Detailed Information on the
US Embassy Compound Security Upgrades Assessment

Reduce time needed for project planning by at least 15 percent, in the FY2007-2010 period, by eliminating the least relevant aspects of the planning process, increasing process standardization, and streamlining the data collection/approval process.

Create databases of installed physical security features at overseas posts, focusing initially on forced-entry/ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) products, to be better able to measure mean-times-to-repair/replacement, analyze possible deficiencies, and improve future products and installation methods.

OBO requests this measure be suspended or postponed because work priorities for the unit in charge of this measure were redirected in 2007 to include assisting, training, and inspecting contractors' installations of FE/BR products in new embassy compound (NEC) construction projects. This focuses more expert attention on getting the initial installations of FE/BR products correct, thereby reducing the future replacement and repair workload. Simultaneously, this FE/BR unit continued their normal work of replacing/repairing doors and windows in existing facilities. Despite the increased workload, they completed the basic database design and, while at posts, collected significant amounts of data to make the new database design meaningful to meet this measure's objective. The critical need in 2008 is to dedicate our limited resources to ensure the proper initial installation of these life-saving security features at our diplomatic posts around the world and to continue the normal replacement/repair of FE/BR doors and windows in existing facilities as funded. We expect to add personnel to this unit in FY2009 to match resources with the expanded workload, to include developing the database application and carrying out related activities.

Based on trips to overseas posts and comprehensive reevaluations of requirements and cost estimates by the end of CY 2006, a revised Long-Range Compound Security Upgrade (CSUP) Project Plan for FY 2008 going forward.

Measure: Number of contract awards made for major Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) projects at overseas U.S. diplomatic posts

Explanation:The normal practice is to make an award for a design/build contract for each physical security upgrade project during the funding year. A task order from another contract for supporting relatively minor technical security work may occur in the next fiscal year. Nevertheless, the D/B contact award is the culmination of the requirements identification, planning, and procurement stages, and it is a critical milestone that sets the project in motion toward completion. This program began in FY2003, and the last year for seeking appropriations for these awards will be FY2012.

Measure: Number of major Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) projects completed at overseas posts

Explanation:Since the 1988 embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, all diplomatic posts have received some security improvements. Completion of the target projects below represent the final work on 114 posts that are not scheduled to receive new embassy compounds (NECs) in the near term to bring them to the highest feasible level of protection. This program will receive funding in the FY2003-2012 period, and, since project duration is normally one to two years, the last ones will be finished in FY2014.

Measure: Number of posts receiving forced-entry/ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) door and window installation projects (starts/completions)

Explanation:An FE/BR project can be seen as starting with a task order to a contractor for a survey. This is followed later by a task order for a design/build (D/B) installation effort. The latter contractor prepares a design, determines what materials will be needed, has them shipped to the post, and then deploys to perform the work, which for complex projects can take up to 15 months. Because there is a variable gap between survey and design/build efforts, and sometimes there is no follow-on D/B contract because of changing circumstances, the D/B task order is the most appropriate project starting time. Therefore, the numbers in the table below to the left of each slash indicate task orders D/B work; the numbers to the right are the completed installations of the FE/BR products. (Note: in FY2003 a small purchase order system was used that resulted in many very small installation activities. In total they amounted to 6-10 of the larger efforts now underway, but even this equivalency was too rough to enter a number of FY2003.)

Measure: Implement improvements to forced-entry/ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) products by developing a comprehensive database of installed products, measuring mean-times-to-repair and failure, and analyzing probable causes of inadequacies.

Explanation:The durability of FE/BR products depends on several variables, including the their initial quality, appropriateness for local conditions, installation methods, and maintenance. With a detailed, comprehensive database, OBO will be able to (1) measure and analyze the rates of premature repairs and failures, (2) better determine the probable causes, and (3) implement needed changes. Since the actual degree of success resulting from such changes can only be determined after several years of follow-on measurements, and that would take this measure too far into the future, it is ending at the change-implementation stage. The completion of each stage (with target date in parentheses) is represented by cumulative percentage increases, with pro-rata credit for activities spanning two years, as follows: DATABASE PHASE: Database Design??10% of total effort (Completion by 12/06); Computer Application development??10% (04/07); Data Entry??30% (04/08). ANALYSIS/CHANGE IMPLEMENTTION PHASE: Mean-Time Measurements??10% (07/08); Analysis/Determining Modifications??15% (09/08); Implementation of Changes??25% (04/09).

Measure: Percentage reduction in forced-entry/ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) product installation labor costs

Explanation:The cost reductions are being sought through several means: establishment of a pool of three qualified, competing contractors; diligent bargaining with task-order prices, and training. FE/BR product installation is not a standard, private-sector skill. It takes considerable expertise to install them efficiently and effectively, and the related training of contractor personnel by OBO experts is lowering labor costs to a substantial extent while maintaining or increasing the resulting product reliability. "Contract labor-related costs (i.e., negotiated rates to accomplish standard FE/BR product installation tasks) tend to account for about 35% of typical door/window composite project costs that also include expenses for surveys, designs, travel, equipment, and materials. In dollar terms, therefore, given average fiscal-year FE/BR budgets of about $28 million, the 19% FY2005 savings over equivalent FY2004 costs saved approximately $1.8 million. A full 33% reduction by FY2007 would achieve a $3.2 million savings." FY2004 is the base year. FY2008 is a test year for maintaining the cost savings level. The percentages are cumulative.

Measure: Percent of design reviews completed within 17 calendar days of submission

Explanation:This is an illustration of the many design performance measures in OBO that affect CSUP projects. Designs for CSUP and other OBO projects, almost always done by contractors, have to be checked, especially regarding OBO's many security and other unique requirements, in a meticulous manner and with multi-disciplinary reviews aimed at correcting possible errors that could have cost or other consequences in the construction phase. Given the overall workload imposed by the large number of OBO projects, it is hard to finish these reviews with a perfect on-time record, but the results have been good and improving. For FY2006 at the end of the 2nd quarter, the completion rate was at 100%.

Measure: Ensure that 100% of the completed and in-progress security upgrade projects are within or ahead of schedule

Explanation:This is one of several measures that OBO's Construction and Commissioning Division (OBO/PE/CC) uses to enhance its costruction work. Stringent standards are imposed and there is a constant, intense monitoring and adjusting of contract performance to achieve optimum results. One 2005 project (Tallinn) did slip because of a delay in obtaining a permit, and one initially post-executed 2006 project (Hong Kong) was completed behind the contract schedule when its major portion was subsequently done by a Washington-based contractor. Overall, however, on-time performance has been first-rate, especially in consideration of the complex international environment in which these projects take place, and permit problems will not impede project execution in the future because OBO now requires that written local permissions be obtained in the planning phase before project execution ever begins.

Measure: Ensure that 100% of completed and in-progress security upgrade projects are within the aurhorized budgets.

Explanation:The CSUP projects are well planned, and the goal is to keep all of them within established contract costs. Nevertheless, given the different variations in security equipment and post conditions with each project, perfection cannot always be expected. In 2004, one project (Tallinn) experienced a permit-problem delay that raised costs. In 2006, an in-progress project (Luxembourg) had a cost increase caused by the need to expand its scope. Both cost increases were minor, however, and the overall record has been excellent.

Measure: Percentage reduction in time to prepare Project Analysis Packages (PAPs) for Compound Security Upgrade Program projects.

Explanation:A PAP encompasses all planning needed to estimate project funding and ensure effective execution. It defines the purpose, scope, budget, execution strategy, security needs, schedule, risks, local requirements (including written permissions from local authorities), and all other important elements. Time saved in preparing PAPs??from site visit to handoff to OBO's Project Execution Office??will decrease planning costs and allow for quicker initiation of projects. This measure reflects the goal to reduce the average time for a standard PAP by about 16%, from the current 220 calendar days to 185 days. This will be accomplished through increasing the clarity of the planning scope, eliminating/decreasing the least beneficial material, and streamlining the data-collection/approval process.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) is designed to provide the maximum feasible physical security to employees and facilities in overseas diplomatic missions. Terrorist attacks, such as those recently directed at U.S. diplomatic compounds in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and Karachi, Pakistan, continue to prove that protective intelligence, counter-intelligence, and law enforcement are not enough to protect the lives of over 100,000 American and host-country national employees. To safeguard those serving on the front lines of diplomacy, the Department must continue to aggressively upgrade the security of its facilities. To maximize physical and technical security at U.S. diplomatic posts, the State Department's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) is constructing new embassy compounds (NECs) at an unprecedented pace to provide adequate setbacks, blast-resistant walls and windows, and other features required to meet full security standards. Given finite resources, however, even the most massive construction program in the Department's history will not bring all of the proposed NECs on line until about 2021. Furthermore, some of the many embassies and consulates will not be replaced. These include compounds with adequately sized sites, posts that received relatively secure "Inman Program" NECs, facilities that are irreplaceable (e.g., London and Paris), and very small posts that will mostly remain in commercial buildings. For posts not designated for NECs or not in near-term plans, security must be enhanced. This is the clear role of the CSUP. It is designed to fill a critical gap by furnishing physical security protection, to the extent feasible, at posts not anticipated to be in the long-range Capital Security Construction Program or where a constructed NEC will not appear for a substantial number of years. The CSUP provides or enhances perimeter security, public access controls, forced-entry/ballistic-resistant doors and windows, emergency egress, roof hatches, safe havens, enclosed emergency generators, buried fuel tanks, and other features that greatly increase the security of persons and property at U.S. diplomatic posts.

