Detailed Information on the
Secret Service: Financial and Infrastructure Investigations Assessment

Provide program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Continue to ensure that effectiveness, efficiency and return on investment are emphasized as key components of program evaluations.

Continue to collect and analyze the quantitative data required to complete and test the Return on Investigations (ROI) model, and gather the qualitative information needed to put the ROI model in context.

Providing program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Revising how program evaluations are conducted to ensure that efficiency is incorporated as a key component of evaluations.

Developing additional performance measures that are closely tied to the program's mission; are measurable against an established, objective baseline; can be used to make resource allocation decisions; and include achievable targets that challenge the program to continue improving long-term performance.

Continue to provide program managers with program-level performance reports, including efficiency measures.

Measure: Counterfeit passed as a percentage of genuine currency in circulation. (New measure, added February 2008)

Explanation:This measure is an indicator of the proportion of counterfeit currency relative to the amount of genuine U.S. Currency in circulation. It reports the dollar value of counterfeit notes passed on the public per million dollars of genuine currency. The measure is calculated by dividing the dollar value of counterfeit notes passed by the dollar value of genuine currency in circulation, multiplied by $1 million. All Counterfeit program measures use data collected from the Counterfeit /Contraband System (CCS), which provides a means of record keeping for all case and subject information. CCS is comprised of global counterfeit activity on U.S. currency, which is entered by authorized Secret Service personnel. As with all Secret Service database applications, CCS has many features built into it in order to provide the most accurate and secure data possible. Along with the mainframe security features, there are many edit checks built into the application to ensure the accuracy and validity of the data. Secret Service personnel with access to the application are governed by specific procedures to input case and arrest data. Recurring verification reports are generated and reviewed to ensure data accuracy.

Measure: Financial Crimes Loss Prevented.

Explanation:This measure reports an estimate of the direct dollar loss prevented due to Secret Service intervention/interruption of a criminal venture (excluding Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTF) cases) through a criminal investigation. This is an estimate of the amount of financial crime that would have occurred had the offender not been identified nor the criminal enterprise disrupted. (At the individual case level, estimates of loss prevented are calculated using conservative, fixed amounts "per access device," "per check," etc. Estimates are not reported by the program until they receive scrutiny by INV field managers, Management and Organization Division statisticians, and INV headquarters managers). The measure uses data collected from the Master Central Index (MCI) system. This system is used by all Secret Service investigative field offices and provides a means of record keeping for all case and subject information. The MCI database is comprised of case and arrest information, which is entered by Secret Service personnel. As with all USSS database applications, MCI has many features built into it in order to provide the most accurate and secure data possible. See the above explanation of CCS for details regarding these features.

Measure: Financial Crimes Loss Prevented - ECTF.

Explanation:The USA PATRIOT Act mandated that the Secret Service develop a network of electronic crimes task forces throughout the United States. This measure reports an estimate of the direct dollar loss prevented due to ECTF investigations. This is an estimate of the amount of electronic financial crime that would have occurred had the offender not been identified nor the criminal enterprise disrupted. (At the individual case level, estimates of loss prevented are calculated using conservative, fixed amounts "per access device," "per check," etc. Estimates are not reported by the program until they receive scrutiny by field managers, Management and Organization Divison statisticians, and INV headquarters managers). The measure uses data collected from the MCI system. The system and its accuracy / security features and procedures are described above.

Measure: The Financial Investigations Program Efficiency Index.

Explanation:Efficiency indices show whether the Secret Service is using more or less resources in the current year versus a base period to accomplish a comparable outcome. An index of 1.00 indicates the same resources were used within the program during the current fiscal year versus the base period. An index of less than 1.00 indicates fewer resources were required within that program during the current fiscal year versus the base period. An index of greater than 1.00 indicates more resources were required within that program during the current fiscal year versus the base period. This measure is the sum of the proportioned indices for manhours per Financial Crime Loss Prevented, Counterfeit Passed on the Public, and Background Investigations Conducted versus a base period. The performance data are collected from MCI and CCS (described above). The resource data are collected from the Manhours Reporting System (MRS). MRS is comprised of employee hours expended on investigative and protective activities. The three systems used in calculating this measure, along with their accuracy / security features and procedures are described above.

Measure: The Infrastructure Investigations Program Efficiency Index.

Explanation:This measure is the sum of the proportioned indices for ECTF agent manhours per Financial Crime Loss Prevented and Computer Exams conducted compared to a base period. See above for a detailed explanation of indices' measurement on a 1.0 scale. As with the Financial Investigations Efficiency Index described above, performance data used to calculate this index come from CCS, MCI, and MRS. These systems, along with their accuracy / security features and procedures are described above.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose of the United States Secret Service's Investigations (INV) program is two-fold. (1) The program protects our Nation's financial infrastructure, to include currency and financial payment systems. To achieve this purpose, the program investigates associated criminal violations on a prioritized basis; detects, prevents, and investigates attacks on the U.S. financial industry; and forms and leverages partnerships (including but not limited to "Electronic Crimes Task Forces") to achieve program objectives. (2) By design, the INV program provides manpower on a temporary basis to fulfill the Secret Service's mission of protecting our Nation's leaders. This role is both purposeful and efficient; the INV program's field resources provide a "surge capacity" of protective manpower without which the Secret Service could not accomplish its protective mandate in a cost-effective manner.

