Detailed Information on the
Employee Benefits Security Administration Assessment

Implement program improvements based on the independent evaluations that have been completed or are currently underway. Continue to subject its programs to independent evaluation, with the goal of identifying additional opportunities for improvement.

Develop ways to quantify and reduce the burden imposed by its regulations.

Continuing to support pension reform to ensure pension promises to employees are kept.

Monitor the efficiency of its operations using the newly-developed measure, and improve efficiency where possible.

Aligning budget activities to improve budget and performance integration.

Measure: Ratio of closed civil cases with corrected fiduciary violations to all civil cases closed.

Explanation:The civil ratio is one of three broad performance indicators that, taken together with other management data, measure the success of the agency's mission to enhance pension and health benefits security. The indicator is expressed as a percentage of cases closed with a successful result. Successful results include plan assets restored to a plan or person, plan assets protected, a prohibited transaction corrected, or other correction of a fiduciary violation. The ratio increases as EBSA closes more civil cases with fiduciary violations corrected. A higher ratio demonstrates the effectiveness of EBSA case targeting strategies and investigative techniques. While the overall indicator has steadily risen over the years, performance may fluctuate significantly depending upon the mix of plan types, sizes, and complexity of investigations. Other indicators measure agency performance on selected priority investigative projects. In FY 2007, EBSA tightened the definition of this performance measure to include only fiduciary violations, those considered more important to the security of pension and health benefits. Between FY 2003 and FY 2006, the agency reported both fiduciary and non-fiduciary violations. In 2008, EBSA began implementing a regulation that provides a safe harbor for assessing the timeliness of forwarding participant contributions to 401(k) plans. This safe-harbor regulation could substantially impact the enforcement program, both civil (including National projects) and criminal, because approximately one-third of the investigations conducted by EBSA focus on this issue. It is difficult to predict the magnitude of the impact. However, the regulation could materially reduce EBSA enforcement ratios because the regulation approaches compliance issues comprehensively, as opposed to the previous case-by-case approach.

Measure: Ratio of criminal cases accepted for prosecution to cases referred.

Explanation:The criminal ratio is one of three broad performance indicators that, taken together with other management data, measure the success of the agency's mission- to enhance pension and health benefit security. The indicator is expressed as a percentage of cases accepted for prosecution from those referred. The prosecution of criminal acts relating to employee benefits plans is a critical part of the agency's enforcement program. EBSA demonstrates its commitment to maintaining a strong criminal enforcement program by conducting criminal investigations. Through these investigations EBSA assists United States Attorneys and other law enforcement agencies in their prosecution of such cases. Successful cases may result in wrongdoers being prosecuted criminally, being ordered to pay restitution, serving jail time, and/or being barred from serving as fiduciaries. In FY 2007, EBSA tightened the definition of this performance measure from cases referred for prosecution to cases accepted for prosecution, a more robust measure and a better indicator to measure the quality of cases pursued.

Measure: Number of applications submitted to the voluntary compliance programs.

Explanation:The voluntary compliance indicator is one of three broad performance indicators that, taken together with other management data, measure the success of the agency's mission to enhance pension and health benefit security. The measure is comprised of two distinct programs: The Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program (VFCP) and the Delinquent Filer Voluntary Compliance Program (DFVCP). The VFCP is a voluntary enforcement program that encourages the correction of many types of fiduciary violations of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The program allows plan officials to identify and fully correct certain transactions such as prohibited purchases, sales and exchanges, improper loans, delinquent participant contributions, and improper plan expenses. The DFVCP program encourages pension and welfare plan administrators to file overdue annual reports (commonly referred to as the Form 5500). EBSA provides plan administrators with the opportunity to pay reduced civil penalties for voluntarily coming into compliance with the annual reporting requirements. The Form 5500 is an important compliance, research, and disclosure tool for the Department of Labor, a disclosure document for plan participants and beneficiaries, and a source of information and data for use by other Federal agencies, Congress, and the private sector in assessing employee benefit, tax, and economic trends and policies.

