Detailed Information on the
DoD Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Assessment

Work to improve the integration of UAS requirements across the Services to enhance commonality, interoperability, and lower overall costs.

Review the requirements for UAS as part of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. Adjust resources, as needed.

Review the requirements for UAS as part of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. Adjust resources, as needed.

Measure: Objective endurance requirement - medium UAV

Explanation:Performance

Measure: Number of aircraft delivered on schedule - medium UAV

Explanation:Schedule

Measure: Change in acquisition cost from total cost estimate - medium UAV

Explanation:Cost

Measure: Objective endurance requirement - intermediate UAV

Explanation:Performance

Measure: Change in acquisition cost from total cost estimate - small UAV

Explanation:Cost

Measure: Number of aircraft delivered on schedule - small UAV

Explanation:Schedule

Measure: Objective endurance requirement - small UAV

Explanation:Performance

Measure: Change in acquisition cost from total cost estimate - large UAV

Explanation:Cost

Measure: Percent of persistent ISR requirement met by high altitude UAS

Explanation:Performance

Measure: Number of aircraft delivered on schedule - large UAV

Explanation:Schedule

Measure: Number of aircraft delivered on schedule - intermediate

Explanation:Schedule

Measure: Notice to FAA required to fly a high altitude UAV in the same airspace as a manned aircraft

Explanation:Performance

Measure: Objective endurance requirement - large UAV

Explanation:Performance - actual denotes record achieved with early version of Global Hawk in 2001

Measure: Change in acquisition cost from total cost estimate - intermediate UAV

Explanation:Cost

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The DoD UAS program's purpose is to meet the Combatant Commanders' (COCOM) mission needs with UAS when, and only when, UAS are the best solution for the specified military capability need. The procedures established in the Joint Capabilites and Integration Development System (JCIDS) support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in advising the Secretary of Defense in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs. For an UAS program to be initiated, the JROC must approve it; i.e., determine that it is the best solution. UAS technology development guidance is provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) UAS Roadmap. OSD's first UAV Roadmap (2000-2025) was released in April 2001. Biennially, the roadmap has been updated; detailed appendices were added starting in 2003. OSD's UAS Roadmap provides the Services with technology-related goals to enhance UAS operational effectiveness; each Service has a UAV Roadmap with plans for UAS development.

Evidence: The OSD UAV Roadmap (2002-2027) and the current draft OSD UAS Roadmap (2005-2030) provide guidance and goals for UAS-relelated technology development. The procedures established in the Joint Capabilites and Integration Development System are outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01E. Each UAS program has an Operational Requirements Document and Mission Needs Statement, or a Joint Capabilities Document/ Initial Capabilities Document/Capability Development Document, that describes the mission need/capability gap to be met. The COCOMs' specific UAS priorities are also classified. An integrated COCOM priority list is found in the UAS Roadmap (2005-2030).

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Existing capability needs are documented by each COCOM annually; each submits a prioritized Integrated Priority List (IPL) of shortfalls in that theater's warfighting capabilties. Of the 50 capability gaps specified in the FY06-11 IPLs, 54% are capabilities that are currently, or could be, satisfied by UAS. OSD UAV Planning Task Force (PTF), through the Joint Staff, asked the Combatant Commanders to prioritize their capability needs; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) consistently was ranked as one of the highest priorities.

Evidence: The FY06-11 IPL is a classified document that describes the capability shortfalls; some of the shortfalls, as determined through the JCIDS process, are being addressed by UAS.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: DoD is the primary Federal entity developing and operating UAS; the U.S. Coast Guard and other elements of the Department of Homeland Security have plans to operate UAS; however, these activities are generally leveraging DoD efforts. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense interfaces directly with DHS for all DoD/DHS coordination; and the Deputy, UAV Planning Task Force is an Advisory Member to the DHS UAV Executive Steering Group (ESG). With DoD as an advisory member of the DHS UAV ESG, DHS is able to leverage DoD experience in the development and acquisition of UAS.

