Detailed Information on the
Assistance to Rebuilding Countries Assessment

Identify and track intermediate indicators at the operating unit level that assess whether the program is on track to meet longer-term targets.

Ensure that performance on measures is factored into the decision-making process and presentation of future budget requests.

Develop targets for the efficiency measure and develop a method to identify cost savings or efficiencies from meeting future targets.

Measure: Percent change in sales of licit farm and non-farm products in U.S. Government assisted areas of Afghanistan

Explanation:This annual outcome measure indicates how far along the U.S. Government is in developing and implementing alternative livelihood programs in targeted poppy areas. The Alternative Livelihoods program is a key part of our five-pillar strategy for countering narcotics in Afghanistan and a fitting program for a rebuilding country, where our assistance addresses drivers of conflict and rebuilds economic capacity. This annual measure contributes to the longer term indicator measuring poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan. It is expected that as farmers increase the sales of licit farm and non-farm products, poppy cultivation levels will decrease. Direction of Change: Higher = Better

Measure: Number of kilometers of roads built in Afghanistan with US Government assistance

Explanation:This indicator measures progress in constructing provincial roads in Afghanistan and ties into long term indicators measuring success in Peace and Security (poppy cultivation) and Governing Justly and Democratically (World Bank Government Effectiveness Index). It is expected that as more roads are accessible, the writ of governance into provinces will improve and farmers will be more successful getting licit products to markets and will thus not rely on poppy cultivation. The targets are ambitious. Although the 2006 target was not met, significant progress was made. This is not a cumulative indicator.

Measure: Number of deaths among children under age five in Nepal and Afghanistan in a given year per 1,000 live births in that same year.

Explanation:The 2015 target is based on the Millennium Development Goals' effort to reduce the child mortality rate by two-thirds by 2015. Although targets for prior years are not available, the average rate has shown a steady decline. Under-five mortality rate is the probability of (expressed as a rate per 1,000 per births) of a child born in a specified year dying before reaching the age of five if subject to current age-specified mortality rates. Rationale: The under-five mortality rate demonstrates the likelihood that a child will survive past the age of five and is a widely used indicator to measure the overall health of the population in a given country. Direction of Change: Lower = Better

Measure: Number of rural households benefiting directly from U.S. Government interventions in Afghanistan

Explanation:This annual indicator measures the progress of U.S. Government efforts to increase the productivity and improve the livelihoods of the rural population in Afghanistan. It tracks progress toward the Economic Growth Objective and Peace and Security Objective via training and technical assistance to a range of agricultural stakeholders-from individual farmers and product distributors to agricultural departments in local universities and the Ministry of Agriculture. Targeted interventions will also provide expanded access to markets and credit in rural areas. Funds will also be used to support the development of viable commercial agro-business alliances. Improving the reach of U.S. Government rural development programs should correlate with a reduction in the long-term indicator of reduced poppy cultivation as more farmers rely on licit products. Rural development activities should also correlate to the long term indicator of "cost of starting a business," as more farmers have the capacity and skills sets needed to efficiently develop agro-businesses. In FY 2008 the target doubles due to the increased focus and funding for agriculture assistance. This indicator is not a cumulative indicator. Direction of Change: Higher = Better

Measure: Number of Afghanistan's Executive Branch personnel trained with US Government assistance

Explanation:The U.S. Government's training of Afghanistan's Executive Branch personnel supports efforts to apply a civil service reform model to Afghanistan. This activity is typical of our assistance for the Governing Justly and Democratically objective in Rebuilding Countries, in which there is a concentration on building the institutional capacity of the state. This indicator also correlates with the long-term indicator, the World Bank's Government Effectiveness Indicator. As more Afghan personnel are trained, the effectiveness of the government should increase. The FY 2008 target is significantly higher due to an in crease in funding for governance activities. This is not a cumulative indicator. Direction of Change: Higher = Better

Measure: Number of children under five years of age who received Vitamin A from U.S. Government supported programs in Nepal

Explanation:This indicator measures progress towards the U.S. effort in rebuilding countries to "restore/establish the provision of basic social services such as health." Vitamin A deficiency (VAD) is a global problem and is responsible for as many as one in four child deaths in areas with high VAD rates. Vitamin A is important for a healthy immune system, good vision, and reproduction. It can be difficult, however, for mothers and children in rebuilding countries to consume enough vitamin A because of poor availability of, or poor access to, nutrient-rich foods. In addition to dietary deficits, infections and parasites can also reduce the body's supply of vitamin A. This annual indicator correlates with the long-term indicator of under five mortality rate in Nepal. This is not a cumulative indicator. Direction of Change: Higher = Better

Measure: World Bank Government Effectiveness Index for Nepal

Explanation:The Government Effectiveness Index is one of six indicators utilized by the World Bank's Governance Matters Initiative. In addition to the Government Effectiveness Index, the indicators include Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The indicators cover 213 countries and territories and are based on several hundred individual variables, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. Each indicator is a weighted average of its underlying data, with weights reflecting the precision of the individual data sources. The composite score depends on the available material for that year, for that country. Each indicator score is based on a worldwide average being 0.0, with scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. The methodology generates margins of error for the estimates for each indicator for each country, which needs to be taken into account when making comparisons across countries and over time. The Government Effectiveness Index measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Scholars and researchers have found that a country improving its quality of governance from a low level to an average level can in the long term quadruple the income per capita of its population, and similarly reduce infant mortality and illiteracy. The direction of causality is clear: it goes from better governance to higher incomes, and not vice versa. Although the average score for all low-income countries in the Developing Countries category is -.83. the average for "comparable" low-income countries in the Developing Countries category, i.e., Bangladesh and Pakistan, is -0.74. The 2015 target for Nepal is thus set at -.74.

Measure: % of U.S. Government Management Support Funds to Total U.S. Government Program Funds

Explanation:This efficiency indicator measures the ratio of funds used for management support to the total amount of program funds utilized in Rebuilding Countries. Support functions include personnel, program design and learning activities (i.e. evaluations, assessments, and new activity design), outreach, contracting, and financial management. This efficiency measure does not have a baseline because it is a new measure.

Measure: Cost of Starting a Business in Afghanistan

Explanation:This long-term indicator measures progress in the Economic Growth Objective in Afghanistan by demonstrating the efficiency of conducting business in Afghanistan. The World Bank Group calculates the cost of starting a business by examining all procedures required to register a firm, the average time spent during each procedure, the official cost of each procedure and the minimum capital required as a percentage of income per capita. The cost is thus reflected as a percentage of the country's income per capita. The average percentage for comparable low-income countries in the Developing Countries category is 51%, thus the 2015 target for Afghanistan is 51%. This is a high standard for rebuilding countries. Direction of Change: Lower = Better

Measure: Number of people in Afghanistan who receive medication or other services from USG-funded programs to control and reduce communicable diseases.

Explanation:This indicator measures annual progress towards the Investing in People Objective and the Overall Rebuilding objective of getting essential basic services to the Afghan people. It is also tied to the long-term measure to reduce the under-five mortality rate, as decreasing communicable diseases within families will decrease the infant mortality rate. It indicates progress on efforts to rebuild/establish the provision of basic services for health in rebuilding countries. This is not a cumulative indicator.

Measure: Percentage of the Government of Afghanistan budget atributed to customs revenues

Explanation:This outcome indicator measures U.S. efforts in Afghanistan towards the Economic Growth Objective. In particular, this outcome measure signifies the U.S. Government's efforts to "restore/build basic economic governance and physical infrastructure necessary for macroeconomic stability" in rebuilding countries." Attaining macroeconomic stability is critical towards enabling Afghanistan to improve its per capita GDP and progressing towards graduating from US development assistance. Direction of Change: Higher = Better

Measure: Number of individuals who receive U.S. Government supported political party training in Nepal

Explanation:This indicator measures U.S. Government efforts towards the Governing Justly and Democratically Objective in Nepal. Political party training is a tool to "strengthen groups outside the state (non-governmental organizations, political parties) to enable reconciliation, deter political polarization, build trust, recreate social fabric, and provide an outlet for frustrations and political views," which is a stated goal for Rebuilding Countries. This indicator correlates with the long term World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator. As more political party members receive US Government training, the effectiveness of the Nepali Government should improve. This is not a cumulative indicator.

