National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy

Office of National Drug Control Policy

June 2009
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The original National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy was published in 2007 and focused primarily on what the entities of the U.S. Federal Government could do to prevent the illegal trafficking of drugs across the border with Mexico. In the time since, Mexican President Felipe Calderon has embarked on a courageous campaign to break the power of the drug cartels operating in his country. Through the Merida Initiative, the United States is supporting Mexico’s efforts and helping to strengthen law enforcement and judicial capacities in the region. As the cartels battle the Mexican Government and one another, we have seen significant disruptions in the availability of such drugs as cocaine and methamphetamine in U.S. markets. There has also been a significant increase in violence within Mexico, making the need for a revised National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy all the more important as part of a comprehensive national response.

As a result of the changing situation on the border, the 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy has expanded its focus beyond stemming the inbound flow of illegal drugs from Mexico. It also recognizes the role that the outbound flow of illegal cash and weapons plays in sustaining the cartels and addresses this threat in two dedicated chapters. The strategy also is the result of an expanded consultation process, including more thorough coordination with Congress, State and local authorities, and the Government of Mexico.

I would like to thank the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, and the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, for the leadership role they played as Executive Agents in the development of this strategy. Along with the Merida Initiative; the Administration’s recently announced increases in border related personnel and equipment; the development of the Department of Homeland Security’s operations plan for border related contingencies; and our national effort to reduce the demand for illegal drugs at home, the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy is a key component of our comprehensive national response to the threat along the border. I thank the Congress for its support and ask that it continue to support this critical endeavor.

R. Gil Kerlikowske
Director
Office of National Drug Control Policy
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President Calderon has been very courageous in taking on these drug cartels. We’ve got to also take some steps. Even as he is doing more to deal with the drug cartels sending drugs into the United States, we need to do more to make sure that illegal guns and cash aren’t flowing back to these cartels. That’s part of what’s financing their operations, that’s part of what’s arming them, that’s what makes them so dangerous. And this is something that we take very seriously and we’re going to continue to work on diligently in the months to come.

President Barack H. Obama
March 24, 2009

Drug trafficking across the Southwest border remains an acute threat to our homeland security and one of the top drug control priorities for the United States. Mexican drug trafficking organizations have come to dominate the illegal drug supply chain, taking ownership of drug shipments after they depart South America and overseeing their transportation to market and distribution throughout the United States. It is now estimated that 90 percent of the cocaine that is destined for U.S. markets transits the Mexico/Central America corridor. Mexico is the primary foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine destined for U.S. markets and is also a source and transit country for heroin. Mexican drug trafficking organizations dominate the U.S. drug trade from within, overseeing drug distribution in more than 230 U.S. cities. These organizations also control the southbound flow of other forms of drug related contraband, such as bulk currency and illegal weapons.

The U.S. Government is responding to the range of threats along the border with Mexico in several ways. Under the Merida Initiative, $875 million has been appropriated so far to support a partnership with Mexico ($700 million) and the neighboring nations of Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic ($175 million) to enhance regional capabilities and reduce criminal activity over the long term. To respond to immediate threats associated with a substantial increase in violence in Mexico resulting from the pressure placed on the cartels by Mexican authorities, on March 24, 2009 the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice announced the Administration’s comprehensive effort to reduce the illegal flow of drugs, weapons, and cash across our border. The President’s 2010 budget request includes millions of dollars in additional equipment and hundreds of additional Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of the Treasury personnel to improve control of the border. The Department of Homeland Security is also working to better coordinate its intra-agency efforts, and the Administration is monitoring the situation on the Southwest border and prudently planning for potential contingencies. The Department of Defense will provide support to these efforts in authorized areas, subject to the availability of resources, and at the request of appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign officials with counterdrug responsibilities, if such support does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.
As the President has stated, our response to the threats along the Southwest border will be an effort that the Administration will work on diligently in the months to come. This document, the 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, is part of that ongoing effort, and is guided by the following strategic goal and six strategic objectives:

**STRATEGIC GOAL**

Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

The Strategic Goal and Strategic Objectives are repeated at the beginning of each thematic chapter. Each chapter consists of a background section and a list of supporting actions. Chapter 1 describes efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on efforts to prevent smuggling at and between the ports of entry (POEs). Chapter 4 focuses on air and marine assets utilized in interdiction efforts. Chapter 5 discusses priority actions needed to support investigations and prosecutions. Chapter 6 concentrates on efforts to counter money laundering and bulk cash smuggling across the Southwest border. Chapter 7 outlines steps to combat the illegal smuggling/trafficking of weapons from the United States into Mexico. Chapter 8 advises on technology needs to advance efforts against narcotics smuggling. Chapter 9 links this strategy with our partnership with the Government of Mexico, building on ongoing cooperation and integrating efforts launched through the Merida Initiative.

To successfully implement this strategy, the United States must commit appropriate resources to efforts within the United States on the Southwest border. These efforts will serve to complement the courageous and dedicated counterdrug efforts of the Mexican government; to sustain recent disruptions in the drug market that have been detected through changes in price and purity; to protect U.S. border communities from drug related violence; and to disrupt the illegal flow of weapons and money south across the border.

We must also ensure a much more comprehensive Federal partnership with State and local law enforcement agencies, one of the major areas of emphasis in this strategy. State and local law enforcement agencies are key players in border security efforts, particularly with regard to the southbound flow of illegal weapons and money. The reach of Mexican drug trafficking organizations extends into our cities, suburbs, and rural areas, into our
national parks, public lands, and even our prisons. The active involvement of State and local agencies coupled with the development of new technology, such as license plate readers and nationally linked electronic databases, now make it possible to identify and track suspect vehicles with money or guns before they cross the border into Mexico. This strategy, by building out the necessary architecture, identifying needed resources, and enlisting State and local law enforcement in a genuine partnership of equals, will enable the Nation to address the threat posed by violent drug cartels in a comprehensive manner.

As the President has stated, stemming the inbound flow of narcotics and other contraband is not enough. We must acknowledge the full range of factors that contribute to the current situation on the Southwest border in order to successfully address it. In Chapters 6 and 7, this strategy provides a plan to support the dedicated efforts of the Mexican Government in its fight against the cartels by addressing the role that the United States plays as a supplier of illegal cash and weapons to the cartels.

We must also acknowledge that it is the demand for illegal drugs in the United States that drives the threat along the border. The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy is an integrated component of this Administration’s broader national drug control policy, which includes a renewed commitment to reduce the demand for illegal drugs at home. Approximately $5 billion have already been committed in the previous year for initiatives to reduce illicit drug use within our borders. The Administration is focusing on integrating substance abuse services into national healthcare systems with early screening, diagnosis, and intervention as regular preventative medicine. The fiscal year (FY) 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act includes $63.9 million for drug courts that bring together the judicial, law enforcement, and treatment communities, as well as other social and public services, in order to end a nonviolent offender’s drug addiction.

Effective prevention is essential to our efforts to reduce illegal drug use over the long term. In the Southwest border region in particular, just as increased national and binational collaboration can improve interdiction, intelligence, and enforcement efforts, an increased and coordinated focus on substance abuse prevention will benefit both the United States and Mexico. The Administration will work to increase communication and collaboration among relevant Federal, State, and local agencies, binational organizations, and Mexican counterparts in order to address the common factors that influence the region’s violence and substance abuse problems. While specific local circumstances may differ, the United States will place a greater focus on shared issues and work in concert with Mexico to pursue common substance abuse prevention goals.

This strategy is submitted pursuant to Section 1110 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-469). A classified version of this strategy will be submitted separately. Public Law 109-469 requires that not later than 120 days after the date of enactment, and every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Drug Control Policy shall submit to the Congress a Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and that the document shall:

1. set forth the Government’s strategy for preventing the illegal trafficking of drugs across the international border between the United States and Mexico, including through ports of entry and between ports of entry on that border;

2. state the specific roles and responsibilities of the relevant National Drug Control Program agencies (as defined in section 702(7) of the National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1701(7))) for implementing that strategy; and

3. identify the specific resources required to enable the relevant National Drug Control Program agencies to implement that strategy.
Public Law 109-469, section 1110 (c) additionally mandates that the strategy incorporate specific content related to drug tunnels between the United States and Mexico including (1) a strategy to end the construction and use of tunnels and subterranean passages that cross the international border between the United States and Mexico for the purpose of illegal trafficking of drugs across such border; and (2) recommendations for criminal penalties for persons who construct or use a tunnel or subterranean passage for such purpose.

The Director of National Drug Control Policy will oversee the implementation of this strategy, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, and the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The Director will also ensure that the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy is coordinated with other border related efforts, including the Merida Initiative, led by the State Department, and the Department of Homeland Security’s Southwest border operations plan. Updates on the implementation of the strategy will be provided to the Director of National Drug Control Policy at least every six months until the actions are fully accomplished, with the first reports due by October 2, 2009. Starting in 2010, a report on the implementation of the strategy will also be incorporated into a section of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy dedicated to the Southwest border.
CHAPTER 1: INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

STRATEGIC GOAL
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND
Over the past several years, elements within both the law enforcement community and the national Intelligence Community have implemented initiatives to address a range of interrelated challenges on the Southwest border, including drug and human smuggling into the United States, associated violence, and the transit of arms and bulk cash from the United States to Mexico. Through the Merida Initiative and other bilateral efforts, the United States and the Government of Mexico are expanding the nature and scope of their intelligence cooperation on these issues.

As the operational environment of the Southwest border continues to evolve in line with the Administration’s expanded border control initiatives, so too will the demand for the comprehensive, relevant, and timely intelligence necessary for agencies to execute effective operations; guide near and long-term planning; and inform resource allocation. Over the next few years, the focus of these intelligence programs will be on improving and integrating the flow of timely and relevant intelligence and analysis—as well as the process of information sharing and coordination—among the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies dedicated to protecting the Southwest border from the illicit flow of drugs and associated threats.

This chapter addresses specific intelligence programs and activities designed to enhance support to operational efforts along the Southwest border. Additional intelligence support activities and requirements are identified in
other chapters in this strategy. The intelligence efforts in this strategy will be aligned with and will incorporate other national intelligence efforts along the Southwest border, in particular those efforts coordinated by the Director of National Intelligence.

**SUPPORTING ACTIONS**

1. **Enhance coordination and, where possible, harmonization of intelligence and information collection, analysis, and dissemination among the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies with Southwest border counterdrug intelligence responsibilities.**

   *Re-establish the Interagency Working Group on Intelligence Coordination (IWG-IC) to facilitate implementation of all actions in this Chapter.* Intelligence resources and systems are finite assets which must be carefully coordinated and integrated, wherever possible, to avoid redundancies and to maximize overall effectiveness. The IWG-IC, co-chaired by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Office of Intelligence, and the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, has been re-established to coordinate implementation of intelligence initiatives contained in this strategy. Working Group members include representatives from all agencies/activities having a counterdrug intelligence support role. The co-chairs will establish ad hoc subgroups to address specific objectives or supporting actions and will, as necessary, collaborate with and seek assistance from other existing coordination groups.

   *Enhance coordination of existing intelligence requirements processes among law enforcement and Intelligence Community organizations.* Increasing responsibilities related to counterterrorism and homeland security have placed multiple and competing demands on the intelligence functions of law enforcement agencies and Intelligence Community organizations. Coordination and integration of intelligence requirements processes reduces strain on the entire system, enables increased productivity, eliminates the misdirection of duplicative assets, and creates a “go-to” point for intelligence collection needs. Sustained efforts must be made to coordinate existing and developing intelligence requirements management processes and, where appropriate, incorporate State, local, and tribal interests in such processes. Opportunities for regular feedback among all narcotics enforcement customers must be included in intelligence requirements management processes.

   *Enhance coordination and, where practicable, integration of Southwest border related intelligence collection programs and activities carried out by both law enforcement and Intelligence Community organizations.* Law enforcement, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community organizations have a variety of intelligence and information collection capabilities and programs which are either directly or indirectly related to Southwest border enforcement efforts. As these capabilities are expanded as part of the Administration’s initiatives to enhance border security, it is even more important that these programs and activities be carried out in a coordinated and cohesive manner. Technical collection capabilities and programs along the Southwest border, such as the National License Plate Reader Initiative and Law Enforcement Technical Collection programs should be deployed and carefully coordinated among participating agencies. Non-technical law enforcement intelligence collection efforts, such as “reports officers” and special field intelligence and debriefing programs, should be enhanced and better coordinated.
Enhance coordination of intelligence assessment production among law enforcement and Intelligence Community elements. Elements in the intelligence, Federal law enforcement, and State, local, and tribal law enforcement communities regularly produce a variety of assessments related to the Southwest border. These products range from comprehensive national assessments to more issue-specific or localized assessments. Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies will establish mechanisms to coordinate the production of intelligence assessments related to the Southwest border and to better integrate such efforts with State, local, tribal, and international entities.

Enhance activities to link intelligence efforts and products to operational needs and capabilities. Law enforcement customers in the counternarcotics and homeland security communities need “actionable” intelligence. Greater emphasis must be placed on ensuring that intelligence products contain valid operational links or leads and add value to interdiction and investigative activities. Efforts to link intelligence to operations, such as the El Paso Intelligence Center’s (EPIC) Gatekeeper program, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers, the Southwest Border Coordination Integration Cell, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Southwest Intelligence Group should be sustained and improved. Efforts to exploit seizure and investigative information for tactically relevant intelligence will be enhanced. Agencies should consider deploying additional intelligence analysts from headquarters-type roles into frontline operational organizations to facilitate the linking of intelligence to operations.

2. Enhance intelligence and information sharing collaboration.

Enhance intelligence coordination and sharing among Federal law enforcement, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community elements and “centers.” Though substantial progress has been made in ensuring effective coordination of intelligence programs and activities, continued focus and effort is necessary. Particular progress has been made in eliminating duplication of effort among law enforcement intelligence “centers” in the El Paso area. Enforcement and intelligence agencies have increased both their programs and staff at EPIC to facilitate coordination of intelligence and, in some cases, operational efforts. These efforts should continue, along with initiatives to better coordinate “Common Operating Picture” and “Common Intelligence Picture” capabilities. Agencies should consider enhanced command and control structures for Southwest border operations, including concepts that could virtually link centers on the Southwest border with the Joint Interagency Task Forces and other national centers. The IWG-IC, through its subgroups and other appropriate entities, will identify specific methods to improve intelligence coordination, collaboration, and, where feasible, the integration of systems and processes.

Enhance intelligence coordination and sharing between Federal agencies/activities and border related State, local and tribal entities. Law enforcement and Intelligence Community agencies have been working to enhance information sharing with State, local, and tribal partners. Such efforts should continue, with the goal of expanding the scope, quality, and timeliness of actionable information and intelligence shared with appropriate non-Federal entities, especially operational entities. Efforts will focus on enhancing and better coordinating existing activities such as (but not limited to) EPIC, State and local fusion centers, BESTs, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) along the Southwest border, as well as systems for information sharing such as the Homeland Security Information Network, Homeland Security - State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest, Regional Information Sharing System, Law Enforcement Information Sharing Service, Homeland Secure Data Network, the online HIDTA
Resource Management System, and Intellipedia (unclassified). The EPIC Open Connectivity Project includes the National Seizure System (NSS), a law enforcement data application that accommodates the entry of drug seizure data in addition to other related data, such as suspect and conveyance details. To fully realize the benefits of the NSS, agencies collecting law enforcement data on illegal drug removals should electronically stream their data to EPIC. The interagency will also work to ensure full participation in the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB), which includes information on where, when, and how individual drug trafficking events took place; the response of interdiction forces to those events; the outcome of an event; and the type and quantity of drugs involved. Agencies will continue efforts to sanitize and disseminate information and intelligence derived from classified reporting and law enforcement investigations, in accordance with Director of National Intelligence directives and departmental guidance such as the Department of Homeland Security “Write to Release” policy. The Department of Homeland Security and DEA “reports officer” programs have been successful in extracting and disseminating intelligence and information derived from operational and investigative activities.

*Enhance coordination of intelligence sharing with Mexico, including information provided to and received from Mexican agencies.* Chapter 9 of this document addresses overall initiatives between the United States and Mexico, including enhanced information sharing. In support of these overall efforts, processes and procedures should be established to ensure that intelligence information, shared with or received from Mexican authorities, is fully coordinated and shared among the appropriate U.S. agencies to ensure timeliness, to minimize duplication of effort, and to ensure the most effective use of the information.
CHAPTER 2: AT THE PORTS OF ENTRY

STRATEGIC GOAL
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND
Despite the tireless efforts of U.S. border security and law enforcement personnel on the Southwest border, massive amounts of drugs are smuggled each year through the 43 legitimate border crossing points. Drug traffickers alter both the methods and timing of their operations in response to border interdiction activities. Trafficking organizations have shown tremendous resiliency, maintaining operations while enduring the loss of significant amounts of drugs. In order to achieve the goal of protecting our borders, the Nation needs to improve its defenses at POEs. Some improvements will result from enhancements directed at countering terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the entry of illegal aliens.

