Detailed Information on the
Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare Assessment

Continuing to refine the annual and long-term performance measures to ensure they accurately reflect the expeditionary warfare capability.

Reviewing the long-term and annual performance measures.

Tracking the data of the annual and long-term performance measures to establish a baseline for the program.

Measure: Capability of MAGTFs Leading Joint and Coalition Mission Planning and Execution

Explanation:By 2015, Marine Air Ground Task Forces will be capable of leading joint and coalition mission planning and execution. The Combat Operations Center annual measure corresponds with this long-term measure.

Measure: Establishment of Combat Operations Centers

Explanation:This measure tracks the number of Combat Operations Centers that the Marine Corps plans to establish by fiscal year. This annual measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Joint and Coalition Proficiency.

Measure: Projection of Assaults From Over the Horizon By Integrated Vertical and Surface Means

Explanation:By 2018, Marine Forces will be able to project assaults from over the horizon by integrated vertical and surface means. Annual measures that correspond with this long-term measure include ones for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles and Joint Maritime Assault Craft.

Measure: Number of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles Procured

Explanation:This measure tracks how many Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles will be procured by fiscal year. This measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Operational Reach.

Measure: Number of Joint Maritime Assault Crafts Procured

Explanation:This measure tracks how many Joint Maritime Assault Crafts will be procured by fiscal year. This measure corresponds to the long-term measure on Operational Reach.

Measure: Number of MV-22 Ospreys Procured

Explanation:This measure tracks how many MV-22 Ospreys will be procured by fiscal year.

Measure: Conduction of Joint Forcible Entry Operations Anywhere in the World Within 30 Days

Explanation:By 2024, amphibious assault ships with sustaining maritime prepositioning platforms will be able to conduct joint forcible entry operations anywhere in the world within 30 days. Annual measures that correspond with this long-term measure include ones for the amphibious ships (LHD, LHA(R), and LPD-17) and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).

Measure: Delivery of Amphibious Assault Ships

Explanation:This measure tracks when the amphibious assault ships of the LHD and LHA(R) classes will be delivered to the Navy. This measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Force Projection.

Measure: Delivery of LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Dock

Explanation:This measure tracks when the LPD-17 class amphibious transport docks will be delivered to the Navy. This measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Force Projection.

Measure: Number of Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Ships Procured

Explanation:This measure tracks how many ships for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) will be procured by fiscal year. The ships that will make up the MPF(F) include the T-AKE cargo/ammunition ship, Mobile Landing Platform, LHA(R) amphibious assault ship, and Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off vessels (LMSR). This measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Force Projection.

Measure: Indefinite Sustainment of Marine Forces in Major Combat Operations From the Sea Base

Explanation:By 2024, the ability to indefinitely sustain Marine Forces in major combat operations primarily from the sea base. The Logistics Vehicle System Replacements annual measure corresponds with this long-term measure.

Measure: Number of Logistics Vehicle System Replacements Procured

Explanation:This measure tracks how many Logistics Vehicle System Replacements will be procured by fiscal year. This measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Sustainability.

Measure: Equipping MAGTFs With Strike Fighter Aircraft Capable of Short Take-off and Vertical Landing and Rotary-Wing Attack Aircraft

Explanation:By 2024, the ability to completely equip Marine aviation elements with strike fighter aircraft capable of short take-off and vertical landing and rotary-wing attack aircraft. Annual measures that correspond with this long-term measure include ones for the Joint Strike Fighter and UH-1Y/AH-1Z attack helicopters.

Measure: Number of Joint Strike Fighters Procured

Explanation:This measure tracks how many Joint Strike Fighters will be procured by fiscal year. This measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Operational and Organizational Adaptability.

Measure: Number of UH-1Y/AH-1Z Attack Helicopters Procured

Explanation:This measure tracks how many UH-1Y/AH-1Z attack helicopters will be procured by fiscal year. This measure corresponds with the long-term measure on Operational and Organizational Adaptability.