Measure: Employee Contribution Project - ratio of closed cases with corrected fiduciary violations to total closed cases.

Explanation:The Employee Contributions Project (ECP) is aimed at ensuring the timely deposit of elective participant contributions to 401(k) plans and health care plans. This project represents the largest single category of cases investigated by the agency. In the absence of our efforts, participant contributions to their retirement accounts or health plan might be delayed or, in some cases, not made at all. This national project is one of five and is a component of the overall civil ratio.

Measure: Employee Stock Ownership Plans - ratio of closed cases with corrected fiduciary results to total closed cases.

Explanation:The Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) project focuses on the unique violations arising from ESOPs, the most serious of which generally involve the incorrect valuation of employer securities. Improper valuation of employer stock held by the ESOP could result in participants receiving incorrect benefits. The agency's intervention seeks to correct the valuation and to ensure the security of pension assets. This national project is one of five and is a component of the overall civil ratio.

Measure: Health Fraud/Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements - ratio of closed cases with corrected fiduciary results to total closed cases.

Explanation:The Health Fraud/MEWAs project investigates abusive and fraudulent MEWAs ( a type of group health benefit program most often marketed to small employers) created by unscrupulous promoters who sell the promise of inexpensive health insurance, but default on their obligations. The agency attempts to ensure that insurance or health care claims are paid as promised. This national project is one of five and is a component of the overall civil ratio.

Measure: Rapid ERISA Action Teams - ratio of closed cases with corrected fiduciary results to total closed cases.

Explanation:The Rapid ERISA Action Teams (REACT) expeditiously respond to protect the rights and benefits of plan participants when the plan sponsor (often employer) faces severe financial hardship or bankruptcy, which may put the assets of the employee benefit plan in jeopardy. By filing a petition in bankruptcy proceedings or taking other appropriate action, the agency seeks to protect plan assets that, in the absence of our efforts, might be liquidated to defray other operating expenses and be lost to plan participants. This national project is one of five and is a component of the overall civil ratio.

Measure: Consultant/Advisor Project - ratio of closed cases with corrected results to total closed cases. (New measure, added February 2007)

Explanation:The Consultant/Adviser Project (CAP) focuses on the agency's monitoring of the receipt of improper, undisclosed compensation by pension consultants and other investment advisers. In essence, plan fiduciaries/administrators that rely on pension consultants and investment advisers, must have trust that the advice they receive is in the plan's interests. Improper or undisclosed compensation received (incentives) by consultants/advisers who recommend investment products or services to fiduciaries/administrators undermines that trust and may lead to plan losses. This national project is one of five and is a component of the overall civil ratio. The project was new in FY 2007. EBSA anticipates establishing a baseline measure subsequent to FY 2008 if sufficient casework is developed. These cases are extremely complex and time consuming to investigate.

Measure: Average cost (per case) to produce results.

Explanation:The efficiency measure is determined by dividing the inputs ($) by outputs (cases with results). Approximately 95% of EBSA's budget is comprised of employee compensation and benefits, fixed expenses (e.g. rent), or other mission critical requirements (e.g. expert witness, IT, etc.) that are not discretionary. While in theory efficiency could be improved by better intelligence gathering, targeting and case management, which would lead to increased case results, this ability is constrained by enforcement policy decisions which often require investigating complex, policy sensitive and/or precedent-setting cases in high cost areas (NYC, LA, SF). The efficiency measure covers program operations constituting approximately 70% of the annual appropriation. EBSA began tracking its efficiency measure in FY 2005.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: Protect and foster employee pension, health, and other benefit plans in the private sector through education, information, regulation, enforcement, and compliance assistance.

