Detailed Information on the
Secret Service: Protective Intelligence Assessment

Provide program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Continue to ensure that effectiveness, efficiency and return on investment are emphasized as key components of program evaluations.

Achieving annual and long-term performance goals while demonstrating improved efficiencies.

Providing program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Revising how program evaluations are conducted to ensure that efficiency is incorporated as a key component of evaluations.

The Budget includes continued support for the Protective Intelligence (PI) program.

Reviewing efficiency index to incorporate, where possible, variables (such as threat level) that may impact workload and other efficiency factors.

Continuing to provide program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Measure: Known Subjects Who Approach Protectees or Protective Events

Explanation:This measure represents the number of known subjects classified as a threat who have approached a protectee or protective event. The performance target is always zero. Anything other than zero is unacceptable.

Measure: Number of Protective Intelligence Cases Completed

Explanation:This measure represents the total number of intelligence cases completed by agents assigned to field operations. These cases generally represent an assessment of individuals or groups who have threatened or exhibited an unusual direction of interest in a protectee of the Secret Service. The target given should be interpreted as an estimate.

Measure: Number of Protective Intelligence Advances Completed

Explanation:This measure reports the total number of protective intelligence advances completed in support of protectee travel. Because the number of advances in a given year is completely driven by protectees, targets should be interpreted as estimates. Annual targets (estimates) are being established for FY 2005 and beyond. For security reasons, detailed data are law enforcement sensitive.

Measure: Volume of Intelligence Assessed

Explanation:This measure reports the intelligence message traffic assessed in support of the protective mission. For security reasons, detailed data are law enforcement sensitive.

Measure: Protective Intelligence Efficiency Index

Explanation:This measure is a weighted index reflecting changes in efficiency compared to the base period.

Measure: Percent of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely

Explanation:The Security of protectees is the ultimate priority of the Secret Service. This measure represents the percentage of travel stops where the protectee arrives and departs safely. Anything under 100% is unacceptable.* *See "Notes" tab for discussion.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose of the Protective Intelligence (PI) program is to minimize the risk of harm to persons, property, and events protected by the United States Secret Service (USSS). The program achieves this purpose through three primary means: (a) receives, evaluates, disseminates, and maintains information concerning subjects (individuals and groups) and activities that pose a known, potential, or perceived threat to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service; (b) investigates those subjects and activities; and (c) conducts intelligence 'advances' preceding protectee travel.

Evidence: Protective Statutes (includes 18 U.S.C. 3056, which lists persons, property, and event categories protected by the Secret Service). Various internal USSS training documents and operations manuals.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: The Secret Service meets the Federal government's need to provide a secure environment for our Nation's leaders (at home and abroad), visiting foreign dignitaries, and National Special Security Events (NSSEs). Meeting this need requires an intelligence program wholly dedicated to assessing and mitigating threats to these individuals and events; the PI program provides USSS law enforcement personnel with the timely and relevant information needed to carry out their associated protective operations. The historical importance of an aggressive PI program has only increased given the sustained elevated threat environment following the September 11th attacks on our Nation.

Evidence: (1) National and world history demonstrates that terrorism, political dissent, mental health, and other factors motivate various individuals and groups to attempt to assassinate, kidnap, or otherwise harm nations' leaders. Protecting our Nation's leaders is an ongoing homeland security imperative. (2) The need for world leaders to be able to conduct business securely in the United States is based on statute, treaty, diplomacy, and reciprocity. (3) The vulnerability of large, public, visible events to terrorist attack is such that the Secret Service is required by Presidential Decision Directive-62 to plan and implement security designs for NSSEs.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: While the intelligence community is composed of various entities that specialize in intelligence related to various populations or facilities (e.g. troops overseas, air travelers, immigrants, Federal installations), the Secret Service is the sole entity responsible for receiving, evaluating, disseminating, maintaining, and investigating information concerning subjects and activities that pose a threat to our Nation's highest leaders and visiting foreign dignitaries. By design, the program receives raw intelligence from other agencies in the intelligence community. This is not a duplication of effort; rather, as a consumer of other agencies' human (HUMINT), signals (SIGINT), and other intelligence, the USSS PI program leverages partners' collection capabilities to meet the robust intelligence needs of USSS operations with only a modest investment ($67.5 million in FY 2005). The PI program's analysis, dissemination, and field investigative use of intelligence collected by other agencies is consistent with the findings of the Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (the 'Warren Commission' Report).

