Detailed Information on the
Army Base Operations & Support Assessment

?? Developing, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, definitions, cost models, and performance measures for all base support services that are common across all military services.

Ensure that the Army sustains its covenant with Army families.

Measure: Percentage of BOS services (there are 64 in all) that receive the highest or second highest rating out of four.

Explanation:The Army has developed detailed performance standards for the 64 installation services and rated performance levels on a scale of C1 (best) to C4 (worst). This measure displays the percentage of services rated C2 (or higher).

Measure: Water Services, including Waste Water

Explanation:The percent of installations receiving the highest evaluation (C1) in water services (C1 rating means 3 or less major unplanned outages per year lasting over two hours). This measure, as well as the measure for electrical services, is representative of other critical services within the BOS program.

Measure: Electrical Services

Explanation:The percent of installations receiving the highest evaluation (C1) in electrical services (C1 rating means 3 or less major unplanned outages per year lasting over two hours).

Measure: Child & Youth Services

Explanation:The percent of installations whose child and youth program is rated C1. (i.e. is the installation Child Development Services program certified by DoD ?) This measure, as well as the measure for environmental compliance, is representative of the more discretionary services within BOS.

Measure: Child Development Services

Explanation:Measures percentage of Army child care demand filled (Army child care spaces filled/Army child care demand)

Measure: Environmental Compliance

Explanation:The percentage of installations meeting the Environmental Compliance program is rated C1. (i.e. did the installation meet its compliance site reduction goals?)

Measure: Energy Management

Explanation:Energy reduction, as directed by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, of 2% per year starting in FY 06 using a baseline year of 2003. Energy consumption per square foot in 2003 was 90KBtu (90 thousand Btu per square foot)

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose of the Base Operations Support (BOS) program is to provide essential services such as electricity, water, sewage, and communication at Army installations. These services support the home station infrastructure necessary to project Army forces throughout the globe. In addition, BOS provides "quality of life" programs such as Child Development and Morale Support.

Evidence: The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (OACSIM), in accordance with responsibilities outlined in US Code, Title X and DOD guidance, provides policy guidance and program management through regulations and policy memorandums on matters relating to management of Army installations. The purpose of this guidance is to ensure the availability of efficient, effective base services and facilities worldwide. The OACSIM strives to accomplish this mission by coordinating across DOD and Army to develop sound policies, and maintain stable, predictable funding for essential services at Army installations.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Army installations require extensive services to enable the operational force to perform its mission. BOS fills that requirement. BOS needs are determined by statutory and regulatory guidance, as well as customer expectations at installations regarding the services necessary to provide the essential infrastructure to support the Army mission.

Evidence: BOS service areas include Municipal Services, Utilities, Leases, Fire and Emergency Services, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), Logistics, Installation Command and Control, Force Protection, Family Centers, Child and Youth Services, Environmental Quality, and Audio Visual/Base Communications. Beginning in the late 1990s, the Army developed Service Based Costing (SBC) in conjunction with the Installation Status Report (ISR), to address the requirements of Government Performance Results Act as well as other DOD performance measurement initiatives. There are currently 82 services in SBC; 62 of them are within BOS. OACSIM developed performance measures focused on outcomes for each of these services.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The U.S. Army is solely responsible for managing support activities at its installations. This effort has strong links to the local communities and the program designs are tailored according to services available from entities outside the army. For geographically isolated installations or when local community resources are inadequate; installations continue to provide services independently.

Evidence: To maintain industry standard technology and garner efficiencies, the Army privatized 111 utility systems in the United States. Other BOS programs partnering with local communities to avoid redundancy and duplication include Fire and Emergency Services, MWR, and Employment Assistance programs. Child and Youth Services partners with local government agencies to provide training to their employees to enable them to become nationally accredited, a DOD requirement. In turn, these local government agencies provide the installations with much needed spaces in Child and Youth Programs at rates acceptable to DOD.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The design of the Base Operations Support (BOS) program and the associated services and performance metrics is sound. The Army continually assesses the program to improve its design based on input and feedback from all customer segments, and reallocates resources based on a changing environment. Furthermore, local commands have the flexibility to re-prioritize programs under their control based on evolving needs.

Evidence: The Army rates the effectiveness of the BOS program thru the Installation Status Report (ISR), where sixty-two (62) services are rated in effectiveness from C1 (highest) to C4 (lowest). The last set of ratings (FY 2005) shows that over ?? of the services were rated C1 or C2, while only three of the sixty-two received the lowest rating of C4. Furthermore, the 'must do' services (water, waste water, other utility services) were more often rated C1 while services with a discretionary nature (sports, recreations and libraries) were more likely to be rated C4. These ratings indicate that the Army has a sound BOS program design, but one short of optimization due to constrained funding because of competing Army priorities.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: The Army allocates BOS resources directly to installations through the Installation Management Agency (IMA) for Active Army and Reserve installations (the National Guard receives its own BOS allocation). This allocation is based on the needs of the individual installations. Installation managers have the flexibility to address shortcomings in their programs as the year progresses.