Measure: Political Stability and Absence of Violence in Afghanistan

Explanation:The Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS/AV) is one of six indicators utilized by the World Bank's Governance Matters Initiative, as reported by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. In addition to PS/AV, the indicators include Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption. The indicators cover 213 countries and territories and are based on several hundred individual variables, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. Each indicator is a weighted average of its underlying data, with weights reflecting the precision of the individual data sources. The composite score depends on the available material for that year, for that country. Each indicator score is based on a worldwide average being 0.0, with scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. The methodology generates margins of error for the estimates for each indicator for each country, which needs to be taken into account when making comparisons across countries and over time. The Political Stability and Absence of Violence indicator represents perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. The median score for low-income countries in the Developing Countries category is -1.20, and as both Nepal and Afghanistan are categorized as low income by the World Bank, the 2015 target is -1.20. This target is ambitious; countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda have scores close to the median. This indicator has also been added to each country's "spider graph," a snapshot of country progress across key dimensions in four of the five objectives in the new foreign assistance framework.

Measure: Reduce Cultivation of Opium Poppy in Afghanistan with the long-term goal of achieving a poppy-free North between 2005 and 2010 (21 out of 34 provinces).

Explanation:The Mission Strategic Plan (MSP)-driven goal is to reduce opium poppy cultivation between 2005 and 2010 in 21 Northern provinces based on a North/South dividing line between Herat and Kabul. Poppy-free status is defined by cultivating less than 1,000 hectares of opium poppy. The security situation in the South poses great obstacles to reducing cultivation in this region. Therefore, the focus is on a poppy-free North, and the indicator measures number of Poppy-Free Provinces (PFP) or Provinces Reducing Cultivation (PRC).

Measure: Political Stability and Absence of Violence in Nepal

Explanation:The Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS/AV) is one of six indicators utilized by the World Bank's Governance Matters Initiative, as reported by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. In addition to PS/AV, the indicators include Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption. The indicators cover 213 countries and territories and are based on several hundred individual variables, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. Each indicator is a weighted average of its underlying data, with weights reflecting the precision of the individual data sources. The composite score depends on the available material for that year, for that country. Each indicator score is based on a worldwide average being 0.0, with scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. The methodology generates margins of error for the estimates for each indicator for each country, which needs to be taken into account when making comparisons across countries and over time. The Political Stability and Absence of Violence indicator represents perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. The median score for low-income countries in the Developing Countries category is -1.20, and as both Nepal and Afghanistan are categorized as low income by the World Bank, the 2015 target is -1.20. This target is ambitious; countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda have scores close to the median. This indicator has also been added to each country's "spider graph," a snapshot of country progress across key dimensions in four of the five objectives in the new foreign assistance framework.

Measure: World Bank Government Effectiveness Index for Afghanistan

Explanation:The Government Effectiveness Index is one of six indicators utilized by the World Bank's Governance Matters Initiative. In addition to the Government Effectiveness Index, the indicators include Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The indicators cover 213 countries and territories and are based on several hundred individual variables, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. Each indicator is a weighted average of its underlying data, with weights reflecting the precision of the individual data sources. The composite score depends on the available material for that year, for that country. Each indicator score is based on a worldwide average being 0.0, with scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. The methodology generates margins of error for the estimates for each indicator for each country, which needs to be taken into account when making comparisons across countries and over time. The Government Effectiveness Index measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Scholars and researchers have found that a country improving its quality of governance from a low level to an average level can in the long term quadruple the income per capita of its population, and similarly reduce infant mortality and illiteracy. The direction of causality is clear: it goes from better governance to higher incomes, and not vice versa. The 2015 target for Afghanistan is -.83, as it is the average score for low-income countries in the Developing Countries category.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: Yes. The purpose of providing foreign assistance to Rebuilding Countries (the program) is to support efforts to create a stable environment for good governance, increase availability of essential social services, and to create policies and institutions upon which future progress will rest. Assistance aims to bolster countries as they emerge from conflict and to prevent a return to conflict. In 2006, the Department of State created the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance in order to clearly outline USG-wide objectives for financial engagement overseas. This office produced a new Strategic Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance. This framework clearly defines the purpose of Assistance to Rebuilding Countries, one of five Country Category designations that group countries according to common characteristics that make common goals clear. Rebuilding Countries are defined as those states in conflict, or emerging from and rebuilding after conflict, a context which affects either the country's available resources to meet citizens' needs and/or the government's ability to move forward with programs that will advance the country to the next category of transformational development, which the framework identifies as "Developing Countries." For Rebuilding Countries, U.S. Government diplomacy and/or defense structures have lead roles, with foreign assistance programs operating in support of them. This particular program is comprised of two countries in the Asia and Near East Region: Afghanistan and Nepal. The program focuses on four broad objectives: Peace and Security, Investing in People, Economic Growth, and Governing Justly and Democratically. The Assistance to Rebuilding Countries is administered jointly by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State).

Evidence: The new Strategic Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance is built around five priority objectives that support the overarching goal of helping move countries toward self-sufficiency and strengthened strategic partnerships. The framework includes five country categories based on shared characteristics to make common goals clear. (Foreign Assistance Summary Framework and Foreign Assistance Extended Framework, http://www.state.gov/f/direction/) The Rebuilding Country Guidance includes the following: rebuilding category definitions, goals, issues, and approaches used to help advance those countries that fall into this category along the transformational development trajectory to a Developing Country. (Rebuilding Category Guidance http://f.state.gov/framework.html)