Measure: MV-22 Osprey program reaching cost target as criteria for full-rate production

Explanation:This measure tracks the ability of the MV-22 Osprey program to reach its cost target per unit for full-rate production. Dollars are in millions.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: Expeditionary warfare is the temporary projection and application of Marine Corps power into a foreign setting. Marines establish a forward base, either on land or at sea, from which military power can be brought to bear into the austere foreign operating environment. This PART examines the capital investment programs which support the Marine Corps' expeditionary warfare mission as defined in the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Joint Doctrine, and Marine Corps Strategy 21.

Evidence: The 2005 National Defense Strategy identifies a requirement for eight key operational capabilities, of which at least three are accomplished by expeditionary warfare -- Operate from the Global Commons, Project and Sustain U.S. Forces in Distant Anti-Access Environments, and Deny Enemies Sanctuary. The 2005 National Military Strategy expands on this capability, specifically calling for a joint force that is expeditionary, which it defines as "rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the global battlespace." See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ for copies of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. Joint Doctrine documents are available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm. Marine Corps Strategy 21 is available at http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ind.nsf/publications/.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The expeditionary warfare capability of the Marine Corps is vital in defending the United States and its interests and fighting the Global War on Terrorism. The Marine Corps, supported by the Navy, provides the Nation its only sustainable forcible entry capability. This capability projects and sustains the combat power resident in a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, from a secure sea base against deep inland objectives.

Evidence: The expeditionary warfare mission is required by the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Joint Doctrine. See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ for copies of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. Joint Doctrine documents are available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: Marine Corps expeditionary warfare is unique, fulfilling a distinct and non-duplicative role in the National Defense. While both the Army and Marine Corps constitute the Nation's land forces, each force provides unique and complementary capabilities for carrying out military missions. The Army provides forces for sustained combat operations on land, as well as for power projection and forcible-entry operations, and maintains heavy and light forces, based both in the United States and overseas. The Marine Corps, as part of the Nation's maritime forces, provides expeditionary forces to project combat power ashore either in support of naval campaigns or in conjunction with Army and Air Force units. The Marine Corps maintains forces designed for seabased, self-sustained power projection and forcible entry ashore, as well as non-traditional missions such as noncombatant evacuations, security operations, tactical recovery of aircraft personnel, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. While the Army performs power projection by mobilizing and dispatching a large force of potentially several divisions, the Marine Corps remains forward deployed at all times. Marine Expeditionary Units, consisting of about 2,000 Marines, are forward deployed in or near regions of vital U.S. interest. These forces provide a swift and effective means of responding to fast-breaking crises and can remain on station for indefinite periods of time, ready to intervene or take action if needed.

Evidence: Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the DoD and its Major Components (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d51001x.htm), delineates the role of each military service to ensure there is no redundancy. Per the directive, the Marine Corps "shall" develop and maintain the capability to perform amphibious operations.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: There are two significant flaws with the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare program. The Navy, rather than the Marine Corps, makes decisions regarding the number of and funding for amphibious ships. Although the Marine Corps may have a requirement for a specific number of expeditionary strike groups and associated ships, the Navy can choose to not provide funding to the required levels or reduce the number of ships in the program of record. It is not clear why the Marine Corps force structure requirements appear to be disconnected from the Navy amphibious lift requirement. Second, although the concept of joint seabasing will increase the capabilities of Marines in expeditionary warfare operations, seabasing can also be viewed as a threat to the Marine Corps since it could allow the Army and Air Force to have full operations from the seabase. If the Army will conduct its land-based operations directly from the seabase, it would be difficult to differentiate their operations from Marine Corps expeditionary warfare.

Evidence: The Navy controls the amount of funding for and units procured in several accounts that impact the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare program, such as Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, and the National Defense Sealift Fund. Although the concept of seabasing is still being refined, DoD officials have indicated publicly that it will be jointly used by all military services.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Available resources are being effectively allocated by the Marine Corps to achieve the required capabilities in support of expeditionary warfare. The Marine Corps develops new investment programs using requirements identified by the Joint Capability Integration Development System process. Approved acquisition objectives are developed for each individual program. In addition, combatant commanders perform their own analysis of needed capabilities with the drafting of the Integrated Priority List. Each year, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs conducts the Chairman's Program Assessment to determine if there are any gaps in capabilites across all the military services. A recent addition to the Marine Corps acquisition process is the Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, which allows warfighters to provide input into the investment process. This involvement often results in the rapid development of specific capabilities for use in the battlefield, such as armor, special types of rifles, or specialized surveillance systems.