Evidence: IMA uses a funds distribution system that sets targets for individual BOS services. This system is linked to workload and their associated requirements, thus ensuring that the programs with the greatest needs receive priority for resources. These targets are adjusted throughout the execution year, in response to changing requirements. Additionally, common levels of support (CLS) are being developed to improve upon the current funds distribution process by prioritizing BOS services.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The Army measures the extent to which it is succeeding in providing services to installations through the Installation Status Report. This report rates each of the 64 BOS services on a scale of one to four using objective criteria. The performance measures section of the PART lists two critical BOS services -- Electricity and Water, and two discretionary services -- Child Development and Environmental Compliance for illustrative purposes. While the measures are technically output rather than outcome, one can infer from the data that higher ratings for the services produces an outcome of satisfied customers (army families).

Evidence: The Installation Status Report scores each of the 62 BOS services on a scale of one to four.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Given the Army's history of funding BOS at less than 100% of 'requirements', the targets appear to be extremely ambitious.

Evidence: The Army's strategic plan for BOS lays out a program that is ambitious. The challenge for the Army is identifying sufficient funding to meet those targets.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: Annual performance measures for BOS are in the Installation Status Report (ISR) which tracks the specific annual performance measures for each sub-program.

Evidence: ISR ratings for the sixty-two (62) BOS services rated from C1 (highest) to C4 (lowest). An example of an ISR service would be Water Services. The performance measure for this service is the number of unplanned disruptions of water service lasting more than two hours. To receive a C1 rating an installation would have to report 3 or less, for a C2 rating 4 to 7, and more than 7 would receive a C3 rating.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The annual measures provided include baselines and ambitious targets, particularly in light of the fact that the Army's fiscal management has historically relied on siphoning funds away from BOS to support higher priority programs.

Evidence: The Army Installation Management-Headquarters Information (AIM-HI) model uses Service Based Costing (SBC) and the ISR ratings to calculate what it should cost to obtain a C1 rating for a particular service. For example, SBC reveals a baseline of $271M spent for Transportation in FY 2004; this produced an Installation Status Report rating of C2 for this major program area. In order for this program to reach C-1, the Army determined it would need $335M.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The OACSIM ensures all partners on Army installations are committed to and working toward the annual and long-term BOS program goals. At the installation level, the garrison commander is the critical individual responsible for pulling it all together and, therefore, works with resource managers, contracting personnel, and local officials to achieve these goals.

Evidence: The garrison commander is rated by the IMA Regional Director and the Senior Mission Commander residing on his/her installation. This dual accountability ensures good oversight and proper execution of BOS services. The garrison commander's responsibility to both the installation community and the tactical mission give him/her authority to guide the installation's partners, such as contractors, Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentalities and non-Army tenants, towards long-term goal accomplishment. Contracts lay out the cost, schedule of the services to be performed and what results are expected. Army Regulations state Performance Work Statement (PWS) teams develop the PWS including supporting workload data, performance standards, and all information relating to the activity being competed. This ensures linkage of contractor performance to annual and long-term goals.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Agencies that regularly conduct independent evaluations include the Army Audit Agency, the Army Inspector General, the DOD Inspector General, OMB, and GAO. The scope is typically limited to specific programs at individual installations, but two notable exceptions are highlighted below.

Evidence: IMA was assessed by the Army Inspector Generals office which issued its final report in June 2005. In that assessment, BOS was recognized as being under funded. The Government Accounting Office Report (GAO 05-556, June 2005) "Defense Infrastructure - Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support" addressed BOS at the DOD level with limited discussion at the service level. The report specifically mentioned that at each of the military bases visited by the GAO team, they observed BOS services being reduced due to funding constraints.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The Chief of Staff of the Army has established a goal of funding 90 percent of BOS requirements. While that may be ambitious based on historical levels of BOS funding, it is not explicitly tied to accomplishing specific goals. Rather, it is a number that is a function of prior year funding levels and only implicitly tied to specific goals.

Evidence: The Army takes a "level of effort" approach to BOS funding in that it focuses on funding 90 percent of its requirements rather than identifying the specific requirements that are most critical and funding to that level. There is no evidence that 90 percent is the correct number as opposed to 89 percent or 91 percent.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: There are several processes conducted on a regular basis that provide updates and corrections to BOS strategic plans. First, the ACSIM sponsors an after-action review of the performance measures in the ISR. This review is conducted annually immediately after the installations have reviewed and verified their data for expenditures and workload, as well as the resultant ISR ratings for each program. Based on this review, the ACSIM revises the performance standards in each service. Second, the ACSIM revises the strategic plans to update guidance, priorities, and goals. Third, the ACSIM reworks the formulas for its BOS parametric models based on program and workload changes.