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Yes. Assistance to countries in the Rebuilding category addresses the specific and existing problems, interests and needs that Rebuilding Countries must address in order to progress toward the overarching goal of graduating from a US development assistance program: "sustained, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system." In addition, security and development assistance to Rebuilding Countries are essential tools to protecting the security of the United States. Assistance to Rebuilding Countries also addresses the broader need to stabilize rebuilding nations and provide economic and political opportunities that foster conditions that encourage the people of rebuilding countries to reject terrorism. Assistance helps empower citizens in these countries to overcome the poverty and hopelessness our foes seek to exploit, and directly supports the U.S. national security strategy and Global War on Terror. Foreign assistance is also closely linked to the safety of U.S. troops in the region. Priorities for Rebuilding Countries include: achieving security by restoring the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force; consolidating peace processes and engaging in consensus-building and strengthening groups outside the state; restoring/establishing the provision of basic social services such as health and education; and restoring/rebuilding basic economic governance and the physical infrastructure necessary for macroeconomic stability. Assistance targets the 3-5 year period in which 2/3 of states emerging from conflict return to conflict, and aims to advance countries into the next category, i.e., Developing. Our efforts in Nepal and Afghanistan clearly target the areas that are impeding this progress. In Afghanistan, the major obstacle to advancement is the lack of basic security and human capital, inadequate infrastructure, and the absence of an accountable, participatory, and predictable rule-based economic and political governance structure. To address these challenges, the U.S. is pursuing a multi-year program of political engagement, security sector assistance, and improvements to Afghan governance, rule of law, and service delivery. In Nepal, the major obstacle to the country's advancement is a ten-year old Maoist insurgency that has forced the retreat of the Government from much of the countryside. The resulting vacuum has displaced thousands from their homes and impeded service delivery, tourism, local development, and investment. Ongoing efforts to resolve the insurgency through negotiations and the concurrent effort to establish lasting democracy in Nepal offer extraordinary opportunities for transformational diplomacy. U.S. assistance will help push the peace process forward, and at the same time restore service delivery and expand law and order in order to strengthen the foundation for stability and advancement.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Congressional Budget Justification reflects a focus on the specific gaps and obstacles countries face in moving from one country category to another, and the identification of the target objectives appropriate to the individual country context. With the proper implementation of financial and human resources, it is believed that the USG goal of moving countries through the transformational development trajectory is possible. (FY 2008 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2008/). Examples of development indicators can be found in each country's "spider graph." Spider graphs provide a current snapshot of country progress across a handful of key dimensions in four of the five objectives in the new foreign assistance framework. The charts are intended to provide an empirical look at country progress to facilitate discussion on country needs across objectives as well as within objectives. Alongside other considerations (including government commitment, U.S. strategic priorities, U.S. assistance effectiveness, other donor activity, and political considerations such as earmarks) this discussion in turn is intended to facilitate USG resource allocation decisions. http://ppc.usaid.gov/esds/tracking_tools.cfm The data, primarily from the World Bank, UN, and Freedom House, were converted to values ranging from a "1" to "5" representing the best score possible worldwide.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: Yes. In 2006 the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance established a new process to help ensure that there is no duplication of effort within the U.S. Government (USG) and with international donors as well. The Office has authority over State and USAID foreign assistance resources and programs and the ability to convene all agencies involved in foreign assistance. Using this authority the Office integrates budgeting, planning, and implementation across the U.S. Government. While the Office does not have authority over U.S. Government resources outside of State and USAID, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Department of Defense, and Treasury, these outside agencies participate in budget allocation meetings and policy reviews to ensure that there is no duplication of effort. The reform process also addresses redundancy and coordination through the development of integrated Operational Plans, in which State and USAID describe how they collaborate with other USG agencies and international donors to avoid duplication of effort. For example, Nepal's Fiscal Year 2007 Operational Plan demonstrates how maternal and child health activities are coordinated with complementary activities funded by other donors, such as UNICEF and Australia, and other U.S. agencies, such as the Center for Disease Control. Internally, the Operational Plan process revealed programs being jointly implemented by two embassy units that were previously working independently, leading to better coordination and differentiation. At the country level, coordination is also ensured through country team meetings and donor working groups.

Evidence: Through collaboration between USAID and the Department of State, guidance was issued to help missions develop their FY 2007 Operational Plans. The guidance addresses how missions should take into account resources and activities from other U.S. Government agencies and other donors in planning activities. (FY 2007 Operational Plan Guidance) An Operational Plan is an integral tool designed to link funding to activities and results in a particular country. By their design, they help to strengthen the role of leadership in the field in driving the allocation of foreign assistance; improve coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness; strengthen accountability; help the USG provide more accurate and consistent data on programs so that the USG can efficiently and effectively communicate to various stakeholders, including Congress, OMB, and the American public what funds have been directed to and what we are getting in return for our foreign assistance investments; and identify the essential links between U.S. policy objectives, resource allocation, and results. The Operational Plan for Nepal was reviewed in conjunction with this PART to help identify those areas of focus that will help the country progress to the Developing Country category. (FY 07 Operational Plan for Nepal) With the creation of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance came the ability to fully integrate into one office all foreign assistance budgeting, planning, and implementation. With the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance at the helm, there are increased opportunities for those agencies implementing foreign assistance to collaborate in order to accomplish maximum outcomes. (Testimony of Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID, Hearing on Foreign Assistance Reform and FY 2008 Budget, House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 8, 2007)

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Yes. The Rebuilding Countries assistance program is free of major flaws and sufficiently flexible to allow a country program to implement activities deemed the most effective and efficient in the specific country context. Prior to foreign assistance reform, the processes related to program design, including analysis, resource availability and priority setting, were often fragmented across operating units and between field missions and Washington headquarters. Field missions submitted design proposals based on a given country context without full benefit of the global overview afforded by headquarters. Absent a uniform system for foreign assistance program analysis and design, critical information to determine the most effective programs and appropriate resource allocations was not always available. The new Foreign Assistance Strategic Framework established priorities for Rebuilding Countries, which are translated into annual technical Operational Plans at the country or other operating unit level. Prior to approval, the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance leads an inter-agency technical and programmatic review of each Plan to identify possible design and implementation flaws and to determine whether the proposed activities will move the country along the transformational development and diplomacy path. Senior leaders then review the plan for alignment with overall foreign policy and assistance objectives. Operational Plans are approved by the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance once all technical, program and policy-related issues and concerns are resolved. While the foreign assistance framework has only been in place for a year, there is already evidence that this new approach will be more effective in achieving the intended results of the program. To ensure that the program continues to be free of flaws throughout the year, inter-agency teams come together periodically to review proposed changes to the Operational Plans or to discuss new problems or unforeseen issues in a specific country or region. In addition, State and USAID also continually evaluate how to address limitations that may be imposed by Congress, such as earmarks and directives, to ensure that the program design continues to be effective. Evaluations and efficiency reviews assess whether other approaches would be more efficient or effective to achieve the ultimate purpose of moving the country to the next category, i.e., Developing.

Evidence: With the creation of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (State/F) came the ability to fully integrate into one office all foreign assistance budgeting, planning, and implementation. With the State/F at the helm, there are increased opportunities for those agencies implementing foreign assistance to collaborate in order to accomplish maximum outcomes. (Testimony of Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID, Hearing on Foreign Assistance Reform and FY 2008 Budget, House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 8, 2007-http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2007/sp070308.html) The Operational Plan review process assesses whether, within dollar levels provided to the operating unit for the objective, area, and element, the proposed programs maximize the impacts on that functional objective, and reflects best practices. Operational Plan reviews assess whether Bureaus are fulfilling their specific roles as conducting research, providing technical leadership, and supporting the field. Their overall goal of the Plans is to ensure that operating units are planning in accordance with the Secretary's Transformational Diplomacy goals and providing solutions when progress is being impeded. (Operational Plan Review Process Guidance and Templates) Evaluations are conducted to evaluate program effectiveness and to identify areas for improvement. All evaluations conducted at USAID are made available to the public at-large for review. Viewers are able to view how current programs fare and where recommendations are made for improvement. Evaluations and cost effectiveness studies are available at http://dec.usaid.gov/.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Yes. The Rebuilding Country program targets resources directly towards addressing the specific gaps and obstacles countries face in moving to the next country category. Prior to foreign assistance reform, resources were first allocated by account, then by sector and finally by country. Starting with the FY 2008 Budget, the inter-agency budget process reversed that order, beginning with allocations to countries for the most critical interventions, and then to accounts. With input from field operating units, teams of experts from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State) used independent indicators, including need statistics, to plot the development gaps in each country and then crafted the budget request to address those gaps with the goal of advancing the Rebuilding Countries toward the next Country Category, Developing. As part of this process, operating units generated detailed Operational Plans that described the activities that State and USAID will undertake to achieve the objectives of the Rebuilding Country program, including the intended beneficiaries. USAID, as the main implementing agency, also ensures that assistance targets and reaches the intended beneficiaries and that the program achieves results through the analysis and review of grant and contract applications, performance data, needs assessments, evaluations, regular reporting routine submitted by grantees and contractors, audits, and field visits.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification reflects a focus on the specific gaps and obstacles countries face in moving from one country category to another, and the identification of the target objectives appropriate to the individual country context. "Spider graphs" are graphic illustrations of a country's performance during a particular year within strategic framework objectives, i.e. Governing Justly and Democratically, Investing In People and Economic Growth. Progress or regression on a spider graph provides an indication of whether the program is successful in reaching appropriate beneficiaries and progress is occurring along the transformational diplomacy trajectory (Fact Sheet: New Foreign Assistance Budget Process http://www.state.gov/f/releases/factsheets2006/75017.htm). The FY 2007 Operational Plan Guidance, P. 12, notes "host country needs" as the first critical question to be considered when preparing an Operational Plan. Grant applications require a needs statement to ensure that the activities target the proper beneficiaries. Evaluations are conducted to assess program effectiveness and to identify areas for improvement. All needs assessments and evaluations conducted by USAID are made available to the public at http://dec.usaid.gov.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: Yes. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State use specific long-term measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully measure both what is being accomplished with U.S. foreign assistance funds and the collective impact of foreign and host-government efforts to advance country development. This assessment includes a representative set of Rebuilding Country performance measures for the two country programs highlighted to demonstrate outcomes that will be achieved in these countries in the next ten years. These long-term performance indicators measure progress in the areas where the bulk of the budget for the Rebuilding Country program is invested: health, agriculture, governance, and economic growth. These program areas are also priority areas for assistance for countries emerging from conflict, as the US Government aims to "increase availability of essential social services," and "create a stable environment for good governance," as stated in the program purpose (1.1). These long term measures are also closely tied to annual measures. For example, improvements in the annual agriculture-related output indicators - measuring rural households benefiting from U.S. efforts and sales of licit farm products - are closely tied to the long-term opium cultivation indicator. Several of these measures are also used by the international community to measures progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Two of the other long-term measures - cost of starting a business and the World Bank Government Effectiveness Index - are used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), USAID, and the Department of State to determine whether countries are moving along the transformational development trajectory. At this time, these measures do not include a measure on the impact on livelihoods of the population of the country. The State Department and USAID are researching whether to add a livelihood measure in the future to capture the impact of these programs not only on the cost to start a business but also on the immediate improvement of the lives of Afghans. Finally, the "Political Stability and Absence of Violence in Afghanistan" long-term indicator, measured by the World Bank Governance Matters Initiative, gives an overall, strategic assessment of progress towards the main purpose of all U.S. Government work across objectives in Afghanistan - building stability. This indicator represents perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Improvement on all of the annual indicators related to Afghanistan should correlate with progress on this stability indicator. For instance, more roads will provide transport opportunities to licit traders and businessmen as well as increase access of the government and security forces to hard-to-reach areas, which should improve stability. Likewise, the more households that benefit from U.S. agricultural assistance and U.S. programs to control communicable disease, the greater the increase in healthy workers and licit, productive agricultural businesses which will in turn reduce the poverty and drug-related crime that contribute to instability. These long-term measures demonstrate that the Rebuilding Country program is advancing the countries to the Developing Country category and also covering the majority of the spending in these programs.