In light of the increased level of violence associated with the illegal drug trade, renewed efforts are being made to secure our borders. On April 1, 2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that more than $400 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding would be directed to the Southwest border, including $269 million for port and other infrastructure projects in Otay Mesa, California; Antelope Wells, New Mexico; Los Ebanos, Texas; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Nogales, Arizona. $42 million will go toward non-intrusive inspection equipment at Southwest border ports of entry, including both low energy and large-scale systems—big enough to scan tractor-trailers. In addition, CBP has requested resources of $793.52 million in FY 2010 for border security and trade facilitation at the POEs. CBP has also stood up a new Outbound Division within the Office of Field Operations. The Outbound Division will focus on developing and implementing security programs that safeguard legitimate trade from being used to smuggle implements of terror and other contraband, including weapons, into Mexico.
Additional improvements may be achieved through the enhanced use of technology, such as biometric-based identity management; traditional resources, such as K-9 units; improved communications; and training techniques designed to counteract smugglers’ tactics at the border. In addition to traditional assets, emerging systems such as non-intrusive inspection equipment, the Port Radiation Inspection, Detection, and Evaluation (PRIDE) program, US-VISIT’s IDENT biometric database, along with improved communications systems and countersurveillance tactics, will increase the effectiveness of narcotics interdiction efforts.

While technology, improved resources, and enhanced communication will benefit narcotics interdiction efforts, improved targeting of border threats – in advance of their arrival – is essential. These efforts will be realized by implementing a coordinated bilateral and multi-agency approach to sharing advanced identity management information, passenger and cargo information, commercial and law enforcement data, and the use of document security systems.

**SUPPORTING ACTIONS**

1. **Use state-of-the-art detection technology, resources, and training to interdict drugs and other contraband.**

   *Expand use of drug detection technology by frontline officers.* Frontline border officers and agents require an array of detection technology to maximize their effectiveness. Agencies will continue to improve current non-intrusive inspection technologies and distribute them to frontline officers. Non-intrusive inspection information will be shared through such entities as the PRIDE program, the National Targeting Center – Passenger (NTC); National Targeting Center – Cargo (NTC-C), and Operation Predict. CBP will address current voids in inspectional capability and increase the speed of inspections.

   *Expand K-9 unit capabilities for drug detection at ports of entry.* Canines are regarded as one of the most effective and time-tested tools available for drug detection. Additional K-9 units at ports of entry along the Southwest border would significantly enhance CBP counternarcotics screening and detection capabilities in both the vehicle-processing and cargo-processing environments. These enhanced capabilities would allow CBP to broaden the focus of its current counternarcotics operations and significantly decrease cargo and vehicle examination times.

   *Upgrade and standardize communications on the Southwest border.* Border agencies should continue to upgrade current communications systems to those that provide greater range, more security, and that are capable of incorporating emerging changes in technology to meet the needs of law enforcement. Agencies should ensure that new systems allow for interagency connectivity among Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies. A unified communications protocol, which establishes communications interoperability among Southwest border law enforcement personnel, will contribute to the increased success of interdiction, enforcement, and investigative operations. The Federal government should also expand upon best practices, as exemplified by the U.S. Border Patrol Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture regarding radio interoperability.

   *Disrupt counterintelligence operations.* Drug trafficking organizations engage in a number of counterintelligence activities, including the use of “spotters” at POEs on the U.S. and Mexican sides of the border. This surveillance must be countered by constructing shielding structures and randomly shifting personnel. Where necessary, steps should be taken to allow for an increase in controlled deliveries and afford greater opportunities to identify command and control entities.
2. Improve targeting of border threats.

*Increase use of advance information.* Interdiction agencies need to improve the use, analysis, and dissemination of advance information to identify and target border threats. This includes improving the use of advance passenger and cargo information as well as commercial and law enforcement databases. Further, it will include the use of information collected and analyzed by other agencies and units (including, but not limited to the NTC-C; the ICE Human Smuggling and Alien Investigation Unit, Illicit Finance Unit, Human Intelligence Unit, and the BESTs; the Embassy Intelligence Fusion Center; Joint Interagency Task Force South; Joint Task Force North; and Mexican law enforcement partners).

*Improve and integrate border databases.* The Department of Homeland Security will improve targeting and analysis by integrating existing databases and enhancing CBP’s existing rules-based targeting system for deployment to Southwest border POEs. CBP’s Automated Targeting System will be fully deployed for use at air and land POEs. The interagency will continue deployment and expansion of CBP’s Automated Commercial Environment, EPIC’s Open Connectivity Project, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center database, and the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) Document and Media Exploitation Real-Time Analytical Intelligence Database (RAID) application. The U.S. Government should seek information sharing agreements with the Government of Mexico to assist in screening, targeting, and identifying threats at U.S. POEs. The Department of Homeland Security should take steps to link POE and Border Patrol Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) into the emerging national ALPR system.

*Enhance identity management and document security.* The security of the Southwest border can be significantly enhanced through information sharing and biometric solutions for criminal alien transborder identity management. The U.S. Government should support the Government of Mexico’s use of biometrics to allow for future comprehensive bilateral collection, maintenance, and sharing of information, including biometric identifiers. The interagency will promote and develop the related technology and information sharing systems necessary to process and validate all border crossing documents and their users along the Southwest border.

*Enhance use of trade information.* The United States will work with foreign governments and the trade community to, wherever possible, prescreen, target, and inspect shipments and containers that pose a potential risk before they arrive at U.S. or Mexican POEs. Through programs such as the voluntary Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security will partner with the trade community to secure global supply chains, develop secure cargo containers, and establish minimum standards for cargo security. Programs should be expanded that speed the flow of trusted travelers and cargo (e.g., the Free and Secure Trade program).

*Increase focus on cargo containers.* CBP will continue to cultivate programs such as the Container Security Initiative, Secure Freight Initiative, and the Immigration Advisory Program to identify high-risk cargo and travelers overseas before they arrive in the United States. The Operation Winternight program should be revitalized at EPIC to further target smuggling via container shipments. The U.S. Government will continue to work with the Government of Mexico to share advance information about cargo and travelers, so that action can be taken before high-risk travelers and material arrive at the Southwest border.
Promote the development of intelligence-based targeting. The U.S. Government will utilize programs such as the Attorney General’s Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list, OCDETF’s Regional Priority Organization Target (RPOT) process, the Department of State’s Anti-Kleptocracy program, the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act sanctions program, and the Department of State’s Narcotics Rewards Program (22 U.S.C 2708) and ensure that these programs are implemented in a coordinated multi-agency approach to improve the targeting of Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating along the Southwest border. CBP’s Field Operations Intelligence Program will provide support to CBP inspection and border enforcement personnel in disrupting the flow of drugs through the collection and analysis of all-source information and the dissemination of intelligence to the appropriate components. Such activities as Buckstop Operations, which screen outbound travelers and their personal effects, and Cashnet Operations, which interdict bulk currency exported in cargo shipments, will be continued at the POEs.
CHAPTER 3: BETWEEN THE PORTS OF ENTRY

STRATEGIC GOAL
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND
In addition to the 43 legitimate border crossing points, the Southwest border includes thousands of miles of open desert, rugged mountains, the Rio Grande River, and the maritime transit lanes into California and Texas. This vast and diverse range of environments presents opportunities for terrorists, drug traffickers, and human smugglers to cross into the United States undetected. The linkages between drug trafficking organizations operating in Mexico, at or near the Southwest border, and human smuggling groups are well documented. In addition, the routes and methods of existing smuggling organizations could potentially be utilized to transport terrorists or weapons of terror across the border. In enhancing U.S. counternarcotics efforts along the Southwest border, this strategy contributes to the broader border security missions of the U.S. Government.

SUPPORTING ACTIONS
1. Expand the operational capabilities of U.S. personnel at or near the border.

   Enhance patrol and interdiction capabilities. Technology, infrastructure, personnel, and intelligence are critical elements of effective border interdiction efforts. Utilizing the proper mix of these elements is essential to the U.S. Border Patrol’s operations to detect, identify, classify, and respond to all illegal crossborder activities. A multi-layered defense provides the best enforcement posture for detecting and seizing illegal drugs. This multi-layered defense should include enhancements to U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints, including the improvement of facilities, the expansion of canine capabilities, the use of non-intrusive inspection equipment, and the leveraging of other resources that improve detection capabilities near checkpoints. Additional agents and resources dedicated to detection and interdiction activities at
and around checkpoints have made a positive impact on counternarcotics efforts in the Southwest border region. Building on these efforts, the Secretary of Homeland Security recently announced an additional $50 million in Recovery Act funding to accelerate the deployment of SBInet surveillance technology and associated command and control technologies in Arizona. Targeted prosecution efforts such as Operation Streamline have also shown that consequences for illegal activity are essential to deter criminal behavior. Increased prosecutorial resources, such as additional U.S. Attorneys, are a critical next step. Plans are in place to double the staffing of Violent Criminal Alien Teams located in ICE Field Offices on the Southwest border.

Enhance capability to assess suspects. The U.S. Government will improve the ability of border personnel to assess the threat posed by individuals apprehended between POEs through better coordination and information sharing among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement and intelligence communities. Methods of collecting information from those housed at detention facilities will be further developed and improved. The U.S. Border Patrol will improve the use and capabilities of biometric systems between POEs, such as IDENT/IAFIS, which are installed nationwide at all Border Patrol stations. The Border Patrol will also continue utilizing processing systems such as e3, the system that has replaced ENFORCE; local checks that include a combination of nonbiometric systems and databases; and immigration status systems, such as the Central Index System. Efforts will be continued to provide mobile capabilities for systems like IAFIS and e3. Border law enforcement personnel will expand the use of resources at EPIC, NDIC, and the OCDETF Fusion Center, which can be used in support of OCDETF investigations.

2. Improve coordinated operations and partnerships on the Southwest border.

Enhance capability of task force initiatives. The Southwest border has experienced a surge in violence in recent years due to intense competition between Mexican drug cartels and criminal smuggling organizations that employ predatory tactics to protect their profits. In response to this trend, multi-agency task force initiatives have been developed to enhance information sharing and increase the effectiveness of law enforcement operations. For example, the Department of Homeland Security has partnered with Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement counterparts to create BESTs. BEST participants include ICE; CBP Office of Field Operations; U.S. Border Patrol; DEA; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S. Attorney’s Office; and key State, local, and, in some locations, Mexican law enforcement liaisons. There are currently ten BEST teams along the Southwest border. Additionally, the National Guard offers mission support to law enforcement agencies conducting border security and counternarcotics operations on the Southwest border. The majority of current National Guard support efforts are focused on engineering projects and communications support. Another key initiative is the OCDETF Southwest Border Strike Forces. These groups are collocated Federal, State, and local task forces that conduct joint operations targeting drug traffickers and money launderers operating in their regions.
Upgrade collaboration with non-Federal agencies. The Federal Government will enhance partnerships with State, local and tribal law enforcement agencies through outreach programs. Agencies will expand the use of interior enforcement, working through the Southwest Border HIDTA program when possible. The U.S. Border Patrol will work with State, local, and tribal agencies to ensure the execution of effective interdiction operations. The Border Patrol, in coordination with FEMA, has initiated Operation Stonegarden, a grant program that disperses funds to State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies along the border. These funds pay for operational overtime, equipment, mileage, fuel, and vehicle maintenance. Funds are used for operational activities that will enhance border security and are coordinated directly with the Border Patrol.

Continue to improve coordination. Existing law enforcement coordination efforts will be reviewed and expanded through the identification and application of best practices. These efforts will include integrated leadership and operational planning on a regular and recurring basis. Law enforcement leaders will establish regular Southwest border interdiction planning sessions. An interagency working group will be established or dedicated as a single point of contact to collect, develop, and publish lessons learned from previous interagency counterdrug operations.

Develop multi-agency and bilateral tunnel detection operations. As discussed in Appendix A of this strategy, the interagency will work to formalize procedures for tunnel detection, exploitation, post-seizure analysis, closure, and remediation among relevant agencies and with Mexican counterparts. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice will continue to work with the Department of Defense and other organizations to research new and improved technologies, procedures, methods, and techniques for detecting the construction and use of crossborder tunnels and subterranean passageways.
CHAPTER 4: AIR AND MARINE

STRATEGIC GOAL

Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND

Gaining control of the Southwest border involves continuing to improve the U.S. Government’s capability to detect, monitor, and respond to the air, land, and maritime threats to the United States. Mexico remains a major transshipment location for bulk cocaine loads smuggled via the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean regions. Despite varying trends in cocaine smuggling routes and modes of transport, the initial destination for U.S.-bound cocaine loads is nearly always Mexico or Central America. Mexico is also a major foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine, as well as a source and transit zone for heroin. Closer bilateral cooperation with Mexico holds the potential to reveal more about the air, land, and maritime threats bound for the United States and will help to improve our ability to respond to those threats. The United States can and must provide information to help the Government of Mexico respond to bulk shipments of drugs and other contraband before they cross the border. To assist in this effort, the CBP Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) coordinates detection and response activities relating to suspect aircraft with other Department of Homeland Security component agencies (U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, Office of Border Patrol), the Department of Defense, EPIC, and other Federal, State, and local authorities, as well as with other interagency task forces and with Mexican authorities. Concurrently, the U.S. Coast Guard coordinates maritime patrolling with CBP along the approaches to the United States in the Gulf of Mexico and near the Southern California border. The U.S. Coast Guard, working closely with the U.S. Navy, continues to provide premier interdiction capabilities in the maritime domain adjacent to the border and throughout the maritime transit zone in which the majority of cocaine destined for the United States travels via non-commercial maritime conveyances. Investigative and intelligence support continues to increase with a greater focus on information sharing and interagency cooperation in criminal investigations.
SUPPORTING ACTIONS

1. Sustain the air and marine presence along the Southwest border.

   **Optimize detection and response capabilities.** The U.S. Government will optimize deterrent and interdiction capabilities by developing and sustaining air and maritime detection and monitoring, intercept, tracking, and apprehension operations along the Southwest border to guard against illegal activity and border violations on the ground, air, or water. The keys to this effort are early and persistent detection capabilities, joined with multi-agency assets and sensors, and followed by coordinated endgames. The U.S. Government has made significant progress toward increasing the air and marine presence along the Southwest border to enhance detection and response capabilities. Simultaneous activities are ongoing to optimize deterrent and interdiction capabilities, including the further development of a centralized law enforcement planning, intelligence, and operational fusion center at the AMOC. CBP has strategically located aviation air branches along the U.S. Southwest border for regular patrols or cued launches to provide further scrutiny of suspect air activity. National Guard aviation assets provide Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies with additional reconnaissance capabilities, including full motion video for ground agents. With the strong emphasis on stopping contraband smuggling on the land portion of the Southwest border, the U.S. Coast Guard has stepped up efforts to detect, monitor, and interdict suspect traffic along the maritime approaches to the United States. These activities are, and will continue to be, complementary to counterdrug efforts in the source and transit zones, as interdictions that occur in Central America and South America help to alleviate the pressure on Mexico and the Southwest border.

2. Enhance bilateral air cooperation.

   **Expand liaison and information sharing activities with Mexico.** The Department of Homeland Security should establish a CBP Air and Marine (CBP A&M) and ICE liaison presence within Mexico’s new coordination center in cooperation with the appropriate Government of Mexico agencies. AMOC has historically engaged in close coordination with the Government of Mexico and with Mexican law enforcement personnel. AMOC should continue to explore the possibility of sharing radar data feeds to improve the Mexican air picture—as well as that of the United States—by integrating northern Mexico radars into the AMOC radar picture.