Evidence: The ISR after action review occurs annually and was held most recently on 17 - 21 July 2005. More than 500 issues were submitted for review in 2005. These issues are categorized, prioritized, and reviewed by groups of subject matter experts. The resultant decisions are then incorporated into the framework of the ISR for the next fiscal year. The final draft of the 2006 DISP is being coordinated with the Services, and an update to the AISP will be conducted once the DISP is published. Annually, the BOS parametric models are reevaluated for accuracy and subsequently certified by Army cost and economic experts. Cost Estimating Relationships are developed annually, using the 3 most current years of execution data, to predict future costs of various BOS services. ISR performance data is then used to adjust the predicted costs for various levels of performance (C-1, C-3, C-4).

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: BOS program managers regularly collect and review expenditure data provided by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and program performance data through multiple workload management systems. Installations submit performance results via the ISR, providing leadership at the installation and headquarters level with information on BOS services that is used to make immediate decisions at the installation level as well as strategic decisions at the headquarters level, including modeling of future funding requirements. Additionally, installations are using Interactive Customer Evaluation (ICE) as an information feedback system to collect and act upon customer reactions as to the adequacy of installation services.

Evidence: DFAS expenditure data and program performance data on BOS programs are collected and presented quarterly as part of the Army Performance Budget Review process. ISR performance measures are collected and services are rated C1 through C4 based on the outcome related goals on each program. These service ratings are then aggregated to determine overall C ratings for BOS. The BOS requirements model is developed using "should cost" parametric equations based on these C ratings vetted against financial expenditures and workload data to predict funding needed on future budgets. ICE is a web-based, DOD-wide system that collects feedback on services provided and is being implemented Army-wide. Feedback from ICE is used to make decisions at installation and headquarters level.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Army garrison commanders, resource managers, and contracting officials are held accountable for costs, schedule and performance of BOS services.

Evidence: Garrison Commanders are held responsible through their rating chain which begins with the Installation Management Agency and ends (senior rater) with the Installation Commander (usually the Senior Mission Commander) at that installation; this rating chain insures the proper delivery of services to support the operational mission of tactical army commanders. Resource managers, and contracting officials are rated by Garrison Commanders. Contracts lay out the cost, schedule of the services to be performed and what results are expected. Army Regulations state The PWS team will "Develop the PWS including supporting workload data, performance standards, and all information relating to the activity being competed."

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: There is a formal funds distribution system in place that delineates the overall level of BOS funding provided to each operating agency, and those funding levels are reconciled with DFAS accounting systems on a daily basis. All funding is obligated by the end of the fiscal year and distribution systems link priorities and workload accordingly, thus ensuring that programs with the greatest need receive priority for resources.

Evidence: Senior Army leadership conducts periodic reviews of expenditures and realigns resources within control guidelines as needed to ensure critical needs are met. Additionally, the Army maintains internal control systems to ensure safeguard of resources and correct any material weaknesses. DFAS reports reflect obligations within BOS and show that funding is used for the intended purpose in accordance with the BOS categories in the Base Support chapter of DFAS Regulations.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The Army uses competitive sourcing studies ("A-76" studies) to obtain the most cost effective commercial services to accomplish the BOS missions. Army efforts in Business Transformation using the Lean Six Sigma (LSS) approach are another procedure Army is using to achieve efficiencies.

Evidence: OMB Circular A-76 and Army Regulations establish procedures and provide the instructions for conducting studies to determine the most cost effective performance as to whether contract or government personnel will perform the commercial activity(s). Between 1995 and 2005 over 32,000 BOS positions were competed under A-76 guidelines. The net result of these competitions was a 44% annual savings compared to costs before the studies. Using the LSS approach and other industry best practices, the Army has conducted approximately 10 Value Stream Analysis which have resulted in more than 15 Rapid Improvement Events related to BOS.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Army BOS collaborates and coordinates with the BOS programs of other Services and DOD Agencies as well as with similar programs provided by local communities. Garrison Commanders interface regularly with local governments on issues such as schools, fire and emergency services, and utilities. Additionally, the Army has representation on cross Service installation working groups which serve to achieve efficiencies and eliminate unnecessary redundancies.

