UN's transition strategies for post-conflict nations, which directly relates to the USG goal of closing missions when their mandates have been accomplished. In addition to GAO reports, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Best Practices Unit annually prepares numerous reports on UN peacekeeping missions that focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions and provide specific examples of results of previous actions taken and recommendations for new actions to be taken to improve effectiveness in the specific mission and other missions.

Evidence: GAO reports, [www.gao.gov]. GAO list of relevant reports provided to OMB. Briefings and feedback on Congressional fact-finding missions. Meeting notes of State Department and OMB officials attending briefings. UNDPKO Best Practices Unit reports. www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Resource needs are requested for each existing UN peacekeeping mission in budget requests. The President's national security inter-agency decision-making organization includes OMB and the State Department as key participants to ensure that the CIPA budget request is directly tied to the President's long-term and annual goals (which may include political as well as performance goals) and to the Department's long-term and annual goals. The funding requests are directly tied to decisions to establish new missions, continue them unchanged and to downsize or expand or closeout missions. The goals can only be accomplished if the UN effectively carries out the mandates of the UN Security Council (which requires funding to operationalize.)

Evidence: Congressional Budget Documents, Congressional Notifications for new or expanded UN peacekeeping missions. Briefings and testimony to Congress on Budget requests for CIPA. [www.state.gov/s/h/tst] BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers:

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: When IO concludes that the evidence demonstrates that goals are not being met, IO works to have the State Department and interagency processes adjust strategies, planning measures, and seek appropriate changes to mission mandates and forces to meet those targets. In the case of East Timor, the U.S. delegation presented a speech in the UNSC highlighting problem areas and outlining the way ahead for the East Timor mission, which led to a change in this mission's mandate and size. Additionally, USUN staff made a presentation to the UNSC on U.S. peacekeeping policy in May 2004. IO also participates extensively in the Department's Performance Plans through the Mission, Bureau, and Department planning products. Through the PART process in FY 2006 longterm and annual goals were included that are based in part on previous Bureau Performance Plans.

Evidence: UN Security Council resolutions establishing revised mandates [www.un.org/Docs/sc]. NSC inter-agency agendas for PC and DC meetings. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Past BPPs included targets on "indicative" peacekeeping operations.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The State Department gets information from the UN, SYG, UN DPKO, UN peacekeeping missions, and nearby U.S. and other embassies on the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operation. Data is collected by active solicitation of views of U.S. embassies, State Department field trips, other governments agency reports, press reports and UN reports. This data collection is particularly intense preceeding Security Council votes to establish, renew or change UN peacekeeping mission mandates. Data is used to make assessments about progress or problems and to make determinations of changes required. U.S. positions are then often documented in instruction cables to USUN, Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) agendas and Interagency Summary of Conclusions, to be used in negotiating Security Council resolutions.

Evidence: Congressional briefing notes, memos to State Department and NSC management . Data is gathered from CIA, press reports, cables from U.S. missions, reports from the UN field briefings and other UN official reports [www.un.org/Docs/sc].

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Within the Department of State's Bureau of International Organization (IO) Affairs and its missions, the primary federal managers responsible for achieving U.S. goals related to UN peacekeeping are the Assistant Secretary, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, and officers in IO/Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations (PHO), IO/UN Political Affairs (UNP), and the U.S. Mission to the UN (USUN). The CIPA Account is primarily managed by IO/PHO and IO/Executive Office (EX). Those individuals have work requirements that take into account their CIPA-related responsibilities. At the UN the ACABQ (budget committee) conducts annual mission performance reviews. All member states review these performance reports and provide feedback. The UN has recently begun a results-based budgeting process where specific measures and indicators are created for all programs, including UN peacekeeping missions.

Evidence: UN Security Council resolutions, SYG reports, ACABQ and Fifth Committee reports [www.un.org/documents]. GAO review of the results based review process [www.gao.gov/highlights/d031071high.pdf - 1014.3KB - GAO Reports]. Job elements of program managers.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: UN missions are generally approved before there is a budget for the mission. The budget is based on the actual mandate and size of the mission approved by the Security Council. The Administration must inform Congress of the intent to vote for a new mission and also include how the mission will be funded out of existing resources, but this notification is generally based on preliminary estimates, which usually change. In addition, the UN peacekeeping fiscal year begins in July, while the President's Budget is submitted in February, so the estimates for ongoing missions included in the Budget may be very different from the actual budget for the mission. Finally, OMB suspects the CIPA account violated the Anti-Deficiency Act in FY2003, where obligations exceeded the amount apportioned. The Department continues to investigate this issue.

Evidence: UN prepares budget Performace Reports for each mission. [www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specpk.htm#spepk] Department of State financial records on obligations and fund disbursements.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: There are not cost comparisons, IT improvements or other incentives in place to achieve efficiencies. However, the bureau has procedures in place for reviewing all major aspects of a mission prior to its renewal, establishment or elimination through our vote in the UNSC. This involves contacting stakeholders (e.g., U.S. embassies in affected area), and the interagency process including the NSC and OMB. USUN is involved in negotiating peacekeeping budgets and asks performance-related questions during those negotiations. The UN has estabished a Best Practices Unit to improve efficiency and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. In terms of in-house USG efforts to achieve efficiencies and cost effectivness, the Department has created an efficiency indicator which measures total assessed UN peacekeeping mission expenditures divided by the total UN peacekeeping mission staff.