Evidence: The long term goal for moving towards graduating from the Rebuilding Country Category is reflected in the Foreign Assistance Framework and Extended Framework, http://www.state.gov/f/direction/, and Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions, http://www.state.gov/f/direction/. The specific indicators and their explanation can be found at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/78558.pdf, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/78557.pdf, and http://www.state.gov/f/releases/factsheets2007/78450.htm. The Millennium Development Goals are at http://www.undp.org/mdg/goallist.shtml while the Millennium Challenge Account indicators are here: http://www.mcc.gov/selection/indicators/index.php.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Yes. For its long-term measures, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State have set ambitious targets and timeframes for the long-term measures that represent very ambitious goals for the Rebuilding Country program over a ten year time period. The long-term measure under five mortality rate reflects the international community's and host countries' commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). State and USAID based the targets for these indicators on reducing by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under five mortality rate. The targets for the other two long-term measures-cost of starting a business and the World Bank Government Effectiveness Index-are based on the average of low-income countries in the Developing Country category, a high standard for this sector. These organizations do not publish/set annual targets prior to 2015, but the U.S. Government will track progress as data is available. Meeting these targets will demonstrate significant progress towards graduating from the Rebuilding Category to the Developing Country status and toward graduation from U.S. Government assistance. Although these organizations do not set annual targets prior to 2015, the U.S. Government will track progress towards end targets as data is available on most of these measures annually. Operating units currently report on indicators that demonstrate outcomes attributable to U.S. foreign assistance and show the link between the annual, output measures and the long-term, outcome measures. Program managers use these mid-level indicators to assess whether the program is on track to meet the 2015 targets, making management changes if progress is lagging. The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has convened a State/USAID team to examine the most efficient and accurate way to track each operating unit's specific mid-level indicators within its Operational Plans, which in turn are based on the foreign assistance framework.

Evidence: The long term goal for moving towards graduating from the Rebuilding Country Category is the Foreign Assistance Framework and Extended Framework, http://www.state.gov/f/direction/, and Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions, http://www.state.gov/f/direction/. The specific indicators and their explanation can be found at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/78558.pdf, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/78557.pdf, and http://www.state.gov/f/releases/factsheets2007/78450.htm. The Millennium Development Goals are at http://www.undp.org/mdg/goallist.shtml while the Millennium Challenge Account indicators are here: http://www.mcc.gov/selection/indicators/index.php.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: Yes. The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have selected discrete, quantifiable, and measurable annual performance measures to assess progress towards achieving the program goals established in the Foreign Assistance Framework. This assessment includes a representative set of annual measures for Afghanistan and Nepal. These annual performance measures, when combined with mid-level impact indicators, indicate whether the Rebuilding Country program is of sufficient scope and focus and on track to achieve the long-term targets discussed in questions 2.1 and 2.2. For example, the annual output indicator "Vitamin A supplementation coverage among children under the age of five" will demonstrate progress towards reaching the long-term target of reducing the number of deaths among children under age five. Similarly, all of the annual indicators related to Afghanistan indicate whether the country is on track to achieve the long term targets set in the "Political Stability and Absence of Violence" indicator, as measured by the World Bank's Governance Matters Initiative. Increased vitamin A supplementation and the number of people receiving medication from U.S. funded programs, for instance, will increase the healthy population in Afghanistan, improving livelihoods and prosperity, which in turn should decrease the population of drug-trafficking and violent criminals. Likewise, more Executive Branch personnel trained with U.S. Government assistance should lead to less corruption and bribery, which will increase trust in the governance system. More roads and increases in sales of licit farm and non-farm products will improve business opportunities as well as the Government's and security services' access across the nation, which will enhance Afghanistan's political stability. Overall, annual progress on indicators measuring security, good governance, health, and economic growth will indicate progress towards the U.S. Government's long-term objective in Afghanistan: building stability. Each country category has targets for these indicators, which when combined with per capita income, determine whether a country is progressing towards graduating to the next category or from foreign assistance altogether. The annual performance measures are reported on by operating units and measure outcomes and outputs that are directly attributable to the U.S. Government program. In addition to these annual indicators, each USAID Mission tracks mid-level impact indicators that highlight the link between annual and long-term measures. An example of a mid-level indicator is the percentage of USG-assisted mothers breastfeeding their children until two years of age, which links the annual indicator "number of people trained in maternal/newborn health" with the long-term indicator "number of deaths among children under age five." Although these mid-level indicators are not tracked by the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, the Office is examining the most efficient and accurate way to track each operating unit's specific mid-level indicators within its Operational Plans.

Evidence: The long term goal for moving towards graduating from the Rebuilding Country Category is reflected in the Foreign Assistance Framework and Extended Framework, http://www.state.gov/f/direction/, and Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions, http://www.state.gov/f/direction/. The specific indicators and their explanation can be found at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/78558.pdf, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/78557.pdf, and http://www.state.gov/f/releases/factsheets2007/78450.htm. The Millennium Development Goals are at http://www.undp.org/mdg/goallist.shtml while the Millennium Challenge Account indicators are here: http://www.mcc.gov/selection/indicators/index.php.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Yes. The program has baselines and ambitious targets for almost all of its annual measures. Three of the annual measures do not have baselines associated as they are new measures starting in FY 2007. Targets are set through a variety of methods, including needs assessments, trusted data from other organizations, and performance data from on-going projects. This information, combined with a variety of related factors including other donors' actions, adequacy of staffing, and the status and timeline of needed inputs, is analyzed to determine baselines for those measures that are new and achievable, ambitious targets for all annual measures. These measures are an important component of the annual Operational Plans submitted by each of the program's operating units. An inter-agency team of technical, strategy, and policy experts reviews each Operational Plan to ensure that targets are appropriate, ambitious and realistic. Under foreign assistance reform, a set of standard performance measures has been developed to enable the systematic review of program results across the Rebuilding Country category. Several of these standard performance measures are new for FY 2007 and are based on comparable, but not identical, measures for which there is prior year performance data. The baselines for the new measures starting in FY 2007 will be 0, but the same analysis will be used to assess the target and ensure it is ambitious and attainable even though baseline data is lacking.