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. Section 3056; U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Mission Statement; Office of Investigations (INV) Strategic Plan - Investigative Strategy for Today and the Future; INV Manual - INV Functional Responsibility Statement (INV-00); INV Organization Chart; List of USSS Core Criminal Violations

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Secret Service's statutory establishment in 1865 reflected a need to return integrity to the Nation's financial system; the problem was clear, as one-third of the currency in circulation at that time was counterfeit. The Secret Service addressed this need with distinction, and has since protected the Nation's currency for over 140 years. Due to the agency's ongoing investigative excellence, counterfeit notes passed today are a fraction of the genuine currency in circulation. Counterfeiting, however, is by no means a strictly historical problem; the need to protect the Nation's currency is ongoing: Despite the "cashless" society that some futurists projected for the 21st century, the amount of U.S. currency in circulation actually increased by over 25% between 2000 and 2005. Growing numbers of countries are also adopting the U.S. dollar as their official currency (termed "dollarization"); in fact, more U.S. currency circulates abroad than domestically. What's more, the growth in availability and decrease in cost of "inkjet" technology provides the capability to digitally produce high quality counterfeit notes in the home. With technology's impact on financial transactions, protecting the Nation's financial infrastructure has come to entail addressing fraudulent transactions perpetrated electronically with access devices, computers, and fraudulent identification. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 addressed this need; 18 U.S.C. 3056 was so amended to reflect the Secret Service's jurisdiction with respect to access device, computer, and identity fraud. Identity theft, access device fraud, and cyber crime -- due to their high impact on individual consumers and financial institutions -- are the focus of the INV program's efforts to protect the Nation's financial payment systems. As the use of on-line banking and electronic commerce increases, so does their use by the criminal element to commit financial crimes. Seeing the need to engage with public and private sector partners to prevent, detect, mitigate, and investigate attacks on the Nation's financial infrastructure, the Secret Service proactively formed the New York City Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF) in 1995. The USA PATRIOT Act (2001) recognized both the need for and the effectiveness of this task force; the Act mandated that the Secret Service establish a nationwide network of ECTFs based on the New York model. Economic security is a constituent interest of homeland security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reflects that interest in Objective 3.3 of its strategic plan, "Protect against financial and electronic crimes, counterfeit currency . . . and identity theft."

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. Sections 1028-30, 3056; Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between USSS and FBI on Crime Control Act; U.S. Currency and Coin Outstanding and in Circulation; Dollars and Cents - Circulation of Money: 1910 - 2000; Counterfeit Treasury Obligations Database Enhancement Proposal, pp.2-3; ECTF Mission Document; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) - Section 105; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Plan; List of Dollarized and Semi-official Dollarized Countries

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The Secret Service exercises sole investigative jurisdiction pertaining to the counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the U.S. Government, therefore there is no redundancy or duplication with other actors. Exclusive jurisdiction also applies to the Secret Service's protective responsibilities. In areas of concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (e.g., access device fraud, identity fraud, computer crime), the Secret Service and the FBI abide by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). As stated in the purpose section of the MOU, "The intention of this agreement is to promote efficiency of operation, prevent the overlapping and duplication of investigative responsibilities and to avoid confusion . . . concerning the appropriate agency to contact regarding possible violations of respective statutes." Secret Service investigators work in partnership with state and local law enforcement agencies. While a mutual interest and benefit exists for all agencies involved, the work is not duplicative because the Secret Service and state and local agencies consult with one another to investigate a case once, instead of multiple agencies investigating the same case(s) simultaneously. A separation of effort exists between the state and local law enforcement agencies. The U.S. Marshals Service deputizes the state and local law enforcement officials working on Secret Service task forces investigating the violation(s) of Federal crimes. Secret Service investigators work with state and local law enforcement partners and U.S. Attorney's Offices to determine whether a case is eligible for Federal prosecution. Local prosecutors may pursue (in state or local court) cases that do not meet the respective U.S. Attorney's Office's standards and/or threshold for Federal prosecution. The Secret Service encourages deconfliction. Field offices commonly have roundtable meetings with state, local, and Federal agencies to discuss ongoing cases. These meetings exist to eliminate redundancy or duplication and efficiently leverage resources. Private industry partners' role in combating financial and electronic crimes is confined to non-law enforcement areas (e.g., prevention, education, and cooperation in Federal investigations), whereas the actual execution of the associated investigations is the jurisdiction of the INV program. Efforts of the INV program and private sector partners are therefore symbiotic, not redundant.

Evidence: 18 U.S.C. Sections 1028-1030, 3056; INV Manual - INV Functional Responsibility Statement (INV-00); INV Organization Chart; INV Manual - Relationships with Other Agencies/MOUs (FCD-3) - pp. 1,2,10-18; MOU between USSS and FBI on Crime Control Act; Excerpts from Operation Direct Action (ODA) Briefing; INV Manual - Special Deputation Program (ISD-20); Agenda from Miami ECTF Meeting; Morris County Detectives Association (MCDA) Meeting Flyer; MCDA Roster

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The Secret Service's investigative responsibilities are statutory. Therefore, the INV program is "direct federal" and delegating associated responsibilities to state, local, or private entities through a "grant" or "regulatory" program design would be inconsistent with statute. Still, the INV program extends its impact by leveraging the contributions of partners to achieve its goal and objectives. For instance, criminals are increasingly employing electronic technologies to commit violations in the Secret Service's jurisdiction. Through ECTFs, the Secret Service leverages the resources (human, physical, and technological) of public and private sector partners to prevent, detect, and mitigate electronic commissions of the Secret Service's core violations. The INV program serves the Secret Service's dual mission of protecting the Nation's financial infrastructure and the Nation's leaders. Field resources ordinarily focus on the agency's investigative mission; however, headquarters re-directs field agent manpower to secure the physical safety of protected persons on an as-needed basis. This re-direction of resources occurs in two primary ways: (1) Special agents assigned to Secret Service field offices provide critical manpower for protective assignments when protectees travel through their districts. (2) During four-week long temporary assignments to the investigative rotation (ROTA), field agents will travel out of district as needed to perform protective functions as changing field conditions (i.e., protectee travel destinations and threat levels) dictate. While at the surface this may appear to represent an undesirable interruption to investigative case work, the business case for this program design is compelling. The requirement that they perform protection assignments drives the development of exceptional time management skills on the part of criminal investigators, and the "street" experience that they gain in working criminal cases develops their skill set for future, full-time protection assignments. Most critical is that the absence of the INV program's contributions to the agency's protective mission would force the Secret Service to adopt one of two highly inefficient alternative program designs: (1) locating large numbers of protection-dedicated personnel in field offices throughout the Nation (cost prohibitive in terms of idle manhours between protectee visits) or (2) making each protective detail self-sufficient in terms of post-standers (cost prohibitive in terms of staffing and travel costs). Employing either of these alternative protective program designs would require the Secret Service to expend a far greater level of total resources to accomplish its dual mission of protection and investigations.