Evidence: Authorizing law -- Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as amended (ERISA; 24 USC 1001 et seq) Program mission statement included with GPRA materials at www.dol.gov/_sec/stratplan/main.htm & www.dol.gov/_sec/budget2003/2003app-toc.htm

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: Under the law, pension protection is advanced by certain uniform fiduciary duty, reporting, and disclosure requirements, without which employees probably could not efficiently obtain the safeguards and information that they need.

Evidence: Congressional findings and declaration of policy (Sec.2 of ERISA) as well as its legislative history, summarized, e.g., in Barbara J. Coleman, "Primer on ERISA," 4th ed., 1993.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: Although other agencies help to protect pensions, no others regulate fiduciary duty and there is no overlap in enforcement, reporting, or disclosure requirements. The other federal pension-protection agencies are: 1) Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (which is an insurance program for defined-benefit pensions against company failures); and 2) part of the Internal Revenue Service, which enforces tax-law requirements on access to pensions and companies' funding of defined-benefit pensions. These agencies operate very differently. ERISA preempts states from regulating pensions. No other federal agency regulates company health plans, but states do regulate health insurance, not employer plans directly. Private efforts addressing pensions and health are generally limited to voluntary standards.

Evidence: Authorizing law -- Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Program mission statements. GAO, "Answers to Key Questions About Private Pension Plans," September 2002 (includes agency roles). See GPRA materials (including Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan) at www.dol.gov/_sec/stratplan/main.htm & www.dol.gov/_sec/budget2003/2003app-toc.htm. Also see Sec. IV, q. 2.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The statute underlying EBSA's programs produces benefits but is not designed to maximize them. While technically meeting the criteria for "yes" answer, future reviews will continue to give this question close scrutiny.

Evidence: Authorizing law -- Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Program mission statement. Brookings Institution, "Cutting Government," 1995. Also see the explanation under Sec. II, q. 2.

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: EBSA restored and/or protected approximately $1.4 billion in pension and health plan assets in FY 2003 with an annual appropriation of approximately $116 million. In addition to monetary results, EBSA facilitated resolution to hundreds of health care coverage issues which can't be measures quantitatively but are equally important to participants and beneficiaries.

Evidence: FY 2003 DOL Annual Performance and Accountability Report. FY 2005 President's Integrated Performance Budget. EBSA achieved a 69% hit ratio (i.e. closed cases with results to total closed cases) in FY 2003 with respect to civil cases. It is on course to meet or exceed that ratio in FY 2004. With respect to criminal cases, EBSA achieved 40% ratio in FY 2003 (i.e. cases referred for prosecution).

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: EBSA's mandated structure makes it difficult to measure its overall long term performance. To compensate for this, the agency has selected output measures to use as proxies for overall performance, and has developed three long-term and five annual performance measures. Program areas covered include civil, criminal, and voluntary compliance assistances cases; and programs that the Secretary has identified as priorities: Employee Contribution Project, Health Disclosure and Claims, Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements, Orphan Plans, and Rapid ERISA Action Teams (REACT).

Evidence: See FY 2006 PART measures correspondence during the PART reconsideration.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: EBSA has established significantly ambitious targets and time frames for its three long-term measures of performance in the program areas identified above in 2.1.

Evidence: See FY 2006 PART measures correspondence during the PART reconsideration.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: In each of the eight program areas identified in 2.1 above, EBSA has annual performance measures that will permit it to demonstrate progress.

Evidence: See GPRA materials (including Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan) at www.dol.gov/_sec/stratplan/main.htm & www.dol.gov/_sec/budget2005/2005app-toc.htm. Also see Sec. IV, q. 2.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: EBSA adopted annual measures that reflect its national priorities and has several years worth of baseline data. They have established annual targets as a subset to their long-term civil ratio goal.

Evidence: See FY 2006 PART

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Program partners are notably the American Savings Education Council, the International Foundation for Employee Benefit Programs, and the contractor for processing benefit plans' annual reports (i.e., the EFAST system). They commit to performance measures feeding into the annual goals. However, ERISA sets very general requirements (e.g., "prudent" investment) and the regulated entities interact rather narrowly with regulators and so cannot be considered as traditional program partners.