Evidence: The FY 2007 Operational Plan Guidance describes the baseline and target selection process operating units used and the FY 2007 Operational Plan Review Process Guidance and Templates from Technical and Program Reviews explain how targets were reviewed to be ambitious yet realistic. USAID's Automated Directive System - ADS 200 Planning offers many helpful tools that are currently being re-written to accommodate the new foreign assistance framework however the basic principles of the learning cycle beginning with a needs assessment, target formulation and SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Timely) indicators will remain the same.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Yes. The execution of a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement in the Rebuilding Country program requires that all program partners agree to commit to and work toward specific annual and/or long-term program goals and provide regular performance reports that document their progress toward these goals. These goals directly align to the measures captured in this assessment. A Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) is assigned for each contract, grant and cooperative agreement to closely monitor partners' performance and activities and ensure that they are committed to the goals of the program. CTOs hold partners accountable for performance and ensure that their activities are contributing to the program purpose, as described in questions 1.1 and 1.2. Results are verified by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State employees through regular site visits, meetings with partners and stakeholders, evaluations, and audits.

Evidence: Request for Applications Number RFA-306-004 Afghanistan Community Based Education articulates the goals the implementing partner agreed to. ADS 300 defines CTO responsibilities (ADS 302 for contracts and ADS 303 for grants), see http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/, to closely monitor partners' performance and activities to ensure that they are committed to the goals of the program.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Yes. Independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality are conducted on a regular basis to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the needs of the Rebuilding Countries program. As the primary implementing agency, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) policy ensures that timely and meaningful information is available to make management decisions. In recognition of the importance of rigorous and comprehensive evaluation, in 2005, USAID launched an initiative to revitalize evaluations. This initiative requires evaluations of all major programs and mandates that all operating units appoint a monitoring and evaluation officer, set aside funding for evaluations, create an annual evaluation plan, provide training in evaluation, and offer incentives to staff that encourage evaluations. Most evaluation work is done at the project and activity level, where contracts and grants often require independent evaluations. Mid-term evaluations are also conducted to determine the future course of projects, pointing out gaps or weaknesses in the approach so that the program can be adjusted and achieve its objectives efficiently and effectively. Final evaluations assess the impact of a completed project, determine whether there are future opportunities or obstacles for assistance, and articulate lessons learned for future interventions. Evaluations are generally conducted by entities outside of USAID and State, such as private firms not directly associated with the activity or program. Regular audits by the Government Accountability Office and Office of the Inspector General provide additional, independent information on the impact of the USAID and State programs, usually on a broad scale. In rebuilding countries, USAID ensures that independent evaluations of programs across all the objectives in the strategic framework are conducted throughout the lifespan of the programs. For example in the Governing Justly and Democratically Objective, the Center for Research on Environment Health and Population Activities (CREHPA) independent evaluation of the Center for Development and Population Activities' (CEDPA's) and Aamaa Milan Kendra's (AMK's)Adolescent Girls Group Anti-Trafficking Project reviews the progress of CEDPA's work upon the completion of the program and how it contributed to the overall Governing Justly and Democratically goal of providing an opportunity for disadvantaged groups to protect themselves. Likewise, Brian Gilligan and R. Pulkit Choudhary's evaluation of Save the Children's' HIV/AIDS project examined the program's success towards the Investing in People goal of reducing the susceptibility and vulnerability of children and families to HIV/AIDS in particular communities where male migration to India is endemic. Save the Children undertook this evaluation as part of their funding agreement with USAID. Also, Chemonics International's independent evaluation of the ongoing RAMP's Rebuilding Agricultural Markets -Rural Finance Program in Afghanistan measured progress towards strengthening Afghanistan's agricultural value chains. This in turn measured progress towards both the Peace and Security and Economic Growth objectives, as stronger agricultural value chains would promote economic development as well as provide viable profit alternatives to narcotics trafficking. This was the ninth in a series of evaluations, demonstrating that USAID evaluates projects throughout their cycle.

Evidence: The recommitment of USAID to evaluation in 2005 is well described in Administrator Andrew Natsios' Cable FW: 05070811419/ State 127594 / Actions Required to Implement the Initiative. ADS 203.3.6 on evaluations discusses the importance of evaluations, when to evaluate, what to evaluate, evaluation methodologies, and learning from evaluations at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/. ADS 202.3.9.4 on Conducting Audits can be found at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/202.pdf. "The Anti-Trafficking Program in Rural Nepal: Assessment of Change in Awareness and Communication among Adolescent Girls, Peers and Parents in Baglung District, an Endline Survey" by the Center for Research on Environment Health and Population Activities (CREHPA) was an independent evaluation of the Center for Development and Population Activities' (CEDPA's) and Aamaa Milan Kendra's (AMK's) Adolescent Girls Group Anti-Trafficking Project documenting the progress of CEDPA's work upon the completion of the program and how it contributed to the overall Governing Justly and Democratically goal of providing an opportunity for disadvantaged groups to protect themselves. "HIV/AIDS IMPACT Mitigation through Mobilizing Affected Communities Project, Kanchanpur, District, Nepal," by Brian Gilligan and R. Pulkit Choudhary's examined the program's success towards the Investing in People goal of reducing the susceptibility and vulnerability of children and families to HIV/AIDS in particular communities where male migration to India is endemic. "Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program RAMP Rural Finance Impact Report" is Chemonics International's independent evaluation of the ongoing RAMP's Rebuilding Agricultural Markets -Rural Finance Program in Afghanistan which measured progress towards both the Peace and Security and Economic Growth objectives, as stronger agricultural value chains would promote economic development as well as provide viable profit alternatives to narcotics trafficking. This was the ninth in a series of evaluations, demonstrating that USAID evaluates projects throughout their cycle.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Yes. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the primary implementing agency for this program, and in prior year's budgets the USAID Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) tied budget requests for each of its performance goals to a performance score. The performance scores were calculated utilizing various inputs from an array of disparate and disaggregated sources. Foreign assistance reform introduced a more streamlined, standardized and transparent performance management system to be phased in over a two-year period. This system requires each USAID and Department of State (State) operating unit to prepare an annual Operational Plan (OP) that reflects a uniform system of budget requests linked to standardized performance objectives, goals, measures and targets for the current and future years. The OP data is supported by a budget and performance database tracking system, the Foreign Assistance Comprehensive Tracking System (FACTS). Once aggregated across relevant operating units, the performance measures tied to requested funding reflect the resources needed to achieve the entire program's performance goals. In addition, each Operational Plan (OP) addresses the impact of a 10% increase or decrease in funding. The transition to the OP system began in FY 2007, and as a result the linkage between performance data and resource needs was not fully available prior to submission of the FY 2008 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ). (Afghanistan did not prepare an Operational Plan in FY 2007, but is scheduled to submit one for FY 2008.) In lieu of the this data, the budget justification drew from performance data contained in the integrated FY 2008 Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) submitted by each of the program's field operating units, as well as the Afghanistan Action Plan overseen by the National Security Council. As the FY 2007 Operational Plans have now been completed, a summary FY 2008 Foreign Assistance Performance Plan is being prepared which will include budget and performance data from the Nepal OP as well as relevant data for Afghanistan drawn from the sources noted above. With FY 2008 Operational Plans scheduled for submission in early fall, the performance and budget data contained in these Plans will serve as the basis for the FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification and will be incorporated into requests to the Office of Management and Budget.