3. Collect comprehensive information on the air and maritime threat.

   **Modernize sensors and other collection mechanisms.** A full modernization review will be conducted to evaluate existing airborne sensors and their connectivity to air, ground, and maritime interdiction platforms. This may include continuing to develop Surveillance and Tracking Radar Processor (STRAP) technology in order to maximize the full potential of the Department of Defense Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS). CBP will provide its aircraft with advanced technical collection capabilities to expand and strengthen those capabilities along the Southwest border. The U.S. Government will fully exploit unmanned aerial systems to serve as low-visibility, high-endurance platforms for intelligence collection and interdiction cueing. In addition to being able to display a total of 450 live radar sensors, the AMOC can also receive data through its Air Defense System Integrator both from other ground units and from aircraft equipped with various data link capabilities (e.g., TADIL A, TADIL J). The CBP A&M P-3 Airborne Early Warning aircraft can link with the AMOC, using a computer-to-computer air-to-ground data link interface to exchange Track of Interest information.
Establish a common operating picture (COP). The interagency will develop and maintain, within the existing architecture, a comprehensive, real-time COP of the air and maritime threat, to include an active, intelligence-driven database of suspect aircraft, pilot cadres, and associated support pipelines and networks. Agencies will enlist the support and expertise of the national Intelligence Community for access to collection technologies applicable to the smuggling threat. Currently, there is no common architecture to integrate the systems monitoring the National Airspace System. Data sharing is hampered by the lack of common equipment and operating systems. The Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Aviation Administration currently use different command and control systems. These stovepiped systems inhibit the sharing of data and information. A bridge between interagency stovepipes is one of the major operational objectives of the CBP SBInet project. Further development and fielding of a COP will help the U.S. Government attain all-domain (air, land, maritime) awareness, as well as a common system to communicate comprehensive situational awareness, including information that incorporates an intelligence-driven operations capability to all operational levels and locations.
CHAPTER 5: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

STRATEGIC GOAL
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND
Today, four major organizations control the flow of drugs across the Southwest border: the Arellano-Felix Organization on the West Coast, the Gulf Cartel on the Gulf Coast, and the Juarez Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel/Federation in the Central Region. Pressure is building on these cartels as a result of the aggressive counterdrug efforts of Mexican President Felipe Calderon, as well as increasing competition with one another. Violence in Mexico is reaching alarming levels, with over 6,000 drug related murders occurring in the country during 2008.

Targeting and attacking criminal organizations through effective investigations and prosecutions is critical to an effective counternarcotics strategy on the Southwest border. Given the magnitude of the threat, it is imperative that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies explore ways to enhance their capacities to undertake or assist such investigation and prosecution efforts. U.S. and Mexican law enforcement and intelligence communities must closely coordinate their efforts to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations responsible for the movement of illicit drugs, firearms, and drug proceeds across the Southwest border by building strong cases against these organizations and bringing their leaders to justice.
SUPPORTING ACTIONS

1. Increase the presence of U.S. law enforcement liaisons in Mexico.

   **Expedite expansion of U.S. law enforcement liaison presence in Mexico.** Placing expert U.S. personnel on the ground where the cartels are operating will enable closer collaboration with Mexican law enforcement partners. Due to the vast geographic area of Mexico and the direct impact that drug trafficking and related criminal activity in Mexico have on the United States, U.S. law enforcement agencies must work with the Government of Mexico to increase their liaison presence in key Mexican cities along the U.S.-Mexico border and in other locations in order to support the investigation and prosecution of transborder organizations engaged in this criminal activity.

   **Use joint and coordinated efforts among U.S. law enforcement agencies and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations operating along the Southwest border.** Improved investigative collaboration and coordination between OFAC and key U.S. law enforcement agencies, task forces, and HIDTA offices will increase OFAC’s ability to attack the financial infrastructures and commercial operations of major trafficking organizations while also enhancing criminal investigations and prosecutions. OFAC will continue to ensure the coordination of investigations under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act with the Department of Justice.

2. Enhance intelligence support to investigations.

   **Ensure that State and local investigators have the necessary clearances.** All law enforcement personnel involved in Southwest border investigations must have the necessary clearances to perform their duties.

   **Fully utilize threat assessments and other interagency intelligence products.** Federal agencies and interagency groups regularly develop products containing information about crossborder drug trafficking and related criminal activity. Dissemination of information from these resources, particularly in view of the coordination efforts envisioned in Chapter 1, will enhance the effectiveness of investigations and thereby result in more successful prosecutions.

   **Standardize assessment of the impact of law enforcement operations.** After-action assessment has proven to be a key to the success of such initiatives as Operation All-Inclusive in Central America and is a critical element in the planning of new operations. An interagency process should be formalized to evaluate operations, assess the value and use of intelligence, and document lessons learned for future efforts.

3. Increase prosecutorial and judicial resources dedicated to investigations relating to Mexico and the Southwest border.

   **Increase the capacities of U.S. Attorneys Offices to handle Southwest border drug investigations and prosecutions.** U.S. Attorneys Offices play a key role in and are directly affected by changes in border security efforts. Prosecutors on the Southwest border currently handle staggering caseloads that will only increase with intensified security efforts. A comprehensive strategy must increase the capacities of the U.S. Attorneys Offices to handle Southwest border drug smuggling and trafficking investigations and prosecutions by ensuring sufficient OCDETF and non-OCDETF Assistant U.S. Attorney resources for the agent workforce. Successful and timely prosecutions also will require a complete support package to include paralegals and clerical support, equipment, office space, and document translation services.
Increase the capacities of other criminal justice components to support Southwest border drug investigations and prosecutions. Intensified efforts in targeting, interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of Southwest border drug cases necessarily have an impact on other criminal justice system components. To handle the increased number of investigations and prosecutions, more support is required for judges, pretrial services and probation officers, Assistant Federal Public Defenders and court appointed defense attorneys, Deputy U.S. Marshals, and Federal corrections officers. In addition, there must be adequate detention facilities for both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. Further, the increased numbers of complex investigations will necessitate support for the Department of Justice’s Office of Enforcement Operations, which handles applications for judicially authorized Title III wiretaps; the Office of International Affairs, which handles requests for foreign evidence and extraditions; the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section (NDDS), which prosecutes major drug trafficking organizations operating along and across the Southwest border; and the DEA-led Special Operations Division (SOD), which coordinates complex multi-district investigations; as well as the Department of State’s Office of the Legal Advisor, which handles extradition matters.

Enhance the capacities of investigative agencies and U.S. Attorneys Offices to dismantle the financial infrastructure of Southwest border drug trafficking organizations. As discussed in Chapter 6, in order to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations contributing to the Southwest border threat, investigations and prosecutions must attack the entire financial infrastructure of the targeted organizations and destroy their ability to operate.

4. Increase judicial cooperation with Mexico.

Utilize Merida Initiative activities to build cooperation. The Merida Initiative includes several programs to improve cooperation between U.S. and Mexican counterparts, including through programs related to prosecutorial capacity building, judicial exchanges, and enhancing investigative capacities. Implementation of these programs will increase the capacity for complex investigations and prosecutions on both sides of the border against narcotics trafficking and related arms smuggling/trafficking, money laundering, and corruption.

5. Attack corruption involving domestic public officials along the Southwest border.

Conduct integrity awareness training for U.S. law enforcement agencies working along the Southwest border. Agencies will conduct and enhance integrity awareness training for the Southwest border law enforcement workforce to ensure that each employee is aware of the responsibility to report allegations of misconduct. This training also will reinforce core values in employees and thereby assist in preventing corruption in the workforce.

Increase the focus on connections between public corruption and threats to U.S. national security. Public corruption undermines faith and confidence in government, eroding trust in institutions upon which the Nation’s democratic system is based. Corruption not only facilitates the activities of violent criminal organizations that traffic drugs, firearms, and illegal proceeds across the U.S.-Mexico border, but it also makes the United States vulnerable to terrorist attacks through the potential importation of dangerous contraband or the illegal entry of criminals, terrorists, and foreign intelligence officers. Investigating, prosecuting, and deterring corruption on all levels along the U.S. borders is vital to combating transnational organized crime and protecting national security.
6. Attack foreign official corruption that supports drug trafficking and related crimes.

Utilize and support the Department of State’s anti-Kleptocracy program, specifically visa denials/revocations through the framework of Presidential Proclamation 7750 (PP7750). Official corruption is a truly international problem and a major enabler of narcotics trafficking. Combating corruption is a foreign policy priority for the United States, as corruption facilitates virtually all transnational illicit activities, from drug trafficking to terrorist finance. PP7750 allows the United States to deny entry on the basis of corruption in the absence of a conviction; this denial may also extend to family members if certain conditions are met.
Chapter 6: Money

Strategic Goal
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

Strategic Objectives
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

Background
The emergence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations as the dominant source of supply to the illegal U.S. drug market has made the Southwest border the primary route for expatriation of illicit drug proceeds. Strict compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act by U.S. financial institutions deters drug traffickers from initially placing illegal profits directly into the U.S. financial system. According to NDIC, however, Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations annually generate, remove, and launder between $18 billion and $39 billion in wholesale distribution proceeds, a large portion of which is believed to be smuggled in bulk out of the United States through the Southwest border. Numerous U.S. law enforcement investigations have confirmed this method of moving U.S.-generated drug proceeds.

Analysis of currency flows between the United States and Mexico has also depicted this movement. Information collected from U.S. financial institutions indicates a substantial imbalance between the volume of U.S. banknotes repatriated from Mexican financial institutions and the volume of banknotes purchased by these institutions. These measures of net U.S. dollar repatriation suggest that a large amount of U.S. currency travels to Mexico outside of formal financial channels. Many economic factors contribute to this imbalance, but currently a significant portion remains unexplained by known estimates of legitimate activity.

U.S. law enforcement has also documented that bulk cash fuels both Mexican drug trafficking organizations and their illicit drug suppliers in South America through an elaborate money laundering network. The processes of moving bulk cash out of the country and its eventual repatriation present vulnerabilities and intelligence which U.S. law enforcement can exploit to identify and dismantle illicit drug organizations.
SUPPORTING ACTIONS

1. Stem the flow of outbound bulk cash smuggling.

*Enhance OCDETF operations along the Southwest border to target bulk cash movements.* Efforts must be made to focus resources on the coordinated and strategic use of asset forfeiture and prosecutions, under the appropriate money laundering and/or bulk currency smuggling statutes, as well as the application of all other strategic and tactical assets to prevent the crossborder movement of illicit proceeds. U.S. law enforcement will support this effort, through the specific targeting of bulk cash smuggling activities across the Southwest border. Targeting of these criminal organizations should be brought under the auspices of the OCDETF program whenever possible in order to identify and dismantle the organizations moving bulk cash across the border.

*Rapidly share bulk currency seizure information.* DEA, ICE, and the Department of the Treasury each collect and maintain separate repositories of information relating to bulk currency seizures through EPIC’s National Seizure System, ICE’s Bulk Cash Smuggling Center, and the TECS database (formerly the Treasury Enforcement Communications System), respectively. In order to provide more effective operational access and utility to law enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of the Treasury will address options for establishing methods to rapidly share information derived from Federal, State, and local bulk cash seizures. Plans should be made to move to a real-time data sharing methodology.

*Improve coordination of Federal bulk cash concealment detection training.* DEA, ICE, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have each instituted bulk currency initiatives. DEA and ICE initiatives include the training of State and local officers in concealment “trap” detection, methods of courier debriefing, and guidance on pertinent evidence identification. The IRS bulk cash initiative is a pilot program that seeks to provide State and local officers with uniform training in evidence exploitation while providing Federal contacts to further develop and disseminate best practices in bulk cash and money laundering investigative techniques.

*Enhance bulk currency interdiction capacities.* The United States should increase the odds of interdicting illicit proceeds along U.S. highways, at POEs, and at checkpoints. Law enforcement agencies should analyze the effectiveness of outbound traffic stops and, if warranted, consider expanding the number in search of bulk currency. Mexico’s newly implemented southbound inspection program will facilitate greater interdiction of bulk currency and illegal weapons flowing from the United States into Mexico.

*Increase interior enforcement targeting of bulk cash.* U.S. law enforcement has identified primary origination points throughout the United States where illicit drug proceeds are consolidated prior to being moved to the Southwest border. The HIDTA Domestic Highway Enforcement initiative should continue to expand and enhance efforts to target and interdict illicit bulk currency transiting our highways. Coordinated efforts between Federal, State, and local authorities are needed to best exploit the intelligence gleaned from highway interdictions and seizures of bulk cash. This intelligence will also enhance OCDETF’s CPOT and RPOT initiatives. Seizure and forfeiture of these funds should not be looked at as the end game, but rather the beginning of an investigation. All efforts need to be made to connect bulk cash to the drug trafficking organizations that generate it.
Address the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions. In the case of Cuellar v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under 18 U.S.C 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), ruling that the government did not establish “why” the defendant was transporting U.S. currency in a concealed manner. The Court also stated that the facts would not have supported a conviction under the bulk cash smuggling statutes because the government did not establish that Cuellar knew of and intended to evade currency reporting requirements. In the United States v. Santos, Santos successfully argued that the government had to establish not only that the “proceeds” -- in this case from an illegal gambling enterprise -- were derived from a crime, but also that the proceeds were profits rather than gross receipts. These recent Supreme Court decisions have resulted in the filing of numerous appeals of convictions. As a result, prosecutors are discontinuing many investigations with similar fact patterns.

2. Identify, investigate, and prosecute the illegal use of money services businesses and the illegal use of electronic payment devices.

Target illicit money services businesses (MSBs). One of the key findings of the National Drug Threat Assessment 2009 was that drug trafficking organizations continue to utilize MSBs to launder illicit drug proceeds. U.S. law enforcement agencies are targeting MSBs based in both the United States and Mexico. The Department of the Treasury will work with Federal law enforcement agencies to determine whether the use of Geographic Targeting Orders or Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act could help to disrupt money laundering networks that utilize MSBs.

Encourage agencies to share financial investigative information and intelligence through the OCDETF Fusion Center. The Executive Office of OCDETF has opened an OCDETF Fusion Center (OFC) which serves as a comprehensive narcotics related data warehouse. The OFC contains or provides access to investigative drug and financial intelligence possessed by some OCDETF member agencies, as well as agencies such as NDIC, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the national Intelligence Community. Combining all of this intelligence in one location helps to identify and attack drug trafficking organizations and their financing.

Target the illicit use of electronic payment devices. U.S. law enforcement and regulatory agencies need to monitor new trends in money laundering, including the conversion of cash to stored value devices, electronic payment devices, and online services. Unless sufficient controls are in place, narcotics traffickers will increasingly rely upon new industries and technology to launder and move funds. U.S. law enforcement and regulators need to work closely with these emerging industries to ensure that anti-money laundering controls are implemented to effectively monitor the purchase of these devices and subsequent financial transactions.

3. Prioritize and increase targeted financial sanctions.

Aggressively apply the Department of the Treasury’s OFAC Kingpin Act authorities in the Southwest border region. OFAC has several ongoing investigations of financial networks associated with Mexican drug kingpins designated pursuant to the Kingpin Act and is working closely with ICE and DEA offices on targets of mutual interest along the Southwest border. Along with closer cooperation with law enforcement agencies, OFAC will continue to target front companies used by narcotics traffickers along the border, their financial networks, and other facilitators. Other financial networks and assets, identified independently or through law enforcement cooperation, will also be the focus of OFAC investigative efforts.
4. **Enhance and utilize multilateral mechanisms.**

*Initiate intelligence sharing and joint strategic projects with the Mexican financial intelligence unit.* FinCEN and its Mexican counterpart, the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF), have increased their tactical and strategic level collaboration to include a joint examination of crossborder currency flow. The foundation of this study is the reciprocal sharing of relevant financial data available to FinCEN and the UIF.

5. **Improve statistical measures for assessing the money laundering threat.**

*Develop a stronger empirical basis for assessing money laundering vulnerabilities and measuring effectiveness in combating money laundering.* Measuring the scope of money laundering and the effectiveness of law enforcement and regulatory countermeasures was identified as a key challenge in the 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy. Available records need to be exploited to determine the prevalence of certain money laundering methods and to more precisely determine the significant gap between cash sent to Mexico through formal channels and cash repatriated from Mexico. This information will assist law enforcement entities in their efforts to better measure the effectiveness of law enforcement and regulatory efforts to combat money laundering. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, FinCEN, the DEA, the Department of Justice, OCDETF, ICE, and NDIC are all involved in efforts to improve statistical measures.
CHAPTER 7: WEAPONS

STRATEGIC GOAL
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND
The National Drug Intelligence Center assesses that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the primary participants in and beneficiaries of firearms trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border. The close link between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking on the Southwest border has facilitated the acquisition of increasingly powerful and sophisticated weaponry by drug trafficking organizations. These organizations require a consistent supply of firearms and ammunition to defend their territory, eliminate rivals, enforce business dealings, challenge government operations, and control organization members. This in turn has resulted in the proliferation of U.S.-based illegal firearms and explosives smuggling/trafficking schemes operated by persons, gangs, drug trafficking organizations, and other criminal groups seeking to capitalize on the extraordinary demand.

Once thought to be a purely regional problem that focused law enforcement on border interdiction efforts and criminal investigations solely in those states contiguous to the Mexican border, the U.S. sources of illegal firearms and explosives to Mexico are now found in nearly all 50 states. As Mexican-based drug trafficking organizations have expanded operations into communities across the United States, so have they expanded their hunt for firearms and explosives to facilitate their operations domestically and abroad.