Evidence: Internal documents such as EFAST contract.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: EBSA has initiated a number of evaluations, but it is too soon to tell whether they will result in program improvements or other benefits. EBSA conducted two program evaluations in its enforcement and participant assistance programs in 2003. In 2004 EBSA is conducting, with the assistance of GALLUP, further program evaluations in the Office of Participant Assistance, but they are not yet completed. Therefore, their scope and quality cannot be determined, nor is it known whether program improvements will result. EBSA is also conducting a discrete, baseline compliance study in the Employee Contributions Plan arena, and an Audit Plan Quality project (a follow-up to a 1995 baseline study). For these evaluations also, the scope and quality cannot be determined, nor is it known whether program improvements will result.

Evidence: OMB has received reports from the FY 2003 program evaluations. The Audit Plan Quality project report is due out later in the fall. The investigative efforts associated with the Employee Contribution Plan project is ongoing in FY 2004. A report will be available in FY 2005. The FY 2004 Gallup evaluation will be completed approximately in July 2004 with a formal report issued sometime soon thereafter. OMB is also in possession of EBSA's long range baseline study plan.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Almost none of the DOL agencies yet satisfies the standard for "yes." And there is no true cost accounting, i.e., by estimating unit costs. However, this agency has submitted an FY 2005 integrated performance budget request that accounts for expenditures at the program goal level. EBSA is also actively involved in the Department Managerial Cost Accounting Project which should facilitate associated inputs with outputs.

Evidence: FY 2005 budget submission.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: In 2004, EBSA struggled to develop meaningful long-term performance targets and annual goals. The result is a significant improvement over previous attempts.

Evidence: "Final Report: EBSA Performance Measures and Data Systems," Veridian/MRJ Technology Solutions, September 29, 2002. MPR Case Opening and Results Analysis (Mach 31, 2004). Briefing on "Strategic Planning Process." Each is summarized at left. In March 2003, subsequent to the initial PART review, EBSA met with senior OMB officials to continue the effort of reaching consensus on appropriate performance measures. In June 2004, EBSA modified its performance goals and developed a long range baseline study and program evaluation plan. The modified performance matrix will permit reporting on discrete national projects considered emerging issues. EBSA also modified its targets and has achieved green in budget and performance integration.

Are all regulations issued by the program/agency necessary to meet the stated goals of the program, and do all regulations clearly indicate how the rules contribute to achievement of the goals?

Explanation: Although they are largely necessary, only rarely do the agency's rules and other regulatory actions indicate how they contribute to goal achievement. Instead, preambles emphasize only the legal authority and, generally, the need for the action and the benefits expected. However, EBSA (along with other DOL regulatory agencies will by mid-2004 review all significant regulations and plan for improvement, as consistent with the law. The planned improvements will provide compliance flexibility and maximize net benefits by eliminating or modifying identified regulations. Implementation will begin shortly thereafter.

Evidence: Rules, Interpretive Bulletins, and Class Exemptions [from legal standards & requirements], e.g., "Adoption of Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program," [a compliance-assistance initiative], final rule, Federal Register, 3/28/02. All available at www.ebsa.dol.gov

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Agency has initiated new information systems and procedures to collect extensive performance information from regional and field offices, such as the Enforcement Management System (EMS) and the Technical Assistance and Inquiry System (TAIS). The new system for processing plans' annual reports allows speedier use in compliance-assistance and enforcement, while that information can do the most good.

Evidence: EMS and TAIS reports (see explanation); quarterly management reviews. Development of EBSA's "orphan plan project" (for instances where responsible parties are no longer managing plan assets) was sparked by data from these monitoring systems.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The Department of Labor has recently tied its performance goals to performance ratings for managers; the new appraisal system is to be cascaded through the Department.