Evidence: United States Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, "Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan: FY 2006-2011" of January 2006. Section X (pages 339-348) of the current edition of this annual planning document explains the CSUP in more detail than provided above. U.S. Department of State Cable of 01/03/05; Subject: "CAPITAL SECURITY COST SHARING (CSCS): PROGRAM ENACTED BY CONGRESS" describes the Capital Security Construction Program timetable, with funding through FY2018. Given that these NEC projects take up to three years to finish, this is evidence that the final completions dates are projected to take place in FY2021. The Department's "Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Justification, Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance" provides a summary description of the program's purpose and design.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Security vulnerabilities at U.S. diplomatic facilities represent a real, sometimes grave problem. For example, as the initial draft of this PART was being prepared, OBO security specialists were in Karachi, Pakistan in the wake of the March 2, 2006 car bombing at the U.S. Consulate. There were tragic consequences close to the compound: a U.S. official (an OBO employee assigned to the Consulate), his driver, a Consulate guard, and two others were killed, and over 50 people were injured. If the terrorists had been successful in penetrating the compound, their powerful bomb that left an eight-foot wide crater outside of the compound would have had devastating consequences. They were thwarted, however, by well-trained guards and by the types of physical security improvements the Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) is designed to provide. This was not the first attempt. In June 2002, a truck-bomb outside of the Consulate killed 14 Pakistanis. In March 2004, police defused a huge bomb in a van parked on a street near the Consulate minutes before it was timed to explode. The potential for future attacks in Karachi or other U.S. diplomatic posts anywhere, constitutes the "specific and existing problem" that the CSUP is addressing by continuing to implement security standards developed by the inter-agency Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB). In the interim, that no deaths or serious injuries have taken place within the Karachi compound is directly attributable to the kinds of protective measures approved by the OSPB and provided by the CSUP. Similar benefits that have been provided to a degree to all posts, but further improvements must be made.

Evidence: For a comprehensive description of the security deficiencies at U.S. diplomatic posts, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "OVERSEAS PRESENCE, Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities," of March 20, 2003. Included in this information was that, as of 12/2002, the primary office building at 232 posts lacked desired security because it did not meet one or more of State's five key current security standards; that in the 1998-2002 there were 30 terrorist attacks against diplomatic targets; and that during the same period there were 83 instances of forced evacuations of personnel or suspensions of operations in response to direct threats or unstable security situations in the host country. Although the GAO acknowledged that the "??State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve physical security at overseas posts," their description of the security situation on the eve the start of the CSUP is accurate. For substantiation of information for Karachi, see MSNBC News Services (March 2, 2006), "Pakistan car bomb kills U.S. diplomat, 3 others," from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11631196/ and "2002 Karachi consulate attack" from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Karachi_consulate_attack. As noted in U.S. Department of State cable, UNCLAS KARACHI 000266, 0 161139Z MAR 06; SUBJECT: KARACHI NCC - LEASE AGREEMENT SIGNED, only difficulties in acquiring a site has prevented this dangerous post from receiving an NEC. E-mail (04/20/06) from Consulate Karachi; subject: "Karachi FE/BR Replacement and Safe Area Project" that expressed appreciation for the post-bombing OBO assistance.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: There are no state, local, or private efforts involved in this undertaking. Furthermore, there are no other Federal agencies with the statutory mandate or activities designed to provide security protection to U.S. diplomatic posts abroad. Thus, there are no redundant or duplicative efforts. OBO is the Department's sole real property manager for overseas diplomatic posts, and is responsible for construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of that property, including physical security items. Typical physical security construction funded and managed by OBO includes perimeter walls, screening facilities, gates and barriers, hardened doors and windows, safe havens, and other building or site-infrastructure items. The Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is responsible for maintaining the technical security systems installed in overseas facilities. These items include closed circuit television, systems, video monitors, alarm systems, x-ray machines, metal detectors, explosive detection equipment, and emergency notification systems. DS also is responsible for facility-wide technical security upgrades. OBO security upgrades during construction projects often have technical security components, including door controls, CCTV cameras, screening equipment, and emergency notification system speakers. Within the Department of State, OBO and DS work together, depend on each other, and avoid any overlaps. No other Federal agencies or other pubic or private entities share this responsibility.

Evidence: Pursuant to its real property manager responsibilities under the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as amended, OBO has been in charge of physical security upgrades for all non-DOD diplomatic compounds. While it shares some physical and technical assignments with DS, the separate responsibilities are clearly delineated at in a detailed five-page "OBO-DS Responsibility Matrix." Coordination is further evidenced by the fact that senior members of OBO's Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM) are DS Foreign Service Officers who return to DS positions after their tours in OBO. All the participants understand quite clearly what both bureaus do and have no incentive to be competitive or redundant in the execution of their respective duties. With OBO and DS being in the same department and being the only ones directly involved in compound security functions, there are no other Federal agency, or any state, local, or private entity programs for which there could be redundancies or duplications.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) is free of major flaws that would limit its effectiveness or efficiency. Moreover, the program has continued to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances since its 2003 inception, incorporating enhanced security measures as appropriate. For example, after the analysis of the December 2004 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, another element was added to the security upgrade list: the need for mantraps at all existing compound vehicle entrances where space is available. Probably the most clear-cut verification of the lack of any major flaws was a major OIG audit of the program that found only a few minor weaknesses that, it acknowledged, OBO was beginning to address. In a memo a year after the audit report, the OIG commended OBO for quickly implementing CSUP aspects of the report recommendations. Thus, the auditors did not find major flaws, were satisfied with how OBO dealt with the few minor flaws they did find, and gave no indication (nor has any other entity) of a more effective, efficient approach to improving security at designated posts. Also illustrative of the lack of flaws, an Accountability Review Board report on the 2004 terrorist attack against the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia determined that the security systems in place met standards and were properly implemented.

Evidence: United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, "Review of the Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades," Report Number AUD/PPA-04-37, August 2004. (SBU) Memorandum from OIG/AUD/PP - Richard A. Astor to OBO/RM - Mr. Jurg Hochuli, dated August 11, 2005, Subject: Review of the Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades (AUD/PPA-04-37, July 2004). (SBU) Accountability Review Board, "Jeddah Terrorist Attack, December 6, 2004." Secret Report issued April 8, 2005.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: The program effectively targets resources to safeguard personnel at U.S. diplomatic posts around the world. These personnel, in turn, are an important source of information about what is needed to better protect them, as their lives depend on the Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP). Their communications to CSUP officials involve the post Regional Security Officer (RSO), a security expert who is knowledgeable about local conditions. The RSO works for the Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), is present when projects are implemented, remains on hand to help evaluate their results, and reports any remaining security weaknesses to OBO. In addition, OBO security specialists visit posts, as do OBO Area Management Officers. In fact, for OBO's Area Management Division such trips represent the first of its five most important performance measures (i.e., "Visit 200 overseas posts, as identified in the AM handbook, each year and produce and distribute within three weeks of returning from visits comprehensive trip reports outlining area of concern observed during visits"). OBO Area Managers look for all deficiencies, including security ones. State Department Office of the Inspector General (OIG) auditors and inspectors also focus on security issues, and their teams provide another important source of information on even the smallest deviations from security standards. The OIG and all other participants providing such information understand the CSUP's purpose and what is needed based on current standards. Moreover, the U.S. personnel who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the CSUP are able to see the direct benefits, know that the equipment and materials are effectively targeted, and play a continual, central role in ensuring that their security needs are well communicated and implemented.