Evidence: The President's Budget supports key expeditionary warfare systems. The transformational lift triad of the MV-22 Osprey, Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, and the Landing Craft Air Cushion, Experimental are progressing as expected and the legacy ships of the amphibious fleet are being replaced with the amphibious ships LPD-17, LHD-8, and LHA(R). The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) program will provide the foundation to achieve the number one priority for the future of expeditionary warfare -- a joint seabasing capability. The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps will reduce the Marine Corps' portfolio of logistics support automated information systems from over 240 legacy applications to less than 70 updated and streamlined systems. In addition, items requested through the Urgent Universal Needs Statement process are being brought forward on a regular basis for development and fielding, if warranted.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The expeditionary warfare program has a limited number of specific long-term performance measures. These measures reflect its objective of being Joint and coalition capable, with Marine Air-Ground Task Forces leading and/or supporting integrated operations in austere expeditionary environments. The long-term measures for expeditionary warfare are focused on: Joint and Coalition Proficiency, Operational Reach, Force Projection, Sustainability, and Operational and Organizational Adaptability. While these measures each produce outputs that constitute different elements of Marine Corps expeditionary warfare capabilities, the combination of these outputs will produce the outcome of a Marine Corps that will be ready to fight in the Nation's current and future conflicts.

Evidence: These objectives are established by the 2005 National Defense Strategy, 2005 National Military Strategy, and Joint Doctrine. The objectives are also referenced in the Secretary of the Navy's Naval Transformation Roadmap for 2003 (http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/transformation/trans-cover.html) and the Capability Development Documents for individual expeditionary warfare programs. See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ for copies of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. Joint Doctrine documents are available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm The long-term performance measures track the execution of these strategic objectives for Marine Corps expeditionary warfare.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The expeditionary warfare program has ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures.

Evidence: The Marine Corps' strategic objectives for expeditionary warfare are detailed in its 2005 Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capability List (https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/). The long-term performance measures of joint and coalition proficiency, operational reach, force projection, sustainability, and operational and organizational adaptability track the execution of these strategic objectives.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The Marine Corps has a number of annual performance measures for the individual programs that support expeditionary warfare which track to the five long-term measures mentioned in the answer to Question 2.1. These measures track the procurement numbers of specific items, as well as schedule, cost, and performance of its key acquisition programs. Because expeditionary warfare is a capital asset program, the output measures for the individual programs are aligned with the Marine Corps' overall strategic goals of improving Marine expeditionary capabilities.

Evidence: The Marine Corps has annual performance measures for the individual programs that support expeditionary warfare, including Combat Operations Centers, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, Joint Maritime Assault Craft, amphibious ships LPD-17, LHA(R), and LHD, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), Logistics Vehicle System Replacements, Joint Srike Fighter, UH-1Y/AH-1Z attack helicopters, and MV-22 Osprey.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The Marine Corps has baselines for many of its annual measures. The individual programs that support expeditionary warfare have ambitious annual targets so they can deliver needed capabilities in the areas of Joint and Coalition Proficiency, Operational Reach, Force Projection, Sustainability, and Operational and Organizational Adaptability.

Evidence: The Marine Corps has baselines for many of its annual measures, such as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, amphibious ships LPD-17, LHA(R), and LHD, and MV-22 Osprey. Some of the measures are focused on new or planned programs which do not have baselines in the areas being tracked.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The Navy does not consistently commit to and work to the annual and long-term goals of the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare program. Because they, rather than the Marine Corps, make decisions regarding the number of and funding for amphibious ships, it is often difficult for the Marine Corps to accomplish their annual or long-term goals. Although the Marine Corps may have a requirement for a specific number of expeditionary strike groups and associated ships, the Navy can choose to not provide funding to the required levels or reduce the number of ships in the program of record.