Evidence: USSS Organization Chart; INV Organization Chart; INV Regions Map; ECTF Mission Document; "Manpower Requirement - Rotation #06-04" (most recent monthly e-mail about ROTA requirements)

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Identity theft, access device fraud, and cyber crime -- due to their high impact on individual consumers and financial institutions -- are the focus of the INV program's efforts to protect the Nation's financial payment systems. To meet INV program purposes, the Office of Investigations prioritizes investigative cases (and thus program resources) as follows: cases that have a significant impact on the general public or the community; cases that pose a threat to critical infrastructure sectors; cases that are transnational in nature; cases that have clear national or economic security implications; and major interstate cases. To determine the optimal location and staffing of field offices (i.e., the program's physical and human resources), the Office of Investigations annually uses statistical workload data reflecting 33 categories of activity. The Office of Investigations opens and closes offices, and increases or decreases their staffing, as needed to meet program goals. By the nature of the Secret Service's investigative authorities, the beneficiaries of the INV program are the American public, the Federal Reserve System, and private financial institutions. The program determines and communicates the extent of benefit through its collection of performance measures (see Section 2). While other beneficiaries may indirectly benefit from some program activities, that benefit is incidentally accrued in the program's targeting of its intended beneficiaries. For example, the Secret Service's anti-counterfeiting efforts in "dollarized" economies may benefit foreign countries (their publics and/or central banks), however the ultimate benefit of the stability of the dollar overseas accrues to the U.S. Federal Reserve (which gains interest ["seigniorage"] proportional to the amount of U.S. currency that foreign countries purchase) and to the American public (when that seigniorage funds government programs that would otherwise require funding by income taxes). INV supports the protective mission of the Secret Service through use of the ROTA. Each field office (in accordance with established guidelines) submits the names of the 35% of agent personnel who are, in effect, "on-call" for a four-week cycle. The Office of Investigations' Manpower Section targets the temporary allocation of INV personnel based on the agency's protective needs.

Evidence: USSS Interim Strategic Plan FY 2003- FY 2008; INV Staffing Model Criteria; USSS Roster - list of all offices; USSS Organization Chart; INV Organization Chart

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The INV program has three long-term performance measures: Counterfeit Passed per Million Dollars of Genuine U.S. Currency; Financial Crimes Loss Prevented; and Financial Crimes Loss Prevented - ECTF. (See Measures Tab for a definition and description of all three measures). Each of these measures explicitly supports the program's purpose (articulated in Response #1.1); each of these measures is an outcome measure. In providing an essential surge capacity for protective operations, the INV program contributes to the Secret Service's over-arching long-term protective measure, the Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely. The INV program works together in a symbiotic fashion with the Secret Service's protection programs (already PART'ed) to achieve this measure in an efficient and cost effective manner.

Evidence: Future Year Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) System User Guide, Vol. 1, pp. 2 - 4; Performance Measures Summary Report; Case Types Classification guidelines; INV Manual - Calculation of Potential Loss Figures Relating to Access Device Investigations (FCD-09), introduction page; Verification of Potential Loss Figures

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The targets and timeframes for the INV program's long-term performance measures focus on continual progress in mitigating the effects that financial and electronic crimes wreak on our Nation's financial infrastructure. The program has ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures as follows: the target for Counterfeit Passed per Million Dollars of Genuine U.S. Currency is $71 by the year 2011; the target for Financial Crimes Loss Prevented is $2 billion by 2011; and the target for Financial Crimes Loss Prevented - ECTF is $180 million by 2011. These targets are challenging but realistic given the projected level of program resources and achievable efficiencies; they represent a substantial and quantifiable contribution to the Nation's economy, public, and financial industry. Baseline data (see Measures Tab) from which to measure targets exist for all three of the INV program's long-term measures. The number of years of baseline data is proportional to the number of years that the program has conducted the measured activity. For example, baseline data go back farther for Financial Crimes Loss Prevented than for Financial Crimes Loss Prevented - ECTF, since ECTF activity began relatively recently in the program's history. The ambitious target for the long-term outcome measure "Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely" is 100%.

Evidence: Performance Measures Summary Report; INV Strategic Plan - Investigative Strategy for Today and the Future

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The INV program's long-term goal is to reduce crimes against our Nation's financial infrastructure. The program has three annual outcome measures that demonstrate progress toward achieving this goal: Counterfeit Passed per Million Dollars of Genuine U.S. Currency, Financial Crimes Loss Prevented, and Financial Crimes Loss Prevented - ECTF. These annual outcome measures mirror the program's long-term outcome measures, but have different [incremental] targets that measure the program's progress toward achieving the long-term goals discussed in Response #s 2.1 and 2.2. The INV program also has two efficiency measures (Financial Investigations and Infrastructure Investigations indices), described in Response # 3.4. The Secret Service's over-arching annual performance measure for protection is Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely. This is both an annual and long-term measure (with targets of 100% for and across all timeframes) because the ongoing, complete safety of protectees is essential; interim targets below 100% that would build incrementally toward 100% would be unacceptable to the Secret Service, the Federal Government, and the taxpayer. Given the agency's existing FTE and funding levels, the Secret Service could not meet this target without the surge capacity of manpower that the INV program provides.

Evidence: Description of Efficiency Measures; Performance Measures Summary Report; Case Types Classification guidelines; INV Manual - Calculation of Potential Loss Figures Relating to Access Device Investigations (FCD-09), introduction page; Verification of Potential Loss Figures

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The Secret Service collects and maintains historical investigative data (baselines) for all of the INV program's annual measures. The program has ambitious targets for all of the annual measures addressed in Response # 2.3. Annual outcome measures have targets that demonstrate performance toward the outyear targets of the program's long-term outcome measures. The Secret Service determines these targets based on consideration of numerous factors, including baseline performance, projected resource levels, achievable efficiencies, trends in financial crimes, and projected protective resource needs. The latter factor (projected protective resource needs) reflects the "surge capacity" that the INV program provides in the advancement of the Secret Service's overall mission efficiency (see Response # 1.4). That is, the INV program lowers the targets for investigative outcomes during election years, because in these years the INV program will be called upon to provide substantial resources (manpower, technology, capital assets) for the protection of candidates and nominees. The target for the Financial Investigations and Infrastructure Investigations efficiency indices is always ambitious (1.00). (See Response # 3.4 for further discussion of program efficiency measures.) The Measures Tab includes baseline and target data for each of the program's annual measures. The ambitious annual target for the Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely (see Response # 2.3) is 100%, with the baseline reflected in the Measures Tab.