Evidence: United States Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades," Report Number AUD/PPA-04-37, August 2004 (SBU). This Report's main conclusion was that: "The Department's processes for identifying and approving projects needing security upgrades and for planning, funding, and procuring contracts were well conceived." Regional Security Officer Physical Security Surveys, which are done at all posts, provide evidence of the comprehensive considerations behind how many security-upgrade requests are generated.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) essentially has one central long-term performance measure for its main physical security improvement work. This is to achieve the maximum feasible security protection for 114 diplomatic posts that can be attained within reasonable costs by funding all of the required projects by the end of FY 2012 and completing construction by the end of 2014. At the program's end, all currently existing facilities will have been upgraded to meet current security standards. Achievement of the CSUP's central, long-term improvements will greatly help to (1) deter terrorists or others from attacking what are relatively "hard targets" and (2) substantially minimize death and destruction if attacks do occur. These are the desired outcomes. They cannot be measured precisely, however, and that is the reason why long-term performance is stated in terms of physical improvements. Multiple intelligence reports do indicate that terrorist elements reconsidered attack plans against U.S. missions and assets overseas in response to enhanced physical security measures. With regard to minimizing casualties and damage, the effectiveness of CSUP features such FE/BR doors and windows, access controls, and safe havens are undeniable. The protection afforded by CSUP efforts can be and in some actual cases has been critically important, and the program's goal meaningfully and clearly characterizes the purpose of the program.

Evidence: The chief performance measures for the CSUP are presented in more detail in the performance measures section at the end of this PART. The key performance measures for the Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM), which funds and coordinates the CSUP, are listed in the "FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan, Overseas Buildings Operations." This includes the number of major Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) projects completed at overseas posts. In addition, there are numerous performance measures of that division and of the principal OBO divisions that support the CSUP by providing the detailed planning, design, and construction aspects of the projects. These measures can be found in "Performance Measures for a Results-Based Organization, Division-Level Measures," United States Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, February 10, 2004, pages i-ii, 16-44.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) has ambitious, yet realistic, targets and timeframes for its long-term measures to ensure that full security standards are met at approximately 114 posts, or have an ongoing active project to do so by 2012. Of its array of security-upgrade activities, some have essentially been completed, such as applying shatter-resistant window film and installing basic perimeter security equipment. Others, such as mantraps that became a requirement only in 2005, have a steeper climb to completion, but they will be provided. A chief criterion for prioritizing CSUP projects is the relative vulnerability of posts, based on country risk and the nature of the diplomatic compounds (susceptibility to blast, size of setback, etc.). Unlike in the pre East African 1998 embassy bombings era, however, vulnerability prioritization is a temporary expedient on the road to full security upgrading of all posts that are not near-term candidates for new embassy compounds (NECs). Added to the ambitiousness of the CSUP is the fact that work on bringing 114 posts up to full standards is not its sole concern. To date the program has provided security enhancements to 174 posts, some in and some not in the list of 114. Sometimes the need for additional security equipment cannot be delayed. Then too, there is the extra workload imposed by the forced-entry/ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) products installation and repair sub-program that accounts for about a fifth of the CSUP funding. No requirement for FE/BR equipment or repairs can be postponed. So the CSUP workload is heavy, sometimes interrupted by emergencies, and always being carried out in difficult international circumstances. Considering the whole scope of the program, its dynamic nature, and the difficulties it faces, the CSUP is quite ambitious as well as very valuable.

Evidence: OBO's "Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan: FY2006-2011" (pages 340-348) indicates the range of activities and security features provided by the CSUP, as do Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM) presentations at monthly OBO Program Progress Reviews (PPRs). It should be mentioned that there are three subprograms that are not being covered in this PART exercise. The nature and size of these programs are substantially different from the other CSUP activities. They all enhance the security of overseas personnel, but they are included in the CSUP budget line primarily because they are not large enough to have their own lines. They also have different starting and ending dates. One of these sub-programs is to install equipment to help protect diplomatic facilities from chemical-biological attacks. This effort, just barely begun, has received only small amounts of funding. A second initiative, to enhance security around U.S. owned and long-term leased residences, has also had only quite limited funding. The third undertaking not being included is the Soft Targets Program that seeks greater security for locations where diplomatic personnel, their dependents, and other U.S. citizens gather, with a focus on overseas schools attended by U.S. citizens. Related requests, mostly from private schools, are vetted by the Department's Overseas Schools Office, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), and OBO. With funding of about $15 million a year, this activity's budget exceeds those of the chemical biological protection and residential security efforts combined. This has been a highly successful program, but its aims, procedures, and timelines make it quite distinct from the core CSUP. These three small sub-programs are being mentioned here to note that they account for about a quarter of the CSUP funding. They also demand some attention of the CSUP Program Manager and staff. This is useful to in relating actual resources to the ambitiousness of the basic CSUP.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The program does have quantifiable, effective annual measurements of progress toward the long-term goal of this program. One of the two most important ones focuses on the annual number of contract awards made for major Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) projects at overseas posts. The combination of requirements identification, project planning, and contracting to perform the work constitutes a major portion of any project. Therefore, the awarding of the contract is an important milestone that clearly demonstrates progress in achieving the program's long-term goal of substantially upgrading 114 posts. The other measurement is the completion of major CSUP projects. Since every project represents one step to achieving the CSUP's chief long-term goal, each one is a specific, meaningful accomplishment. There are additional measures, such as the efficiency measures for minimizing the time needed for the planning of CSUP projects and for reducing labor costs for the forced-entry/ballistic-resistant activities component of the CSUP, but the contract awards for and completions of major CSUP projects are the core measures. The reason why these are output rather than outcome measures, which has been discussed more extensively elsewhere, is basically because, even though the security upgrades have demonstrated their worth in protecting lives and facilities at a number of overseas posts, precise measuring of these desired outcomes cannot be made without having terrorist attacks on a massive scale to comprehensively test protection provided by this program.

Evidence: These measures are further described in (1) Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, "Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan: FY 2006-2011" (LROBP), issued January 2006, pages A-29-A-31; (2) "Overseas Buildings Operations - Project Execution SECURITY MANAGEMENT, March 2006 Program Performance Review (PPR), page 18; and (3) "FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan (BPP), Overseas Buildings Operations," pages 18-22.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The baseline is clear. Of the U.S diplomatic posts that were not scheduled to obtain new embassy compounds (NECs) for ten years or more, if ever, at the beginning of the Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP), 114 required major security upgrades. The ambitious target was to identify all of the specific needs of these 114 posts and then to provide the improvements. As the knowledge of both the terrorist and anti-terrorist sides grew, new requirements were added to the list of necessary security enhancements, thereby increasing the ambitious nature of the program. Through feedback from posts and other sources, the requirements have been relatively well defined and the path forward clearly established. Furthermore, a major effort is in progress to gain even more refined estimates of those requirements and related costs. Specifically, posts scheduled for major CSUP projects were, in February 2006, requested to provide the most comprehensive, up-to-date information possible. In addition, there are associated plans to send out two-person teams??one from OBO's Project Evaluation and Analysis Division; the other from its Design and Engineering Division (Security Engineering Branch)??to most of the CSUP scheduled posts to verify all data by November 2006. This effort will bring even more precision to a program that is currently on a solid planning basis, has an ambitious long-term goal, and has annual targets that will become even more ambitious as the number of projected awards and completions increase in the upcoming years.

Evidence: The broad, ambitious scope of the program is clearly indicated in the list of CSUP components and numerous planned projects listed in OBO's most recent "Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP). Efforts to obtain the most up-to-date, precise planning data are illustrated by Department of State cable R 131847Z Feb 06 2005 (Subject: OUT-YEAR PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADE PROGRAM - EMBASSY/CONSULATES) that notified posts about team visits and requested gathering of most up-to-date security upgrade requirements information; and Office of Planning and Development, "FY09-12 Planning Effort for Physical security Upgrades," 1/06 Briefing by OBO/PD Non-Capital Planning Branch that gave an overview of the process.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Partners involved in the Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) are committed to and work toward annual targets and long-term program goals. There is no formal cost sharing. The Department of State and other Federal agencies with representatives in U.S. diplomatic posts abroad typically identify relevant CSUP issues to the post-based Regional Security Officer (RSO). Coordination and relations between CSUP personnel and RSOs have been excellent, based on a shared aspiration to provide the best possible physical security protection. Contractor commitment to the goals of the program is reflected in statements of work and contract terms, partnering sessions, and joint problem-solving efforts. In working toward annual goals, partners cooperate with implementation of specific projects and ensure compliance with project commitments. In a meaningful way, CSUP work also reflects input by Foreign Affairs Community members in the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) that, in turn, sets the security standards adhered to by the Department. For example, a new, OSPB-approved component of the CSUP is the Lock and Leave Security Upgrade initiative, which is yet another adaptation to security needs by this dynamic program. It involves the design and construction of physical security measures to protect classified material at lock and leave posts that have controlled access areas and no 24-hour cleared American presence. In this and other ways Federal Government standard setters are working in synch to bring security protection up to the mutually agreed levels. Partner representatives at overseas posts respond by reviewing their security posture and requesting appropriate physical security upgrades through the CSUP.