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. 3056. Excerpts from the Warren Commission Report. Excerpts from Congressional Budget Submission. Various internal USSS operations manuals.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The USSS responsibility to protect our Nation's leaders, visiting dignitaries, and NSSEs is statutory; therefore the PI program is 'direct federal' and the Federal Government could not delegate associated responsibilities to state, local, or private entities through a 'grant' or 'regulatory' program design. The program's structure (which is heavily reliant on agents in the field to perform intelligence advances and investigate intelligence cases) is not only effective (see Section 4) but also efficient: field resources (primarily focused on investigating counterfeiting and other financial crimes) are re-directed to intelligence activities based on protectees' travel itineraries, NSSEs' venues, and variances in national and regional threat levels. The 'surge capacity' of the field to perform intelligence functions, and then revert to financial investigations, makes the PI program far more efficient than if it were to locate intelligence-dedicated personnel in every USSS field office, or deploy intelligence advance agents out-of-district in support of every protectee stop. Also, the program's focus on the analysis and investigation (versus collection) of intelligence effectively leverages other agencies' collection activities to attain mission-required intelligence support for a modest investment.

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. 3056. Various internal USSS workload statistics.

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: Consistent with 18 U.S.C. 3056, the PI program devotes intelligence resources only to intended beneficiaries (our Nation's leaders, visiting foreign dignitaries, and NSSEs). Moreover, the program employs intelligence advances to determine the appropriate level of operational resources needed for protectee visits; intelligence advance agents' determinations as to the nature and scope of the local threat environment drive the allocation of resources (e.g., manpower, communications, equipment) in protective operations. Within the Intelligence Division (ID), program resources surge and contract (both within and across geographic and functional areas) in response to such factors as protectee travel destinations, NSSE venues, variance in national threat levels, and/or crisis management scenarios.

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. 3056. Various internal USSS training documents and operations manuals.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The PI program's long-term outcome goal is to minimize the risk of harm to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service. The program's primary long-term performance measure is the Number of Known Subjects Who Approach Protectees or Protective Events (NEW MEASURE). In addition, the program directly contributes to the Secret Service's overarching long-term protective measure, the Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Submission. Annual Performance Plans and Reports. Future Years Homeland Security Program. Various internal USSS training documents and operations manuals.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Given the critical nature of the protective mission, the PI program strives to completely eliminate risks associated with individuals and groups that pose a threat to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service. Anything short of their complete safety is unsatisfactory; therefore, the targets for the PI program's long-term measures are: (1) zero known subjects approaching protectees or protective events and (2) 100% instances of protectees' safe arrival and departure. Such ambitious targets promote continuous improvement, maximizing the safety of protected persons, property, and events. The activities associated with the PI program are given the highest priority by the Secret Service.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Submission. Annual Performance Plans and Reports. Future Years Homeland Security Program.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The PI program's long-term outcome goal is to minimize the risk of harm to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service. The PI program's annual outcome measures, which demonstrate progress toward achieving this goal, are (1) the Number of Known Subjects Who Approach Protectees or Protective Events (NEW MEASURE) and (2) the Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely. The PI program's long-term and annual outcome measures are identical. In addition, the following annual output measures demonstrate progress toward the program's long-term goal: (1) Volume of Intelligence Assessed, (2) Number of Protective Intelligence Advances Completed, and (3) Number of Protective Intelligence Cases Completed. Additionally, the Management and Organization (M&O) Division is currently developing a comprehensive efficiency measure (an index that illustrates the change in unit cost from the base year to the current year), which will be available at the end of FY 2004. Answer 4.3 presents an interim efficiency measure for the PI program.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Submission. Annual Performance Plans and Reports. Future Years Homeland Security Program. Sample internal USSS operational statistics.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Given the critical nature of the protective mission, the PI program strives to completely eliminate risks associated with individuals and groups that pose a threat to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service. Anything short of their complete safety is unsatisfactory; therefore, the targets for the PI program's annual outcome measures are: (1) zero known subjects approaching protectees or protective events and (2) 100% instances of protectees' safe arrival and departure. Such ambitious targets promote continuous improvement, maximizing the safety of protected persons, property, and events. See Measures Tab for outcome measures' baselines. Baseline data are also available (see Measures Tab) for the program's output measures (Volume of Intelligence Assessed, Number of Protective Intelligence Advances Completed, and Number of Protective Intelligence Cases Completed). However, "targets" for the program's output measures are actually "estimates" (versus targets), because they are entirely driven by factors external to the program's control (protectees' travel itineraries, volume and severity of threats received, DHS NSSE designations, etc.).