Evidence: Performance Measures Summary Report; INV Strategic Plan - Investigative Strategy for Today and the Future

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Enhancing partnerships in the pursuit of the agency's investigative goal is an explicit objective of the Secret Service's Strategic Plan. The INV program routinely works in collaboration with an array of partners who commit to and work toward the Secret Service goal of reducing crimes against our Nation's financial infrastructure. The INV program's premier partnership vehicle is the ECTF. Like all "task forces," ECTFs are conceived to address large and multi-jurisdictional problems. What distinguishes ECTFs from traditional law enforcement task forces is their scope of membership. ECTF membership does not stop at Federal, state, and local law enforcement; uniquely, ECTFs also feature active membership of prosecuting attorneys, private industry, and academia. All ECTF partners work toward a common purpose to prevent and combat electronic threats to the Nation's financial infrastructure. Partners adhere to specific guidelines and parameters, and have documentation and reporting requirements that ensure consistency. The Secret Service measures the performance of ECTF partnerships by measuring and tracking the outcome (financial crime loss prevented) of ECTF activity (measured separately of loss prevented by other investigative activities of the INV program). Given the level of state and local law enforcement resources needed to secure a protectee who is in travel status, the outcome of consistently safe protectee arrivals and departures evidences our partners' ongoing contributions to program goals. Working relationships that INV field personnel establish and foster with state and local law enforcement in the course of executing the investigative mission prove invaluable when those same INV personnel need to arrange critical state and local police support for protectee visits. The program communicates schedule and performance expectations to partners in "Police Meetings" that precede a protectee's arrival in any jurisdiction.

Evidence: List of MOUs Currently in Place for Investigations Program; Memorandum of Agreement template; ECTF Mission Document; Electronic Crimes Task Force / Working Group Principles document; ECTF/ECWG 3rd Quarter 2005 Report, pp. 2-23; Welcome screen for CFT / FCD Public Education Seminars database; Welcome screen for USSS Extranet https://www1.einformation.usss.gov/elib/welcome.nsf/AbouteInfo; Performance Measures Summary Report; Office of Protective Operations (OPO) Manual - Advance Team Procedures (OPO-06) pp. 3, 6-7; Police Meeting briefing document; 2005 Presidential Inauguration Tabletop Exercise, pp. 1-5; 2005 Presidential Inauguration Operational Security After Action Report, pp. 1-7, 13-15

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Secret Service has well-established statistical systems in place for gathering data that measure investigative inputs, outputs, and impact (outcomes) on a recurring basis. An independent staff of analysts and statisticians in the Secret Service's Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems (QSSS) Branch operates the Workload Statistical and Reporting System, consisting of data contained in the Master Central Index (MCI), Agent Manhour and Protection Support (AMPS) System, Master Personnel System (MPS), and Manhours Reporting System (MRS). Data collection is transparent to users, systematic (to provide consistency), and (in the case of the INV program) exhaustive in scope. Using these data, QSSS issues reports to program managers for use in decision-making. The Workload Statistical Reporting System facilitates functional (monthly, yearly) and strategic (outyear) reporting and analyses of operational data that MCI, AMPS, MPS, and MRS gather from day-to-day. This "system of systems" constitutes independent evaluation because it is high in quality, exhaustive in scope, non-biased in nature, and continual in frequency; it precludes gaps in program performance information and, by extension, obviates that which the PART guidance describes as evaluations needed "to fill gaps in performance information." The quality of the aforementioned "system-of-systems" is such that the Secret Service measures the INV program's impact as a matter of routine business practice, obviating the intermittently-staggered, traditionally-defined program evaluations that gauge the same outcomes. The Secret Service emphasizes - as a matter of routine business practice - recurring performance measurement, de-emphasizing for INV the ad hoc evaluations that less frequently or less comprehensively measured programs must undergo in order to demonstrate effectiveness. INV program managers are heavy users of performance information. In addition to the performance data/reports (see Evidence section for descriptions) that QSSS routinely disseminates to INV program managers, these individuals routinely initiate contact with QSSS and request interim and/or specialized performance reports for their use in program management.

Evidence: USSS Organization Chart; INV Organization Chart; Office of Administration (ADM) Organization Chart; Management and Organization Division (MNO) Organization Chart; Quantitative Studies and Statistical Systems (QSSS) Branch Intranet Home Page; MNO/QSSS Intranet Home Page; ADM Manual - Management and Organization Division Functions (MNO-01) pp. 3; Sample Monthly Reports from WSRS; Annual Statistical Summary FY 2005; Sample memos from INV program managers requesting specialized performance reports; USSS Program Performance Report FY 2006 (President's Management Agenda - Budget and Performance Integration)

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The Secret Service organizes its budget into six program areas, including Financial Investigations and Infrastructure Investigations. Financial and Infrastructure Investigations each represent a specific amount (line item) within the agency's base budget, transparently linked to the performance measures present in each area. The Secret Service aligns each program budget request with the appropriate DHS strategic goal, DHS strategic objective, Secret Service strategic goal, program performance goal, and program performance measure. The FY 2007 Budget request for INV reflects the agency's estimate - given President's Budget assumptions - of what the program needs in the budget year to accomplish its targeted level of program performance. The FY 2007 President's Budget level for the INV program includes no initiatives over and above the prior year funding level; therefore INV's FY 2007 budget narrative addresses no funding, policy, or legislative changes. Per Office of Management and Budget guidance, the Secret Service budget request reflects the full cost of INV, inclusive of indirect or "overhead" costs (e.g., retirement, training, technical security support, human resources, procurement support, finance and accounting) needed to attain program results.