Evidence: Response is No

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: There are several independent agencies that conduct regular evaluations of individual Marine Corps programs that support expeditionary warfare. These evaluations include ones performed by independent agencies within the Department of Defense -- the Marine Corps' Operational Test and Evaluation Activity, the Navy's Commander Operational Test Force, the Department of Defense's Operational Test and Evaluation Office -- as well as by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). These evaluations are high quality and comprehensive in scope and the majority of them support program improvements.

Evidence: The Marine Corps' Operational Test and Evaluation Activity typically conducts six to eight initial evaluations per year of major new programs and actively reviews around 90 existing Marine Corps acquisition programs annually. The Navy's Commander Operational Test Force evaluates all Marine aircraft and amphibious ships. The Department of Defense's Operational Test and Evaluation Office conducts evaluations of all Acquistion Category I programs. GAO, CBO, and CRS conduct periodic reviews of individual programs within the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare program.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The Marine Corps reviews programs using the Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBE) and ties their budget requests to the accomplishment of goals for the individual programs that support expeditionary warfare. The PPBE is supported by the Joint Capability Integration Development System which formally develops and approves performance measures for DoD's acquisition porgrams. The resource needs for the individual programs that provide expeditionary capabilities are presented in a complete and transparent manner in the Marine Corps and Navy budget documents.

Evidence: The Marine Corps has annual performance measures for the individual programs that support expeditionary warfare. The resource needs for the individual programs are contained in the Marine Corps and Navy budget documents.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The Marine Corps has articulated long-term performance measures for its expeditionary warfare capability. When the PART reviewed expeditionary warfare in 2005, the Marine Corps could not identify long-term measures, only annual measures for individual acquisition programs. Over the last year, the Marine Corps has worked to develop specific, long-term performance measures for its expeditionary warfare capability.

Evidence: The long-term performance measures for expeditionary warfare include measures related to joint and coalition proficiency, operational reach, force projection, sustainability, and operational and organizational adaptability.

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals, and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: The Marine Corps and Navy conduct Analysis of Alternatives (AoAs) for the individual programs that support expeditionary warfare. Recent AoAs that were conducted relate to the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the MV-22 Osprey, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), and the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. These and other AoAs evaluate cost, schedule, and performance and provide appropriate trade-off alternatives. The results of the AoAs are reviewed by the Defense Acquisition Board, which uses the results as part of their decison-making process in determining whether to proceed with the program's next major acquisition milestone.

Evidence: For example, in October 2000, the Marine Corps issued an Analysis of Alternatives for a vehicle to replace its current Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The Marine Corps examined 13 different alternatives, including a few that were not even vehicles. The various options were examined using historical, force effectiveness, logistics impact, and cost analyses. Ultimately, the cost and operational effectiveness analysis concluded that a new conceptual amphibious vehicle capable of 25-knot water speeds and main battle tank-like mobility ashore (now known as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle) was the preferred outcome.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The Navy and Marine Corps regularly collect performance information on individual programs that make up the expeditionary warfare capability. The DoD acquisition system includes milestones and decision points where programs must be on track with cost, schedule, and performance measures before being able to proceed. Shortcomings in the execution, delivery schedule, or achievement of the measures can result in the immediate reevaluation of the program and/or the subsequent redirection of resources. The individual programs use an earned value management system.

Evidence: The procedures and processes for the DoD acquisition system are outlined in the DoD 5000 series (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d50001x.htm). The Acquisition Program Baseline and Capability Development Documents for each program contain performance measures called Key Performance Parameters. The Defense Acquisition Executive Summary is the principal internal mechanism for tracking the most important objectives and thresholds for the program. In addition, Selected Acquisition Reports give a public summary of the key cost, schedule, and technical information for DoD's acquisition category I programs.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Program managers and contractors are held accountable for the cost, schedule, and performance results of the individual programs which make up Marine Corps expeditionary warfare. Program managers are required to follow DoD acquisition regulations and regularly report to senior DoD management using the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, which tracks a number of measures, including cost, schedule, and performance. In addition, contractors are held to cost, schedule, and performance accounting and goals using such techniques as the earned value management system.