Evidence: OSPB's wide membership is described in the State Department's 12 FAM (Foreign Affairs Manual) 022 Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB). The purpose of the OSPB is to develop, coordinate, and promote uniform policies, standards, and agreements on security operations outside the United States and on programs and projects that affect U.S. Government civilian agencies represented abroad. See 12 FAH (Foreign Affairs Handbook)-6 H-014. b. For the OSPB Charter, see 12 FAH-6 Exhibit H-014.1. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-29 (September 16, 1994) provides authority for the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB).

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The CSUP has very high visibility with the Congress, auditors, the Intelligence Community, the media, and other outside groups that provide independent views on the program. Whenever a terrorist incident occurs at a diplomatic facility, OBO hears from these groups as they seek to find any possible deficiencies in compound security. Even when the media spotlight is less intense, there is a steady stream of program questions, critiques, and suggestions for possible improvements. Outside of Congressional interest, which peaks at annual budget justification times, most of these contacts are made on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, their magnitude and recurring nature equates to a constant barrage of scrutiny and information flows that keeps CSUP officials extremely vigilant to any imperfections or potential improvements in the program. On a more regular basis, the most involved independent entity is the Department's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which often focuses on various aspects of OBO's security programs. The OIG schedules an inspection of each post within five-year cycles in accordance with the Foreign Service Act of 1980, and these invariably include examining the security of the facilities. The inspectors know the security standards, and they are in constant communication with OBO concerning any deviations from those standards. They are partners with CSUP officials in finding deficiencies. They even attend OBO's monthly Program Progress Review two-day sessions in which OBO senior management and division leaders vigorously and openly go over program difficulties and solutions. Nevertheless, they remain quite independent critics, and they never consider an issue as being resolved without a full, convincing explanation or appropriate action. The OIG has a favorable opinion of OBO's security upgrading efforts, as expressed in a major audit, but does not inhibit them from criticizing even the smallest imperfection that they believe they have uncovered. OBO also meets quarterly in one-day sessions with an Industrial Advisory Group made up of private and public sector officials knowledgeable about facilities and management. Even some of the best practices used in planning, designing, and construction CSUP projects have been enhanced from exchanges with that group. OBO also meets periodically with various industry groups, such as the Association of General Contractors, which also provide useful feedback and critiques. Then too, the Department's the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has an accreditation program that regularly ensures that compound security elements in place meet all Department and Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards for the given environment. In summary, there are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a frequent enough basis to support program improvements, effectiveness, and relevance.

Evidence: The OIG report on the "Review of the Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades" (Report Number AUD/PPA-04-37, August 2004), comments that OBO's planning process has been improved with emphasis on costs and timeliness, and that these changes "have improved the compound physical security upgrade processes." The OIG report also cites OBO's monthly project performance review as a "best practice" in the management of the compound physical security upgrade program. OBO's "Stewardship Report, January to December 2005" (page 24) provides information on OBO's extensive interactions with the GAO, OIG, and other entities.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The program budget accurately reflects the annual program requirements. All project costs are funded from within the CSUP, without additional funding from other sources. This provides a clear picture of actual project costs, including design and construction costs, as well as overhead costs such as travel and construction management. The budget request is project specific and reflects the initial cost estimate for each project. Since the budget request is presented two years out, there can be variations between the specific plans and sums allocated to specific projects. The changes are sometimes caused by updates to the new embassy compound (NEC) Program that alter the need for a compound security upgrade at specific sites, difficulties with local governments, and emergencies. Nevertheless, when obstacles do arise, the program advances backup projects to ensure that security upgrades are awarded and rapidly completed. In this way, although there may be small changes in the planned project list, the numbers of projects remain very close to those were set in conformity with the Financial Management Division's (OBO/RM/FM) budget submission guidance??with annual CSUP budget requests being explicitly tied to the performance targets and goals set forth in OBO's Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP). Budget and performance integration is thus assured, resulting in budgets that are directly linked to annual and long-term goals. Narrative justifications articulate what will be accomplished with the requested funding levels. OBO's Planning and Development Office produces the CSUP cost estimates. After consultation with OBO/RM/FM budget analysts, the Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM) develops and completes the budget requests, considering historical commitment, obligation, and expenditure data. This approach ensures that the true cost of each project is fully captured and funded from within the program. Also, SM coordinates with other relevant offices and divisions to ensure that complete and accurate representations of CSUP budget requirements are presented. Through this rigorous process, funding levels are recommended to the OBO Director/Chief Operating Official after intensive scrutiny by the three SM branches and its Director. Further, the annual CSUP budget request includes only the highest priority projects that have met the criteria regarding post security needs. To ensure the CSUP budget request is complete and provides the best use of resources, the budget request goes through this rigorous review by all functional experts and senior managers within OBO.

Evidence: The CSUP coordinating division (OBO/PE/SM) annually prepares a binder-size budget justification that includes detailed information on the Compound Security Upgrade Program that is distilled down to a presentation to OBO senior management. The 19-page "Security Management Division FY 2007 Budget Overview" is the latest available presentation. This material explicitly links resource needs with annual projects as related to longer-term goals. This information, in a more abbreviated form, goes forward to the Department level for review, and an even more abbreviated version goes to OMB and eventually the Congress. Budget documentation related to the CSUP sent outside of the Department contains only a brief description of the program and a one line, total budget figure for each fiscal year. See "Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Justification for Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance," U.S. Department of State, Overseas Buildings Operations. Unlike budget justifications for, say, OBO's capital construction program that identifies individual projects, each one usually costing more that the CSUP's entire budget, this program is too small for that treatment at the OMB/Congressional levels. The presentations at those levels include funding for but no explicit mention of the numerous, minor OBO-funded (through advices of allotments) post-executed projects, many of which are not anticipated but arise because of emergencies or other circumstances, that cannot always be planned.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: On both the macro and micro levels, many meaningful steps have been taken to improve the strategic planning process and bring it to its current level of excellence. The principal force behind the overcoming of deficiencies has been OBO's successful, multiyear effort to make effective planning the key to its entire operations. Early in the tenure of OBO's current Director/Chief Operating Officer, a planning division was transformed into a four-division office, with its first major initiative being the introduction of an annual Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) process that became the center of its successful strategic planning. This LROBP has been continually improved and also expanded to cover more OBO activities. A Project Analysis Package (PAP) is developed early in this process for each major project. The PAP is an in-depth review of the existing facility conditions and the local construction environment, a conceptual design for the project, and a cost estimate. This package allows the executing team to clearly understand the project, and it forms the basis for the project scope of work and procurement effort. Major security upgrade projects are included in this OBO-wide planning process, and??since their planning, design and construction are handled in the same manner as other OBO projects??they have benefited from all of the related improvements made in OBO in recent years. The CSUP itself reflects planning advances. A significant example is the evolution from initially providing interim, small-scale upgrades to the most security-deficient facilities around the world to a program directly linked to OBO's fast-paced NEC program for replacing vulnerable facilities. Another example of improved planning relates to local approvals. Previously, the lack of such approvals, or lack of clarity of approvals granted, sometimes led to delays and eleventh-hour adjustments that increased costs or lowered the security value of CSUP projects. In the current, more proactive planning mode, the local approval process has been revised to require that local permission be obtained in writing before the potential projects are handed off from OBO's Planning and Development Office to its Project Execution Office. This ensures that all known local approvals are received prior to project solicitation.

Evidence: "Overseas Buildings Operations - Planning and Development Program Performance Review slides on "PAP Handoff Plan" are updated monthly to show and give assurance that all requirements have been met to transfer projects to the Project Execution Office. The Project Analysis Package for a major security upgrade project for Bangkok, Thailand provides an example of a PAP. Department of State cable R 131847Z Feb 06 (2005, Subject: OUT-YEAR PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADE PROGRAM - EMBASSY/CONSULATES notified posts about team visits and requested gathering of most up-to-date security upgrade requirements information.

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals, and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: Assessment of alternatives that can improve the cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals of the CSUP is an ongoing process for OBO, executed through several formalized mechanisms on a weekly, monthly, and quarterly basis. Weekly risk assessment and management meetings, with participants from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and OBO, allow for the exploration by those at senior levels in both organizations of options and alternatives related to CSUP activity. Monthly Program Performance Review (PPR) meetings include presentations by both the OBO Planning/Development Office and the Security Management Division. In preparation, both divisions conduct their continual analyses of CSUP projects. During the meetings, senior OBO management is able to offer critiques of the projects and associated strategies. Quarterly Industry Advisory Panel meetings allow for input from the construction industry regarding developments that can affect CSUP goals and programmatic approaches. OBO also seeks feedback from other entities, such as has occurred recently in several meetings with the Association of General Contractors. The relatively new, high visibility, dynamic CSUP is continually receiving input from the Congress, the private sector, and other Government entities. With this inflow of information and guidance, and with mechanisms in place and operating well to review and make any necessary corrections, the analysis of trade-offs and alternatives for CSUP activity is a disciplined, ongoing process for OBO.