Evidence: As mentioned in previously, the Army has privatized utilities and other services where it has been determined practical and cost effective, and partners with local communities to avoid redundancy and duplication of services. Through a joint Service workgroup, partnerships are being formed to generate joint solutions for common problems between installations located in common geographical areas. These installations are reducing operating costs for programs such as pest control, linen service, and hazardous waste disposal. Child and Youth Services (CYS) works with Boys and Girls Clubs of America to provide training for Army employees, thereby leveraging existing training systems that are well-developed and time tested.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The Defense Department's financial management weaknesses are well-documented, and notwithstanding efforts to improve it, the Department has yet to obtain an unqualified audit opinion. While the Army does use a variety of budgetary reports and financial data designed to track the status of specific activities within the BOS program, it does not have audit reports demonstrating that the program is free from internal weaknesses.

Evidence: While no reports or audits specifically cite the Army's BOS program for material financial weakness, none of them specifically looked at that aspect of the program. Given the underlying weakness of DoD's overall financial management practices, we expect component programs to exhibit similar results.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The Army's is using LSS in conjunction with Business Transformation efforts to garner financial efficiencies, address management deficiencies, and implement corrective action. Additionally, the Army is continually refining the components within its forecasting model. This model has developed from a simple mathematical tool, to a state of the art model that forecasts requirements based on regression cost-estimating relationships built using historical data, demographics, pacing measures, and quality factors.

Evidence: The Army has conducted approximately 10 Value Stream Analysis which resulted in more than 15 Rapid Improvement Events related to BOS environmental services. The BOS forecasting model based on parametric methodology has been used to determine requirements for the President's Budget Request and associated Performance Budgets since 2004. Army officials are now analyzing all the components of the model to include its relationship with CLS to provide uniform delivery of various BOS services at an affordable level across Army installations worldwide. The Army is further working with OSD to ensure all the military departments share a common definition of BOS services necessary for future joint basing decisions.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Recent emphasis on BOS and a commitment by the Chief of Staff of the Army to increase funding for BOS marks a significant departure from past practices of underfunding the program and falling short of its targets. While the new support from the top leadership may not be enough to achieve the long-term targets (which may be unrealistic to begin with), it clearly reflects a move in the right direction.

Evidence: Direction from the Chief of Staff of the Army to fund BOS at "90% of requirements."

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: BOS goals are adjusted based on the amount of funding available. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the success on a year to year basis. Army installations continue to operate successfully when viewed wholistically, although the program misses some of the targets for individual services. In general, the critical services such as water and electricity meet their goals while the Army assumes more risk with discretionary services.

Evidence: The overarching annual performance goal for BOS is to achieve an ISR ratings equivalent to or greater than that which corresponds to the level of funding appropriated. For FY 05 total funding for the BOS program was approximately 80% of requirements. The ISR for FY 2005 shows an overall rating of C3, which corresponds to that funding level. At this ISR rating the Army was able to meet its objectives for the majority and most critical BOS services (i.e. utilities,). However more discretionary services (Sports Libraries and Recreation) were unable to meet all their objectives.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The Army is emphasizing industry best practices (Lean Six Sigma - LSS) to provide better value, increased responsiveness, and decreased cycle time in processes and activities. It is, however, difficult to quantify the extent to which it is succeeding. Reduced budget requests may be the result of efficiencies, or they may be the result of a consicious decision by Army leaders to shift funding to higher priority programs.

Evidence: The Department of the Army decreased its energy consumption by 29% since 1985. This reduction was achieved through facility equipment retrofits, energy awareness and conservation assessments, energy manager training and Energy Saving Performance Contracts. Competitive sourcing (A-76 Studies) has generated an average annual recurring savings of 44% for each position competed. Between 1995 and 2005 over 32,000 BOS positions were competed and those programs that remained government-operated were reconfigured into structures that reflected the most efficient organization.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The absence of common metrics makes it difficult to compare the Army BOS program with that of other services or private enterprise. Furthermore, some BOS services are unique to installation requirements, and are therefore difficult to compare with public and private sector. That said, maintaining Army installations during a time of war and with competing demands on available funding is a challenge and the Army has managed to continue providing critical services with little to no interruption.

Evidence: Army installations pride themselves on being good stewards of the environment, and have received numerous accolades from state and local environmental regulators and advocates for dealing effectively with issues like wetlands protection and management of endangered species. Installations work with state and local historical regulators and advocates to manage properties identified under the National Historic Preservation Act. The Army Child Care program is considered a "Model for the Nation" because it provides quality, equitable care for soldiers of all ranks and ethnic backgrounds.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Numerous audits/studies have been conducted by Army Audit Agency and Army Inspector General on distinct services (i.e. Rod & Gun Club; Laundry and Dry Cleaning) at installations around the world; however, independent performance evaluations of BOS are limited. Two notable exceptions are highlighted below.

Evidence: The Army Inspector General conducted an assessment of the Installation Management Agency (IMA) and issued its final report in June 2005. BOS funding was recognized as being underfunded but no findings were provided on BOS performance. The GAO Report (GAO 05-556, June 2005) DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support addressed BOS at the DOD level with limited discussion at the service level.