

0800, Wednesday, December 12, 2012

Brian Kavanagh
From: Captain Brian J. Kavanagh, Charleston Branch Pilots Association
To: U.S. Coast Guard Investigating Officer
Subj: HR RECOMMENDATION loss of propulsion control with grounding, Dec. 11, 2012

Boarded subject vessel at 1719 Tuesday, December 11, 2012, in the vicinity of buoys 3 and 4, for inbound voyage to the Columbus Street Terminal. Master pilot exchange completed satisfactorily.

While making approximately 15 knots in order to maintain safe navigational control in the entrance channel due to cross set, and approximately a half-mile seaward of buoys 13 and 14, alarms sounded on the bridge. At this point in the voyage for this vessel's draft, the depth outside the channel provided roughly 50% underkeel clearance. I took the opportunity to leave the channel to give the crew more time to assess the alarm conditions. I ordered hard left rudder, and the rudder and the ship responded. As we were in the turn, the captain was speaking to the engine room, and then assured me there was no mechanical problem with the engine. We completed the full turn and re-entered the channel with full control.

Approximately five nautical miles later, while setting up to meet the outbound vessel SEALAND EAGLE in the vicinity of buoys 21 and 22, an alarm sounded on the bridge, and the vessel's heading began to veer to starboard. The captain relayed there had been a propulsion power failure, and I believed it was evident that the vessel was going to exit the channel. Because the vessel we were meeting was only a half-mile ahead, I ordered 20-degree right rudder to assure we would not cross in front of the approaching outbound vessel. The vessel continued to veer to starboard and left the channel between buoys 20 and 22. As the vessel was leaving the channel, propulsion control was restored and I ordered half astern to slow our headway. The vessel responded to the order, but too late to avert grounding. The bow ran aground and the vessel came to a gradual stop at a heading of 033 degrees true.

The SEALAND EAGLE passed without incident. I plotted our position and determined the vessel was completely out of the channel. I ordered the starboard anchor dropped as a precaution to hold our position because there was other traffic approaching both inbound and outbound. I then notified the Coast Guard on VHF channels 16 and then 22. I was informed by radio the tugs that were waiting to dock the ship had started my way to assist the vessel.

The tugs Diane Moran and Cape May arrived at approximately 1900. Docking Pilot Warren Tawes boarded the ship to direct the tugs. The tugs stood by until the master and the Coast Guard approved an attempt to refloat. At approximately 2030 an attempt to refloat by the two tugs with ships propulsion astern was unsuccessful.

The Diane Moran stood by through the night. At the following high tide with Coast Guard approval, at approximately 0500, Wednesday, December 12, the Elizabeth Turecamo, Diane Moran, and the Cape May, along with ship's propulsion freed the vessel. I piloted the vessel with tug escort to the Columbus Street terminal without further incident.

It is important to note that having maintained safe navigational speed prior to the loss of power allowed me to maneuver the vessel away from the outbound SEALAND EAGLE and avoid a much more consequential casualty.

0815, Saturday, September 29, 2012

From: Captain W. Crayton Walters, III, Charleston Branch Pilots Association
To: U.S. Coast Guard Investigating Officer
Subj: HANJIN GDYNIA loss of power, September 29, 2012

Boarded subject vessel at 0337 Saturday, September, 2012, in the vicinity of buoys 3 and 4, for inbound voyage to North Charleston Container Terminal. Master pilot exchange and propulsion, steering, and navigational systems checks uneventful and all completed satisfactorily.

While making 15 to 16 knots and setting up to meet the outbound vessel HYUNDAI TIANJIN in the vicinity of buoys 13 and 14, lost power at 0412, approximately one ship length from the meeting. No alarms sounded, my first indication of the loss was reduced RPM's and vessel's head swinging to port, towards the vessel we were meeting, due to bank effect. Regained heading with rudder control. Having maintained safe navigational speed prior to the loss of power allowed me to maintain control through the meeting maneuver. Ordered tugs by radio to assist vessel immediately. Contacted other pilots on other traffic to avoid the area.