Illegally smuggled/trafficked weapons from the United States are primarily transported overland into Mexico using the same routes and methods employed when smuggling drugs north. Within the United States, drug trafficking organizations typically rely on “straw purchasers” to acquire arms at gun shops, gun shows, and pawnshops. These organizations also use associations with U.S.-based prison and street gangs to facilitate the smuggling/trafficking of firearms and explosives across the border. Intelligence derived from criminal investigations clearly indicates that U.S.-based street gangs are involved in both the receipt of narcotics from drug
trafficking organizations and the smuggling/trafficking of weapons to them. The increase in gang involvement in illicit trafficking (narcotic, human, and firearms smuggling/trafficking) has the potential to increase Southwest border violence exponentially, while contributing to the profitability and growth of international gangs such as MS-13, Latin Kings, and Mexican Mafia.

Additionally, there remains a lack of definitive information on other international sources and transit routes supplying weapons to Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Recent reports indicate that weapons, including AK-47s and grenades, have been illegally imported via Mexico’s southern border, as well as supplied through linkages with international crime syndicates. The problem is further compounded by weapons imported legally into Mexico from various countries, which have been subsequently diverted to criminal organizations.

As the United States continues its partnership with Mexico through the Merida Initiative, U.S. law enforcement agencies must work to marshal resources at all levels – Federal, State, local, and tribal – to develop an effective, coordinated, and comprehensive response to the threat of illegal weapons smuggling/trafficking from the United States into Mexico, and to support Mexico’s broader efforts to deny drug trafficking organizations access to arms from other international sources. An effective weapons interdiction strategy should consider both the vulnerabilities along the U.S.-Mexico border and the other international sources of illegal weapons in order to appropriately address the full scope of the challenge.

**SUPPORTING ACTIONS**

1. **Improve intelligence and information sharing relating to illegal weapons smuggling/trafficking.**

   - *Facilitate U.S. Government interagency intelligence sharing.* U.S. law enforcement organizations and intelligence agencies operate a variety of intelligence collection and analysis programs which are directly or indirectly related to weapons smuggling. The Department of Defense provides analytical support to some of these programs with regard to captured military weapons and ordnance. In order to provide better operational access and utility to law enforcement agencies, the U.S. Government will capitalize upon the existing law enforcement interagency intelligence center, EPIC, to reinforce rapid information sharing methods for intelligence derived from Federal, State, local and Government of Mexico illicit weapons seizures. Absent statutory limitations, plans should be made to move to a real-time data sharing methodology.

   - *Enhance programs at EPIC targeting illegal weapons smuggling/trafficking.* ATF’s Project Gunrunner utilizes the EPIC Gun Desk as the focal point for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of investigative leads derived from Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement agencies. This enforcement effort extends beyond the affected border states and will support investigative and enforcement efforts in Mexico through assistance and cooperative interaction with Mexican authorities. The Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC), housed at EPIC, serves as ICE’s central point for analyzing all-source intelligence, analyzing trends in border violence and firearms smuggling/trafficking and for referring investigative and operational leads to U.S. and foreign partner agencies to help facilitate the timely sharing of intelligence and threat information. In addition to supporting U.S. law enforcement entities, a key goal of the BVIC is to provide intelligence support to Government of Mexico law enforcement agencies investigating the murders of Mexican law enforcement or government officials. ATF and ICE will work with interagency partners to facilitate more robust information sharing with Federal, State and local law enforcement, as well as with Mexican law enforcement agencies.
Rapidly share weapons seizure information among U.S. law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement organizations have a variety of intelligence collection capabilities and programs which are either directly or indirectly related to information on illicit weapons smuggling/trafficking. Such resources must be utilized in a coordinated and cohesive manner. The ICE Border Violence Intelligence Cell and ATF Gun Desk located at EPIC each utilize separate systems to collect and maintain information relating to weapons seizures, such as TECS, ATF’s OnLine Lead, the National Tracing Center, Violent Crime Analysis Branch, and the U.S. Bomb Data Center. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice will address options for establishing methods to rapidly share information derived from Federal, State, and local and Government of Mexico illicit weapons seizures. Absent statutory limitations, plans should be made to move to a real-time data sharing methodology. CBP has established positions at the EPIC Gun Desk with connectivity to ATF eTrace. The Gun Desk receives CBP compiled weapons seizure data monthly for interagency post seizure analysis. This relationship affords CBP and ATF the ability to jointly develop actionable intelligence to support Project Gunrunner. Based upon current interagency agreements, further sharing of weapons seizure information would help to disseminate relevant firearms intelligence to appropriate agencies and jurisdictions.

Utilize military-to-military engagement to improve interagency information sharing. U.S. law enforcement agencies will work with the Department of Defense to include information sharing as a topic for discussion during military-to-military engagement opportunities with Mexico and Central America to support cooperation in areas such as tracing captured weapons. This is especially important regarding military-type weapons and ordnance used by drug cartels and gangs. The Department of Defense is uniquely positioned to guarantee confidentiality if allowed to help inventory captured weapons and share that information with U.S. law enforcement organizations.

2. Increase the interdiction of illegal weapons shipments to Mexico.

Expand intelligence-driven interdiction of illicit weapons shipments destined for Mexico through multi-agency investigative efforts such as ICE Operation Armas Cruzadas and ATF Project Gunrunner. ICE developed Operation Armas Cruzadas to combat transnational criminal networks smuggling/trafficking weapons into Mexico from the United States. As part of this initiative, the Department of Homeland Security and the Government of Mexico have partnered in bilateral interdiction, investigation, and intelligence sharing activities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal networks engaged in weapons smuggling/trafficking. ATF developed Project Gunrunner to focus ATF’s investigative, intelligence, and training resources on the suppression of firearms smuggling/trafficking to Mexico. Similarly, CBP operations supporting U.S. efforts to combat arms smuggling/trafficking are based on three pillars: analysis of firearms and weapons related data, information sharing, and coordinated operations. CBP liaisons at the EPIC Gun Desk will compile and disseminate information and intelligence about crime related guns and suspect guns, firearm thefts and losses, purchase patterns, suspicious purchasers, secondary gun markets, and other data related to firearms activity.

Increase the use of mobile gamma ray non-intrusive inspection equipment and canine inspection. Utilizing non-intrusive inspection equipment in the United States and providing the Government of Mexico with non-intrusive inspection support and canine inspection team training at interior checkpoints will deny routes to traffickers in the most remote areas.
Enhance infrastructure and protocols to facilitate uniform CBP outbound operations along the Southwest border. The Department of Homeland Security will incorporate new facilities in the planning of safe, effective, and coordinated outbound weapons and currency interdiction operations. CBP will aim to enhance infrastructure, including electrical conduits, technology mounts, and traffic management barriers and signage. Additionally, CBP will enhance the inspection of weapon shipments by reviewing export and Freight Remaining on Board data. Through the NTC-C, such shipments will be identified, examined at the U.S. port of export to verify contents and quantities, and confirmation of shipment order and expected delivery will be obtained from Mexican authorities. These efforts will help to ensure the legitimacy of such shipments, and reduce the possibility of diversion.

3. Enhance cooperation with international partners in weapons smuggling/trafficking investigations.

Engage in international training to include post-blast investigations, firearms identification, detection of concealment traps used for smuggling/trafficking of firearms in vehicles, and border security training. U.S. Government training programs can be expanded to more officials and include additional curricula. Mexican and Central American authorities may request comparable military-type training and associated equipment from the Department of Defense if appropriate under existing programs. In addition, programs such as the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, the U.S. Government’s premier initiative to help member countries improve their export control systems, would prove beneficial to Government of Mexico officials in their efforts to combat the flow of illegal weapons into and out of their country.

Complete and enhance the deployment of Spanish-language eTrace capabilities among Mexican law enforcement agencies. Firearms tracing is the systematic tracking of a firearm from its manufacturer or importer through the chain of distribution from wholesalers and retailers to the first retail purchaser. ATF is the only entity in the U.S. Government authorized to perform this task, as specified in the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). To increase functionality, the ATF Firearms Tracing System needs to modernize/upgrade software and current infrastructure by consolidating firearm tracing applications, accelerating the retirement of stovepiped systems, and enhancing current eTrace software to include a mapping solution that will provide timely data ready for use in policy, management, and enforcement applications. Nearly all firearms trace requests from Mexico are sent to ATF via a system called eTrace, a web-based system that provides approved law enforcement agencies the ability to send trace requests, receive trace results, and perform analysis of their consolidated results securely via the Internet. Mexican officials, however, are currently unable to fully capitalize on the benefits of the system because it is in English, and the system’s data structures do not allow for name and address conventions common in Hispanic cultures and countries. ATF is currently developing a Spanish language version of eTrace that is scheduled for full deployment at the end of FY 2010. The continued enhancement of ATF’s eTrace program and expansion of Spanish eTrace through Mexico and Central America will provide law enforcement with a more robust investigative tool to target firearms smuggling/trafficking.

Work with the Government of Mexico to trace weapons seized during Mexican military operations. Processes and procedures should be established to ensure that seized weapons are made available for physical examination with U.S. Government agencies and traced through ATF’s eTrace system. The information obtained would then be analyzed and ultimately shared with the Government of Mexico for action and with U.S. agencies for coordination.
Support the Department of State to increase the number of end-use verifications of firearms exported from the United States to Mexico through the Blue Lantern Program. The export of firearms and ammunition is regulated by the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). State authorizes the export of firearms and ammunition via an export license (DSP-5). Initial review of DDTC data by ICE indicates that a substantial amount of firearms, ammunition, and related equipment have been authorized for lawful export to Mexico since 2007. In order to verify that controlled commodities exported out of the United States are being utilized consistent with the authorization, State engages in a program entitled “Blue Lantern” which is a systematic process for monitoring the end-users and end-use of U.S. defense exports. ICE partners with State in these Blue Lantern verifications due to ICE’s expertise and authority in enforcing the Arms Export Control Act. ICE will work diligently to support State in increasing the number of end-user verification checks.

Increase bilateral cooperation on arms smuggling/trafficking investigations through initiatives such as ICE’s Weapons Virtual Task Force. ICE has recently established the Operation Armas Cruzadas initiative, which focuses on combating the smuggling/trafficking of weapons from the United States into Mexico. As part of this initiative, ICE has created the Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF), a cyberspace task force comprised of ICE law enforcement and intelligence personnel and Government of Mexico partners. The WVTF leverages the capability to communicate and share critical information regarding criminal conspiracies to finance, acquire, and smuggle weapons across the U.S.-Mexico border.

Support prosecutorial capacity building in Mexico. Strengthening capacity to investigate and prosecute illegal arms smuggling/trafficking and related crimes is key to ensuring the Government of Mexico’s success in combating the destabilizing influence of drug trafficking organizations and related violence.

Utilize the Mexico Fellowship Program. The Department of Homeland Security will work with the Government of Mexico to deploy two Mexican Customs officials to the CBP NTC-C to facilitate cooperation and exchange of information to identify smuggling patterns in both countries and to increase security.

Expand the deployment of ATF and ICE liaison officers in Mexico. One method of cooperation between the United States and the Government of Mexico is the established Mexico Border Liaison Officer (BLO) program. The Mexico BLO program allows ATF and ICE to more effectively identify and combat crossborder criminal organizations by providing a streamlined information and intelligence sharing mechanism between U.S. and Government of Mexico law enforcement personnel. In addition, the expansion of permanent ATF and ICE investigators working in ATF and ICE attaché offices throughout Mexico is critically important in facilitating crossborder coordination of weapons smuggling/trafficking investigations. Programs that improve intelligence coordination and collaboration should be continued and expanded in scope.

Modernize, expand, and network ballistics imaging technology with Mexican law enforcement agencies. Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS) equipment allows firearms technicians to acquire digital images of the markings made by a firearm on bullets and cartridge casings for use in comparing and matching ballistic evidence recovered at literally thousands of crime scenes casing-by-casing and projectile-by-projectile. Ballistics information systems deployed in Mexico could be integrated with a modernized National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) system to enable U.S. and Mexican law enforcement to discover links between crimes more quickly. The Mexican Office of the Attorney General has invested $20 million in a new forensics laboratory, and Merida funds have been...
appropriated to provide three IBIS for this laboratory in FY 2008. Six additional IBIS are planned for FY 2009. Continued deployment of IBIS equipment in Mexico would greatly increase U.S. Government and Government of Mexico investigative efforts to reduce violent crime, and the upgrading of the NIBIN system in the United States would allow for integration with ballistics imaging systems in Mexico.

4. Strengthen domestic coordination on weapons smuggling/trafficking investigations.

**Review and update MOUs among U.S. law enforcement agencies to ensure optimal coordination and effectiveness.** An updated MOU will allow for a more effective use of Federal investigative resources. ATF and ICE are committed to cooperation and, when practical, joint enforcement efforts. In those situations where each agency’s respective mission efforts coincide, this MOU will serve to coordinate how each agency will pursue its investigations in complementary ways while minimizing duplication of effort.

**Improve support to State and local law enforcement efforts targeting illegal weapons smuggling/trafficking.** ICE provides support to State and local law enforcement to target illegal weapons smuggling/trafficking through Operation Armas Cruzadas, its use of Title 19 cross-designation, and through joint operations with the BEST initiative. BEST task forces serve as force multipliers for State and local law enforcement efforts by leveraging Federal, State, local, tribal and foreign law enforcement and intelligence resources in an effort to identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the border and threaten the overall safety and security of the American public. The task forces are designed to increase information sharing and collaboration among the participating agencies with a focus on the identification, prioritization, and investigation of emerging or existing threats. Additionally, ATF offers training to State and local law enforcement in such areas as firearms identification and post-blast investigation.

**Increase ATF staffing levels in the Southwest border region.** By regulating both the firearms and explosives industries and by enforcing the criminal laws relating to those commodities, ATF makes significant contributions to interagency efforts to disrupt the illegal smuggling/trafficking of firearms from the United States to Mexico and other countries in the Americas in facilitation of the illegal drug trade. Project Gunrunner, ATF’s strategy to counter weapons smuggling/trafficking, is a crucial part of the overall U.S. Government strategy to reduce the armed violence occurring in Mexico and the United States. Project Gunrunner’s primary focus is to disrupt and dismantle organizations responsible for the domestic and international movement of high quality “weapons of choice” to and from violent criminal organizations that operate along the borders and throughout the United States.

**Increase staffing levels and expand the use of the BESTs to disrupt crossborder weapons smuggling/trafficking networks.** BESTs are designed to leverage Federal, State, local, tribal and foreign law enforcement and intelligence resources on the border in an effort to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations such as those involved in weapons smuggling/trafficking. The task forces are designed to increase information sharing, maximize investigative authorities, and promote collaboration among the participating agencies focusing on the identification, prioritization, and investigation of emerging or existing threats.

**Fully utilize the Border Corruption Task Forces to investigate corruption among U.S. law enforcement and military personnel related to weapons smuggling/trafficking.** The illegal smuggling/trafficking of weapons is a potential source of revenue for criminal and terrorist organizations. It can facilitate the commission of criminal activity in both the United States and in foreign countries, as well as strengthen the influence
of criminal and terrorist organizations. The corruption of U.S. public officials can directly facilitate weapons smuggling/trafficking in a variety of ways, from simply protecting illegal activity to potentially eroding the overall regional government structure, including its executive, legislative, regulatory, and judicial components.

**Develop a new export requirement that allows for capturing serial numbers of firearms exported from the United States.** By capturing the serial number of firearms when they are exported, U.S. authorities are able to provide foreign law enforcement with immediate and actionable intelligence (e.g., the date the weapon was exported and to whom the weapon was exported). This gives the foreign government a starting point in their country for an investigation. Capturing serial numbers at the time of export also allows the United States Government to rapidly identify if a weapon utilized in a foreign violent crime was smuggled out of the United States or if it was lawfully exported. The Department of State has instituted a policy to require and retain serial numbers on all United States Munitions List Category I, II, and IV firearms that have been granted authorization to be exported from the United States to Mexico. The capturing of serial numbers will be accomplished by entering the data into existing export data systems.

5. **Work with the U.S. Congress and key stakeholders to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in countering illegal arms smuggling/trafficking.**

**Encourage the Senate to Ratify The Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA).** CIFTA requires parties to the Convention to establish or maintain export, import, and transit licensing systems; require the marking of firearms; criminalize illicit manufacture and trafficking of firearms; and engage in international information exchange, coordination, training, and law enforcement cooperation. Ratification of the Convention will send a powerful message to partner nations and help the countries of the hemisphere to shut down the illicit transnational arms market that fuels the violence associated with drug trafficking, terrorism, and international organized crime.

**Coordinate United States Government outreach to Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs) and relevant nongovernmental organizations to increase awareness of the weapons smuggling/trafficking threat and improve cooperation.** Fair and effective regulation and outreach to the firearms industry is a key component of ATF’s firearms enforcement efforts. To this end, ATF investigates FFL applicants to determine eligibility and to educate them about their recordkeeping responsibilities; conducts compliance inspections of current FFLs; and collaborates with industry on voluntary compliance efforts. ATF Industry Operations Investigators conduct inspections of FFLs to detect diversion, ensure compliance with laws and regulations, and assist with business practices designed to improve compliance with the GCA. Additionally, ATF also regulates the importation of firearms into the United States. ICE conducts industry outreach in the form of Project Shield America. Since 2001 ICE has conducted over 16,000 briefings as part of Project Shield America in an effort to elicit cooperation from industry sources and provide information regarding U.S. export laws and potential threats from smuggling/trafficking networks. As a result of these briefings, many potential violators are identified at the initial stages of their illicit activities. Coordinated outreach among U.S. agencies will lead to an increase in awareness and cooperation with the firearms industry.