Evidence: Monthly PPR presentations provide detailed evidence. The "Stewardship Report: Overseas Buildings Operations, January to December 2005,"page 29 descripes three Industry Advisory Panels meetings in 2005. An example of efforts to find cheaper alternatives is found in a DS to OBO memo of April 15, 2004; Subject: DS-50 (1 meter anti-ram wall) with recommendations to reduce the cost of perimeter upgrades, while still maintaining required performance standards. DS and OBO continually review such alternative designs for security equipment. In April, 2004, DS approved a revised anti-ram perimeter knee wall that meets the OSPB anti-ram performance specifications, while using only 67% of the concrete and 50% of the steel required for the previous design. As concrete and steel have been rapidly increasing in price on the world market, this is achieving substantial cost reductions on current and future perimeter projects. To assist with the need for removable or temporary bollards, DS approved a removable bollard, the model DS-22R, that meets the anti ram requirements while addressing the need for removable bollards for very infrequently used entrances. This allows seldom-opened entrances (utility entrances, for example) to be properly protected without having the utility and maintenance costs for a hydraulic bollard system. Another improvement is the revised bollard design that allows wider spacing of bollards to improve pedestrian and mobility challenged access without compromising facility protection. These are examples of DS and OBO constantly reviewing protective systems with an eye toward lower cost, faster construction, and more user-friendly security measures.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The process of regularly collecting information on CSUP projects focuses on intra-OBO organizations, feedback from the posts receiving upgrades, verification by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) that every single project meets the security standards, and periodic checks by the OIG. OBO holds monthly meetings attended by internal planning and design officials, the CSUP Program Manager, and representatives from DS. Their discussions center on potential projects, specific threats and related effects on project priorities, and other issues or concerns about the program. DS is also involved at the initial stage for individual projects when its Project Coordination Branch reviews the related scopes of work and design documents for compliance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards. This is in addition to technical and engineering reviews that occur within OBO. Once a project is underway, the timeliest information comes from the assigned Project Executive in the Construction and Commissioning Division (OBO/PE/CC), partly through monthly reviews at the Bureau's Program Progress Reviews (PPRs) and partly in meetings between Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM) officials and the PE/CC Project Executives. PE/CC is responsible for overall construction and for collaboration with colleagues from other OBO divisions; DS; members of the embassy's administrative section and other embassy staff; and the Regional Security Officer (RSO), who functions as the ambassador's senior security representative. Once the project is nearing completion, DS again plays a major role. In addition to the OBO technical specialists project reviews, the post RSO and a DS Regional Security Engineering Officer verify that the project scope of work has been completed, develop a list of any outstanding items, and ensure that the systems are operating correctly. On selected large projects, an accreditation team from the Certification Accreditation and Transit Security Branch in DS performs more extensive reviews of the security aspects of the projects. Even after all of these reviews, if problems arise later the RSO will promptly report them to OBO. In addition, the OIG reviews the effectiveness of the projects in achieving security standards in inspection trips to roughly a fifth of all posts each year. So performance information is collected in a regular, timely way, and all partners have ample opportunity to provide inputs.

Evidence: 12 FAM (Foreign Affairs Manual) 360, Construction Security Certification Program, provides substantiation, especially Exhibit 361.3 which is the Memorandum of Agreement Between Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Regarding Responsibilities for Security Accreditation Inspections and Procedures for the Resolution of Issues. OBO Project Performance Reviews (PPRs) furnish the best illustration of how closely performance information is generated and tracked. Every month, OBO managers from all divisions gather for the specific purpose of reviewing OBO's execution performance in all areas, with a very strong emphasis on cost and schedule. Documentation of this process, and CSUP performance, can be found in any of the monthly presentation packages that are available for the last three years. "Overseas Buildings Operations, Office of Project Execution, Customer Satisfaction Survey" is a document sent to posts after a CSUP or other project to check whether the recipients were satisfied.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The Program Manager from OBO's Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM) is held accountable for developing and monitoring a detailed plan of budget, schedule, and scope for all major Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) projects. The CSUP Manager administers this OBO program by developing and maintaining six-year spending plans; keeping an up-to-date accounting of obligations and expenditures; setting program priorities and selecting projects for construction; approving projects and entering them into the Facilities Projects Subsystem; supplying budget input and justifications within OBO's budgetary cycles to ensure that security-related requirements are adequately funded; and providing the necessary security management oversight to ensure the successful planning, designing, and execution of all approved security-related construction, to include successful accreditation on the first visit. Each major project subsequently has an assigned project executive from the Construction and Commissioning Division (OBO/PE/CC) responsible for measuring progress and making monthly project reports that are, in part, reflected in PE/CC's monthly Program Performance Reviews. In the PPRs, the assigned CC project executive advises on project status, as well as on performance against the budget and schedule, and answers questions posed by OBO's senior management. Projects at-risk are scrutinized and decisions made that bring them in line with schedule, scope, and budget. This is where the project executives are most directly held responsible. Further, they are held accountable for ensuring that the completed projects meet Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) standards??accomplished by overseeing contractors' performance, meeting payment schedules, reviewing invoices for work performed under these CSUP contracts, and monitoring the expeditious correction of any deviations from DS security standards. Additionally, the construction contractors adhere to specific contractual requirements, being accountable for any deviations from those contracts. The project executives ensure that contractor milestones have been met prior to invoice payment, that all deliverables for contract compliance are thoroughly reviewed before the final payment is made, and that contractors are accountable for accomplishing any other agreed-upon contractual terms. The project executives and the SM Project Manager have shared responsibilities for CSUP projects; however, their individual performances are appraised annually with a review of the program's performance and outcomes, and they are responsible for administering a cost-effective program while ensuring contractor performance through a well monitored, thorough quality assurance program. In this way, the project executives are held accountable based on performance work plans that include specific job elements.

Evidence: Monthly PPR submissions (including PE/CC submissions) illustrate the nature of the project reviews and the considerable detail of the scrutinized information. Advices of Allotment to posts specify uses for which obligations of appropriated CSUP funds are authorized, and Project Authorization Memorandums (PAMs) permanently record the critical data associated with OBO's CSUP and other non-capital projects. CSUP contract closeout documentation demonstrates the effectiveness in achieving contract administration in this ongoing program. Importantly, the contract closeouts are accomplished when all administrative actions have been completed, any disputes settled, and final payments have been made. Following a comprehensive contract closeout checklist, specialized closeout activities are conducted, such as a funds status review and a confirmation that all deliverables are accepted, Government property is properly disposed of, and excess funds are de-obligated.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Timelines in the short span (less than one year) between Congressional approval and obligations for project surveys, designs, and the construction contract are excellent. At the end of fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 the percentages of appropriations not obligated were 8.68%, 11.58%, and 1.79%, respectively. Thus, while the CSUP funds are appropriated with no-year budget authority for an indefinite period to cover extensive construction projects, these funds have been obligated and liquidated in an expeditious manner. Some security expenses, such as paying for construction security technical equipment installations, are incurred after construction begins. This reflects Congressional and OMB intent for flexibility in obligating CSUP funds for projects that generally take more than one year to survey, design, and complete. OBO has, however, obligated funds swiftly, tracked all transactions in the Department of State's (DOS) Central Financial Management System (CFMS), and maintained detailed documentation that all funds were spent for the intended purposes. The Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM) follows current Federal law where funds are apportioned by OMB. For each project, the contractor must submit invoices for the contracting officer's representative's endorsement and approval with available obligation balances in OBO's Voucher Tracking Application (VTA). Possibly the best check on whether funds are spent for the intended purposes is the role of the Regional Security Officers (RSOs) at posts. There are two types of CSUP projects: OBO-executed and post-managed. The first type accounts for the majority of the funds. OBO carefully monitors what its contractors deliver in conformity with contract scopes and terms for OBO-managed projects. For post-managed projects, OBO provides an advice of allotment (AOA), and the posts generally award contracts to perform the work. Requirements for all of these projects either originated with or passed through RSOs on their route to OBO. The RSOs receive AOAs for the subsequent projects, observe the work, and check on the final results. If funds were somehow used for an unintended purpose, and security was compromised, the RSO would be held seriously accountable. That consideration, along with the fact that the RSO is on site and actively engaged, is first-rate insurance against any possible inconsistencies in the tracking process or use of funds for anything short of the intended purposes.