Evidence: Congressional Budget Submission. Annual Performance Plans and Reports.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The PI program recognizes the importance of and relies upon partnerships. Furthermore, the Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (the 'Warren Commission' Report) established the need for information sharing between the Secret Service and other agencies. The program works in partnership with numerous agencies in the law enforcement and intelligence communities to achieve its goal of minimizing the risk of harm to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service. Through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Letters of Agreement (LOAs), and other general agreements, government partners provide an array of non-reimbursable support, such as SIGINT and HUMINT feeds that impact upon the program's mission. In addition, the program utilizes medical and mental health professionals for case consultation, field-based training, and professional liaison; whether provided contractually or through mutually cooperative associations, these services assist the program in evaluating individuals who could pose a threat to USSS protectees.

Evidence: Excerpts from the Warren Commission Report. Various internal USSS documents and interagency agreements.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: 'Independent statisticians and analysts in the USSS Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems Branch use the Workload Statistical and Reporting System to provide the PI program's managers with routine (at least monthly) reports containing performance indicators. This process ensures that the Secret Service systematically obtains and uses feedback in order to evaluate and improve the PI program's performance. The regularity of the data's dissemination is such that program effectiveness is evaluated on a systematized and routine (vice ad-hoc) basis. 'Historically, other independent evaluations by the USSS M&O Division have "filled the gaps," answering questions not easily found in performance data. Such evaluations often focus on maximizing the PI program's effectiveness through process improvement, organizational changes, or broader management considerations. Examples include three M&O studies that: (1) validated the adequacy of the staffing and the relevance of the structure of key ID activities, (2) recommended methods for increasing the efficiency of ID's Duty Desk, and (3) verified the efficiency and effectiveness of the process for sharing intelligence information among originating units, ID, and field agents working PI investigations and advances. Note that the USSS Management and Organization Division (inclusive of the Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems Branch) exists outside the PI program's chain of command. 'Finally, the program's parent division (Intelligence Division) undergoes a thorough "Inspection" process every two years. Secret Service inspections assess effectiveness of operations; quality of management and supervision; and adherence to policies, regulations, and procedures. Inspectors are senior ranking criminal investigators independent of the program's and the division's chain of command.

Evidence: Various internal USSS training documents and operations manuals.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The Secret Service organizes its budget into six program areas, of which PI is one. Each program area represents a specific amount within the USSS base budget, linked to the performance measures present in each of the program areas. The Secret Service aligns its PI budget request with the appropriate departmental strategic goal, bureau strategic goal, bureau strategic objective, program performance goal, and program performance measure. [The FY 2005 budget request for PI reflects the USSS estimate of what resources the program needs in the budget year to accomplish its goal, to minimize the risk of harm to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service. The FY 2005 President's Budget requested no funding, policy, or legislative changes relative to the PI program.] Finally, the USSS budget request reflects the full cost of the PI program, inclusive of indirect or 'overhead' costs (e.g., training, human resources, procurement support, finance and accounting) needed to attain program results. [The Secret Service will update the above bracketed portion upon completion of its FY 2006 budget request.]

Evidence: Congressional Budget Submission. Various internal USSS reporting materials.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The PI program has both specific, ambitious long-term performance goals and annual performance goals demonstrating progress toward them (see answers 2.1 and 2.3). External factors affecting the PI program's ability to meet its goals include the advancement of information technology useful to the criminal element, the need for enhanced information sharing within and across agencies, competition for analytical support personnel, and the increasing sophistication of the terrorist threat. ID's parent office (the Office of Protective Research [OPR]), although not required to do so by any external entity, is in the process of publishing a strategic plan (currently in draft form) containing objectives and strategies addressing these critical areas of intelligence strategic planning. While the PI program funds the manpower costs of non-OPR personnel's conduct of intelligence advances and investigation of intelligence cases, these employees' critical role in the PI program is also addressed and captured by the OPR Draft Strategic Plan, which substantially addresses information technology improvements needed to enhance communication and PI case management between headquarters and the field. This strategic plan spans 2004-2008.