Evidence: USAID's FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification includes Country Profile Tables that tie budget requests for each of its performance goals (listed as "Objectives") to performance scores. The FY 2007 Operational Plan for Nepal links budget and performance data in a transparent and complete manner. The Foreign Assistance Tracking and Coordination System (FACTS) is the database that houses Operational Plan data for each operating unit, including the specific links between performance measures and budget requests. FY 2008 Mission Performance Plans are comprehensive, integrated planning documents prepared by each overseas U.S. mission. The Afghanistan Action Plan and Annual Reviews provide a comprehensive plan for and annual review of assistance to Afghanistan, to which the Assistance to Rebuilding Program contributes.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Yes. Prior to foreign assistance reform, the program was fragmented across numerous operating units within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). Assistance efforts lacked the coherence necessary for maximum impact, accountability could be difficult to measure, and resources were not always strategically tied to overarching goals. Under foreign assistance reform, Washington and the field focus on their respective strengths and responsibilities - integrated strategic direction and priorities across agencies set in Washington, and operational plans and tactics for the achievement of results developed and implemented by the field. The new Foreign Assistance Strategic Framework clearly defines the purpose of and priorities for Assistance to Rebuilding Countries, one of five Country Category designations that group countries according to common characteristics that make common goals clear. In the past, State and USAID operating units in the same country submitted their own plans, to their own agencies, for their own operations??often on different timelines. This resulted in inconsistent opportunities, and little motivation, to compare programs across agencies and ensure that foreign assistance programs were comprehensive and coordinated. In accordance with foreign assistance reform, USAID and State have prepared joint operational plans for Nepal. The plan fully integrates USAID and State activities and resources that in turn link directly to the strategic goals of the overall Assistance to Rebuilding Countries program. Strategic planning deficiencies were corrected through the process of preparing the Plans; for example, in Nepal the Operational Plan process uncovered redundant programs being implemented by two different embassy units, a discovery that lead to better coordination and differentiation between the two. Due to a continuing need to reprogram and adjust U.S. assistance plans for Afghanistan to respond to rapidly-changing circumstances on the ground associated with countries in war, Afghanistan did not prepare a Fiscal Year 2007 Operational Plan. Instead, Afghanistan performance measures are based on the existing interagency Action Plan. Performance data has been reported based on this plan since that time. The reports produced by the weekly meetings of the Afghanistan Interagency Working Group have enabled the U.S. government to identify and resolve planning deficiencies and improve the coordination of activities. Conditions permitting, Afghanistan will submit an FY 2008 Operational Plan and the performance measures used will be in sync with those of the Action Plan. It is expected that an operational plan will be submitted in Fiscal Year 2008 for Afghanistan and the performance measures used will be in sync with those of the Interagency Action Plan. As both documents are drafted on an annual horizon, coordinating the two plans to should not be difficult. As identified in 2.2 and 2.3, the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance does not currently track all mid-level indicators that link annual measure to long-term performance measures. However, the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has convened a State/USAID team to examine the most efficient and accurate way to track each operating unit's specific mid-level indicators within its Operational Plans.

Evidence: The Joint State-USAID Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004 - 2009 is a collaborative effort that sets forth the Secretary of State's direction and priorities for both organizations in the coming years. The Strategic Plan supports the policy positions set forth by President Bush in the 2002 National Security Strategy and presents how the Department and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. (http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/) Achieving results requires leveraging talents and resources across the U.S. Government, both in the field and in Washington. A new collaborative budget process gives the USG the tools to jointly and strategically allocate resources to improve effectiveness, impact, and efficiency through better coordination at every level. The new budget and planning process gives the Secretary the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of USG foreign assistance and make strategic decisions to advance transformational development. (Fact Sheet: New Foreign Assistance Budget Process http://www.state.gov/f/releases/factsheets2006/75017.htm).

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Yes. Credible and timely performance information is collected from partners and used to manage the program and improve performance. As specified in their contracts or grants, funding recipients are required to submit performance information to operating units on a regular basis (no more than quarterly, no less than annually). The program manager, the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) compares the reported results to the baseline data and milestones established in the program's performance management plan. The CTO meets with implementing partners to discuss performance issues and make adjustments as needed. Performance is also assessed periodically during portfolio reviews. For example, Afghanistan's portfolio review uncovered an economic growth partner's lagging performance, leading the CTO to develop a plan of action to address the performance issues. In addition, operating units conduct evaluations to identify strengths and weaknesses, assess performance, and recommend improvements to the program's design, approach, or implementation. CTOs assess the credibility of performance information submitted by partners by conducting data quality assessments. In Afghanistan's Action Plan and Nepal's operational plan, operating units use performance information from their partners to report on progress towards meeting the targets established in their performance management plan. When targets are not met, the contract or grant agreement may be modified, additional funds may be delayed or not provided, or management changes may be introduced.

Evidence: Credible and timely performance information is collected from partners and used to manage the program and improve performance. (Quarterly Report from USAID/Afghanistan Grantee on the Technical Support to the Central and Provincial Ministry of Public Health in Afghanistan Project (July - December 2006) http://dec.usaid.gov) The Operational Plan is an integral tool designed to link funding to activities and results in a particular country. By their design, they help to: strengthen the role of leadership in the field in driving the allocation of foreign assistance; improve coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness; strengthen accountability; help the USG provide more accurate and consistent data on programs so that the USG can efficiently and effectively communicate to various stakeholders, including Congress, OMB, and the American public the programs to which funds have been directed and what we are getting in return for our foreign assistance investments; and identify the essential links between U.S. policy objectives, resource allocation, and results. The Operational Plan for Nepal was reviewed in conjunction with this PART to help identify those areas of focus that will help the country progress to the Developing Country category. (FY 2007 Nepal Operational Plan) A Mission Performance Management Plan is a critical tool for planning, managing, and documenting how performance data is collected and used. It defines specific performance indicators for each strategic objective, determines baselines, and sets targets. It also plans and manages the Annual Report data collection process to meet quality standards, incorporates relevant data collection requirements into activities and obligation agreements, and communicates expectations to partner institutions responsible for producing the outputs intended to cause measurable changes in performance. (USAID/Afghanistan's Performance Management Plan) Additional evaluations used to assess program performance include: USAID/Afghanistan's 2006 Portfolio Review Follow-Up Action List, Mid-term evaluation of USAID/Nepal's Building Demand for Reproductive Health Awareness among Adolescent Girls in Conflict-Affected Districts in Nepal http://dec.usaid.gov and USAID/Nepal Data Quality Assessment checklist for Forestry and Buffer Zone Activities (PDF). In order to assess implementing partner performance and overall program performance, CTOs and Strategic Objective Teams routinely gather to discuss performance. ADS 202.3.6 on Monitoring Timeliness of Key Outputs outlines CTO responsibilities as they relate to monitoring contractor/grantee performance. (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/202.pdf) Policies used to manage and assess assistance awards to grantees are found at 22 CFR 226 "Administration of Assistance Awards to US Non-governmental organizations," Section 226.51 "Monitoring and Reporting Program Performance" http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/10apr20061500/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2006/aprqtr/pdf/22cfr226.51.pdf.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Yes. Project and grant managers are held accountable for program results under their purview through an annual performance evaluation and periodic program reviews and discussions. Agency employees are evaluated annually on their overall performance and skills, which have a direct bearing on the success of their programs. A Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) is designated for each contract and grant, signing a standard designation letter which outlines their duties and states that failure to discharge these responsibilities can result in disciplinary action. CTOs are certified by passing formal training courses to ensure that they have the knowledge and skills to effectively manage contracts and grants. CTOs are responsible for holding partners accountable for performance and compliance with technical, cost, and schedule provisions of their award. When performance targets are not met or other accountability issues arise, managers and program partners work together to identify the source of the problem and needed remedial action. The contract or grant agreement may be modified, additional funds may be delayed or not provided, and/or management changes may be introduced. CTOs report to USAID Mission Directors, who are responsible for achieving program results in their country. Each Mission Director must complete an annual performance plan with work objectives and performance measures. These annual performance plans must include one work objective and one performance measure related to achieving key program results. The work objective is stated as follows: "Provide leadership and direction to Mission staff to identify and develop technical programs, activities and partners to accomplish foreign policy/transformational diplomacy objectives," and the performance measure must relate to how "Mission program implementation and management of approved activities meet or exceed annual program and management efficiency targets." A Mission Director's performance on this work objective and performance measure forms the basis for their annual performance evaluations which are, in turn, the basis for Performance Board decisions on promotion, limited career extensions, performance pay, Presidential Award and referrals to the Performance Standards Board, which determines whether the employee has failed to meet the standards of class. Findings of the Performance Boards are also one basis for tenure decisions. A Senior Coordinator at State is responsible for overseeing and coordinating assistance for the Rebuilding country program. The Senior Coordinator is measured on his or her ability to coordinate processes with State and USAID regional bureaus to develop foreign assistance priorities and associated foreign assistance funding requirements for the Rebuilding country category throughout the budget development process. Although Senior Coordinators are not responsible for program performance, Deputy Assistant Administrators (DAAs) at USAID are responsible for achieving program results at the regional level instead of the country category level.