6. **Increase the likelihood of successful Federal prosecution for illegal weapons trafficking.**
Assign Violent Crime and Gang Unit prosecutors to the Southwest border. The Department of Justice’s Violent Crime and Gang Unit will assign trial attorneys to work with various Southwest border intelligence centers, strike forces, Mexican law enforcement partners, and United States Attorneys Offices to develop an aggressive and uniform approach toward gun smuggling/trafficking cases. Promoting and coordinating intelligence efforts can increase the ability of law enforcement officials to determine the involvement of drug trafficking organizations and gangs in gun smuggling/trafficking and associated violent crime along the border.

Expand the scope of Operation Community Shield to enhance BESTs. The ICE National Gang Unit oversees the following major operational and programmatic areas: Operation Community Shield; nationally coordinated ICE Specialized Urban Response Gang Enforcement (SURGE) operations; Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization investigations; Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering investigations; Continuing Criminal Enterprise investigations; and other criminal gang investigations. A large number of gang members are foreign-born and are in the United States illegally. Many members of these criminal organizations have prior criminal convictions or are involved in crimes that have a nexus to the border, making them subject to ICE’s broad scope of immigration and customs statutory and administrative enforcement authorities. Under Operation Community Shield, ICE partners with law enforcement agencies at the local, State and Federal level, both in the United States and abroad. ICE also partners with Department of Justice Violent Crime and Gang Unit prosecutors to develop a comprehensive and integrated approach to conducting complex criminal conspiracy investigations, short and long term gang SURGE enforcement operations, and other law enforcement efforts to address the threat posed by transnational street gangs.

Expand the Violent Crime Impact Team initiative to help address gang and violent crime issues along the Southwest border. ATF works to reduce violent crime by targeting and dismantling the gangs that pose the greatest threat to public safety. The Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT) approach is one of many tools that ATF employs to address gang violence. ATF’s VCITs are integrated Federal, State, and local law enforcement initiatives focused on removing the most violent criminals and criminal organizations from the community. By expanding and targeting these initiatives throughout the Southwest border, ATF will be able to pursue a fully integrated strategy for the reduction of violent crime and the interdiction of illegal firearms. ATF also partners with Department of Justice Violent Crime and Gang Unit prosecutors, conducting complex criminal conspiracy investigations and utilizing other law enforcement tools to address the problem of violent street gangs.
CHAPTER 8: TECHNOLOGY

STRATEGIC GOAL
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND
The U.S. officers and agents who defend the Southwest border require state-of-the-art technology to counter the efforts of traffickers, who have proven to be creative and adaptable in their attempts to evade law enforcement. The Federal Government needs to commit resources to the ongoing effort to research, develop, and deploy technologies that support the counternarcotics effort. The purpose of this chapter is to direct the development and fielding of emerging and state-of-the-art technologies to further Southwest border counternarcotics efforts as a part of broader efforts underway to bring operational control to the border. These technological enhancements will seek to improve capacities in the following areas:

- Detecting, tracking, and classifying all threats along the land and maritime borders. Particular needs include technologies to support detection in rugged and subterranean environments (including tunnels -- discussed further in Appendix A), concealing foliage, water obstacles, mountains, and in other areas that are subject to environmental constraints.
- Wide-area surveillance—for detection, identification, and tracking—from the coast to beyond the horizon, including port and inland waterways. Particular needs include detection (and the capability to geo-reference the images) of vessels between the port region and beyond the horizon, especially small vessels and semi-submersibles.
- Non-intrusive inspection capabilities to detect narcotics, bulk currency, and illegal firearms in cargo and vehicles. These capabilities include the detection of intrusion or unauthorized access, particularly into containerized, palletized, parcel, or bulk/break-bulk maritime and air cargo.
• Tools and technologies that will allow border security law enforcement officers to perform inspections of vehicles and vessels more efficiently, effectively, and safely.

Supporting Actions

1. **Employ state-of-the-art detection technology to interdict drugs and other contraband.**

   *Improve the ability of law enforcement personnel to detect and identify narcotics and other contraband.*

   Frontline personnel require the capability to identify multiple threats with one unit/setup that operates on portable power; is wearable and self-contained; and is able to sample for and detect contraband without direct contact.

   *Improve screening and examination through non-intrusive cargo container inspection.* Technology is required to facilitate the detection or identification of contraband items (e.g., drugs, bulk currency, and illegal firearms), threat materials, or stowaways. This technology will improve penetration, resolution, throughput, contrast sensitivity, reliability, mobility, and interoperability and will integrate with future Automated Target Recognition capability. The Department of Homeland Security will pursue Conveyance Security Device technology to detect the unauthorized opening of cargo containers in transit.

   *Explore potential improvements in bulk currency detection technology.* Existing technology is only capable of detecting large quantities of bulk currency in clandestine environments. Advances in this technology will make it possible to detect smaller amounts of concealed currency in containers, automobiles, and parcels as well as on body-carriers.

   *Improve the capability to continuously track illegal contraband on ships or containers.* A particular need is the ability to conceal transponders while maintaining effective transmissions. This technology would help to link illegal shipments to the organizations that are smuggling those shipments.

   *Work with Mexican authorities to deploy appropriate and effective non-intrusive inspection technology on both sides of the border.* Criminal organizations, especially drug traffickers, have exploited the huge volume of passenger and commercial traffic that enters the United States via Mexican airports and maritime ports. The United States has already supported technology enhancements on the Mexican side of the border and will expand this assistance through the Merida Initiative (see Chapter 9). The United States should work with Mexico to regularly reevaluate airport and maritime port inspection needs in order to determine/recommend the nature of future cooperation in these areas.

   *Explore the use of behavior-based screening through operational validation of observable indicators related to smuggling, terrorism, and illegal immigration activities.* Explore the potential of conducting research to validate behavioral indicators and to develop the supporting real-time, non-invasive sensors capable of identifying these behavioral indicators and automatically alerting authorities.

2. **Improve officer safety technologies and provide tools and technologies to law enforcement officers so they can perform their missions more efficiently, effectively, and safely.**

   *Enhance ballistic protection.* Incidents of violence against U.S. Border Patrol personnel on the Southwest border have increased in recent years. To help improve officer safety, enhanced personal protective equipment is required to increase effectiveness against a wider-range of projectile types. There is also a need for equipment with a lighter weight and integrated helmet protection.
Improve inspection of hidden or closed compartments. The Department of Homeland Security will work to develop and deploy tools that allow the nondestructive inspection of hidden and closed contents. In particular, these tools should possess the ability to find contraband and security threats on vessels, in vehicles, and within cargo.

Improve nonlethal weapon technology. Improved nonlethal weapon technology would empower law enforcement officers to ensure compliance of lawful orders by deploying nonlethal weapons capable of disabling vessels/vehicles and temporarily incapacitating persons to prevent the infliction of damage or harm.

Utilize weapon fire identification technology. The Department of Homeland Security will work to deploy tools that will enable law enforcement personnel to quickly identify the origin of gunfire and classify the type of weapon fire. This technology would serve to alert law enforcement personnel to incoming gunfire and would also serve to create forensic data.

3. Improve sensor, data fusion, and data sharing technologies.

Provide data fusion and automated tools for command center operations. These technologies will allow command centers to view entire scenes, provide alerts about anomalous and illegal activity, automate the ability to compare current tasking and location of blue forces to new events, recommend courses of action, and share information and collaborate with other non-collocated command centers.

Increase information fusion, anomaly detection, and automatic target recognition capabilities for cargo. Improved technology is required to provide an automated imagery detection capability for anomalous cargo container contents (e.g., stowaways, hidden compartments, contraband). This technology would also improve the capability to detect anomalous patterns in shipping data, crossborder vehicle data, and crossborder passenger data.

Support deconfliction of ALPR technology. Various agencies have deployed ALPR technology to assist in controlling access to facilities and in monitoring border crossings and areas of high crime. Each agency has a ‘hot’ list of vehicle license plate numbers, which are registered to subjects who are wanted, registered to subjects that warrant further investigation, or are associated with vehicles recorded as being stolen. The Department of Homeland Security will look into placing these ALPRs in strategic locations on routes of egress from the Southwest border. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) will work with partner agencies to provide a means to deconflict and manage various ‘hot’ lists, data, and intelligence derived from multiple ALPR installations among the various agencies that share those data.

4. Enhance communication and intelligence technologies.

Continue to establish classified SIPRNET communication capabilities in the Southwest Border HIDTA Investigative Support Centers. This network will link the Southwest Border HIDTA Investigative Support Centers, supported by National Guard intelligence analysts, to EPIC and JTF North. The intelligence network will leverage military, law enforcement, and intelligence resources to provide greater interagency coordination, collaboration, and cooperation. The classified communication system will provide network members a secure means to disseminate up-to-date information and to protect information flows.
Enhance development, coordination, and sharing of intelligence and information databases, communications systems, and tools. A wide range of intelligence related databases and information systems have been established to facilitate the processing and sharing of intelligence information, both within the Federal community and with State and local partners. The Federal government should examine existing structures and processes to identify ways to better integrate and consolidate their effectiveness and reduce instances of inadvertent duplication. Agencies collecting law enforcement data on illegal drug removals on the Southwest border should electronically stream their data to EPIC for inclusion in the NSS, the system for tracking all-agency illegal drug removals. In addition, protocols should be developed for coordination among Federal and State agencies before new fusion centers are established.

5. Develop capabilities to detect, identify, track, and interdict small vessels, including self-propelled semi-submersible boats.

Improve and develop methods to conduct wide-area surveillance. Due to the continued effectiveness of U.S. and allied interdiction efforts in the transit zone, drug traffickers are attempting to use new and innovative methods to transport drugs to the United States, including the development and enhancement of low-profile and self-propelled semi-submersible vessels. To counter these new methods, enhanced capabilities are required for wide-area surveillance to support the detection, identification, tracking, and interdiction of target vessels beyond 12 nautical miles from the U.S. coastline.
CHAPTER 9: COOPERATION WITH MEXICO

STRATEGIC GOAL
Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border.
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence at the ports of entry, between the ports of entry, and in the air and maritime domains along the Southwest border.
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency, and weapons smuggling/trafficking cases.
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction along the Southwest border.

BACKGROUND
Most of the U.S. illegal drug trade is controlled by organizations based in Mexico. Many of the illegal drugs consumed in the United States—cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana—originate from or pass through Mexican territory and territorial seas. Profits from this illicit trade flow back to Mexican drug trafficking organizations in the form of weapons, bulk currency, and laundered funds. However, Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s aggressive campaign against drug trafficking organizations demonstrates Mexico’s commitment to enforcing international laws along our shared border and bode well for continued crossborder counterdrug cooperation.

To further support President Calderon’s efforts, Mexico and the United States launched the Merida Initiative, a proposed $1.4 billion package of equipment and training to jointly tackle the illicit drug problem. Under the Merida Initiative, $700 million has been appropriated so far to assist Mexico in reforming its judicial system and building law enforcement and military capacity. The initiative provides funding for:

- Non-intrusive inspection equipment for interdiction of smuggled drugs, arms, cash, persons, and precursor chemicals;
- Technologies to improve and secure communications systems;
- Technical advice and training to strengthen judicial institutions and the rule of law;
• Information sharing along with equipment and training for the Mexican armed forces, which provide substantial support to the Government of Mexico’s law enforcement efforts; and
• Helicopters and aircraft to support interdiction and rapid response capabilities for law enforcement personnel.

We have far-reaching geographic, economic, and demographic ties to Mexico and Central America, as well as a compelling national security interest in cooperating with governments in the region to succeed in our battle against transnational crime. The Merida Initiative will support the collective response to regional security threats and will also serve to leverage existing counternarcotics strategies and programs. A multi-year proposal, the Merida Initiative is designed to build on activities already underway in the region and to complement U.S. efforts here at home to reduce drug demand, to stop the flow of narcotics, bulk currency, and illegal weapons, and to confront gangs and criminal organizations. The overall objectives of the Merida Initiative are to break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; curtail gang activity; and reduce the demand for illicit drugs throughout the region. As capabilities improve in the region, the interagency must work to anticipate and counter the resulting displacement of narcotics trafficking activity to other locations and modes.

SUPPORTING ACTIONS

1. Support continued bilateral efforts to stem the flow of drugs, money, and weapons across our shared border.

   Assist with training of Mexican counterparts to detect methamphetamine precursor chemicals and laboratories. DEA Mexico City has recently established a formal methamphetamine laboratory initiative, which focuses on the tracking and interception of precursor chemicals destined for clandestine laboratories, the identification and dismantling of methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution organizations, and the training of host nation law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in clandestine laboratory investigations and processing. To date, 70 Government of Mexico Agencia Federal de Investigaciones agents have successfully completed the clandestine certification program. Additionally, over 2,000 other Government of Mexico personnel have been trained on a variety of investigative, enforcement, and regulatory methods related to countering methamphetamine production and trafficking. This training includes instruction on clandestine laboratory and precursor chemical investigations and synthetic drug identification. As a result of this training, Mexico’s law enforcement agencies have executed several significant seizures of methamphetamine, pseudoephedrine, pseudoephedrine tablets, ephedra, and clandestine methamphetamine superlabs in Mexico. In addition, DEA delivered eight clandestine laboratory vehicles to be deployed in areas in Mexico where the methamphetamine threat is high.

   Assist Mexico in implementing the Aforos project to interdict weapons and bulk currency smuggling at ports of entry along the border. The Mexican Customs service has initiated a pilot project to require all southbound passenger vehicles to stop at the border and to go through an automated vehicle identification process. The system will run data collected through various databases and risk analysis tools, increasing its capacity to prevent firearms, ammunition, and bulk cash smuggling into Mexico. Data collected under this process may be shared among domestic and foreign law enforcement authorities. While the project is being funded by the Government of Mexico, U.S. Government subject matter experts may provide assistance in implementation as requested.
**Expand local cooperation.** Prospects for crossborder State-level and city-level cooperation in counterdrug enforcement are increasing and offer additional resources for interdiction on the common border. The United States will seek to support and encourage these local-to-local initiatives, such as assisting the Government of Mexico in establishing a 1-800 number and an Internet site for anonymous callers/contacts for chemical and methamphetamine leads. Some aspects of the Merida Initiative, such as police professionalization and prison management and reform, will involve coordination and training by local U.S. law enforcement authorities.

**Increase international efforts against precursor chemicals.** The Government of Mexico has enacted a series of new laws, regulations, and agreements which restrict precursor chemical imports and regulate their sale, with an emphasis on pseudoephedrine. This included the banning of the importation of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine as of January 2008. These include prohibiting one-time import shipments weighing more than three tons; restricting importation of pseudoephedrine to drug manufacturers only; requiring shipments of pseudoephedrine to be transported in Global Positioning System-equipped security-escorted armored vehicles to prevent hijacking and unauthorized drop-offs; limiting the sale of pills containing pseudoephedrine to licensed pharmacies; and restricting customer purchases to no more than three boxes of pills with a prescription required for larger sales. The United States will work with Mexico to expand on activities in the international arena, for example, by pursuing multilateral controls such as an information sharing agreement among Mexico, Panama, and Hong Kong on the commercial shipping of pharmaceutical ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. The United States will work with Mexico in providing training and technical assistance to Central American countries on a regional basis to detect and prevent illegal precursor chemical shipments.

2. **Continue to execute Merida Initiative objectives and evaluate opportunities to expand on this initiative.**

**Ensure appropriate and effective technology on the land border.** The United States has already supported technology enhancements on the shared border. These programs will be supported by projects within the Merida Initiative commitment, such as the deployment of non-intrusive inspection equipment. The equipment can be used to detect all forms of contraband, including bulk currency and illegal weapons. In addition, cooperation with Mexico on information sharing and training can significantly enhance operations along the border.

**Expand technology at airports and maritime ports.** Criminal organizations, especially drug traffickers, have exploited the huge volume of passenger and commercial traffic that enters the United States via Mexican airports and maritime ports. The Merida Initiative includes funding for enhanced security at airports in Mexico City and throughout the country.