Evidence: Monthly Project Performance Reviews (PPRs), with Security Management (PE/SM) PPR project slides and Construction and Commissioning Division (PE/CC) Accountability slides illustrate how project funding are closely followed on a monthly basis by OBO senior management. A Voucher Tracking System (VTA) invoice approval for a Buenos Aires project and an advice of allotment (AOA) for Kuala Lumpur provide samples of these documents. OBO/RM/FM project finance tracking documents show how a CSUP project is monitored and managed so that funds are obligated in a timely and appropriate manner.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: At the headquarters level, the CSUP is a de-layered operation with a single Program Manager, 5 forced-entry/blast-resistant (FE/BR) product specialists, and 1-2 two FTEs of support in the division (OBO/PE/SM) that funds and coordinates the program. The OBO specialists who take CSUP projects through the planning, design, and construction stages are also efficiently operating with minimum personnel as they concurrently handle other OBO projects in what has been recognized by the Department's Competitive Sourcing Executive as a High Performing Organization. Thus, efforts to increase efficiencies and cost effectiveness have been concentrated on promoting corresponding improvements in contractor performance. There is an ongoing efficiency measure in this regard, another just initiated, and another one in development. The existing measure is to reduce the cost of FE/BR installation labor by 33 percent over the FY2004-08 period. Reducing the planning time for CSUP projects, largely by cutting out the least beneficial aspects and doing some process streamlining, will bring an added efficiency to the program over the next few years. Another approach, which should promote other cost reductions as well as quality improvements, involves the upcoming development of an accurate, comprehensive database from which mean-time-to-repair and failure rates can be better determined for FE/BR products and eventually for most mechanical security equipment. To a degree, this approach is being applied now on an ad hoc basis. With a more methodically collected database, however, and the gradual inclusion of more security products, there will be substantially more potential cost saving opportunities and increases in product reliability. With the associated need for extensive longitudinal tracking of failures and the effects of remedial actions, this is an efficiency technique that will be implemented over time. Additional cost-saving approaches have included subjecting the larger CSUP projects to the scrutiny of OBO's very active value-engineering program that has been moved up to the planning stage. The Value Engineering (VE) Program seeks average savings of about 3 percent of total projected costs, but that percentage can be much higher. Still another current initiative seeks to utilize locally employed staff (LES) at the embassies and consulates, with some regional coverage, to perform routine maintenance and repair of FE/BR products??a specialized capability not possessed by general maintenance personnel. Even after training costs are factored in, the lower salaries, dramatically reduced or eliminated travel costs, and shorter response times hold great promise of reduced costs. The first LES teams (in India and Hong Kong) just recently completed the necessary training, and this undertaking should proceed rapidly in the next couple of years. In summary, with existing measures and very near and longer-range efficiency efforts underway, OBO has and will continue to make intense, successful advancements to bring about substantial, measurable efficiency improvements in addition to those gained by the vigilant enforcement of contract terms.

Evidence: OBO Program Performance Reviews for 2/06 and 3/06 show the Value Engineering (VE) measure and 7-8 slides on the program and projects under review. They explain that the VE savings rate so far for FY2006 is at 8 percent, and that sizable savings (initial plus life cycle) are involved for the three CSUP projects being reviewed. For CSUP Bangkok project, for example, the accepted VE savings amount to $1.3 million, or almost 16 percent of the contract award amount. For the Cairo and Naples projects, the proposed savings are substantial, but the accepted levels have not yet been determined. The VE Program is achieving valuable cost savings for the CSUP. The idea of using locally engaged staff (LES) to perform FE/BR maintenance and repair is described in a March 2006 memo to the OBO Director, Subject: FE/BR LES Pilot Program.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Within the Department of State, OBO Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) officials collaborate and coordinate with Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) programs to ensure the identification and satisfaction of all security upgrades requirements at posts around the world. Once needs are identified, DS and OBO agree upon the level of upgrades needed to bring these facilitates up to standards. In addition, current and out-year planning and the execution of necessary work at each post are coordinated with other OBO programs. For example, if a major rehabilitation of a chancery or consulate building is scheduled in the near term, any upcoming security upgrade project will be scheduled for the same time, resulting in a lower combined cost and less disruption to post operations. The same approach is taken when the integration of security upgrade work with other OBO or DS work planned for similar time periods is appropriate. Knowledge sharing among OBO elements is facilitated by having the annual Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan that shows what each has planned, as updated during the year by OBO's Planning and Development Office. Furthermore, all OBO offices involved with the CSUP meet on a regular basis, often with DS colleagues, to collectively establish requirements and priorities. Normally, this is done in a working-group setting to allow for the free exchange of ideas and information. Included in these sessions is the DS office that manages the physical security profiles for each post to ensure that up-to-date information on post security posture is available. Further collaboration occurs with DS because these upgrades are carried out in accordance with Public Law 100-204 as amended, which requires, in part, certification that OBO projects provide diplomatic facilities with adequate protection for the personnel working in them as attested to by DS. There are no programs outside of the Department of State of this nature, and thus collaboration in this regard is not relevant. There is collaboration with the Overseas Security Policy Board. This is not in a programmatic sense, however, but rather as an opportunity for the Department to participate in setting security standards.

Evidence: "Physical Security Survey, Consulate General - Casablanca, Morocco, 09/16/02" provides a Sensitive But Unclassified (most are SECRET) example of a Regional Security Officer report that includes a section of security deficiencies that may be resolvable at post or with DS or OBO assistance. "FY 2007 Bureau Performance Plan, Overseas Buildings Operations," pages 19-24 specifies what partners are involved with what functions. P.L. 100-204, Approved December 22, 1987 (101 Stat. 1331) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 describe OBO-DS collaborations in certifying security projects.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has instituted comprehensive procedures to ensure that payments are made properly for intended purposes and in accordance with prompt-payment requirements. The Contracting Officer's Representative's (COR) responsibility is to review all invoices for accuracy and completeness and to prohibit erroneous or duplicate payments. This includes using OBO's Voucher Tracking Application (VTA) that is designed to allow the CORs to maintain effective internal controls to prohibit erroneous or duplicate invoice payments. All Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) CORs initially take 40 hours of specific COR pre-award and post-award contract training, with a Department requirement to repeat that training every five years. OBO has an internal requirement to take a refresher course every three years that emphasizes administration of design and construction contracts. Performance measures have been established to track key project milestones with related expenditures. To avoid interest payments, the Project Executive pays invoices in accordance with the Prompt Payment Act by accepting or rejecting invoices within seven days of receipt and returning them to the payment office in a timely manner to allow on-time payments prior to the Act's 30-day due date. The performance measures are reported monthly in the Program Performance Reviews (PPRs) attended by all of OBO's senior management. Contractors are required to submit invoices for payment to the Financial Management Division (OBO/RM/FM) that, in turn, expeditiously provides the invoices to the CORs for thorough review, certification that goods or services were provided, and approval of the invoice with available obligated funds as reflected in VTA. CORs return the invoices to OBO/RM/FM for payment in the Department's Central Financial Management System (CFMS) and submission to the Department's certifying officers for final payment approval.

Evidence: Supporting documentation includes Monthly Project Performance Reviews; COR vendor payment analyses; Facilities Projects Subsystem; use of the VTA to properly pay CSUP invoices with obligated funds for the intended CSUP purposes; open obligation reports since inception that are reviewed for un-liquidated obligations for prior years to determine funding status; the contract closeout process for un-liquidated obligations; CFMS used to track obligations by location, amounts, and line items; and OBO's Budget, Allocation and Planning System (BAPS).

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The program has taken meaningful steps to address management deficiencies at both the organization and program levels. Organizational advances that began a half-dozen years ago were extensive. The Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (A/FBO) became the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), and it was transformed from being a highly criticized entity (one that a major advisory panel in 1999 recommended abolishing) to one having an outstanding reputation within and outside of the Department. An improvement philosophy was institutionalized by a complete reengineering of the organization and its procedures, along with the infusion of numerous best practices. Without those changes OBO would not have been able to go from having $0.7 billion worth of work under management in 2001 to $5.7 billion at the end of FY2005; it would not have been able to win so many awards; and it would not have gained the excellent reputation it now has. Within this improved organization, compound security upgrade projects are handled essentially as are other projects in OBO. They pass through planning, design, and construction stages that take place in the appropriate OBO divisions and follow procedures and practices that have been established for the entire organization. In this regard, although OBO continually seeks improvements, it has overcome the major management deficiencies that plagued its predecessor. As for the management of the CSUP itself, early on it did face some serious challenges with a rushed, plug-the-dike mentality, reflecting a situation where emergencies were relatively frequent. With more experience and much of the most basic protective work now in place, the management approach has changed to emphasize more efficiently and economically executed larger projects. One area where management could be enhanced further would be have personnel more frequently step back more from their daily activities to strategize and spearhead new initiatives such as the effort to track and analyze mean-time-to-repair or failure of installed security equipment. To provide this added capability, the Security Management Division (OBO/PE/SM) is currently recruiting five GS-14 "Project Integrators." They will be dealing with all PE/SM programs, not just with the CSUP. Nevertheless, they will be able provide to provide key support to a lean operation. The CSUP is now managed quite well, but the Project Integrators should be able to enhance performance even more.