Evidence: A Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) is designated for each contract and grant, signing a standard designation letter that outlines their duties and states that failure to discharge these responsibilities can result in disciplinary action (AAPD 04-10 Standardized Model Letters for Designating the Cognizant Technical Officers for Contracts, Grants and Cooperative Agreements can be found at http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd04_10_Att1.pdf for contracts and http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd04_10_Att2.pdf for grants). Agency managers are required to pass a Cognizant Technical Officer course to ensure that they have the knowledge and skills to effectively manage contracts and grants (USAID's CTO Program Course Description, CTO Certification Requirement Announcement). ADS 303.2 (f) defines CTO responsibilities (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/303.pdf). Performance is a major factor in selecting contractors and grantees (See Guidance on Evaluation and Use of Contractor Performance Information and ADS 303.3.6.3 http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/303.pdf for guidance on the use of past performance information in selecting grantees). The Request for Applications Number 306-004 Afghanistan Community Based Education shows that past performance is 15% of the score used for selection. A USAID Executive Message dated June 14, 2006, entitled "Standard Work Objective for Mission Director's Annual Evaluation Form," outlines the required performance objectives and measures (http://iapp1.usaid.gov/notices/notDetail.cfm?msgid=11509&currmo=6&curryr=2006&prevnext=no). USAID's Automated Directive System (ADS) Chapter 463 describes the foreign service Performance Board system.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Yes. As the primary implementing agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has a financial management system, Phoenix, which tracks obligations and enables transparent and accurate reporting of obligations down to the program element level. In Fiscal Year 2006, USAID's Asia and Near East Bureau and its operating units obligated 99 percent of that year's funds. Funds are provided on an incremental, as-needed basis so operating units and headquarters can monitor disbursements. Agency policy stipulates that the amount of funds in the pipeline (funds obligated into an agreement but not expended by the partner) cannot exceed what is needed for the next 12 - 18 months. Regular portfolio reviews are conducted to ensure that partners are expending funds in a timely manner and for the intended purpose. For example, when USAID/Nepal found that a family planning partner was expending funds too slowly through its portfolio review, the CTO was given instructions to work with the partner to increase the burn rate. Finally, all operating units are required to prepare plans that outline upcoming procurements and obligations to ensure that funds are spent in a timely manner. Awards and modifications are reported in the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation.

Evidence: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has a financial management system, Phoenix, which tracks obligations and enables transparent and accurate reporting of obligations down to the program element level. (Sample Accruals Report Phoenix Report on Commitments and Obligations) The following policies in USAID's Automated Directive System/Employee Handbook provide directives on how to manage obligations and forward funding. (ADS 202.3.8.3 on Obligations Management http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/202.pdf; ADS 602 provides Agency guidance regarding forward funding of programs http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/600/602.pdf) Among other purposes, portfolio reviews are conducted to ensure that partners are expending funds in a timely manner and for the intended purpose. (USAID/Nepal's 2006 Portfolio Review Summary and Issues Paper from Health and Family Planning) Procurement plans provide an outline for those services/goods a particular country will be seeking to obtain in order to carry out program activities to meet stated objectives. (USAID/Afghanistan's 2006 Annual Procurement Plan)

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Yes. The foreign assistance reform process has included a rigorous review of the program's measures for achieving efficiencies and cost effectiveness. Resources are clearly and directly aligned with program goals within an overarching, coherent framework for joint management, planning, and budgeting decisions at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State. As the primary implementing agency for this program, USAID has undertaken a number of initiatives under the reform to improve cost effectiveness. These measures include: 1) improved financial forecasting through more frequent pipeline reviews (pipeline is defined as the calculation of financial obligations less accrued expenditures [accruals plus disbursements]; 2) adopting a new standard of Expended Object Class Codes (EOCC), which links to performance goals and focuses on data gathering across all funds, providing more detail regarding the agency's administrative support costs than ever before; 3) implementation of the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS) which houses program budget data linked directly to program goals 4) implementing the Global Acquisition System (GLAS), a web-based system that standardizes and streamlines the agency's business processes by eliminating paper-based manual procedures, thus reducing costs agency-wide and enabling better managing and tracking of procurement decisions and contract supervision, and; 5) implementing the Manage to Budget (MTB) initiative which strives to ensure the most efficient and effective administrative operations for the U.S. Agency for International Development. In launching the MTB, USAID conducted a comprehensive review of its program goal support costs, collecting prior year data from all operating units. USAID analyzed this data to determine the current average ratio of administrative costs to program costs of 12%. Prior to this exercise, USAID had not developed an agency-wide standard for administrative cost ratios. As a result of this analysis, USAID was able to set initial guidance that an operating unit's annual combined management support costs cannot exceed the current baseline average of 12% of the annual program budget. As USAID further analyzes this data, this 12% level threshold may need to be adjusted. Under MTB, managers must justify all management support expenses, as opposed to only explaining increases over the prior year's budget, defend any budgets exceeding the established acceptable budget ratio, and present a narrative describing the impact of a 10% reduction from it. In the annual Operational Plans, field posts and other operating units must indicate the amount of general program funds associated with management support, a key factor in determining the program's efficiencies and cost effectiveness. As part of the Operational Plan approval process, this cost is reviewed and if necessary, adjusted by the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. Operating units must also provide quarterly reports on their progress toward target ratios, burn rates and significant changes. Managers are held accountable for their decisions through performance evaluations which include a measure that must relate to how Mission program implementation and management of approved activities meets or exceeds annual program and management efficiency targets. USAID also has a decentralized management structure which allows field managers to modify programs as needed to respond to rapidly changing circumstances, without headquarters' approval. USAID also uses annual portfolio reviews to identify ways to achieve efficiencies. For example, the October 2004 review of USAID's Asia Near East Bureau Washington-based programs resulted in the transfer of remotely-managed activities to the Bangkok regional office, cutting travel costs and improving oversight.