**Aggressively utilize existing bilateral mechanisms.** Cooperative mechanisms are in place to help implement the bilateral aspects of this strategy. The United States commitment to the security of the common border will work to ensure that the potential of these mechanisms is fully realized. The United States and Mexico will be establishing a Bilateral Implementation Office where U.S. Government and Government of Mexico officials will work side-by-side to implement the various projects under the Merida Initiative.
INTRODUCTION

This appendix responds to a statutory requirement to include a strategy to end the construction and use of tunnels and subterranean passages that cross the international border between the United States and Mexico for the purpose of illegal trafficking of drugs across such border. The statute also requires the strategy to provide recommendations for criminal penalties for persons who construct or use such tunnel or subterranean passage for such a purpose.

OVERVIEW

The ongoing existence, use, and construction of crossborder tunnels and subterranean passages represent a unique and growing threat to the homeland. Countering this threat requires a unique response, which is described in this strategy.

Criminal organizations have demonstrated enduring and ever-evolving capabilities to creatively construct and use underground passageways to gain access through the border to transport narcotics, people, and other illicit contraband into the continental United States. Since May 1990, 101 crossborder tunnels have been discovered by law enforcement agencies. All but one have originated in Mexico and exited in either California or Arizona.

There were 24 tunnels discovered in Calendar Year 2008 alone. One tunnel -- the longest crossborder tunnel discovered in United States history -- had ventilation, drainage, and lighting systems, as well as a cement floor and a pulley system. The entrance to the tunnel in Mexico was 85 feet below the surface, and the tunnel crossed the U.S. border at approximately 40-45 feet below the surface, with the entrance on the U.S. side approximately nine feet below the surface. Law enforcement authorities seized over two tons of marijuana in the tunnel, which was attributed to a well-known Mexican drug trafficking organization.

The marked increase in the number and sophistication of tunnels along the Southwest border could likely be a result of increased CBP pressure against narcotraffickers and their traditional surface mobility corridors into the homeland. More aggressive enforcement on established overland routes since the 9/11 attacks probably has resulted in Mexican drug trafficking organizations turning more and more to tunnel construction.

The length, number, and sophistication of the tunnels, as well as the extensive time and labor that go into their construction, suggest that smugglers consider tunnels to be a useful investment despite the risk of discovery and interdiction. This strategy lays out a creative interagency approach to end the construction and use of tunnels for smuggling illegal contraband into the United States.

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

The lack of proven tunnel detection technologies for all possible border tunnel/subterranean passage situations reinforces perceptions that a reliable and consistent solution does not exist. Soil and other environmental conditions vary from region to region along the border, and tunnels discovered to date reveal that different methods, procedures, equipment, and materials are used in their construction. Examination of discovered tunnels and subterranean passages can provide valuable information about the strengths and weaknesses of existing detection technologies and can assist in improving detection capabilities.
Information sharing and coordination are critical elements to improving the effectiveness of tunnel intelligence, detection, and interdiction. Multiple stakeholders, to include Federal, State and local entities, all have access to information, intelligence, and trend data related to tunnel activity. This information needs to be shared, analyzed, and disseminated along the front lines.

**STRATEGIC APPROACH**

Successfully countering the construction and use of tunnels and subterranean passages focuses on two critical capabilities: 1) intelligence collection and the sharing of information related to the planning, financing, construction, and use of tunnels, and 2) detection of tunnel construction and smuggling activities.

Intelligence collection should focus on identifying and verifying suspicious activities near commercial and private structures adjacent to the border, especially in densely-populated areas where legitimate activities can easily mask illicit trafficking activities. Investigations of border tunnels discovered near Otay Mesa, CA, for example, have revealed that when factors such as warehouse ownership records, investment and physical construction activities, stated purposes of use, actual activities in the surrounding area, and other available information are all compared, the result is the emergence of suspicious and/or illogical linkages which do not fit the normal profile for a legitimate business in that specific location. Identifying such suspicious locations, through improved intelligence and surveillance, will improve the ability of law enforcement to detect and stop tunnel construction activities.

Detection of tunnel construction and smuggling activities requires improvements in sensor technologies so that law enforcement personnel can detect unexplained voids; acoustic, gravitational, electronic, and/or seismic anomalies; and subtle changes in ground moisture and/or subsidence (sinking), which could confirm the presence of tunnel construction and related activities. A number of U.S. Government entities are focusing on improving their collective efforts to detect and identify tunnel construction activities, as well as the presence and use of tunnels and subterranean passages for the smuggling of illicit contraband.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

The U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), its subordinate Joint Task Force North (JTF North), and the National Guard provide the primary vehicles through which the Department of Defense supports law enforcement counternarcotics efforts within the United States and in cooperation with the Government of Mexico. Such support includes a USNORTHCOM Counter-Tunnel Initiative, which is examining enhanced tunnel detection technology and capabilities together with the Department of Homeland Security, other Department of Defense elements, and with international partners. Other ongoing Department of Defense counternarcotics support activities that enhance this effort include: international drug smuggling detection and monitoring; international partner capacity building; communications; information sharing; training; reconnaissance; analytical support; technological development; and infrastructure programs.

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

CBP is working with numerous Federal agencies that have tunnel related directives to provide a forum for participating in reporting, planning, and deployment activities to develop, document, maintain, and enhance centralized subterranean operations. CBP has designated its Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination to coordinate and be the primary point of contact for CBP Tunnel Detection and Technology Program efforts.
CBP’s Office of Finance, Facilities Management and Engineering has the national lead for tunnel remediation efforts. CBP is also working with ICE, DEA, and JTF North to form a centralized group that deals with tunnel related activities and technology.

**Directorate of Science and Technology (DHS/S&T)**

DHS/S&T is working with CBP, the Department of Defense, industry, and academia to identify, develop, test, and implement tunnel detection technologies. DHS/S&T’s mission is to create high-risk/high-reward homeland security research and development projects that could lead to significant technology breakthroughs that would greatly enhance Department of Homeland Security operations.

During FY 2009, DHS/S&T will continue its Tunnel Detect Innovations Project, which is aimed at developing detection technologies to locate clandestine underground tunnels which are used for crossborder illegal activities such as smuggling.

- In FY 2008, DHS/S&T conducted a series of demonstrations of an electromagnetic radio frequency gradiometer mounted on an unmanned aircraft system. This device will be further evaluated by CBP and ICE. Research and development activities will include incorporating other sensors such as hyperspectral camera systems, which detect differences in environmental characteristics (e.g., moisture), suggesting the presence of a tunnel. The project initiated a parallel effort to prototype and test advanced ground-penetrating radar for tunnel detection. In FY 2009, DHS/S&T will demonstrate the ground-penetrating radar and investigate additional technologies by leveraging Department of Defense tunnel detection efforts for border protection applications.

DHS/S&T is working closely with the Department of Defense to coordinate the following tunnel detection technology research, development, testing, and evaluation initiatives:

- In FY 2008, the Department of Defense developed and installed a fiberoptic based seismic acoustic sensor prototype system in the San Diego area. In FY 2009, DHS/S&T will purchase this system and support its continued operational evaluation by the San Diego Tunnel Task Force (SDTF).
- DHS/S&T will cosponsor a “Tunnel Detection” Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), currently being proposed by USNORTHCOM.
- DHS/S&T is partnering with the Department of Defense to develop a Joint Tunnel Testing Range (JTTR) at Yuma Proving Grounds. The JTTR will directly support tunnel detection system research, development, testing, and evaluation, including the planned JCTD as well as other tunnel technology research and development.

**Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)**

ICE’s Office of Investigations is exploring the “Non-Human Detection of Subterranean Tunnels” initiative, which seeks to develop “fish finder” technology which could have a capacity to detect existing tunnels. Electronic signature and gravitational detection technology has been slow in developing and has limited proven capability. Advanced acoustic and seismic sensors may prove to be the most effective technology currently under development.

- The application of this technology is being tested by a bed of fiberoptic sensors recently installed in the San Diego region by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Testing is currently being conducted.
between the double fence line along the border in between the San Ysidro and the Otay Mesa POEs – an area which has been the site of three major crossborder tunnels. The technology is expected to be able to detect and localize the digging of new tunnels, as well as the sounds of activities associated with existing tunnels.

SAN DIEGO TUNNEL TASK FORCE (SDTF)

One effective model that has improved law enforcement efforts against tunnel activity is the cooperative effort in San Diego, California known as the San Diego Tunnel Task Force (SDTF), where investigators and agents from several agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (ICE and CBP/Border Patrol), the Department of Defense (Naval Criminal Investigative Service), and the Department of Justice (DEA and FBI) are brought together to combat the tunnel threat.

- The SDTF has received financial support from the ICE BEST program and from DEA, which contributes to the SDTF through the Operation Alliance HIDTA Program. This program collocates groups of agents at the DEA Resident Agent in Charge and ICE Deputy Special Agent in Charge San Ysidro, California office.
- The SDTF model has the ability to collect information and intelligence from the several agencies working in the border area to coordinate their resources towards combating the tunnel threat. Additionally, the SDTF serves as the local point of contact for tunnel remediation, detection technology development, and field testing. Many of the investigators also act as subject matter experts in support of tunnel detection technology development.

The SDTF has provided advice and feedback to the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security concerning efforts to evaluate technologies that could meet the operational requirements for a tunnel detection field capability. These efforts include:

- Evaluating demonstrations of commercial off-the-shelf products and developmental prototypes that could be fielded to detect tunnels or the evidence of underground activity, as well as remotely map discovered tunnels, and
- Developing and demonstrating an airborne multi-sensor system which could provide real-time alerts of probable tunnel activity to operational law enforcement personnel.

CRIMINAL PENALTIES

The Border Tunnel Prevention Act, signed into law in October 2006, provides increased criminal penalties for persons who construct or use a tunnel or subterranean passageway for illegal purposes. This legislation amended Chapter 27 of Title 18, United States Code, to prohibit unauthorized construction, financing, or reckless permitting (on one’s land) of the construction or use of a tunnel or subterranean passageway between the United States and another country. The specific provisions include:

- A 10-year prison term on any person who recklessly permits the construction or use of a tunnel or subterranean passageway on land which that person controls.
- A 20-year prison term on any person who knowingly constructs or finances the construction of a tunnel or subterranean passageway that crosses the international border between the United States and another country, other than a lawfully-authorized tunnel or passage known to the Secretary of Homeland Security and subject to inspection by ICE.
• A doubling of penalties for persons who use a tunnel or subterranean passageway to unlawfully smuggle an alien, any controlled substance, weapons of mass destruction (including biological weapons), or any member of a terrorist organization.

• Authorization for the forfeiture of any property involved in, or traceable to, the construction or financing of an illegal tunnel or subterranean passageway.

• An instruction to the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate or amend sentencing guidelines to provide for increased penalties for persons convicted of criminal offenses related to the construction or financing of an illegal tunnel or subterranean passageway.

Recommendation: The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security should examine the efficacy of formally designating a violation of The Border Tunnel Prevention Act as a predicate offense for conducting a Title III wire intercept.

CONCLUSION

As part of the administration’s overall border security policy, this strategy supports the collective interagency effort to end the construction and use of tunnels and subterranean passageways for the purpose of smuggling illegal drugs into the United States. Since terrorists have the potential to use already-established smuggling pathways -- such as tunnels -- to move illegal contraband, personnel, and money across borders, it is essential that tunnels be viewed as a unique and growing threat to the homeland.

The interagency will continue to synchronize its collective efforts to 1) conduct research and development, which leads to better tunnel detection capabilities; 2) improve the collection and sharing of tunnel related information and intelligence, both within the U.S. interagency community and between U.S. authorities and their Mexican counterparts; and 3) establish and execute joint initiatives with Mexico directed at ending the construction and use of tunnels under the Southwest border. The combination of strengthened criminal penalties, improved detection capabilities, and enhanced sharing of information will help to achieve these goals.
APPENDIX B: RESOURCES

The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy provides a comprehensive assessment of activities aimed at substantially reducing the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border, including coordination efforts among Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector entities. The strategy will be resourced through the budgets of several National Drug Control Program agencies, along with support from agencies that are not currently included in the National Drug Control Budget. The information in this appendix represents some of the specific resources that are being requested by departments and agencies in their FY 2010 budgets that will support the strategy.

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $511.8 million

DEA's Southwest border initiatives are part of the larger Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS) in the Western Hemisphere. DFAS is an innovative, multi-agency strategy designed to significantly disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between the source zones and the United States by attacking vulnerabilities in the supply chains, transportation systems, and financial infrastructure of major drug trafficking organizations. DEA's FY 2010 request includes $24.1 million, an increase of 6.5 percent over the FY 2009 enacted level, for 128 positions (including 70 domestic Special Agents and 25 Intelligence Analysts) to attack the flow of drugs across our Southwest border, which remains a critical front in our Nation's defense against both illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. This request also provides funding for Special Field Intelligence Programs (SFIP). Positions concentrated in the Southwest border region will enable DEA to carry out well-planned and coordinated enforcement operations in arrival zone areas. Additional positions and funding throughout the Nation will allow DEA to fully support Southwest border investigations, which frequently involve drug trafficking organizations with operations that extend far into the United States.

DEA has several operational efforts along the Southwest border targeting Mexican drug trafficking organizations. In the past year, DEA completed several major operations that took multi-ton quantities of illicit narcotics off the streets, resulting in the seizure of millions of dollars, and leading to the arrest of hundreds of cartel members. For example, in February 2009, DEA concluded Operation Xcellerator, a 21-month multi-agency investigation targeting the Sinaloa Cartel. As of February 25, 2009, Operation Xcellerator had led to the arrest of 755 individuals and the seizure of approximately $59.1 million in U.S. currency. Drug seizures include more than 12 metric tons of cocaine and more than 7.3 metric tons of marijuana.

DEA's Operation All Inclusive, the centerpiece of the Drug Flow Attack Strategy, has caused major disruptions in the flow of cocaine, money, and chemicals between source zone areas and the United States. Most recently, Operation All Inclusive 2008 was conducted from January 15 to October 20, 2008, and focused on disrupting the flow of drugs, chemicals, and money from the source zone (South America), through the transit zone (Mexico/Central America/Caribbean), and into the United States. This iteration of Operation All Inclusive expanded the geographical area of operational coverage to include portions of the Southwest border and the Andean Region...
Operation All Inclusive 2008 resulted in the seizure of 100 metric tons of cocaine; the seizure of more than $92 million in U.S. currency/assets; and the arrest of CPOTs Jorge Mario Paredes-Cordova and Eduardo Arellano-Felix, and Priority Targets Luis Urbina-Amaya, Lester Marina-Pastor, and Juan Rivera-Perez.

EPIC is a further example of the emphasis DEA places on the Southwest border. EPIC is a national tactical intelligence center that supports law enforcement efforts throughout the Western Hemisphere and is DEA's long-standing and most important intelligence sharing organization focusing on the Southwest border. Much of EPIC's success can be attributed to the strong partnerships forged among the more than 20 agencies represented at the center, including representatives from foreign police organizations in Mexico and Colombia. DEA also has information sharing agreements with police agencies in all 50 states. Through its 24-hour Watch function, EPIC provides law enforcement agents, investigators, and analysts at all levels of government, throughout the United States and in some foreign nations, with immediate access to participating agencies' databases. This function is critical in the dissemination of relevant information in support of tactical and investigative activities, deconfliction, and officer safety. EPIC also provides significant direct tactical intelligence support to State and local law enforcement agencies, especially in the areas of clandestine laboratory investigations and highway interdiction efforts.

ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES (OCDETF)
FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $99.8 million

The OCDETF Program supports the Department of Justice's efforts to reduce illegal drug availability by prioritizing resources in a multi-faceted approach to fully dismantle those drug trafficking and money laundering organizations having the most significant impact on the United States. The OCDETF Program has identified these organizations through the Attorney General's Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list. Currently, there are 55 organizations that have been designated by the Attorney General as CPOTs and approximately 589 active investigations targeting organizations that are linked to one of these 55 targets. The vast majority of these organizations are involved in drug trafficking and/or money laundering activities that directly impact the movement of drugs and money across the Southwest border of the United States. Forty-three percent of the active CPOT-linked investigations are out of the Southwest OCDETF Region.

In addition to addressing the Southwest border threat through the CPOT initiative, OCDETF is devoting resources to attacking the Gatekeepers along the Southwest border through the OCDETF Southwest Region Gatekeeper Initiative. Gatekeepers are individuals that control geographically specific corridors, or “plazas,” along the U.S.-Mexico border and utilize political, social, and family connections to facilitate smuggling of all kinds. These Gatekeepers collect fees to facilitate the movement of contraband from Mexico into the United States.