Evidence: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is planning to acquire UAS. DHS established the DHS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Executive Steering Group (ESG) to address all issues relating to DHS UAV systems in January 2004; its charter states its mission and lists DoD as an Advisory Member. The Deputy, UAV PTF serves in this capacity. DoD, as the leading US government developer and operator of UAS, also provides assistance and coordinates with other agencies in UAS acquisition and policy issues. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01E and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01B outline the JCIDS process.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: JCIDS process is designed to avoid duplication of capabilities, and to determine when UAS are the best solution to fill a capability gap. However, the UAS Roadmap is not a comprehensive plan to ensure that the Services do not develop duplicative programs. More needs to be done to integrate requirements across the Services to prevent multiple systems with similar missions from being acquired.

Evidence: Service priorities have led to several programs with similar capabilities.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Acquisition of UAS is governed by DOD 5000 series. The Planning, Programming and Budget Execution process ensures that resources are optimally allocated among competing requirements. UAS are in high demand by operational commanders; the President's Budget (PB) 2001 provided $300 million for development and procurement of UAS. This investment has grown to $1.6 billion in PB 2006. At the end of calendar year 2000 the Department had a total of 98 tactical and theater UAV airframes; today there are over 200 with the majority of each type operationally deployed. Resources have been applied to emerging needs quickly.

Evidence: Acquistion programs and related funding are subject to regular periodic reviews; e.g., acquisition milestones and annual budget reviews. The President's Budget documentation lays out the funds invested and the number of systems delivered. Examples of emerging COCOM needs that were met efficiently include: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capability on Global Hawk, Hellfire on Predator, and acceleration of fielding Shadow and small UAV systems.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The Strategic Planning Guidance provides direction for future DoD planning. One area identified as critical is increasing persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. OSD's ISR Roadmap summarizes ISR requirements and indicates that a certain percentage of ISR capabilities can be provided by certain numbers of certain types of UAS. In this example UAS programs have been structured to provide this needed capability in a given time frame. Some capability gaps other than persistent ISR can be addressed by UAS, as well. Other goals not related to specific programs, but focused on technology development, include operational assessment of a joint unmanned combat system, and the development of see-and-avoid sensors to provide UAS an equivalent level of safety as manned aircraft.

Evidence: DoD UAS delivered over the last two years are contributing to the persistent ISR capability needs. Virtually all full-motion video collection is from various UAS. Documents include: Strategic Planning Guidance (classified) and ISR Roadmap (classified). The ISR Roadmap provides classified data stating percentage of persistent ISR capability that can best be provided by UAS. The UAS Roadmap, 2005-2030, provides goals for UAS-related technology development. An example includes: Develop and operationally assess for potential fielding, a joint unmanned combat aircraft system.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Ambitious targets for fielding UAS to fill the persistent ISR capability gap can be found in the ISR Roadmap (classified); targets include fielding a number of orbits made up of a given number of aircraft by certain dates.

Evidence: ISR Roadmap provides classified data related to the UAS' capability to fill persistent ISR capability gaps including numbers of orbits required, numbers of aircraft required per orbit, and dates for the orbit.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The overarching annual performance measure associated with the management of all DoD UAS is that Services deliver the warfighter UAS with the required capabilities on schedule and within budget. The Services manage the programs with OSD oversight and establish performance goals for each UAS program. These include cost, schedule, and capability goals that DoD tracks continually. Additionally, the UAS Roadmap provides goals related to UAS development and procurement. Goals are updated every two years; this includes validating and re-prioritizing. Future UAS capabilities are dependent on technology under development now. The UAS Roadmap provides timeframes that UAS related technology is expected to be available for intergration and fielding in UAS.