Evidence: "America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel," of November 1999 supplies a strong critique of OBO's predecessor organization. The OPAP convened after the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. One of its chief recommendations was to replace A/FBO; "to establish a new entity for the financing and management of our overseas presence" (Page 7). It did so because of the facilities it saw "??that lacked adequate security and were poorly maintained, overcrowded, and inefficient " (page 45); that there had been excessive "??project delays, cost overruns, and inordinately long project-completion timelines," and that "the Department has not put in place a disciplined decision-making process to provide FBO with a firm set of priorities??" (page 47). The discipline and the organizational and procedural changes made by OBO have remedied these problems, and with this improved organization OBO is operating effectively to provide the greatest amount of security as practical to existing diplomatic facilities. The "FY2007 Bureau Performance Plan, Overseas Buildings Operations" (pages 3-4) provides a good overview of what OBO has accomplished. Awards included the Engineering News Record Magazine's Award of Excellence for the OBO Director for "Standardizing Design and Upgrading Security at U.S. Embassies." See also Position Descriptions for Project Integrators and PPR slides on Project Analysis Packages.

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: CSUP projects have clearly defined scopes of work and project specifications. The projects progress in a prescribed manner, beginning with comprehensive planning and proceeding through design and construction. This process, developed and refined for the last six years for all OBO projects, ensures clear deliverables, controlled costs, and strictly followed schedules. Project schedules and budgets are presented and internally reviewed monthly at OBO's Program Performance Reviews (PRRs) attended by the OBO Director/Chief Operating Officer and all OBO managing directors and division directors. With respect to capability and performance characteristics of the deliverables, there is no question that the OBO is one of the leaders in the field. The individual security elements that are installed as a part of these projects have specific performance characteristics that are measurable and have been proven to be effective. For example, forced-entry/ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) products require testing and certification to U.S. Department of State Standard SD-STD-01.01. This standard was developed by the DOS and is widely recognized as the primary industry standard. It has been adopted by other Government agencies and by private industry. Vehicle barriers and anti-ram perimeter walls must also be tested to ensure that they meet specific measurable levels of performance. In addition, technical security and control systems undergo rigorous testing by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to ensure that they not only perform the intended functions but are robust enough to be deployed in any of the sometimes difficult environments where diplomatic facilities are located.

Evidence: Project Analysis Packages (PAPs) prepared by OBO's Planning and Development Office provides the initial cost estimate, scope, and schedule. Once a project is handed off for execution it is tracked in a monthly report of OBO's Construction and Commissioning Division called the "PE/CC Active Projects Monthly Report." Schedules and budgets are also reviewed monthly in Project Performance Reviews (PPRs). See also 12 FAH (Foreign Affairs Handbook) 5, "Physical Security Handbook" for clearly defined physical security standards and performance requirements.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) has demonstrated excellent progress aimed at its key outcomes??to deter terrorists or others from attacking U.S diplomatic facilities and to minimize casualties and damage if attacks do occur??by pursuing its the long-term performance goal to provide security upgrades to non-near-term new embassy compound (NEC) posts to the extent feasible to meet current security standards. There are 127 of them at this time. Of those, 13 were at the desired level of security before the CSUP began, leaving about 114 as the number the CSUP is designed to substantially improve by providing all up-to-standard security features except for blast-resistant structures, which require new buildings, and 100-foot setbacks, which generally require relocating a post. In reality, since the initiation of the CSUP program in FY 2003, 174 posts have received some form of upgrade support (sometimes multiple projects) from this program, in addition to forced-entry/ballistic resistant (FE/BR) activities. Although the focus is on posts not destined to receive NECs for a substantial number of years, if ever, security deficiencies at posts with NECs scheduled in the near term still receive some attention. If, for example, funding for an NEC will be sought in FY2008, it still would not be until FY2011 that the facilities would likely be finished. Thus, in the interim some beneficial lower-cost upgrading is typically done. Any consideration of progress for the CSUP, therefore, should include the fact that in the FY2003-2005 period about 60 near-term NEC posts had small CSUP projects. In addition, an even larger number of small improvements were made at the posts scheduled to receive relatively large, comprehensive, final upgrades in this program. These smaller fixes were made because of critical needs that could not wait, and fixes included security measures that became requirements after the CSUP began. Furthermore, in the same time period, there were stand-alone FE/BR product installations completed at over 40 posts. These required considerable effort and expensive equipment, with repairing this sophisticated equipment being a parallel activity. To give an idea of its magnitude, the work plan for FY2006 includes initiating the replacement or repair of 800 FE/BR doors and windows at 42 posts. These products are so critical that they have to be in top condition at all posts no matter where they are on the NEC schedule, and are accomplished by the CSUP. Finally, for the primary target group, posts without near-term NEC possibilities, contracts were awarded in the FY2003-2005 period to bring 21 of them up to security standards. This progress alone represents 18.4 percent of the long-range goal of bringing 114 non-near NEC posts up to standard to the extent feasible. But for a program that had to direct its efforts to such a variety of small projects at so many posts in the initial years, some to provide new types of equipment not anticipated at the beginning of the CSUP, being at over 18 percent is significant progress. Furthermore, the funding in each year is not equal. With the smaller projects workload diminishing, and with more NECs built and the final NEC schedules becoming much clearer and firmer, the plan is to increase the budget requests considerably in FY 2009-2012 to accelerate program completion for the remaining posts on the list. So, performance in terms of funding is another indication that the current annual award/completion rates represent solid progress.

Evidence: "FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan, Overseas Buildings Operations," pages 21-22. "Overseas Buildings Operations - Project Execution SECURITY MANAGEMENT, March 2006 Program Performance Review (PPR), shows the 800 FE/BR product work plan as well as performance measure status (page 7). "Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Justification, Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance." Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, "Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan: FY 2006-2011," pages 341-348 indicates progress to date in broad terms. Evidence of the magnitude of physical security upgrade projects done for posts in addition to the major ones to bring the 114 posts to full security standards (to the extent feasible) are shown in the FY06 Minor Physical Security Upgrades chart in the 3/06 PE/SM PPR, as well as in a list of advice of allotments sent to posts in the FY03-05 period.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The program is achieving its goals and plans to raise its targets in the out-years. Given the difference in post conditions and in the nature of each project, OBO has determined that the best measures, combining simplicity and meaningful units, are (1) to count contract awards aimed at providing 114 non-NEC posts with the highest security protection feasible, and (2) to count project completions toward that end. These tend to be large projects that take one to two years to complete. During the early years of this program efforts had to be divided between bringing those 114 posts to full standards and performing required security enhancement work at many additional posts. This was because of the need make numerous urgent fixes and having unanticipated equipment requirements added after the CSUP began. Nevertheless, 28 contract awards for major projects (and 14 completions) should occur by the end of FY2006. This is in addition to stand-alone FE/BR accomplishments and security upgrades to scores of other posts. This effort has occurred under difficult international conditions, with limited resources, and with emergency situations and evolving requirements. Even with all of the challenges, the only target shortfalls occurred because of the need to subsequently cancel two FY2003 contract awards. These cancellations were taken out of the original number of awards, and this affected FY2003 awards and FY2005 completions. One of the cancellations (because of a failure to obtain local permits, a problem that will not occur in the future because of changes in the planning process) was the high-cost London project. Those funds were assigned to some smller back-up projects and this accounted for a sizable exceeding of the FY2005 awards target. In this way, the CSUP caught up with its scheduled pace. Bearing all of that in mind, the results were impressive and highly important both in terms of the year-by-year achievements toward the program goal, as well as in terms of the degree of protection added to an even wider number of posts. There are no program partners outside of the Department of State except for the inter-agency Overseas Security Policy Board, which has no shared performance measures.