Evidence: Internal Secret Service planning documents.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: ' First, the Secret Service systematically collects a wide range of performance information for all of its core programs, including the PI program. Automated systems that are integrated into normal business processes collect statistics such as manhours dedicated to PI, number of intelligence cases closed, etc. Using these systems, independent statisticians and analysts in the USSS Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems Branch provide program managers with statistical reports that assist them in managing the performance of the PI program. Program managers use these statistical reports, as well as statistical data maintained within ID (such as protective intelligence advances completed) to make resource allocation decisions, particularly manpower determinations for PI advances and PI investigations. Performance information is also useful in program managers' semi-annual office evaluations. Data dating back decades exist for baselining purposes. ' Second, following every protectee trip, the lead PI advance agent completes and submits to the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of ID a mandatory 'Trip Return' report. This reporting requirement is a systematic means for recording and maintaining PI advance agents' observations concerning critical factors that impact performance. The SAIC reviews reports for observations relevant to managing PI performance as it pertains to intelligence advances for particular protectees or venues, or to the program in the aggregate. ' Third, PI program managers also improve program performance using the results of surveys that solicit feedback from the program's customers (USSS protective details). Every two years ' as part of the USSS inspection cycle ' USSS protective details complete surveys pertaining to ID's performance. In 2002-2003 and independent of the inspection cycle, PI program managers surveyed USSS protective details concerning the program's operational and threat assessment services. Management actions taken in response to these surveys included improvements in the timeliness of incident notifications.

Evidence: Internal Secret Service workload reporting documents. Internal Secret Service workload analysis reports.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The Secret Service uses the USSS Senior Executive Service (SES) Performance Appraisal System to rate the performance of the SAIC of ID, as well as the Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) of Protective Research and Assistant Director (AD) of Protective Research to whom the SAIC reports. The Secret Service also uses the USSS SES Performance Appraisal System to hold the Office of Investigations' SAIC, DADs, and AD accountable for field agents' timeliness and performance in carrying out PI investigations. Under this system, the Secret Service has incorporated program performance into executives' performance evaluation criteria. The system's Job Element I ('Organizational Results'), Job Element IV ('Safeguarding Against Waste, Fraud, and Loss'), Job Element VII ('Provides Support to Achieve Program Performance as Measured by the Secret Service Strategic Plan'), and Job Element VIII ('Improve Overall Secret Service Performance Based on the Measures and Targets Established in Accordance with the Secret Service's Government Performance and Results Act Performance Plan') hold the ADs and DADs of OPR and Investigations and the SAICs of ID and Investigations responsible for the cost, schedule, and performance of the PI program.

Evidence: Secret Service Form 3241, Senior Executive Service Performance Appraisal.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: ' A portion of the PI program's budget falls into those categories that the USSS Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and his Budget Staff centrally manage (this primarily includes, but is not limited to, personnel compensation.) The CFO also provides a portion of the program's funding to OPR. ' The CFO's office ensures that all centrally-managed funds are obligated and outlayed in a timely manner (using the Department of Agriculture's National Finance Center as the USSS pay agent, executing rental obligations in accordance with the General Services Administration Schedule, etc.). Each year, the AD for Protective Research prepares a prioritized spending plan based on his constituent divisions' (including ID's) competing requirements for funds. The USSS CFO reviews the spending plan and provides OPR with annual funding to cover expense areas for which the office is responsible. The CFO's Budget Staff uses 'status of funds' reports to ensure that OPR's divisions enter into timely obligations for purposes consistent with the approved spending plan. OPR budget and finance specialists, in turn, monitor sub-allocations to ID and other divisions for which OPR is financially and operationally responsible. ' The PI program's budget funds all compensation for ID personnel. Also importantly, where field or (non-ID) headquarters personnel dedicate a portion of their work-year to conducting intelligence advances or investigating intelligence cases, the PI program's budget funds the corresponding portion of their compensation; this is accomplished using a 'manhours' system that accounts for human resources by activity, including protective intelligence. Capturing field and other manhours associated with the PI program ensures that the full-cost of the program to the Secret Service and the taxpayer is known.

Evidence: Obligation rates spreadsheets ' FY 2002, FY 2003.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The PI program has adopted appropriate procedures to ensure the efficiency of its operations and routinely examines its business practices to ensure cost effectiveness and identify opportunities for savings. These include: (1) the institutionalization of field capacity to perform 'surge' intelligence functions as needed; (2) systematic containment of PI advance agents' travel cost expenditures; (3) investments in information technology (IT) to improve efficiency and program effectiveness; (4) strategic sourcing; (5) a regionalized structure of mental health experts; (6) cross-program and inter-agency coordination on IT issues; and (7) aggressive timing targets for the completion of PI cases and assessments. The evidence document 'Narrative Justification/Explanation for Question 3.4' contains detailed evidence for each of these 7 points.