Evidence: Description of USSS Budget Activities and Programs; Allocations and Obligations FY 2003 - FY 2005; Strategic Context for the FY 2007 - FY 2011 Budget; FY 2007 President's Budget, pp. 131, 139, 144 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/budget.html; DHS's Planning, Programming, Performance Budgeting System (PPBS) and Accountability document; FYHSP report: Performance Based Budget Highlights by Program; Performance Measures Summary Report

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The INV program has specific, ambitious long-term performance goals, and annual performance goals that demonstrate progress toward achieving them (see Response #s 2.1 through 2.4). In the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), the Secret Service plans strategically for outyear issues such as Presidential campaign cycles and the correlative need to "surge" INV resources in support of the agency's protective mission. INV has a strategic plan ("Investigative Strategy for Today and the Future") consistent with those of the Secret Service and DHS. This document includes the Annual Investigative Work Plan that provides the program manager's (Assistant Director for Investigations') framework for allocating resources and communicating specific program goals and objectives to INV offices. At the end of the calendar year, each field entity prepares a response explaining its performance and accomplishments relative to the program manager's Annual Investigative Work Plan. This system incorporates accountability procedures facilitating field entities' movement forward in support of INV's overarching goal - to protect our Nation's financial infrastructure.

Evidence: Performance Measures Summary Report; FYHSP RAP Milestones Guidance; FYHSP reports: Five Year Summary for Financial Investigations and Infrastructure Investigations; Securing our Homeland - U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan pp. 22-23, 51 http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0413.xml; USSS Interim Strategic Plan FY 2003 - FY 2008; INV Strategic Plan - Investigative Strategy for Today and the Future; Sample Work Plan Response from Miami Field Office

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The Secret Service systematically collects a wide range of performance information for all of its core programs, including INV, and INV's task forces with partners. Automated systems that are integrated into normal business processes collect information that includes the inputs (e.g. manhours) and outputs (e.g. cases closed) that support outcomes (e.g. financial crime loss prevented). Baseline data exist for all measures. Independent statisticians and analysts in the Secret Service's QSSS Branch apply quality control techniques to confirm data validity and compile for program managers statistical reports that assist them in managing the performance of investigative operations. Two examples of the use of performance information in INV management actions and resource allocation are as follows: (1) Detailed input (manhours) data inform human resource decisions (both for distributing the current workforce and projecting future staffing requirements). (2) QSSS prepares for the Assistant Director of Investigations mid-year and end-of-year statistical packages containing output and outcome data that he uses in preparing field managers' performance appraisals.

Evidence: INV Staffing Model Criteria; INV Work Plan Data; INV Workload Model; Annual Statistical Summary FY 2005; Annual Investigative Work Plan for 2005 (called "Office of Investigations Investigative Priorities")

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: In October 2004, the Secret Service replaced its Senior Executive Service (SES) Performance Management System with the Departmentally-standardized DHS SES Performance Management System. This system supports the DHS-wide SES pay-for-performance system, now in effect. The Secret Service uses this system to rate the performance of the Assistant Director of Investigations (the program manager) and his deputies (the Deputy Assistant Directors of Investigations). The corresponding DHS appraisal form requires the rating official to document the extent to which each of these SES personnel "Achieves results by setting long-term and short-term objectives that are realistic and measurable, and contribute to the success of the Department's strategic plan, annual work plans, and/or key government-wide objectives. Work plans must include measures that balance the achievement of organizational objectives with customer satisfaction, and other stakeholder/employee perspectives." Performance standards in this section are tailored directly to the program that the individual SES manages; for INV program managers, such elements and measures focus on DHS' goal of "Protection" and DHS' objective to "Protect against financial and electronic crimes, counterfeit currency . . . and identity theft." The program manager's Annual Investigative Work Plan specifies his aggressive goal, objectives, strategies, and measurements for managing INV programs, financial and human resources, and partnerships. At the end of each calendar year, agents in charge of all the field entities submit a written response to the program manager's Annual Investigative Work Plan, detailing how their office achieved its objectives. In this manner, the program manager (Assistant Director for Investigations) holds the managers of field entities responsible for program results. As the Secret Service leads the way in developing partnerships to combat financial and electronic crimes, the INV program communicates goals, schedules, and other performance expectations and standards to partners through MOUs, task force meetings, and working group sessions.

Evidence: DHS Senior Executive Service Performance Appraisal; Position Description for Assistant Director of Investigations; INV Manual - INV Functional Responsibility Statement (INV-00); Annual Investigative Work Plan for 2005 (called "Office of Investigations Investigative Priorities") pp.6-7; Sample Work Plan Response from Miami Field Office; ECTF Mission Document; Excerpts from ECTF/ECWG 3rd Quarter 2005 Report

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: A portion of the INV program's budget falls into those categories that the Secret Service's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and his Budget Staff centrally manage (this primarily includes personnel compensation, travel, and rent). The CFO also allocates a portion of the program's funding to the Office of Investigations. The CFO's office ensures that all centrally-managed funds are obligated and outlayed in a timely manner (using the Department of Agriculture's National Finance Center as the Secret Service's pay agent, executing rental obligations in accordance with the General Services Administration Schedule, etc.). Each year the Assistant Director of Investigations prepares a prioritized spending plan based on his constituent divisions' and field offices' competing requirements for funds. The Secret Service's CFO reviews the spending plan and provides INV with annual funding to cover expense areas for which the office is responsible. The CFO's Budget Staff uses "status of funds" reports to ensure that INV divisions' actual expenditures are timely obligations for purposes consistent with the approved spending plan and that very limited unobligated funds remain at the end of the year. INV budget and finance specialists, in turn, monitor sub-allocations to the headquarters divisions and field offices for which INV is operationally and financially responsible. At the operational level, field managers review throughout the year the expenditures of their respective entities. INV SAICs at headquarters review and approve/disapprove all requests for funding received from the field entities that they oversee. Secret Service proceeds from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) are not part of the agency's annual budget request. The Secret Service uses a separate spend plan to track and monitor TFF funds. INV maintains thorough and extensive records for all asset forfeiture funds received and deposited. The INV budget funds compensation for all personnel in (a) field entities and (b) INV headquarters divisions; however, when any of these personnel dedicate a portion of their work-year to protective operations (e.g., post-standing, ROTA), the respective protective program's budget funds the corresponding portion of their compensation. This is accomplished using a "manhours" system that captures by activity the hours worked by special agents; the manhours systems results in greater accuracy as to both investigative and protective programs' full-cost to the Secret Service and the taxpayer.