Propulsion was not restored. Maintained control of the vessel with rudder and bow thruster control. Intended to drop anchor if way was lost before tugs arrived to assist. Dropped port anchor on the left side of the channel at 0445 just inside buoys 19 and 20, well inside the jetties. Anchor held at the third shot. Flood current laid the starboard quarter softly on the north bank of the channel, after the anchor held and way was off.


Tug ELIZABETH TURECAMO arrived first on scene moments after dropping anchor. Tugs JAMES McALLISTER and PATRICK McALLISTER arrived next. Was told by ships crew cause of engine casualty was a "broken hose" that had been repaired, and engine was ready. Intentionally did not engage ships propulsion until the vessel was clear of the bank. Tugs JAMES and PATRICK McALLISTER pushed starboard quarter off the bank at approximately 0610. With anchor still down, and ship under the control of tugs in the channel, tested engine and rudder satisfactorily.

Third tug, DOROTHY McALLISTER arrived on scene after refloating, but before weighing anchor. Once engine and running gear testing was completed, and with three tugs, DOROTHY, JAMES & PATRICK McALLISTER assisting, weighed anchor at 0637, and set sail bound for Columbus Street Terminal. Proceeded under ships propulsion and assistance of JAMES and PATRICK McALLISTER. DOROTHY McALLISTER departed once underway.

Voyage to Columbus Street Terminal was otherwise uneventful. Docking was conducted by McAllister Towing Docking Pilot Captain Craig Mitchum. Vessel moored at approximately 0750. Submitted to post casualty drug testing conducted by Investigative Associates at 0810 at Pilot office.

It is important to note that maintaining safe speed prior to this loss of power was critical to this incident not becoming much more consequential. Lesser speed prior to the loss of power would have made the meeting situation much less certain, and would also have limited my opportunity to reach protected waters inside the jetties before dropping anchor.

W. Crayton Walters, III 9/29/2012



CHARLESTON BRANCH PILOTS' ASSOCIATION

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September 29, 2004

Officer in Charge Marine Inspection
U. S. Coast Guard
196 Tradd Street
Charleston, SC 29401

Re: M/V BAHAMA SPIRIT, Grounding near Buoy "18" on Fort Sumter Range

Dear Sir:

I was the pilot of the inbound bulk carrier M/V BAHAMA SPIRIT, 26792 GT, 615' LOA, 37'03" deep draft, enroute the Kinder Morgan Terminal, Berth 1, on 28 September 2004. At about 0426, I had disembarked to the pilot vessel from the outbound containership M/V SEA-LAND LIBERATOR. I boarded the BAHAMA SPIRIT in the vicinity of Buoy "C" at about 0441 from the Pilot Vessel FORT MOULTRIE. At the time, the wind was from 200 degrees True at 35 to 40 knots. The seas were 7 to 10 feet in height from 180 degrees True. Visibility was about twelve miles. High water was predicted at Customhouse at 0822 at 6.3 feet. The current was flooding.

Upon boarding, I conducted the required Master-Pilot exchange (MPX) of information. The vessel's Master provided me with a "pilot card" that stated that the vessel's draft was 37'03" on an **even keel**. It is my experience that bulk carriers constructed with the Pilot House aft, as is the case on this vessel, can, upon arrival at a port, be actually down at the head as a result of burning off fuel stored in fuel tanks located in the after part of the ship. This situation can sometimes result in the ship becoming directionally unstable. The result is that a large amount of rudder may be required to change course. While this is not unusual, the pilot must consider this possibility. I noticed that the gyro had a two degree easterly error.

Upon completing the MPX, I directed the vessel on to Fort Sumter Range, at "sea speed", which would provide turns for about twelve knots, but due to wind and sea state and the need for large amounts of rudder to maintain course, the presentation on the bridge radar repeater showed a speed made good of only about 9.5 knots. The bridge radar repeater displays various vessel operating data some of which is derived from the GPS, as well as speed from the Doppler log. However, I noted that there was a variance between the Doppler speed and the GPS speed.

No other vessel traffic was on Fort Sumter Range at the time. I piloted the ship to steer on the channel centerline with the range lights aligned using various course changes to result in a course made good of 299.5 degrees true. I frequently checked the speed and course made good as displayed on the radar screen.