Evidence: Various internal USSS training documents and operations manuals.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The PI program is a consumer of intelligence generated by other intelligence agencies and is therefore dependent upon effective relationships with those agencies. The PI program's commitment to effective coordination and collaboration with related programs is best evidenced by its established array of 'detailee' and 'liaison' arrangements with a number of the Intelligence Community's member agencies and centers. The Secret Service has detailees and/or full-time liaisons to the DHS 'Homeland Security Center' (HSC), Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); the White House's National Security Council (NSC) and Situation Room; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and FBI-led National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF); and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Counter Terrorism Center. These detailee and liaison positions demonstrate the PI program's willingness to devote a portion of its most critical asset (its human resources) to the endeavor of collaborating and coordinating with related programs in order to achieve program goals. As opposed to the alternative of ad hoc interactions with partner agencies, the daily nature of detailees' and liaisons' physical presence at partner agencies ensures that day-to-day program management occurs on a systematically collaborative basis. ' In addition, since 2003, ID has transmitted intelligence information to DHS' Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) on a daily basis. As appropriate, the HSOC incorporates ID-provided intelligence into the 'Homeland Security Intelligence Report' and 'Homeland Security Intelligence Report ' Restricted;" these reports are a tool for the Secretary of Homeland Security's resource allocation and other management actions with regard to preventing and responding to terrorism.

Evidence: Joint Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Homeland Security: Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and Its Relationship with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security. Various internal USSS training documents, operations manuals, interagency agreements, and reports.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The Secret Service issues an annual statement to DHS which "certifies" - through internally-conducted independent and alternative control reviews - that its financial systems and procedures are in compliance with Section 2 of the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) and Section 4 (financial management systems) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA). These actions review management controls to ensure, among other things, that divisions (including ID), allocate resources effectively, avoid fraud and mismanagement, and prevent improper payments. Also, the ongoing financial statement audit by KPMG ensures that payments are properly made, financial information is accurate and timely, and financial statements are clean and without material weaknesses. In the area of centrally-managed funds associated with the program, the Secret Service has strong financial controls for recording, processing, and/or reporting. For example, the Secret Service manages personnel compensation within its FTE ceiling through the use of a Position Identification Number system and utilizes an agency-wide gasoline tracking database system. In the area of funds allocated to the program, OPR monitors ID's financial management; in turn, the office of the CFO monitors OPR's financial management. For instance, a formal system of Procurement Requests and Training Requests ensures that purchases are reviewed by ID and its parent office (OPR), as well as by the office of the CFO. This chain of reviews ensures expenditures support the program's goals and approved spending plans.

Evidence: FY 2003 Statement of Reasonable Assurance of Achievement of Management Control Objectives. Annual Administrative Control Report (Sec. 2 FMFIA). KPMG Financial Statement Audit. Secret Service Form 2041, Procurement Request. Secret Service Form 182, Request for Training. Various internal Secret Service training documents, operations manuals, and reports.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Protective elements undergo a thorough inspection process every two years to assess management performance and to recommend courses of action to address any deficiencies identified (inspectors are senior ranking criminal investigators). Recent inspections have revealed no management deficiencies ("recommendations") associated with the PI program. Program managers also address customer-identified deficiencies using the results of Office of Inspection-conducted surveys that precede the inspection process. Secret Service-wide, the FMFIA and FFMIA reviews annually ensure that efforts are made to address any weaknesses in management control systems. (These reviews identified no material weaknesses in FY 2003). Also, through the Office of Inspection and the M&O Division, a structured process exists to monitor and respond to open Inspector General and General Accounting Office audit findings. Within the PI program, a detailed system exists for identifying, recording, and correcting management deficiencies and other impediments to performance that exist at the program level; following every protectee trip, the lead PI advance agent completes and submits to the SAIC of ID a mandatory 'Trip Return' report. Deficiencies noted by PI advance agents are reviewed by the SAIC in order to improve future program performance both in the aggregate, and as it pertains to intelligence advances for particular protectees and venues.