Evidence: Allocations-Obligations FY 2003 - FY 2005; Budget Breakout - FY 2003 and FY 2004; Sample Memorandum from INV to Field Offices re: FY 2006 Allocations and Allocation Spreadsheets; Asset Forfeiture Manual - Forfeiture (AFB-03); Summary of Asset Forfeiture for FY 2005; FY 2005 Seized Property Cover Sheet; FY 2005 Forfeited Property Cover Sheet; Sample Manhours Report

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The INV program has two efficiency measures: the Infrastructure Investigations Efficiency Index and the Financial Investigations Efficiency Index. The former index measures the program's efficiency in investigating electronic financial crimes, and the latter index measures the program's efficiency in investigating all other types of financial crimes. Each index measures efficiency by comparing the measured fiscal year to that of a base period in terms of time (manhours) applied to accomplish program objectives. (The efficiency measures and their baselines and targets appear in the Measures Tab). The INV program continually strives to achieve efficiency and cost effectiveness in program execution. For example: (1) Whenever possible, the program automates processes associated with researching, storing, cataloging, and investigating evidence. The Genuine Currency Database has substantially reduced the number of hours required to process evidence in counterfeit cases, and the Secure Digital Evidence Storage System provides each field office with multiple terabytes of storage (leasing physical space to store this amount of "hard copy" evidence would be comparatively cost-prohibitive). (2) Rather than developing new technologies and capabilities, the program leverages or shares - when available - those already in place at other Federal, state, local or private agencies. Where a needed capability does not pre-exist, the INV program pursues cost-sharing and/or cost-sponsorship arrangements to reduce costs to the Secret Service. (See Evidence section for a list of examples.) (3) Rather than permanently assigning a Criminal Research Specialist (CRS) to each field office, the INV program addresses temporary increases in investigative activity by rotating CRSs throughout the country on a prioritized basis. (4) The INV program utilizes twelve law enforcement and commercial databases to develop leads in support of the execution of the Secret Service's investigative mission. The INV program has centralized the access and manipulation of these databases at the Office of Investigations' "24-hour Duty Desk," which is available to all Secret Service offices. Centralizing this service represents a substantial "cost avoidance" to the INV program relative to the alternative of licensing and training personnel in every field office to perform database searches. (5) With the "Distributed Network Attack" project, the INV program - in lieu of multimillion dollar supercomputer purchases - harnesses the processing power of idle personal computers in Secret Service facilities to break passwords needed to prosecute cases. As currently configured, this cost-effective project is capable of cracking up to 45 million passwords per second. (6) Through the Secret Service's Logistics Resource Center, the INV program achieves systematic and significant cost avoidance when field agents are called upon to travel for protective assignments.

Evidence: Description of Efficiency Measures; Performance Measure Summary Report; USSS INV Profile Enterprise Architecture; Description of Criminal Research Specialist; List and Descriptions of Law Enforcement and Commercial Databases; ISD Operations Center / 24-Hour Duty Desk Description and Statistics; Logistics Resource Center Description; Discussion on leveraging existing technologies, cost-sharing initiatives, and Federal information-sharing (regarding Response bullet/item #2): (a) Secure Digital Evidence Storage (SDES) System - Description of Storage Capacity (b) FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) (c) MOU with Carnegie Mellon University for the Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) program (d) Distributed Network Attack (DNA) (partnership with CIA) (e) Field Investigative Reporting System (FIRS) (relationship with NSA) (f) Wireless Tracking Capability (federal, state, and local partnership) (g) Forensic Information System for Handwriting (FISH 2000) (h) Questioned Identity Documents (QID) database (i) Handwriting recognition technology - Hammer Award 1996/1997

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The INV program can point to numerous examples of collaboration and coordination with partners -- collaboration that not only affected program management actions, but also contributed to meeting or even exceeding the outcomes to which the INV program aspires. (1) In FY 2005, ECTFs (consisting of Secret Service investigators, Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, as well as representation from the private sector and academia) prevented over half a billion dollars in financial crimes loss to the public. (2) Since 2001, the Secret Service has assisted Colombia in establishing Vetted Anti-Counterfeiting Forces that have seized approximately $150 million in counterfeit U.S. currency. (3) The INV program partnered with law enforcement in Russia, Israel, and the Republic of Georgia to target the most actively-passed offset note in the U.S. from 2003-05; the coalition reduced the amount of that note passed in the U.S. from $100,000 per week to under $1,000 per week in less than a year's time. (4) During Operation Firewall, the INV program partnered with nine foreign countries to detect and arrest electronic criminals. This operation resulted in 37 arrests and what the credit card industry estimated as between $1 and $2 billion in prevented loss. (5) Operation Direct Action (ODA) is a Secret Service-private industry task force designed to detect and prevent financial crimes. Through ODA partnerships, the Secret Service maintains access to the vast majority of the data maintained by the domestic credit card industry. INV works side-by-side with bank investigators and industry analysts developing trend analyses and models that are capable of tracing one fraudulent credit card to a network of financial crimes. This facilitates targeting of the INV program's investigative resources to disrupt and shut down financial crime networks, and benefits the financial industry (and its consumers) in terms of both decreasing actual losses and preventing future losses. ODA has also established working relationships with two Federal Judicial Districts to streamline the judicial process as it pertains to financial crimes.