The OCDETF Gatekeeper Initiative’s objectives are as follows: (1) establish multi-district OCDETF investigations of the major Gatekeepers and their organizations operating along the Southwest border, including the identification and investigation of corrupt law enforcement officials on both sides of the border; (2) identify additional activities of the Gatekeepers in other OCDETF Regions and pass investigative leads to those jurisdictions, thus broadening the scope of Gatekeeper investigations; (3) disrupt drug trafficking patterns along the Southwest border by attacking the smuggling activities of major drug cartels, including CPOTs; (4) target the illegal purchase and distribution of firearms by the subjects of Gatekeeper and CPOT investigations, including analyzing intelligence information to identify facilitators for the CPOTs and Gatekeepers, such as Federal Firearms Licensees and straw purchasers.
OCDETF has been working to develop a more strategic, intelligence-driven approach to investigations. At the centerpiece of this effort has been the development of the OCDETF Fusion Center (OFC), which has combined the drug and drug related financial intelligence of the OCDETF member agencies as well as other relevant information from other agencies, such as the National Drug Intelligence Center, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the State Department. The primary purpose of the OFC has been to develop a more robust intelligence capability to support the efforts of OCDETF participants to “connect the dots” and dismantle organizations in their entirety. These efforts have had a direct impact on investigations along the Southwest border.

Finally, the OCDETF Program Southwest Border Initiative includes a strong prosecution component. To truly be successful in dismantling the organizations responsible for moving drugs and money across the Southwest border, it is not enough to investigate these organizations and make arrests; the members of these organizations must face indictment and prosecution.

The President’s FY 2010 budget request supports additional Southwest border investigative and prosecution resources. The 2010 budget request seeks to expand OCDETF’s ability to focus on those CPOTs and CPOT-linked organizations that are impacting the Southwest border by addressing the intelligence, enforcement, and prosecution requirements needed to reduce the volume of drugs and money crossing the Southwest border. The President’s FY 2010 budget requests $99.8 million for 766 full time equivalents (FTEs), including 456 agents and 87 attorneys, representing an increase of approximately $11.2 million, or 12.7 percent, over the FY 2009 enacted level. OCDETF’s request for FY 2010 seeks enhancements for a Southwest Border Enforcement Initiative that aligns directly with the Department of Justice priorities to dismantle drug trafficking organizations, stop the spread of illegal drugs, and reduce violent crime, especially violence perpetrated with guns or by gangs.

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (OJP)
FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $30.0 million

The Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative provides funding for local prosecutor offices in the four border states of California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. This program, which is authorized by the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L.109-108) and administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, provides payments to support approved prosecution and pre-trial detention costs for cases formally referred to local prosecutors by the U.S. Attorneys Offices and for cases diverted from Federal prosecution by law enforcement pursuant to a locally negotiated agreement. In FY 2010, OJP requests $30 million for this program to continue to provide payments.

The new Southern Border Enforcement Assistance initiative, funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, will award competitive grants to provide assistance and equipment to State, local and tribal law enforcement agencies and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) along the Nation’s Southwest border to help combat border related criminal narcotics activity. Of the funding provided for this initiative, $30 million will be provided for grants and $10 million will be transferred to the ATF to support Project Gunrunner. All applications submitted under this solicitation must address one of the following goals:

- Control, reduce, and/or prevent criminal narcotics activity, including drug related crime and violence, along the Southern border region of the United States, or

- Control, reduce, and/or prevent criminal narcotics activity, including drug related crime and violence, in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas in order to combat criminal narcotics activity stemming from the Southern border of the United States.
Plans for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) include increasing enforcement staffing to combat a wide variety of illegal activities threatening the Southwest border, improving cooperative efforts with the Mexican government, reinforcing intelligence operations in the region, and establishing another Border Violence Intelligence Cell to collect, analyze, and disseminate vital information to the field and the intelligence community. These efforts are intended to lessen the risk of increased criminal activity, weapons and arms smuggling, victimization of smuggled aliens, and the entry of terrorists, criminals, and gang members through the Southwest border.

**ICE Office of Investigations (ICE/OI)**

*FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $48.7 million, $26.5 million drug related*

This request will provide $34.9 million to fund 208 Office of Investigation positions needed to support the Department of Homeland Security’s Southwest Border Security Initiative. The Southwest Border Security Initiative will allow ICE to identify criminal activities and eliminate vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our nation’s borders, as well as support economic, transportation, and infrastructure security. By protecting the Nation’s border security, ICE further expands efforts to eliminate the potential threat of terrorist acts against the United States. The remaining $13.8 million in non-personnel resources will fund travel, training, and other costs as indicated below. This initiative helps to secure the Southwest border of the United States and mitigates the risk associated with foreign nationals operating both outside and within the United States that seek to exploit border vulnerabilities. In addition, non-personnel costs for facilities along the Southwest border seek to adequately support the increase in personnel resources.

**Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)**

ICE Office of Investigations (ICE/OI) is requesting additional personnel for the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST). In addition, OI is requesting non-personnel costs for facilities to house the BEST entities; training for U.S. and Government of Mexico personnel; support for the contingent of foreign law enforcement officers; and the purchase of computer equipment for intelligence and data-mining purposes. BEST is a critical cornerstone of the Secure Border Initiative. BEST integrates Federal, foreign, State, and local law enforcement efforts in the field that are focused on the identification, disruption, and dismantling of crossborder criminal organizations. Interdiction efforts will prevent the smuggling and illegal entry of persons, with a priority on terrorist groups, gang members, and criminal aliens. Investigative efforts will target human smuggling, contraband smuggling, weapons smuggling, money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, criminal gangs, critical infrastructure threats, identity theft and benefit fraud, and any other vulnerabilities that pose a threat to public safety or national security.

**Financial Investigations**

To augment investigations along the Southwest border, ICE/OI is requesting additional Special Agents and Investigative Analysts to focus its financial investigations program on crimes associated with national security and critical infrastructure. ICE/OI aggressively pursues the financial component of every investigation. ICE/OI supports many long-standing initiatives concerning national security: money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, unlicensed money service businesses, and corrupt foreign officials, all of which pose threats to national security and critical infrastructure.
Arms and Strategic Technology Investigations (ASTI)
ICE is requesting funding for additional Special Agents and non-personnel costs to effectively respond to and support the task of investigating the illegal smuggling of weapons from the United States into Mexico. ICE, in partnership with Federal, State, and international law enforcement officials, expanded its ongoing Border Crimes Initiative to include the creation of BESTs in five locations along the U.S. Southwest border. ICE is initiating an expansion of “Operation Armas Cruzadas,” which focuses on the synchronization of key elements in order to comprehensively identify and disrupt illicit cross-border activities that support weapons smuggling/trafficking networks. The initiative implements numerous parallel activities that enhance timely exploitation of the “3-I cycle” - interdiction, investigation, and intelligence - by both Department of Homeland Security and Government of Mexico law enforcement agencies.

Asset Forfeiture
ICE is requesting additional personnel to store and maintain seized property and evidence related to national security and critical infrastructure cases along the Southwest border. Illicit proceeds are gained by organizations utilizing undocumented workers at POEs and/or in-bond warehouses and are used to sustain criminal activity. Asset forfeiture laws allow ICE agents to seize and forfeit the illicit proceeds and other criminally derived assets from critical infrastructure cases.

U.S. Attorney’s Office Liaisons
This request funds Special Agents for liaison positions at the U.S. Attorneys Offices along the Southwest border. The ICE/OI liaison to the U.S. Attorney’s Office will be responsible for managing any task or issue, and enhancing relationships at the U.S. Attorney’s Office relating to ICE/OI investigative authorities or activities. The ICE liaison will facilitate the presentation of other ICE/OI cases for intake by advising ICE agents and supervisors about prosecution guidelines.

With respect to the U.S. Attorneys Offices’ expedited “fast track” program to prosecute previously deported aliens with significant criminal histories, the agent liaison will coordinate and handle intake of such matters. Additionally, the liaison will support fellow ICE agents who request support with matters at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the grand jury, or the District Court.

Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL)
The ICE FDL is requesting additional personnel and funding for very specialized and expensive forensic examination equipment to support the Southwest Border Security Initiative. The FDL plays a pivotal role by directly supporting investigations involving documents or requiring fingerprint examination services, forensic examinations, and provides expert testimony concerning examinations. Many of the programs covered by this initiative, including BEST, ASTI, Financial, Human Rights Violators Center, Human Smuggling and Trafficking, and Worksite, use the services of the FDL to support their investigations.

Human Smuggling and Trafficking
ICE is requesting FTEs to address critical infrastructure and national security violations that involve smuggling or trafficking in aliens or some other form of worker exploitation. Additional non-personnel costs are requested for document translation, training, and staff travel.
**Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC)**
ICE is requesting additional FTEs and funding to expand the HSTC in accordance with Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The HSTC is a multi-agency organization representing the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of State, as well as the Intelligence Community, and is designed to focus the U.S. Government’s efforts to dismantle human smuggling and trafficking organizations. The HSTC has the unique capability to pull together elements from the diplomatic, prosecutorial, law enforcement, and intelligence arenas to have a seamless and coordinated government approach to combating the illegal movement of people into the United States along the Southwest border.

**Identity and Benefit Fraud (IDBF)**
IDBF presents a national security vulnerability by which illegal aliens, to possibly include terrorists and other persons who pose a risk to public safety, can not only gain entry into the United States but also remain here under a guise of legitimacy.

**Title III**
The personnel requested would administer the Title III National contract, facilitate security clearances of monitors, review and process funding requests, process Title III applications, coordinate the Title III training seminar, and administer Title III equipment upgrades, maintenance, and call data. ICE Title III intercepts are an integral tool in many successful criminal investigations. ICE Title III investigations include crimes related to narcotics, child pornography, child sex tourism, human trafficking and smuggling, technology transfer, financial investigations, and gangs.

**ICE Office of International Affairs (ICE/OIA)**
**FY 2010 Southwest border related funding:** $4.9 million, $0.3 million drug related
ICE/OIA requests $4.9 million for the Department of Homeland Security Southwest Border Security Initiative. This initiative will fund 11 Criminal Investigators along Mexico’s northern border in high-risk locations and one Contracting Specialist to provide mission support. The Criminal Investigators will assist in reinforcing and strengthening Office of Investigations operations along the U.S. Southwest border. These agents will:

- Enhance interagency and interdisciplinary efforts between ICE and Mexico;
- Increase ICE’s efforts to identify, disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations and networks;
- Increase the number of priority cases originating in Mexico;
- Increase leads and intelligence information and domestic and host country enforcement actions; and
- Increase coordination with Mexico to target and reduce vulnerabilities and criminal organizations that threaten our security.

This request includes travel costs and will increase cooperation and improve intelligence sharing with our foreign counterparts.
$1.6 million of this request will fund:

- Eleven Criminal Investigators (Overseas) for northern border of Mexico operations to be deployed to Attaché and Consulate offices in Mexico; and
- One Contracting specialist.

$3.3 million of this request will fund:

- Continuing support to the attaché and consulate offices, which support the investigative activities against criminal organizations along the northern border of Mexico. This funding will support operational travel, increased work with foreign counterparts, training, intelligence sharing, interdiction, and investigation of transnational crimes.

The Department of Homeland Security Southwest Border Security Initiative expands and reinforces ICE efforts to protect America by upholding the security and safety of the public along the U.S. Southwest border, specifically by expanding the law enforcement presence overseas along Mexico’s northern border in high-risk locations. By adding investigators who will be supported from existing attaché and consulate offices, OIA will be able to sustain operations where investigations have rapidly increased and the need for crossborder investigative support has been identified. This initiative will fund experienced investigators conducting operations along the northern Mexico border based from three existing offices along the Mexican border and in Mexico City. These efforts will increase support to a number of key homeland security priorities, including preventing cross border crime and associated violence; increasing the ability to engage in bilateral interdiction, investigation, and intelligence sharing activities with the Government of Mexico; and disrupting and dismantling trans border criminal networks engaged in the smuggling of weapons, aliens, and contraband. The comprehensive approach of the Southwest Border Security Initiative will further allow ICE to identify criminal activities and eliminate vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our Nation’s borders, as well as address the public safety threat of criminal organizations operating from Mexican border communities and ultimately to eliminate the potential threat of terrorist acts against the United States.

**ICE Office of Intelligence**

**FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $9.7 million, $1.1 million drug related**

ICE is requesting $6.9 million for 90 Intelligence Officers to reinforce intelligence operations along the Southwest border at existing Southwest border Field Intelligence Groups, current and projected BESTs along the Southwest border, and at the Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC) based at the El Paso Intelligence Center.

BVIC facilitates timely information sharing with State, tribal, local, foreign and other federal law enforcement activities, and serves as the focal point for analyzing all-source intelligence, referring leads to the Border Enforcement Security Task Force groups and ICE attaché Mexico offices to seamlessly support investigation of the criminal networks that span the Southwest border. BEST groups, ICE attaché offices, and the U.S.-vetted Government of Mexico Arms Trafficking Group all exchange crossborder weapons related intelligence through the BVIC.
This enhancement will improve ICE’s capability to develop pre-operational intelligence reports, strategic intelligence products, and post-operational impact assessments. These products will enable the enforcement resources of the Department, ICE, and partner agencies to have the maximum impact possible to protect the Homeland, stem Southwest border violence, and uphold public safety.

The requested Report Writers will ensure that information collected by ICE is appropriately shared with the Intelligence Community. ICE information can fill gaps in intelligence reporting and enable the United States to uncover previously unknown connections among terrorist organizations or other criminal groups. Proper reporting, which includes recognition of the source of the information, serves to promote secure borders by integrating domestic, border, and international intelligence.

The intelligence support provided to the Southwest border will also include expanded liaison to the national Intelligence Community, improved document exploitation capabilities for ICE field offices, improved trend and pattern analysis used to build forecast models, and greater ability to inform the overall enforcement focus along the Southwest border on law enforcement execution and vital resource management issues.

**Mission Support**

*FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $6.7 million, not drug related*

ICE is requesting $3.1 million for administrative personnel, such as legal counsel, personnel security, information technology, and asset management personnel to support the additional personnel requested in the FY 2010 Southwest Border Security Initiative. $3.6 million is requested for human resources support and for facility costs for new personnel.

**U.S. Customs and Border Protection**

*FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $26.1 million, $6.6 million drug related*

CBP requests $10.0 million ($3.0 million drug related) to expand CBP’s Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) Program to 58 outbound lanes on the southern border at the ports of entry. An additional $16.1 million ($3.6 million drug related) is requested to hire 65 CBP officers, 44 Border Patrol agents, and 16 support staff for this initiative that will also be dedicated to the outbound program and be deployed at and between the ports of entry.

In recent years, outbound enforcement operations in both the passenger/traveler and cargo arenas have been implemented, as personnel and budgetary resources allow. Due to staffing constraints, the post 9/11 emphasis has been primarily on in-bound passengers and cargo. However, with the increased threat to the United States as a result of the recent outbreak of violence along the Southwest border, CBP has begun to revamp its outbound strategies and activities for both passengers/travelers and for cargo. The primary focus is on mitigating drug smuggling and the illegal export of firearms and currency from the United States into Mexico that is contributing to the violence.

CBP’s strategy to mitigate the border violence is to dedicate staff to conduct outbound inspections at and between the ports of entry and to interdict the smuggled currency and firearms that are contributing to violence and strengthening the drug cartels. The expansion of the ALPR Program on the Southwest border will assist CBP officers and Border Patrol agents in identifying anomalies in the travel patterns of southbound vehicles that are often indicative of persons trying to avoid detection for illegal behavior.
CBP Office of Border Patrol (OBP)

*FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $8.0 million, $1.2 million drug related*

For FY 2010, the Office of Border Patrol is requesting $8.0 million ($1.2 million drug related) for 52 positions (44 agents and 8 support staff) to be dedicated to combating southbound firearms and currency smuggling. Potential deployments of these enhancements will be in the positions of Border Patrol agents, canine teams, lead Border Patrol agents, intelligence agents, and intelligence analysts. All OBP positions will be assigned in a manner designed to increase the efficiency and the focus of CBP’s southbound operations, to include increasing the presence of Border Patrol agents assigned to Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs). Additionally, increasing agents assigned to the Border Patrol Law Enforcement Technical Collection program will provide CBP the ability to execute intelligence driven law enforcement operations.

CBP Office of Field Operations (CBP/OFO)

*FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $18.1, $5.4 million drug related*

For FY 2010, the Office of Field Operations is requesting $ 8.1 million ($2.4 million drug related) for 73 positions (65 Customs and Border Protection officers and 8 support staff) to be dedicated to combating southbound firearms and currency smuggling. These positions will be used to establish dedicated outbound enforcement teams along the Southwest border, which will provide CBP/OFO with the capability to conduct sustained and recurring outbound enforcement activities. Presently, CBP/OFO conducts short-term operations as resources allow.

Seizure data over the past two years demonstrate the increasing threat of outbound weapons and currency smuggling to Mexico. In FY 2007, CBP/OFO initiated 353 southbound seizures totaling $13.7 million in currency. This increased in FY 2008 to 450 southbound currency seizures, totaling $12.5 million in currency. Similarly, CBP/OFO seized 316 weapons in FY 2007 and 257 weapons in FY 2008.