Evidence: Sample customer satisfaction survey conducted by Inspection Division. Annual Administrative Control Review (Sec 2 FMFIA). KPMG Financial Statement Audit. Various internal USSS training documents, operations manuals and reports.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The PI program continues to achieve its long-term performance goal of minimizing the risk of harm to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service (see Measures Tab). The number of known subjects who approached protectees or protective events has been zero on a sustained basis. The percentage of instances protectees arrived and departed safely has been 100% on a sustained basis.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Submission. Annual Performance Plans and Reports.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The PI program achieves its annual performance goals. During FY 2001, FY 2002, and FY 2003, the Number of Known Subjects Who Approached Protectees or Protective Events was zero and the Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrived and Departed Safely was 100%. Between CY 2001 and CY 2003, the Volume of Intelligence Assessed increased by 13 percent. From FY 2001 to FY 2003, the Number of Protective Intelligence Advances Completed increased by five percent, and the Number of Protective Intelligence Cases Completed decreased by 25 percent. Please see answer 2.4 for an explanation of annual targets (goals) versus estimates. Also, the decrease in the Number of Protective Intelligence Cases Completed is not an indicator of decreased program performance, as factors external to the Secret Service affect this number substantively. For example, the scope and complexity of protective intelligence cases following September 11, 2001 is such that a number of cases remain open longer in the interest of national security.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Submission. Annual Performance Plans and Reports. Various internal USSS reports and analyses.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The PI program has shown improvement in efficiency. Human resources devoted to the analysis of intelligence did not change between FY 2001 and FY 2003, while intelligence traffic increased six percent over the same time period. The M&O Division is currently developing a more comprehensive efficiency measure (an index that illustrates the change in unit cost from the base year to the current year), which will be available at the end of FY 2004.

Evidence: Annual Performance Plans. Various internal USSS operations reports.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (the "Warren Commission" Report) recognized the unique role the Secret Service plays in protecting our nation's leaders, and encouraged the Secret Service to use other agencies' intelligence in order to carry out these "special duties." As part of the protective process, the Secret Service (1) receives, evaluates, disseminates, and maintains information concerning subjects (individuals and groups) and activities that pose a known, potential, or perceived threat to persons, property, and events protected by the Secret Service; (2) investigates those subjects and activities; and (3) conducts intelligence "advances" preceding protectee travel. The agencies with which the Secret Service partners for intelligence collection focus largely on gathering and disseminating information. The PI program, conversely, specializes in analyzing this information while mitigating threats to protectees by investigating intelligence leads and conducting intelligence advance visits to sites before protectee travel. Because of the high profile of the Secret Service's protectees, and because of the unique statutory authority the Secret Service can exercise to use this intelligence to prevent attacks on the nation's leaders and visiting foreign dignitaries, comparisons with other intelligence gathering operations are difficult, if not impossible. Simply put, there is no other government agency with the same integrated focus on intelligence analysis, threat mitigation, and protection of high-risk individuals.

Evidence: Excerpts from the Warren Commission Report. Various internal USSS training documents and operations manuals.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: 'Independent statisticians and analysts in the USSS Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems Branch use the Workload Statistical and Reporting System to provide PI program managers with routine (at least monthly) reports containing performance indicators. These data demonstrate that the PI program is effective and achieving results. 'While not needed to demonstrate the PI program's effectiveness in achieving results, other, ad-hoc independent evaluations have impacted upon the program's efficiency. For example, the M&O Division's activity analysis of ID validated ID's intelligence analyst staffing requirements and the adequacy of ID's organizational structure. As an independent evaluation, the M&O study also offered recommendations for improvement. PI program managers heeded many of these recommendations, as evidenced by OPR's Draft Strategic Plan, which shows how ID activities support program goals, identifies employee retention as a goal, and identifies technology as a key driver in improving information flow. The M&O study of ID's Duty Desk validated that it has a unique function and should not be merged with another division's duty desk. To improve efficiency and effectiveness of the ID Duty Desk, however, the study recommended providing greater access to other database sources; ID heeded this recommendation, as evidenced by the associated section of the OPR Draft Strategic Plan. In addition, other PI process and structural improvements to more efficiently facilitate threat assessment and response are currently under management consideration as a result of M&O's review of counter surveillance information sharing processes. 'Finally, the program's parent division (Intelligence Division) undergoes a thorough "Inspection" process every two years. Secret Service inspections assess effectiveness of operations (see Evidence section for statement of aggregate results); quality of management and supervision; and adherence to policies, regulations, and procedures. Inspectors are senior ranking criminal investigators independent of the program's and the division's chain of command.

Evidence: Various internal USSS training documents, operations manuals, statistical reports, and strategic planning documents.