Evidence: Performance Measure Summary Report; ECTF Mission Document; MCDA Meeting Flyer; MCDA Roster; Excerpts from ECTF/ECWG 3rd Quarter 2005 Report; "Statistics and Investigative Background on Counterfeit Activity of Concern"; Excerpts from Operation Firewall Briefing; Excerpts from ODA Briefing; INV Manual- INV Functional Responsibility Statement (INV-00)

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The Secret Service issues an annual statement to DHS that "certifies" - through internally-conducted independent and alternative control reviews - that its financial systems and procedures are in compliance with the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) and the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA). These actions review management controls to ensure, among other things, that Secret Service program managers allocate resources effectively, avoid fraud and mismanagement, and prevent improper payments. Also, the annual DHS financial statement audit (for which DHS has contracted with KPMG) verifies that payments are properly made, financial information is accurate and timely, and financial statements are clean and without material weaknesses. In the Independent Auditor's Report on DHS's FY 2004 Financial Statements, KPMG issued a "Notice of Finding and Recommendation" regarding the accuracy of INV counterfeit currency records; INV is piloting a corrective action plan during the 2nd and 3rd quarters of FY 2006. In the area of centrally-managed funds associated with the INV program, the Secret Service has strong financial controls for recording, processing, and /or reporting. For example, the Secret Service (1) manages personnel compensation within its Full Time Equivalent ceiling through the use of its Position Identification Number System and (2) audits employees' usage of government-owned vehicles and gasoline cards through monthly Gasoline Reports. In the area of funds allocated to the INV program, program managers exercise additional financial management controls, for example, (1) formal systems of training and procurement requests (which ensure that expenditures support the program's goals and approved spending plan); (2) monthly certification of the Confidential Fund; and (3) participation in DHS purchase card audits. In compliance with laws and regulations governing asset seizure and forfeiture, INV maintains thorough records of all seized and forfeited assets, including expenses incurred during the forfeiture process and funds deposited into the TFF. INV prepares annual Seized Currency Reconciliations and Forfeited Currency Reconciliations that include and identify asset seizure and forfeiture dates, seizure numbers, receipt numbers, dollar amounts, and current location (i.e., Customs Suspense Account, evidence, TFF).

Evidence: FY 2005 Statement of Reasonable Assurance of Achievement of Management Control Objectives; Management Representations for the FY 2005 Consolidated Financial Statements; Excerpt from DHS Performance and Accountability Report FY 2004 (regarding counterfeit currency records); Draft Proposed INV Counterfeit Currency Corrective Action Instrument; Sample Gasoline Reports; Sample Training Requests; Sample Confidential Fund Certifications (Subvouchers for Confidential Expenditure SSF-3049); Sample DHS Purchase Card Audits; FY 2005 Summary of Asset Forfeiture; FY 2005 Seized Property Cover Sheet; FY 2005 Forfeited Property Cover Sheet; INV Manual - Weekly Report (CFT-22(14)) and Monthly Report (CFT-22(15))

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: INV elements undergo a thorough "inspection" every three years to assess management performance and to recommend courses of action to address any deficiencies identified. (Secret Service inspectors are senior ranking criminal investigators who are independent of program offices' chain of command.) Each headquarters division is inspected on 41 items and each field office is inspected on 64 items. The last (three-year) inspection cycle included 133 INV entities (headquarters and field), which were inspected on a total of 8,251 items. Among the 8,251 inspected items, inspectors identified only 32 management deficiencies ("recommendations") - a diminutive recommendation rate of only two-fifths of 1%. The Secret Service's policy is that offices correct all deficiencies (or at a minimum have a corrective action plan in place) before the inspection team conducts the post-inspection follow-up six months after the recommendation's issuance. Through the Office of Inspection and the Management and Organization Division (both which are independent of program offices), a structured process exists to monitor and respond to open DHS Inspector General's audits and Government Accountability Office audit findings.

Evidence: Summary of INV Inspections from FY 2000 - FY 2005; List of INV Divisions & Field Offices Inspected from FY 2000 - FY 2005 (including inspection items and recommendations); USSS Organization Chart; MNO Organization Chart; INV Organization Chart; ADM Manual - MNO Functional Responsibility Statement (MNO-01) (Analytical Support Branch); Office of Inspection Mission and Goals

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The INV program is on track to meet all of its long-term performance goals, as gauged through the extent to which the program has met annual targets of progress, not just in the Prior Year but on a sustained basis. The program met its annual targets of progress for Financial Crimes Loss Prevented on a sustained basis, specifically, in all but one year since the measure's inception. With respect to Counterfeit Passed per Million Dollars of Genuine U.S. Currency, the program met its annual target of progress on a sustained basis, specifically, in nine of the past ten years. (The measure Financial Crime Loss Prevented - ECTF is too new for the program to judge sustained progress; this measure's first target was for FY 2005.) The Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely has been 100% on a sustained basis. Given the agency's historical FTE and funding levels, the Secret Service could not have continually met its 100% arrive/depart safely target without the surge capacity of manpower that the INV program provides by design.

Evidence: Performance Measures Summary Report; Historical Data - Counterfeit Performance Measures: 1996-2005; Historical Data - Financial Crimes Loss Prevented: 1999-2005

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: In 2005, the INV program not only achieved, but surpassed, the annual performance targets for two of its three annual outcome measures: (1) Financial Crimes Loss Prevented and (2) Financial Crimes Loss Prevented - ECTF. (Note that the ECTF measure, by definition, includes partner performance). The program also contributed to the Secret Service's achievement of its over-arching annual protective outcome measure. In FY 2005, the Counterfeit Passed per Million Dollars of Genuine U.S. Currency was $80, higher than the annual performance target of $74. The missed target is explicable in that new currency (twenties) replicable by commercially-available off-the-shelf technology (ink jet printers) entered circulation in FY 2005, and Secret Service-advocated detection countermeasures will not achieve market saturation until FY 2007. This is an extenuating and mitigating circumstance with direct bearing on the INV program's ability to combat counterfeiting. Also note that (a) the INV program is not a passive observer of these countermeasures, rather, it is an active participant in their development and proliferation; (b) in FY 2005, counterfeit passed was only .00000001% of circulating genuine U.S. currency; and (c) in FY 2005 the INV program suppressed 616 counterfeit plants (relative to 499 in FY 2004). Extenuating and mitigating circumstances (see Response # 4.3) explain the INV program's slight missing of its efficiency measures' annual targets for FY 2005. The Percentage of Instances Protectees Arrive and Depart Safely has been 100% on a sustained basis. In summary, the INV program is achieving its annual performance goals to a large extent, because: (1) For two of its three annual outcome measures, the program not only met but surpassed its FY 2005 performance targets. (2) Extenuating circumstances prevented the INV program's meeting of the FY 2005 target for its anti-counterfeiting outcome measure; however, the INV program has a long track record of successful performance, having met the annual target for that measure in each of the preceding nine years. (3) Given the agency's FY 2005 FTE and funding levels, the Secret Service could not have met its annul 100% arrive/depart safely target without the surge capacity of manpower that the INV program provides by design.