CBP is requesting $10.0 million ($3.0 million drug related) for the ALPR program, which will support CBP’s focus on combating southbound firearms and currency smuggling. The ALPR is a tool that consists of cameras and sensors that captures an image of a vehicle’s license plate, converts the image to text showing the state/province of origin and the alphanumeric characters, formats the data, and sends a primary vehicle query to TECS. The ALPR tool automatically locates, reads, and communicates personal vehicle license plate information to the TECS system. TECS then automatically queries its database for law enforcement information associated with that license plate and provides the CBP officer or the Border Patrol agent with the response information.

The deployment of ALPRs will provide for rapid, accurate querying of the license plates through TECS and enable the interception of suspect vehicles, including terrorist related vehicles, for which lookout records have been established. Furthermore, ALPRs will improve the selectivity of low- and high-risk vehicles and people, while expediting the clearance process for low-risk travelers.

Currently, there are a total of 416 ALPRs installed, 358 ALPR inbound primary inspection lanes, 52 outbound traffic lanes, and 3 commercial lanes installed at northern and southern border POEs. In addition to the ALPRs installed at the POEs, there are also 3 ALPR lanes installed at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, GA. As it relates to ALPRs being installed at Border Patrol checkpoints, there is one Border Patrol pilot site currently in progress in the Laredo area.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $94.9 million

The Department of Defense will continue to provide robust support to law enforcement along the Southwest border. The National Guard will continue to provide support via the Governor’s State Plans. The Tethered Aerostat Program provides dedicated radar surveillance of the U.S. Southwest border, and Joint Task Force North will continue to provide persistent air and maritime surveillance, in order to detect and monitor the trafficking of illegal drugs.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE/UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Funding Request in FY 2010
Merida Mexico: $450.0 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Funding

The Merida Initiative seeks to strengthen the capacities of the Governments of Mexico and Central America to confront and bring under control criminal organizations operating within their territories. United States Government assistance falls into the broad areas of: (1) counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and border security; (2) public security and law enforcement; and (3) institution building and rule of law. The U.S. Government recognizes the immediate need to combat the criminal organizations and associated violence; the medium-term requirement to augment the capabilities of civilian law enforcement and security entities; and the long-term necessity of strengthening judicial and other state institutions to resist corruption and improve the administration of justice.

Peace and security are the United States’ top priorities with Mexico. The Merida Initiative will provide support for Mexico’s anti-crime and counternarcotics efforts, including interdiction, demand reduction activities, and Mexico’s expanding anti-money laundering regime. The Department of State will provide significant support to Mexico’s restructuring of its police and judicial institutions. U.S. collaboration and technical assistance to Mexico’s law enforcement and military entities complement Mexican Government efforts to improve and expand its capacity to fight illicit trafficking of all kinds (drugs, arms, currency, and people), including better systems of integration and professional training. The provision of non-intrusive inspection equipment will combat illicit trafficking while facilitating legitimate crossborder commerce. Simultaneously, robust funding will allow for the provision of important, capital-intensive assistance, such as transport and surveillance aircraft, that are essential to Mexican efforts to confront well-funded and equipped criminal groups. Programs will help strengthen technical and data-sharing capabilities, preserve respect for human rights, improve resource management, increase English-language skills, and enhance interoperability and cooperation in counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions.

Support for drug demand reduction efforts, including support for better epidemiological data and groups involved in prevention and treatment, will help underscore the common interest in counternarcotics efforts. These efforts will focus on the U.S. border region, where abuse rates are three times the Mexican national average and drug trafficking related violence is a daily threat to the citizens of both countries.

Through the Merida Initiative, U.S. assistance supports Mexican government efforts to improve its criminal justice system by raising professional standards and strengthening communication and collaboration among Federal, State, and local authorities. U.S.-funded technical assistance will continue to support the justice sector (i.e., prosecutors, investigative police, judges, and public defenders) in the following areas: drafting oral adversarial codes of criminal procedures; designing a viable implementation plan; case and court management;
and on-site training in the new system’s initial stages of implementation. U.S. assistance will support Mexico’s endeavors in instituting governmental code reforms and institutional regulations. The goals of the reforms are to professionalize and develop a unified police, promote institutional checks and balances, strengthen transparency and citizen oversight, support the adoption and implementation of legislation against trafficking in persons, train judges to comply fully with the Hague Conventions on International Parental Child Abduction and International Adoption, and enhance and promote anti-corruption enforcement. These activities will increase the confidence of the Mexican people in their justice system by making prosecutions more transparent, protecting key witnesses, and improving respect for human rights by the justice sector, including the police and military personnel. Seeking to further improve public confidence, support will also be given to improve the capacity of Mexican efforts to investigate and reduce government corruption and unethical practices. U.S. support will also include efforts to expand and improve Mexico’s asset forfeiture regime in order to increase the financial risk of criminal activity. The political participation and consensus-building program will promote increased linkages between civil society groups, party caucuses, and political parties.

Other-related international initiatives

While the following international initiatives do not directly contribute to the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, their international programs complement the strategy.

**Merida Central America:**  
$75.0 million in INCLE  
$25.0 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF)

As part of the Merida Initiative, the U.S. Government remains committed to supporting the nations of Central America in countering the influence of traffickers, gangs, and organized criminal groups in their territories. Central America programs are slated to improve border security, counter the demand for and illicit movement of narcotics, deter gang activity, combat financial crimes and money laundering, and curb trafficking in persons. The Merida Initiative provides the United States and the countries of Central America with a regional vehicle to accomplish these objectives and to link our efforts in Mexico with those in Central America and the Caribbean. Ultimately, the results will enable the governments in Central America to reassert control over their territory, provide the stability needed for the creation of new economic opportunities, and reinforce the critical role of democratic institutions and adherence to the rule of law. Continued support for Enduring Friendship, a program that began in 2006 to bolster maritime interdiction capabilities in the Caribbean and eastern Central America, complements maritime security support provided under both the Merida Initiative and the new Caribbean Security Initiative. The Merida Initiative will support programs to enhance rule of law, provide equipment and training to counternarcotics forces, assist efforts to strengthen anti-crime legislation, and support information sharing among the customs, law enforcement, and border control agencies in the Caribbean.

Central America programs under the Merida Initiative also aim to strengthen justice systems and preserve the integrity of human rights, as well as promote economic and social development and good governance in low-income areas, including rural communities that are vulnerable to drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime. The Merida Initiative seeks to weaken the structure – and diminish the influence and violence – of drug cartels and other criminal organizations operating in Mexico, Central America, and the United States, with a continual drive toward their destruction. Whether they are drug traffickers, human smugglers, or gangs, these criminal groups have weakened government institutions, exercised control over territory, and presided over a significant increase in crime and violence throughout the region.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative: $6.0 million in INCLE
$18.0 million in Foreign Military Financing
$13.0 million in ESF
$8.0 million in Development Assistance (DA)

The President’s FY 2010 budget request includes the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, a nearly $45.0 million security assistance plan for the region. This new multidimensional initiative represents, like Merida, a collaborative, multinational approach to addressing the issues of narcotics and arms trafficking, and organized crime, while simultaneously focusing on the root causes of crime in the region, which include a lack of economic and educational opportunities, resource-depleted governmental institutions, and legal reforms aimed at enabling law enforcement institutions.

OTHER-RELATED DRUG CONTROL AGENCIES

The Other-Related Drug Control Program (ORDCP) agencies are those agencies with primary missions that do not include drug control, nor have readily identifiable drug control line items in the Budget of the President. While the following agencies are not a part of the National Drug Control Budget, they provide essential support to the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $61.0 million

ATF’s Project Gunrunner continues to provide substantive information to ATF agents and investigators, and has resulted in ATF referring more than 1,500 defendants for prosecution in cases involving more than 12,000 weapons. ATF’s eTrace initiative with Mexican officials has been successful in developing investigative leads involving firearms traffickers and straw purchasers. In FY 2008, Mexico submitted more than 7,500 recovered guns for tracing, showing that most originated in Texas, Arizona, and California.

- ATF initiated Project Gunrunner in recognition of the growing violence along the border and the resulting threat to our national security. These efforts were recognized in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. ATF received $10 million for Project Gunrunner, to include hiring 25 new special agents, six industry operations investigators, three intelligence research specialists, and three investigative analysts.
- The funding will establish three permanent field offices, dedicated to firearms trafficking investigations, in McAllen, Texas; El Centro, California; and Las Cruces, New Mexico (including a satellite office in Roswell, New Mexico). ATF will be assigning four agents in the Mexican border cities of Tijuana and Juarez with these funds. These funds are in addition to $5.9 million included in ATF’s FY 2009 budget that will hire 22 agents, 16 Industry Operations Investigations and two Intelligence Analysts to support Southwest border activities. ATF will place two additional Gunrunner Teams in Phoenix, AZ and Houston, TX.
- ATF will be increasing its efforts by sending 100 additional personnel to the Houston Field Division in the next 45 days as part of a new ATF intelligence-driven effort known as Gunrunner Impact Teams. These teams will provide expertise in firearms trafficking and violent crime to the strategic partnerships developed to combat violence along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Criminal Division (CRM)
FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $9.9 million

The Criminal Division supports the President’s National Drug Control Strategy as well as the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. Below are examples how the Division supports these efforts:

- Criminal Division prosecutors investigate and prosecute drug traffickers on the Southwest border who most threaten the United States, either because they are the leaders of large drug supply and drug finance organizations, or because they are increasing the incidence of violent attacks in the Southwest border region. To combat the substantial threat of violence posed by these narcotics trafficking groups, the Division works with United States and Mexican Federal, State, and local law enforcement and criminal justice authorities to develop and implement new and additional law enforcement initiatives aimed at reducing the escalating drug related violence at the United States-Mexico border.

- As the Department’s expert on asset forfeiture and anti-money laundering enforcement, the Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section prosecutes and coordinates complex, sensitive, multi-district, and international money laundering and asset forfeiture investigations and cases. It works with U.S. Attorneys Offices, including those at the Southwest border, and other litigation components to strip the financial base from the major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.

- The Office of Enforcement Operations’ Wiretap Unit provides direct operational support to U.S. Attorneys Offices, other Federal prosecutors, and agents by reviewing all applications for electronic surveillance and by providing guidance to agents and prosecutors on the justification for the development of such applications. The use of Title III wiretaps is a critical tool to effectively target and dismantle the narcotics traffickers operating on the Southwest border.

- The Appellate Section briefs and argues cases, including drug trafficking and violent cases, in the district courts and courts of appeals and prepares draft briefs in the United States Supreme Court.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $47.0 million

The FBI has taken aggressive steps to address the criminal threats along the Southwest border in collaboration with other law enforcement partners. The following provides a high-level summary of the FBI’s work on the Southwest border.

The FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force has instituted the Central American Fingerprint Exchange (CAFE) initiative, as well as the Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) initiative, which coordinates the sharing of gang intelligence between El Salvador and the United States. The Southwest Intelligence Group (SWIG) is a new initiative for FY 2009 and is planned to be located at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).

Southwest Intelligence Group (SWIG)

- The FBI has created the SWIG to be a clearinghouse for all FBI activities involving Mexico. The SWIG serves Legat Mexico City, each of the Southwest border Special Agents in Charge, and FBI Headquarters.
CAFE

- CAFE was developed to collect and store existing fingerprint records from El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, as well as Chiapas, Mexico.
- These records are being integrated into the general database of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division, and will be accessible to all local, State, and Federal agencies in the United States through the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).
- CAFE will enable participating countries to conduct fingerprint identification and analysis by providing system hardware and training.

Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG)

- The FBI's MS-13 National Gang Task Force has created and implemented the Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Task Force to assist in combating the growing threat posed by transnational gangs and drug cartels in Latin America. The objective of the TAG is to aggressively investigate, disrupt, and dismantle gangs whose activities rise to the level of criminal enterprises.
- TAG combines the expertise, resources, and jurisdiction of participating agencies involved in investigating and countering transnational criminal gang activity, specifically MS-13 and 18th Street, in the United States, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico.
- Through information sharing and open communication with the Policia Nacional Civil of El Salvador, the TAG is in a position to acquire and disseminate valuable information previously unavailable to FBI field offices. Utilizing the support of host countries and participating law enforcement agencies, the TAG employs a comprehensive approach to address the threat which MS-13 and 18th Street present to the United States, as well as Central America.

The FBI resources are for expenses of the eight field offices along or in close proximity to the Mexican border: San Diego; Los Angeles; Phoenix; Albuquerque; El Paso; Dallas; San Antonio; and Houston; as well as the expenses for the SWIG initiated in FY 2009.

U.S. Attorneys (USA)

**FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $196.0 million**

The President’s FY 2010 budget proposes 1,296 FTEs and $196.0 million for Illegal Immigration and Southwest Border Enforcement, for resources to prosecute offenses related to border and interior immigration violations, as well as prosecution of gun trafficking and drug smuggling offenses in an effort to curb the violence along the Southwest border.

Recent program enhancements have sought to increase attorney and support staff resources to address the growing volume and complexity of Southwest border drug cases, including the growing involvement of trafficking organizations.

The unlawful exportation of firearms and ammunition from the United States to Mexico is a major cause of the violence in Mexico. The transit of drugs coming north and guns and ammunition going south has been fueling a war between drug cartels and law enforcement — a war that left thousands dead last year. In recognition of the
continued threat to the United States, the U.S. Attorneys have already begun to implement training to address this surge of violence. In summer 2009, the U.S. Attorneys will host training at the National Advocacy Center focused solely on Southwest border firearms trafficking. The training will be geared to Federal prosecutors and agents, as well as State and local authorities.

U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)

FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $239.2 million

The U.S. Marshals Service is the Federal government’s lead agency for conducting investigations involving: escaped federal prisoners; probation, parole and bond default violators; and fugitives based on warrants generated during drug investigations. A percentage of the combined USMS Judicial and Courthouse Security, Fugitive Apprehensions, and Prisoner Security and Transportation Budgets relate to drug enforcement. For each FY those percentages are: FY 2008 - 28%, and FY 2009 and FY 2010 - 24%.

The Office of the Federal Detention Trustee

FY 2010 Southwest border related funding: $411.3 million

The Office of the Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT) manages and regulates the Federal detention programs and the Justice Alien Prisoner Transportation system by establishing an effective operating environment that drives efficient and fair expenditure of appropriated funds. The OFDT provides for the safe and secure housing, transportation, and other related costs of Federal Detainees, including those held on drug offenses along the Southwest border.
APPENDIX C: COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

ALPR  Automated License Plate Reader
AMOC  Air and Marine Operations Center
ASTI  Arms and Strategic Technology Investigations
ATF   Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BEST  Border Enforcement Security Task Force
BLO   Border Liaison Officer
BVIC  Border Violence Intelligence Cell
CAFÉ  Central American Fingerprint Exchange
CBP   U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBP A&M U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine
CBP/OFO U.S. Customs and Border Protection/Office of Field Operations
CCDB  Consolidated Counterdrug Database
CIFTA Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (1997)
CONOPS Concept of Operations
COP   Common Operating Picture
CPO-T Consolidated Priority Organization Target
CTAC  Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center
DDTC  Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
DEA   Drug Enforcement Administration
DFAS  Drug Flow Attack Strategy
DHS/S&T Department of Homeland Security/Directorate for Science and Technology
EPIC  El Paso Intelligence Center
ERDC  U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDL   Forensic Document Laboratory
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFL   Federal Firearms Licensee
FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FTE   Full Time Equivalent
GCA   Gun Control Act of 1968
HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
HSTC  Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
IBIS  Integrated Ballistic Identification System
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICE/OI U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Office of Investigations
ICE/OIA U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Office of International Affairs
IDBF Identity and Benefit Fraud
IDENT Automated Biometrics Identification System
IRS Internal Revenue Service
IWG-IC Interagency Working Group on Intelligence Coordination
JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration
JTF North Joint Task Force North
JTTR Joint Tunnel Testing Range
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSB Money Services Business
NDDS U.S. Department of Justice Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section
NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center
NIBIN National Integrated Ballistics Information Network
NSS National Seizure System
NTC National Targeting Center – Passenger
NTC-C National Targeting Center – Cargo
OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control
OFC OCDETF Fusion Center
OFDT Office of the Federal Detention Trustee
ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy
ORDCP Other-Related Drug Control Program
POE Port of Entry
PRIDE Port Radiation Inspection, Detection, and Evaluation
US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
RAID Real-Time Analytical Intelligence Database
RPOT Regional Priority Organization Target
SDTF San Diego Tunnel Task Force
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SOD Special Operations Division
STRAP Surveillance and Tracking Radar Processor
SURGE Specialized Urban Response Gang Enforcement
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<td>SWIG</td>
<td>Southwest Intelligence Group</td>
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<td>TAG</td>
<td>Transnational Anti-Gang</td>
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<td>TARS</td>
<td>Tethered Aerostat Radar System</td>
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<td>formerly the Treasury Enforcement Communications System</td>
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