Evidence: Revised DOL performance management plans for senior executives (Form DL1-2059, rev. 10/01) and for supervisors & managers (Form DL1-382, rev. 10/01).

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: There are no outstanding audit findings. The agency reviews obligations and outlays monthly to ensure timely obligation.

Evidence: DOL, "Annual Report on Performance & Accountability," various years. Quarterly apportionment reports indicate estimated and actual obligations.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Competitive procedures and a trial period were used in awarding a contract for processing the plan annual reports. That new system has enabled faster disclosure to employees and faster response to needs for agency intervention. However, there are no explicit efficiency goals and there could be more use of competitive sourcing, such as through position classification in the FAIR process.

Evidence: DOL 2003 Commercial Activities & Inherently Governmental inventories.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: EBSA routinely coordinates regulatory initiatives and interpretive issues with the IRS, PBGC, and HHS, including certain coverage and fiduciary issues. The Form 5500 database is extensively shared with numerous federal agencies such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Federal Reserve Board, HHS, and Treasury. With respect to the enforcement program, EBSA, PGBC, IRS, and DOJ routinely exchange information and refer issues accordingly. The ERISA Advisory Council has played a vital role in the development of policies since 1974. EBSA is currently implementing recommendations of the Board in the areas of electronic reporting, fiduciary educations, and Orphan Plans. Finally, with respect to the quality and timely filing of the Form 5500, EBSA cooridnates with a number of entities including PBGC and IRS and refers Certified Public Accountants who have performed substandard audit work to their respective licensing boards.

Evidence: An extensive series of EBSA MOUs provided during FY 2004 PART process. In addition, EBSA maintains systems of correspondence demonstrating the coordination with respect to regulatory and interpretative issues. With respect to the 5500 database: Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds Accounts, National Income and Product Accounts, modeling to project COBRA coverage which is shared with HHS, Treasury, CBO. ERISA Advisory Board minutes and related follow-up activities. DFVC Compliance program, IRS/DOL Joint Non-filer Initiative, DOL/IRS/PBGC Joint Voluntary Compliance Outreach Initiative, Form 5500 Redrafting Committee,.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: There are no material weaknesses or outstanding audit findings. Detailed, quarterly monitoring of regional offices' workload and performance. Also see explanation for sec. III, q. 1.

Evidence: DOL IG Audit Report for FY 2001, 12/17/01.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Has quarterly management meetings to attend to any management deficiencies that may be identified. GAO identified opportunities for improvements in the enforcement activities. EBSA's response indicated improvements planned and already taken. Also, the Department of Labor has recently tied its performance goals to performance ratings for managers; the new appraisal system is to be cascaded through the Department.

Evidence: GAO, "EBSA: Opportunities Exist for Improving Management of the Enforcement Program," March 2002 (summarized at left). Revised DOL performance management plans for senior executives (Form DL1-2059, rev. 10/01) and for supervisors & managers (Form DL1-382, rev. 10/01).

Did the program seek and take into account the views of all affected parties (e.g., consumers; large and small businesses; State, local and tribal governments; beneficiaries; and the general public) when developing significant regulations?

Explanation: EBSA frequently issues Requests for Information with specific questions. It sometimes holds hearings, as well, where agency officials often discuss with the witnesses the issues they have raised. Preambles to final rules detail the comments and respond to them. EBSA has used negotiated rulemaking.

Evidence: Federal Register. Hearing records

Did the program prepare adequate regulatory impact analyses if required by Executive Order 12866, regulatory flexibility analyses if required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and SBREFA, and cost-benefit analyses if required under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act; and did those analyses comply with OMB guidelines?

Explanation: The Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) are thorough and often rely on published data in peer-reviewed journals. However, the RIAs themselves have not been peer-reviewed by expert organizations such as the Employee Benefit Research Institute.