Evidence: The President's Budget documentation provides details on program estimated costs, contract award dates, and delivery schedules. Selected Acquisition Reports (provided to Congress by DoD) show deviations from the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). Senior defense official committees (e.g., Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), Executive Committee (EXCOM)) review major programs' progress (e.g., Global Hawk, J-UCAS). Each acquisition program has an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) or an Initial Capabilites Document (ICD) and Capability Development Document (CDD) that describe the requirement/capability to be developed and fielded. Performance measures (Key Performance Parameters(KPPs)) are provided in the ORD and the CDD. Section 6 of the UAS Roadmap brings together the requirements and desired capabilities with emerging technological and operational opportunities in an effort to stimulate the planning process for UAS development over the next 25 years.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: OSD's goal is that all Service UAS programs deliver the warfighter its required capability on time and within budget. All major programs have baselines and annual targets for cost, schedule and performance.

Evidence: An analysis of the Program and President's Budget documentation provides details on programs' progress based on previous estimates of costs, contract award dates, and delivery schedules. Selected Acquisition Reports (provided to Congress by DoD) show deviations from the program baselines. The Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) provides threshold and objective targets for cost, schedule and performance.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Prime contractors and sub-contractors are fully committed to the program through their contractual obligations. The prime contractor has ultimate responsibility for developing systems and sub-systems, and the integration of such systems to provide the required capability. Contracts are performance based. For example, the Shadow contract requires the contractor to meet schedule goals or face penalties.

Evidence: The overall systems requirement documents (ORD, CDD) are used to develop the appropriate sub-component requirements, which are documented in the programs' integrated master schedule and performance specification documents.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: A Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of the Department's plans for development and fielding of UA and UCAV systems. The GAO has conducted a number of independent evaluations of DoD UA Systems. DoD conducts periodic reviews of individual programs through the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) process (quarterly), and through Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) reviews.

Evidence: DSB Study on UAVs and UCAVs (February 2004). GAO Reports: GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR; GAO-03-598, GAO/NSIAD-99-33; GAO/NSIAD-00-204; GAO-04-342; GAO-05-301. Acquisition Decision Memoranda.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: DoD's Acquisition and Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution processes work hand-in-hand to ensure that program goals are adequately resourced, and resources and/or goals are adjusted based on a program's performance related to its long-term and annual performance measures; e.g., providing persistent ISR capability and fielding specific numbers of UAS each year. Annually, DoD uses this process to adjust resources based on programs' performance and changes in requirements.

Evidence: President's Budget documentation shows how resources and schedule have been adjusted based on program performance. Acquistion Decision Memorandum recently re-baselined the Global Hawk program.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The GAO has noted both program successes and strategic planning deficiencies. CJCSM 3170.01B and CJCSI 3170.01E were subsequently revised May 11, 2005, to improve JCIDS. Revision includes creation of a Joint Capabilities Document to give combatant commands and others a venue to better define needed joint capabilities and identify and prioritize joint gaps and redundancies. JROC directed the establishment of a Joint UAV Center of Excellence (COE) and a Joint Overarching Integrated Process Team (OIPT); the COE for more effective joint concepts of operations development, and the OIPT to address UAS capability needs/issues jointly.

Evidence: GAO Report GAO-04-342. CJCSM 3170.01B, CJSCSI 3170.01E (11 May 2005); JROC Memorandum (JROCM) 136-05 dated July 5, 2005.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: DoD regularly reviews performance information and, based on the information, makes appropriate budget and progam decisions. Cost accounting data is collected for smaller programs, while Earned Value Management is exercised on the larger programs. Examples of reviews include the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, Budget Review, and Defense Acquisition Board.

Evidence: UA programs' performance (cost, schedule, capbility assessments) determine program success and failure. Documentation of program reviews are the quarterly DAES reports, annual Program Budget Decision, and periodic Acquisition Decision Memoranda.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Acquisition directives assign accountability to program managers for cost, schedule, and performance. Contractual requirements are stated in performance terms.

Evidence: Global Hawk contract includes Key Performance Parameters from the program's requirements documents and incentivizes the contractor to meet cost targets . A low award fee was awarded for the last award period and the program manager replaced because of poor performance. Similarly, the Shadow contract incentivizes the contractor to meet schedule goals.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: DoD budget reviews include a review of obligation and expenditure data to ensure that resources are obligated and expensed in accordance with DoD standards.