Evidence: "FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan, Overseas Buildings Operations," pages 21-22. "Overseas Buildings Operations - Project Execution SECURITY MANAGEMENT, March 2006 Program Performance Review, shows FE/BR product work as well as performance measure status (page 7). Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, "Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan: FY 2006-2001" lists performance measures. See also performance measures at the end of this PART.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The program has demonstrated numerous efficiency achievements, with more being developed to improve Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) products and processes to cut costs and improve performance. Starting at the micro level, these efforts have focused on making significant enhancements to protective equipment. Examples include designing a thinner, cheaper, but equally strong anti-ram wall; implementing a variation of this modified wall design in compound access control areas, safe havens, and elsewhere; developing removable bollards for infrequently used entrances in lieu of more expensive hydraulic bollard systems; and creating a thumb-turn locking guard, an installation adjustment mechanism, and a stronger hinge to improve the durability of forced-entry/ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) doors and windows. On the most macro level, the major efficiency move has been to transition from numerous small CSUP projects to larger, consolidated efforts to comprehensively complete the required security improvements at posts not scheduled for new embassy compounds (NECs). The Department reduced the quantity of CSUP projects by almost half from FY2004 to FY2006, while almost doubling the dollar value of the various security features being provided. This has lowered travel and TDY costs; reduced contractor and USG project direction costs; and eliminated one project survey and report, one pre-bid conference, and several USG/contractor work sessions for an average total savings of almost $450,000 per project. This will result in the seven project awards for FY2006 representing an annual savings of over $3 million. In between these micro-macro extremes are three performance measures included at the end of this PART assessment. One is on track to meet its FY2007 goal of reducing FE/BR installation costs by a third (for this CSUP sub-program with FY2004-2005 actual obligations averaging $28.7 million per year). The second efficiency measure aims to reduce planning times for the CSUP projects by 16% ?? thereby decreasing preparation costs, allowing for quicker initiation of projects, and streamlining the plans by eliminating the least useful portions. The third measure, although classified as an output measure because it focus largely on developing and populating an FE/BR products database, includes the initial stages of a major use of that database: to do mean-time to repair/failure analyses to better pinpoint where improvements can be made to extend the life cycles of these products. Thus, this measure has an efficiency component. Following completion of the FE/BR database effort, a similar database will be developed for the major security equipment on compounds. This too will facilitate identification of potential efficiencies through analyzing repair/failure data. In summary, the Department has been highly committed to finding and implementing efficiencies of all types and sizes; the cumulative impact of these successful activities has been substantial; and further cost reducing, quality enhancing efforts are being planned.

Evidence: The thinner anti-ram wall is described in a 4/15/04 memorandum, subject: DS-50 (1 meter anti-ram wall). After approval, the new design was quickly specified for over 1,000 feet of perimeter walls in FY04 projects in Geneva and Buenos Aires. The one-third overall savings from all related cost reductions (mostly from lowering concrete and steel usage by 33% and 50% respectively) produced a savings of about $350,000 (or over $371,000 for equivalent projects in FY2006). Per unit costs savings from using redesigned facility walls is given in a 12/03/04 memorandum, subject: Request for Cost of the SED FE/BR Concrete Wall Designs. Escalated to FY2006, the overall. These wall alterations and other improvements illustrate the constant reviews, research, and testing by OBO and the Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) of existing standard designs to reduce costs and improve constructability without compromising the Department's stringent security requirements. The bollard alternative is described in an 01/24/06 memorandum, subject: DS-22R (removable bollard). These bollard systems cost approximately 77% less than removable bollards, resulting in a typical 6-bollard project initial savings of $56,000, and they have lower follow-on maintenance costs and no utility expenses as compared to retractable bollard systems. Information on the FE/BR installation adjustment mechanism, called the floating nut embed, has been incorporated into the Department of State, Overseas Buildings Operations, OBO Standard Specifications of 12/31/04. Sequential OBO "Long-Range Overseas Building Plans indicate how CSUP projects have become larger over time. The specific comparison above was based on 13 FY04 projects costing $2.4 million costs with 7 FY06 projects with average $4.4 million values. Details on the three performance measures mentioned are provided at the end of this PART presentation.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: This is "NOT APPLICABLE" because there are no other programs for the upgrading of security at U.S. diplomatic posts overseas, and thus, no basis for comparison.

Evidence: The Foreign Buildings Act, 1926, as amended, which provides the authority to the Department of State sole manager responsibilities for "any building or grounds of the United States in foreign countries and under the jurisdiction and control of the Secretary of State."

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The Office of the Inspector General's independent inspections and evaluations demonstrate that the Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) is effective and achieving desired results. For many years, the OIG has been making independent evaluations of OBO and its overseas projects. The OIG inspects individual posts on a continual basis, submitting numerous reports to OBO on CSUP or other OBO activities for comments and/or action. This experience gave the OIG a comprehensive, in-depth knowledge of security upgrade activities even before it began an overall audit of the program that culminated in its August 2004 Report Number AUD/PPA-04-37, "Review of the Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades." The basic findings were that OBO's processes for identifying and implementing projects were well conceived. It also praised OBO's reengineered planning process, timely delivery of projects, and cost containment. The OIG also noted the value of OBO's monthly Program Performance Reviews, citing them as a "best practice." The report did find some relatively minor areas for improvement, while acknowledging the OBO had already begun to address them. These related to improving communications with posts, monitoring contracts, and ensuring the accuracy of architectural drawings. A year later the OIG commended OBO for quickly implementing report recommendations related to security upgrade projects and closed the recommendations. The OIG did reiterate its preference for OBO to have regional project directors on site for longer periods to oversee contractor activities. OBO pointed out the poor cost-benefit returns on having expensive project directors (PDs) on site for projects costing only a few multiples of a PD's cost, and the OIG ultimately accepted this. Now that the CSUP is moving to larger projects, however, there will be more on-site time by regional project directors. In summary, therefore, this independent evaluation of all aspects of the CSUP, along with the OIG's follow-up actions, does represent a high-quality, wide-scope determination that the program is effective and free of significant flaws. It should also be noted that since the start of the CSUP, no Accountability Review Board CSUP has found OBO derelict in its duties or that any of its projects failed to meet the standards in place for the assigned terrorist threat level.

Evidence: United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, "Review of the Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades," Report Number AUD/PPA-04-37, August 2004. (SBU) Memorandum from OIG/AUD/PP - Richard A. Astor to OBO/RM - Mr. Jurg Hochuli, dated August 11, 2005, Subject: Review of the Management of Compound Physical Security Upgrades (AUD/PPA-04-37, July 2004). (SBU) Accountability Review Board, "Jeddah Terrorist Attack, December 6, 2004" Secret Report issued April 8, 2005.

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: The Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP) has been kept on course, despite its complexities and the substantial variations among projects. In the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), once a requirement is identified, a scope of work (SOW) is developed and approved through a systematic and collaborative effort involving OBO, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), and the post. In some cases architect-engineering firms are brought in to help identify deficiencies and offer scope suggestions. By involving these firms early on, OBO capitalizes on their design expertise and facilitates the transition to the subsequent design phase. Once the design process starts, preliminary cost estimates and construction schedules are developed, and minor scope adjustments are made. Several reviews are conducted to verify that the design is proceeding as expected, and that scope, cost, and schedule are appropriate. Following approval of the final design package, the scope, cost, and schedule become the baseline against which future implementation is measured. This whole process maximizes the probability of managing the program within cost and schedule parameters. The nature of international construction, however, gives rise to unique and unforeseen challenges that sometimes makes it necessary to adjust the scope, cost, and schedule for specific projects. These adjustments are made carefully, and any deviation from the original baseline is designed to optimize the new scope, cost and schedule. In recent years, especially with considerable efforts being made to identify potential problems early enough to rectify them, the on-time, on-budget performance has been exemplary. Even though that cannot always be the case under varied international conditions, the almost unblemished record of the past few years is evidence of how the entire process has been improved. With this process, OBO has been highly successful in keeping its security upgrades within established budget and schedule parameters. Of 21 project awarded in fiscal years 2003-2005, example, 18 were completed or are currently ongoing within their established budgets and schedules, and slilppages on the remaining 3 were small. Both schedule and costs accomplishments are tracked with corresponding performance measures described at the end of this PART.

Evidence: The best evidence in the area of cost and schedule performance is provided by the monthly Project Performance Reviews (PPRs). Every month, OBO managers gather for the specific purpose of reviewing OBO's execution performance in all areas for which OBO is responsible, with a very strong emphasis on cost and schedule. Documentation of this process, and OBO's execution performance, can be found in any of the monthly presentation packages available for the last three years, as well as in the monthly OBO/PE/CC Active Projects Spreadsheet. See also the performance measure at the end of this PART on ensuring that completed and in-progress security upgrade projects are within planned schedules and costs.