Evidence: Bureau of Engraving and Printing: New Money - The New Currency, release announcement for the Series2004 $20 bill; Bureau of Engraving and Printing: New Money - The New Currency, release announcement for the Series2004 $50 bill; Performance Measures Summary Report; Historical Data - Counterfeit Performance Measures: 1996-2005; U.S. Currency and Coin Outstanding and in Circulation; Annual Statistical Summary FY 2005 - Counterfeit Trends, Counterfeit Plant Operations Suppressed

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: In FY 2005, the Infrastructure Investigations Efficiency Index was 1.07 in comparison to the prior fiscal year. The 1.07 index, where 1.0 represents the same allotment of resources as in the base period, indicates a .07 increase in the use of resources. In FY 2005, the Financial Investigations Efficiency Index was 1.11 in comparison to an average of the previous four fiscal years. The 1.11 index, where 1.0 represents the same allotment of resources as in the base period, indicates a .11 increase in the use of resources. At first glance, these small increases might indicate that the INV program is operating less efficiently or with diminished cost effectiveness relative to the base period; however, that would be an oversimplified conclusion; rather, the increase in resources (manhours) applied falls within an acceptable range due to the ever-increasing complexity of contemporary financial and electronic crimes. Some of these crimes are requiring more manhours than have traditional investigations historically. The INV program is strategically targeting its resources and manpower towards higher-impact cases (see Response #1.5), which are more manpower intensive by their very nature -- being often global in scope and requiring more coordination between multiple field offices, jurisdictions, and nations. Case complexity is necessitating the application of more program resources; this is an extenuating and mitigating circumstance with respect to results of over 1.0 on the INV program's efficiency indexes. In FY 2005, the Secret Service's protective efficiency indices were all below 1.0, reflecting a state of efficiency that would have been unachievable absent the protective surge capacity that the INV program provides by design.

Evidence: Description of Efficiency Measures; Performance Measures Summary Report

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: That other agencies throughout the Nation and the world look to the Secret Service (not vice-versa) for training, education, and best practices in the area of financial and electronic investigations evidences the INV program's leadership and standard-setting among (and thus favorable comparison to) other programs with similar purposes and goals. Following are several examples: (1) Since 1995, the Department of State has provided funding to the Secret Service to train foreign law enforcement agencies on counterfeit currency and electronic crimes. The INV program provides instructors at four International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) located in El Salvador, Hungary, Thailand, and Botswana, which each hold four to five classes per year to train mid-level law enforcement officials representing agencies from around the world. (2) In addition, the INV program has provided bilateral training to law enforcement officials from over 60 countries. Since these programs began, the Secret Service has provided "Combating Economic Fraud and Counterfeiting" and "Basic Computer Forensics" training courses to over 100,000 foreign law enforcement officers and prosecutors. (3) To educate other law enforcement entities on the subject of cyber crime evidence handling and investigation, INV program staff created the publications "Forward Edge" and "Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence." To date, the INV program has distributed 60,000 copies of "Forward Edge" and 200,000 copies of "Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence" to Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In 2006, the INV program plans to provide law enforcement partners with 43,000 copies of "Forward Edge-Version 2," and 90,000 copies of "Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence-Version 3." (5) Numerous agencies seeking laboratory accreditation from the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors have requested (as models for practice, policy, and procedure) copies of the documents with which the INV program earned accreditation for its forensics lab. Also evidence of the INV program's favorable comparison to like programs is the fact that when the Congress sought to expand financial infrastructure protection efforts nationwide, it was the Secret Service's task force model (ECTF) that Congress elected to codify into law (USA PATRIOT Act of 2001). According to a 1995 independent evaluation by the Department of the Treasury, "The United States Secret Service is recognized as, and is, the most effective protective security organization in the world. Many of its protective methods are viewed as innovative, and through its high level of professionalism, the Secret Service has established the standard against which all other protective organizations measure themselves." That other agencies look to the Secret Service (not vice-versa) for expertise in the area of physical protection evidences that the Treasury Department's 1995 finding remains factual. In 2005, the Secret Service provided protective training to a diversity of Federal agencies, military organizations, and local police departments.

Evidence: Memo from USSS to U.S. Department of State re: USSS Participation in training of international law enforcement officials; Training Manual (1996) - International Training Courses (TNG-11); Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Obligations for USSS-Provided Training: Tracking of Funding, Obligation Numbers, and Un-liquidated balances from FY 1995 - FY 2006 (as of 11/4/05); "Basic Computer Forensics" Training Overview; Sample material from "Combating Economic Fraud and Counterfeiting" training; Copy of "Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence"; Brochure description of "Forward Edge"; USA PATRIOT Act - Section 105; USSS Forensic Services Division's ASLCD Certificate of Accreditation; Dept. of the Treasury: Public Report of the White House Security Review, May 1995, p.39; List of external entities receiving protection-oriented training from USSS in 2005 & 2006

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Independent statisticians and analysts in the Secret Service's QSSS Branch use the Workload Statistical and Reporting System to provide INV managers with routine (monthly, quarterly, and yearly) reports containing comprehensive quantitative performance information. These data, exhaustive in scope, alone demonstrate that the INV program is effective and achieving the aggregate results to which the program aspires. As the PART guidance states, question 4.5 is most important for "programs that have substantial difficulty formulating quantitative performance measures." The INV program does not have that difficulty; to the contrary, the quality, scope, independence, frequency, and recurrence of collection of quantitative INV performance data is such that the Secret Service's statistical systems are far more telling of INV program effectiveness than ad hoc, sporadic evaluations would be. The Secret Service emphasizes - as a matter of routine business practice - recurring performance measurement, de-emphasizing for INV the ad hoc evaluations that less frequently or less comprehensively measured programs must undergo in order to demonstrate effectiveness.

Evidence: USSS Organization Chart; INV Organization Chart; ADM Manual - MNO Functional Responsibility Statement (MNO-01); MNO Organization Chart; USSS Intranet Page - QSSS; WSRS Database Concept Sheet; Annual Statistical Summary - FY 2005