Evidence: UN Best Practices Unit reports such as recent reports on lessons learned on Liberia peacekeeping start-up problems and lessons learned from earlier missons in Haiti [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons]. Reporting cables to/from U.S. embassies.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: IO's CIPA pays UN assessments while the Political-Military Bureau's (PM's) Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account funds voluntary peacekeeping activities'i.e. not assessed by UN. IO and PM program managers collaborate, suchas was the case recently with the transition of the multinational force in Haiti into a UN peacekeeping force. This ensured a process to address issues related to a gap in forces or mandate. Despite CIPA's uniqueness, it has some interaction with the PM-managed PKO account that often pays for U.S. civilian police participation (managed by the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs bureau) in UN missions. To avoid duplication of activities, the UN Administrative Coordinating Committee coordinates UN peacekeeping with other UN funds, programs, & agencies. At the mission level, the SYG's Special Rep. coordinates all UN agency activities. USUN works with like-minded member states to ensure coordinated review of UN financial management of peacekeeping missions in UN Fifth Committee reports.

Evidence: UN Fifth Committee reports [http://ceb.unsystem.org]. Reports of IO and PM participation in the interagency process chaired by NSC with OMB. PKO and CIPA reprogramming requests. Peacekeeping Resolutions of UNSC which assign coordinating responsibility to SRSG.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: In terms of IO in-house mgmt. of CIPA, there is a three-step internal control system in place to ensure that all physical, material, and human resources are safeguarded against waste, fraud, unauth. use or misappropriation. Specifically, funds are allotted to the account by an IO analyst. The allotment doc. is then signed off by the office supervisor. The IO analyst obligates the funds based on budget estimates and current billings. The obligation docs. are also signed by the office supervisor. Payment request memos stating the payment amount are submitted by IO/PHO. The payment vouchers are prepared by the analyst, reviewed and initialed by the office supervisor, and forwarded to the Exec. Dir. for final signature authorizing payment. The office supervisor and Exec. Dir. verify the payment amounts against the incoming memo, budget estimates and billings before signing. However, in FY03 the acct. entered into obligations greater than the amount apportioned to the account.

Evidence: Notes of meetings. roster of attendees, handouts with financial information for Monthly meetings.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Working together with the NSC and other interested parties, we seek to have the inter agency process work smoothly and to address any U.S. or UN deficiencies in UN peacekeeping. When deficiencies are identified, the Program Manager works with Regional Bureaus, NSC, and DOD to develop remedies and corrective action plans. For example, IO, AF, USAID and OMB traveled together to the UN to express concerns and consult on failings of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program in Liberia. IO and House Appropriations Staff traveled to Liberia to study the problems first hand and express concerns. In response to the peacekeeping challenges of the mid-1990s, the SYG convened a group of experts to assess UN shortcomings and make recommendations for change. Their report, known as the Brahimi Report, came out in August 2000 and offered recommendations to improve operations. The UN, with member state assistance, has made improvements based on these recommendations.

Evidence: National Security Council procedures. PCC summaries of conclusions. Congressional Notifications. Reporting cables to/from relevant US Embassy evaluating the U.N. peacekeeping mission. Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Three UN peacekeeping misssions extant in 2002 have been shut down. UNSC resolutions for UNAMSIL and UNMISET indicate specific plans for completing operations consistent with the U.S. long term goal.

Evidence: UNSC resolutions[www.un.org/Docs/sc]. Reports of U.S. Participation in the UN, UN Voting Report, Peacekeeping Annual Report [www.state.gov/p/io/conrpt]. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Regional Stability Goal paper

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Static and Dynamic UN peacekeeping mission operations meet U.S. goals. Although this is a new PART, IO has had and been measuring progress toward established peacekeeping goals, indicators, and targets in the State Department's BPP in previous years.

Evidence: SYG reports on peackeeping missions [www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html]. U.S. Embassies reports and USG analyses. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: Regional Stability Goal Paper

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The US supports UN efforts to improve the efficiency of UN peacekeeping missions. An example is found in the Brahimi recommendation to reduce time in creating a peacekeeping mission after a UN Security Council decision. This led the UN to create the Strategic Deployment Stock (SDS) in Brindisi, Italy. The SDS was created, operational, and is cited on Pg. 12 of the "Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia" (UNMIL) report of Apr. 2004. It was an effective facility in establishing UNMIL's supplies. If missions are in bordering countries, DPKO makes use of the existing mission to improve cost effectiveness, i.e. Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Program managers require "right sizing" of mission mandates and operations at each mandate review and renewal. The USG attempts to lessen the costs of missions that are not meeting their objectives, but can fail due to political considerations. Also, DoS has created an efficiency measure for this program.

Evidence: UN Security Resolutions. UN SYG reports. USG analysis. Stimson Center's publication - The Brahimi Report and the Future of United Nations Peace Operations, cables to posts. UNDPKO Best Practices Unit reports. www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/ BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: Regional Stability Goal Paper

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: There are no other programs contributing to the funding of assessed UN multilateral peacekeeping activities.

Evidence: The UN charter provides for UN peacekeeping and envisions a complementary role for regional organizations [www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html].

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: GAO conducts periodic reviews of UN peacekeeping missions. In a 2003 report regarding UN transition strategies for post-conflict countries, the GAO report indicated that the UN has created a strategy to address past peacekeeping failures, but is still working on creating an effective results-based system for peacekeeping missions. The Stimson Center conducted an independent review of United Nations peacekeeping management and the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations. The report concludes that "[I]n general, the United Nations has demonstrated clear progress in implementing a majority of reforms recommended by the Panel on UN Peace Operations." An example of how Brahimi panel reforms led to UN peacekeeping missions being more effective in achieving results is the SDS'created to improve the launching of new peacekeeping missions. SDS effectiveness is cited in independent UN reports as the reason the UNMIL/UN owned start-up equipment was adequate.

Evidence: Reports from GAO, CODELs and STAFFDELs [www.gao.gov]. Stimson Center's publication - The Brahimi Report and the Future of United Nations Peace Operations. BPP Evidence: N/A