Evidence: Acquisition Program Baseline, Key Performance Parameters, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, Selected Acquisition Reports.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Funds for expeditionary warfare are consistently obligated by the Marine Corps and Navy in a timely manner and are spent for the intended purpose. The Department of Defense reviews programs using the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System and places significant emphasis on execution. Program managers for Marine Corps programs are required to adhere to obligation and expenditure benchmarks issued by DoD and the Navy. All execution transactions are regularly loaded to the official Defense Finance and Accounting Service System and the Standard Accounting, Budgeting and Reporting System. The Monthly Accounting Report 1002 is also used as a tool to ensure that funds are obligated in a timely manner. In addition, there are a number of processes in place to redirect unobligated funds for other uses within the Navy.

Evidence: Defense Finance and Accounting Service System, the Standard Accounting, Budgeting and Reporting System, and the Marine Corps Monthly Accounting Report 1002

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Annual reviews are conducted on every major Marine Corps investment program using the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System to determine if an individual program can be more efficient or cost-effective. The Marine Corps also procures a number of end items as a joint procurement with other military services, significantly reducing the per unit production price. In addition, the Defense acquisition system requires competition in procurement and uses different contract vehicles as appropriate including fixed price, cost plus, award fee, etc. Contractors of major acquisition programs must also use industry standard cost control mechanisms such as the earned value management system.

Evidence: The Marine Corps has strived to reduce the per unit production costs for many of its major programs. For example, the Marine Corps is working to reduce the per unit production cost of the MV-22 Osprey to its target of $58 million. In addition, a number of the Marine Corps investment programs are procured with other military services, including the MV/CV-22 Osprey (Marine Corps/Navy), Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (Marine Corps/Army), and HMMWVA2s (Marine Corps/Army).

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The Marine Corps coordinates with the other military services to eliminate duplication and ensure that joint capability needs are met. The Joint Capability Integration Development System process mandates the joint vetting of acquisition programs across the services. In addition, the Marine Corps works closely with the Navy to coordinate and integrate their shipbuilding, aviation, and combat requirements. The Army and Marine Corps work together through an Army Marine Corps Board to understand each other's capabilities, share information, and review ways to fight better by examining how to best spend scarce resources to field future capabilities that improve joint warfighting.

Evidence: For example, the establishment of a Joint Program Office for the Future Combat System, the Joint High Speed Vessel Program, and the MV-22 Osprey demonstrates increased collaboration between the military services on expeditionary warfare programs. The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps is also closely tied to similar enterprise efforts by both the Army and Navy to ensure mutually supportive and interoperable systems are developed and fielded within each service. The requirement to publish Joint Integrating Concepts for seabasing and forcible entry further enhances collaboration between the services.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: While DoD continues to make efforts to improve its financial management weaknesses, the Department has yet to obtain an unqualified audit opinion. The Marine Corps does not have audit reports demonstrating that its expeditionary warfare program is free from internal weaknesses. However, the Marine Corps appears to have made more progress to improve its financial systems than any other major DoD component and has been chosen as the lead service to obtain a clean audit opinion, thereby providing a model for the other services to follow.

Evidence: The Marine Corps Financial Improvement Initiative will develop and initiate a plan for the Marine Corps to prepare stand-alone financial statements and obtain an audit opinion using the current accounting system. This initiative will be a prototype for the rest of the Department of Defense.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The Marine Corps has a number of specific processes in place to correct program management deficiencies. Program managers are required to regularly report to DoD senior level officials on the cost, schedule, and performance goals of the individual program. In addition, the Management Control Program requires annual certification reporting which identifies weaknesses and deficiencies, as well as the corrective actions taken to date for specific programs. When deficiencies are identified in the program, existing processes require corrective actions.

Evidence: The Defense acquisition guidelines are outlined in the DoD 5000 series (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d50001x.htm).

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: The individual programs that make up the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare capability have clearly defined deliverables, performance and capability characteristics, and strong cost and schedule goals. The requirements process for individual programs establishes the set of deliverables and capabilities for the program. In addition, the DoD acquisition system includes milestones and decision points where programs must be on track with cost, schedule, and performance measures before being able to proceed.