Evidence: For example, final rule relating to employers' use of e-mail for required disclosures, Federal Register, 4/9/02. Available at www.EBSA.gov

Does the program systematically review its current regulations to ensure consistency among all regulations in accomplishing program goals?

Explanation: There are no regular look-back studies of current rules. However, there was some streamlining in 1995 that removed 57 pages of rules and a 2002 review that did not modify any regulation. Such reviews have not emphasized consistency in accomplishing program goals. The final rule just cited DID review a pre-existing regulation, but was not explicitly related to program goals.

Evidence: EBSA continues to develop the process and criteria for the selection of regulations to be reviewed as part of their action plan to follow-up on FY 2004 PART recommendations. We anticipate that by the end of FY 2004, a system for review will be in place. During FY 2005, the procedures will be implemented to conduct reviews, as appropriate.

Are the regulations designed to achieve program goals, to the extent practicable, by maximizing the net benefits of its regulatory activity?

Explanation: A mixed situation that does not yet meet the standards for "yes." Despite good attempts to minimize the INCREMENTAL regulatory burdens, there is little evidence of attempts to minimize the CUMULATIVE burden. Also, thus far, aside from what is mentioned below, there has been no other conversion to electronic filing and there is no assurance of any future streamlining as part of forms conversions. In an effort to reduce burden, however, small plans are often exempted from detailed regulatory, reporting, and disclosure requirements. EBSA has made it easier for employers to make required disclosures to employees in less burdensome electronic ways. It has developed a new system for easier submission by plans of streamlined annual reports.

Evidence: See above; internal GPEA and other documents.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: EBSA has past performance data indicating progression towards the targets for two out of its three long-term measures.

Evidence: See most recent correspondence between OMB and EBSA on PART reconsideration.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Annual performance goals, although not ambitious in previous years, have generally been met. Selected past goals are shown on attachment. EBSA has extensive historical data to demonstrate steady goal improvement. New targets have been established for national priorities.

Evidence: See most recent correspondence between OMB and EBSA on PART reconsideration.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: However, EBSA has a new efficiency measure for enforcement results that will relate inputs ($) to outcomes (cases with results).

Evidence: See OMB approval of new efficiency measure.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The missions and modes of operation of other pension agencies differ so sharply from EBSA's, that there are no similar agencies and no comparable performance measures are available. That is to say, PBGC operates a pension-insurance program; IRS primarily addresses companies' funding of pension plans; and state health departments regulate insurance carriers, not company health plans.

Evidence: Authorizing law. GPRA materials. GAO, "Answers to Key Questions About Private Pension Plans," September 2002 and Employee Benefit Research Institute, "Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Programs," 5th ed., 1997, which is continuously updated at www.ebri.org (each of which discusses operations of various agencies).

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Although critical of many specifics, a recent GAO evaluation concluded that EBSA's important enforcement activities are "overall, a well-run program." Also EBSA is progressing in measuring effectiveness and plan compliance, notably with the recent Health Disclosure and Claims Issues project, which is not yet complete. Future evaluations are expected through EBSA's participation in DOL's crosscut, program-evaluation effort (see 2.6 above).

Evidence: GAO, "EBSA: Opportunities Exist for Improving Management of the Enforcement Program," GAO-02-232, March 2002. GAO, "Pension Plans: Stronger Labor ERISA Enforcement Should Better Protect Plan Participants," HEHS-94-157, August, 1994.EBSA has developed a long range plan for conducting independent evaluations as well as baseline studies in discrete program areas.

Were programmatic goals (and benefits) achieved at the least incremental societal cost and did the program maximize net benefits?

Explanation: Good design of regulatory actions and analyses. The final rule on small-plan audits, for example, considered the costs and benefits of small-plan exemptions from various specific requirements for financial security.

Evidence: Regulatory Impact Analyses. Small-plan rule, Federal Register, 10/19/00, summarized at left. Also see explanations and examples in Sec. III.