Evidence: Monthly Accounting Report (M) 1002 reflects historically timely obligations; GAO Report GAO-04-342 also indicated timely obligation of funds.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Competition is routinely used to minimize acquisition costs. Contracts routinely include incentives for attaining schedule and/or costs efficiencies.

Evidence: The Army Shadow and Extended Range Multi-Purpose UA programs selected contrators based on a review of proposals followed by a competitive fly-off. Selection was based on best value combining performance, acquisition cost, and sustainment cost.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The UAV Planning Task Force was established to be the single point of contact within the DoD to guide Departmental UAS acquisiton efforts in a coordinated manner. Being available to industry and our allies, OSD's UAS Roadmap promotes a common vision for future UAS-related efforts.

Evidence: Examples of collaboration include Navy and Army colloaboration on the Fire Scout UA program. This collaboration has resulted in a cooperative approach to procurement and the establishment of an integrated acquisition structure. Program managers for small UAS also hold monthly teleconferences to resolve common issues, and the JCS has directed the establishment of a Joint COE and Joint OIPT (JROC Memorandum dated July 5, 2005).

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: DoD's financial management weaknesses are well documented. While DoD continues to make efforts to improve them, the Department has yet to obtain an unqualified audit opinion. The services developing UAS do not have audit reports demonstrating that their UAS programs are free from internal weaknesses. Moreover, DoD's plan to obtain a department-wide unqualified audit opinion has continued to slip from its planned milestones, which warrants an "No" for this question.

Evidence: None of the reports or audits specifically cite UAS programs for material financial weaknesses, however, none of the audits specifically looked at that aspect of the programs. Numerous audits document DoD's financial management weaknessess. Because of the magnitude of its problems, DoD is unlikely to obtain an unqualified opinion for some time.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: UAS programs are managed by the Services. OSD has oversight of acquisition programs, but does not directly manage the programs. Once initiated program management decisions and resource allocation are based primarily on Service priorities; even though OSD has the ability to redirect resources during the annual budget process as it did in FY2004 to stand up the Joint Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems program. Efforts are currently underway to better integrate future Service UAS requirements through the management architecture defined in JROCM 136-05, but the effectiveness of this process remains to be demonstrated.

Evidence: JROCM 136-05 dated July 5, 2005.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: UAS are being delivered at the required rate and are meeting performance targets. In some cases, UAS are providing the warfighter needed capablities, such as endurance, prior to declaring Initial Operating Capability.

Evidence: UAS programs are demonstrating progress with respect to the long-term persistent ISR capability performance goals documented in the ISR Roadmap (classified). Global Hawk and Predator B UA prototypes are operating at the required performance levels in support of the Global War on Terror today.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: In general, UAS are being delivered to the warfighter with the desired capability, and are being fielded ahead of planned schedules in most cases. However, there have been some problems with some of the programs.

Evidence: The Army's FY2004 plan was to field four Shadow UAS, actual number of systems fielded was four. FY 2005 deliveries are greater than originally planned due to the increase demand for the system by the COCOMs. The Global Hawk program has experienced some difficulties.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: UAS programs are managed by the Services. OSD has oversight of acquisition programs, but does not directly manage the programs. Individual programs have procedures to improve efficiencies with in the program, but their effectiveness has not been demonstrated.

Evidence: There is no documented evidence of demonstrated improved efficiencies.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: No program has the record of success that the DoD has. DHS is planning to acquire UAS, but UAS program is in its infancy. NASA has some UAS for test and development, but do not have a formal acuisition program. USCG Deepwater program includes UAS capabilities, but none have been delivered.

Evidence: UAS have provided capabliity to warfighters even at the prototype stage. Fielding has also been accelerated for Shadow and several small UAS.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The GAO cites some program successes, while noting strategic planning deficiencies. Needed capabilities are being fielded, but GAO expressed concern that the lack of a UAV strategic plan may result in systems that do not complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid duplication. The success of DoD UAS operationally has led to UAS programs being accelerated, and prototypes deploying. The majority of the systems are deployed.

Evidence: GAO Report GAO-04-342.