When the ship passed Buoys "15" and "16" at 0548, I expected that there would be a set to the right before we reached the jetties and Buoy "18". At the time, I was preparing to order the sea speed reduced to maneuvering speed upon entering the jetties. I checked the radar screen display. I had been steering 296 degrees to make good 299.5 degrees (the range course). I then noted by the radar display that we were making good 300 to 301 degrees True. Accordingly, the ship was "crabbing" so that the bow may have been on Range centerline, but the wheelhouse, located over 500 feet aft near the stern, showed the range lights cracked. I changed the course to 293 degrees. I noted that the range lights were not closing as I wished. I checked the radar display and noted that the ship was still making good 300 degrees, I then ordered 290 degrees. The log showed we had slowed to about 8 knots and the ship continued to set to the right. I ordered 20 degrees port (left) rudder. The "red" buoys were starting to line up. I immediately ordered "Hard Left" rudder. The mate in the chart room was at the GPS and called to me that we had slowed to three knots. Shortly after, the mate reported we were Zero knots. The ship continued to swing to the left. The vessel grounded gently.

The ship stopped on a heading of 336 degrees True. I called for tug assistance and the McAllister tugs PATRICK MCALLISTER and MCALLISTER SISTERS, with Craig Mitchum as the docking master, responded. While they were unable to get the ship off the bottom, the quick response by the McAllister tugs and Captain Mitchum contributed measurably to the preventing the ship from going further aground high tide. The tugs continued to push on the starboard side until the tide began to ebb. I reported the grounding to the Coast Guard. The ship eventually ended up hard aground with about 100 feet of the forward-most part of its hull into the channel, with its bow ultimately headed about 325 degrees True. The hull was sounded and no flooding was detected.

The ship was refloated at about 2200, 28 September 2004 and it proceeded to moor at the SCSPA Union Pier Terminal. I remained as the pilot on board. I was able to gain some rest while on board. On the inbound transit from Buoy "18", while on Shutes Reach, I noticed that as we slowed the ship below eight knots, the gyro error increased from about 2 degrees east to about five degrees east. This may have influenced the difficulty in maintaining the channel heading. The quartermaster had to use large amounts of rudder to change course, which resulted in a reduction in speed. The reduction in speed may have caused a commensurate increase in gyro error. As the ship speed vector decreased, the relative effect of the current vector increased, causing the ship to drift to the right.

I consider the proximate cause of the grounding to be weather related, which caused a strong set from the southwest across the approaches to the jetty entrance. I would not rule out the possibility of shoaling as a result of the recent storms.

I had my personal digital camera with me and I have several images of the ship and the ship's radar display, which are available to be downloaded or printed. If I can provide any further information, please contact me through the Pilots' Office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "William W. Elliott".

William W. Elliott
Member Pilot

Copy to: Chairman, Commissioners of Pilotage, Port of Charleston

Agents Register

Display

Help Home LR-Fairplay Change Password Sign Off

Sea-we

Shipname	BAHAMA SPIRIT	LR No.	9003263
Shiptype	Bulk Carrier	Ship Updated	2004.10.11
Ship Status	In Service/Commission	Date of Build	1995.01

Data Group: **Overview** Details **Summary (Overview)** Go Next

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Builder Query

SHIP INFORMATION (Main Details)

Print

		Tonnages	
Call Sign	YJRE4	Gross	26,792
Official No.	1151	Net	13,616
Sal.Com.Id		DWT	46,606
Ans.Back Code		Dimensions (metres)	
Flag	Vanuatu	Draught	11.355m
Port	Port Vila	Length (Overall)	167.5m
Reg. Owner	Marbulk Shipping	Length (BP)	180.41m
Ship Manager	Atlantic Marine Partnership	Length (Reg.)	
Builder	Sanoyas Hishino Melsho Corp. - Kurashiki (Mizushima Yard)	Breadth (ext.)	32.24m
Yard No.	1123	Breadth (mid.)	32.2m
Class	AB	Depth (mid.)	16.1m
Propulsion	Oil Engine(s), Direct Drive	Scrows	Single-Screw