Evidence: The Defense acquisition guidelines are outlined in the DoD 5000 series (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d50001x.htm). The key performance parameters for the individual programs are contained in the program's Acquisition Program Baseline and Capability Development Documents. The principle internal mechanism for tracking the program's objectives and thresholds is the quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, which examines a number of measures, including performance, test and evaluation, logistics requirements and readiness objectives, cost, funding, schedule, contracts, production, management structure, and interoperability.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Although the Marine Corps has only recently articulated a limited number of specific long-term performance measures for the expeditionary warfare program, the Marine Corps has had expeditionary warfare goals since the 1990s. The Marine Corps articulated these numerous goals within its Expeditionary Capability Lists. These documents served as a roadmap for prior acquisition decisions made by the Marine Corps. Because the various goals of the Expeditionary Capability Lists tie into the newly developed goals of Joint and Coalition Proficiency, Operational Reach, Force Projection, Sustainability, and Operational and Organizational Adaptability, it is apparent that the Marine Corps is making progress in achieving their long-term performance goals.

Evidence: The acquisition programs that are the key building blocks of the long-term expeditionary warfare program are generally on track. These programs include the MV-22 Osprey, amphibious ships LPD-17 and LHA(R), Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron, Joint Strike Fighter, Logistics Vehicle System Replacement, UH-1Y/AH-1Z helicopter, and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The Marine Corps and Navy regularly achieve their annual performance goals. The individual programs that support expeditionary warfare are tracked on schedule, cost, and performance, and the Marine Corps and Navy regularly achieve their goals for these measures.

Evidence: The Marine Corps has achieved its annual performance goals for the MV-22 Osprey, Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, and Lightweight 155mm Howitzer.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The Marine Corps has demonstrated improved efficiencies for schedule on some of its individual programs that support expeditionary warfare, but achieving improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness does not seem to be a key priority for the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare program. This assessment determined that the Marine Corps needs to focus on developing future targets and working to achieve those goals.

Evidence: The Marine Corps has achieved schedule improvement on the amphibious assault ship LPD-17, MV-22 Osprey, and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The Marine Corps has shown great success in its expeditionary warfare capabilities. Although both the Marine Corps and Army conduct land operations, the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare program is unique. Marines are very flexible, performing non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, etc., in addition to their expeditionary warfare mission. Typically projecting their forces from the sea, Marines possess the capability to operate at long distances and for extended periods of time as an integral combined arms element of a joint force. Their forward deployed posture throughout the world, both on land and at sea, supports sustained readiness in fighting the Global War on Terrorism.

Evidence: The flexibility and skill of Marine expeditionary forces has been demonstrated in numerous instances. Most recently, the Marine Corps has performed with great success in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The Marines are performing similarly to U.S. Army units, although they are not figured for long-term stability operations.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Although GAO, CBO, and CRS have not evaluated the Marine Corps expeditionary warfare program overall, they have raised concerns with some of the individual Marine Corps and Navy programs. GAO has criticized the technology and production maturity of some of the investment programs that contribute to expeditionary warfare capability, including the MV-22 Osprey, Joint Srike Fighter, Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. CBO and CRS have studied the cost of the new amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships to support joint seabasing and have developed a number of lower-cost alternatives.

Evidence: See GAO reports "DoD's Cancellation of the Joint Srike Fighter Alternative Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis", May 2006, "The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Encountered Difficulties in Design Demonstration and Faces Future Risks", May 2006, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges", April 2006, "Major Weapons Systems Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems Under DoD's Revised Policy", April 2006, and "Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs", March 2006. See the CBO report, "The Future of the Navy's Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces", November 2004. See the CRS reports, "V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft", January 2005, "Potential Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress", March 2005, and "Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress", November 2004.

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: The Marine Corps is in aggregate adequately executing their individual acquisition programs and meeting their annual goals. Given wartime pressures on many of their investment programs, the Marine Corps is demonstrating adequate budget and performance integration across the majority of their portfolio.

Evidence: Key expeditionary warfare programs, such as the MV-22 Osprey and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, are within budget and on schedule to deliver the required capabilities.