Evidence: Under Manage To Budget, managers must justify all management support expenses, as opposed to only explaining increases over the prior year's budget, defend any budgets exceeding the established budget ratio, and present a narrative describing the impact of a 10% reduction from it. Managers are held accountable for their decisions and rewarded for managing an efficient operational unit and strategically aligning their program and management support resources. (USAID's OMB Presentation: Going to Green - Manage to Budget Implementation (March 28, 2007) and USAID Administrator's Memorandum for Senior Staff, USAID/Washington and Overseas re FY 2007 and FY 2008 Operational Budget Request Guidance (August 1, 2006)) USAID's Getting to Green Plan (March 15, 2007) outlined the steps requiring implementation within the agency in order to move the agency to "Green" status on the Presidential Management Agenda Scorecard. A cable outlined efficiencies to be achieved and duplicative efforts to be eliminated when the Department of State and USAID moved to cost-sharing for administrative support services. (Consolidating and Eliminating Duplication in Shared Administrative Support Services (State Cable, December 2005))

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Yes. Since 2004, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State have had a joint strategy that establishes common goals and ensures that all programs are contributing to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In 2006, the process for foreign assistance program coordination and collaboration was greatly enhanced with the creation of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. To ensure that funds appropriated to USAID and the Department of State are properly targeted and coordinated, the Office of Foreign Assistance instituted a new budget formulation process that resulted in the first joint USAID/Department of State foreign operations budget request to Congress, for Fiscal Year 2008. This joint request ensured collaboration and coordination with USAID and State, and also enabled coordination with other agencies with related programs such as MCC, Treasury, and the Department of Defense. The Operational Plan process also allowed USAID and State to ensure coordination of resources with other non-Federal entities. For example, Nepal's Operational Plan demonstrates how the U.S. Government collaborates with the variety of grassroots level activities for conflict mitigation being implemented by bilateral donors and the United Nations system in Nepal. U.S Government activities complement the work of other donors by focusing on specific and isolated conflict affected regions of Nepal (the mid and far west) on which other donors have not focused to date. To ensure coordination and reduce duplication, the U.S. Government is an active member in various coordination working groups with the UN and other donors.

Evidence: The Joint State-USAID Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004 - 2009 is a collaborative effort that sets forth the Secretary of State's direction and priorities for both organizations in the coming years. The Strategic Plan supports the policy positions set forth by President Bush in the 2002 National Security Strategy and presents how the Department and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. (http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/) An Operational Plan is an integral tool designed to link funding to activities and results in a particular country. By their design, they help to strengthen the role of leadership in the field in driving the allocation of foreign assistance; improve coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness; strengthen accountability; help the USG provide more accurate and consistent data on programs so that the USG can efficiently and effectively communicate to various stakeholders, including Congress, OMB, and the American public what funds have been directed to and what we are getting in return for our foreign assistance investments; and identify the essential links between U.S. policy objectives, resource allocation, and results. (FY 2007 Operational Plan for Nepal (pg. 57), see "Work of Other Players" and "Narrative of USG Participants" as examples of how USAID and State coordinate programs with other donors and other USG agencies)

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: Yes. Under the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) and Management Control Review Committee (MCRC) process, the primary implementing agency, the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), ensures that resources are protected against fraud, waste, and abuse and that they achieve the results for which funds were appropriated. The process requires each operating unit to do an assessment of the adequacy of management controls in all areas of Agency operations, including program, administrative, and financial management. Each operating unit within USAID's Asia and Near East Bureau (ANE) submits a FMFIA memo to ANE Bureau management, which in turn submits a consolidated memo to the USAID Administrator. Following the review of these memos by the MCRC, USAID's Administrator reports major deficiencies and plans to correct them to Congress and OMB via the Performance and Accountability Report. The Office of the Inspector General audits the Agency's financial statements every year and conducts financial-related audits of grantees and contractors. For the fourth year in a row, USAID had received clean (unqualified) audit opinions on its financial statements. By rolling out the Phoenix financial management system to the field, USAID has significantly improved accounting practices. Financial data is now available in Washington and the field the day after it is entered, allowing the Agency to know its financial status at all times.

Evidence: Under the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) and Management Control Review Committee (MCRC) process, USAID ensures that resources are protected against fraud, waste, and abuse and that they achieve the results for which funds were appropriated. The following USAID Automated Directive System policies/USAID Employee Handbook outlines policies and procedures instituted to ensure strong financial management practices (ADS 620 chapter on Financial Managements Principles and Standards http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/600/620.pdf & ADS 596 Management Accountability and Control http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/500/596.pdf). A memo is prepared for USAID's Administrator by the ANE bureau that provides details on the assessment of the adequacy of management controls in all areas of Agency operations, including program, administrative, and financial management. Following the review of these memos by the Management Control Review Committee, USAID's Administrator reports major deficiencies and plans to correct them to Congress and OMB via the Performance and Accountability Report. (ANE Bureau FMFIA Memo to Ambassador Tobias) Performance accountability reports (PAR) are one of several reporting requirements that are required for all Federal agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Traditionally, PARs have enabled interested stakeholders such as the President, the Congress and the public at-large to assess the performance of an agency relative to its mission and demonstrate accountability. (USAID FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report http://www.usaid.gov/policy/par06/) The following reports provide additional evidence of commitment to strong financial management practices and courses of actions taken in order to sustain sound financial management. (IG Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Kandahar-Heart Highway Project available at http://dec.usaid.gov, Phoenix Report on Commitments and Obligations and Report on the Audit of USAID's Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2005 http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy07rpts/0-000-07-001-c.pdf )

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The Department of State/U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Joint Management Council is charged with aligning and achieving the diplomatic and development priorities of the President, Secretary of State, and USAID Administrator, as the two agencies come together to build a common management foundation. Regularly bringing State and USAID together, it addresses financial management, human resources, information technology, procurement, and shared services. This body has overseen the consolidation of mission administrative support services, known as ICASS (International Cooperative Administrative Support Services System), leading to improved efficiencies and decreased duplication. In terms of program management, State and USAID use regular evaluations, audits, site visits, and meetings with implementing partners to identify management weaknesses and rectify deficiencies. Additionally, USAID's Business Transformation Executive Committee (BTEC) is made up of senior officials who meet monthly to discuss progress and obstacles to reforming USAID's management systems and improving organizational performance. Through the BTEC's efforts, USAID improved financial management accountability and received its second consecutive unqualified (clean) audit opinion from the Office of the Inspector General in 2004 mentioned in 3.6. The BTEC was the body that led to the Global Acquisition System (GLAS) improvement noted in answer 3.4 due to identified inconsistencies in procurement. In addition, USAID's Asia and Near East bureau prepares an annual memo for USAID's Administrator that assesses the adequacy of management controls in all areas of Agency operations, including program, administrative and financial management. Following the review of these memos by USAID's Management Control Review Committee, USAID's Administrator reports major deficiencies and plans to correct them to Congress and OMB via the Performance and Accountability Report. The financial management system, Phoenix, mentioned in 3.6 was a direct result of this procedure through which the Agency found that the lack of a common financial management system was a material weakness. USAID is required to report to OMB, on an annual basis, 100% of funding (Program and Operating Expense) that is allocated by OMB mandated class codes. The Agency has never fully complied with this directive, because the Agency did not have an accounting system that could systematically capture the data. Similarly, USAID/Washington had no systematic way of tracking what missions were spending in administrative expenses across both program and OE. This made it difficult to compare agency administrative performance and set targets for administrative cost reductions. With Phoenix deployed worldwide, the Agency can now capture all financial actions in Phoenix using the new code structures, or Expanded Object Class Codes (EOCC), cited in 3.4. While the Phoenix financial management system provides the Agency's financial operating platform, the Agency's overarching goal is to streamline operations and reduce costs throughout the entire Agency. Therefore, USAID is implementing the Global Acquisition System (GLAS), which will bring the Agency another step closer to achieving its goal by providing an end-to-end automated procurement process that will address multiple acquisition and procurement challenges faced by the Agency. USAID has been struggling under ever tightening operating expense budgets that are reducing the ability of USAID to effectively manage program resources and deliver foreign assistance consistent with foreign assistance needs. The Manage To Budget initiative described in 3.4 is intended to permit the Agency to address in part the declining operating resources by devolving responsibility for achieving cost reductions to mission managers, who are then provided with strong incentives to develop innovative solutions.

Evidence: The Joint Management Council regularly brings State and USAID together to address common management issues including financial management, human resources, information technology, procurement, and shared services. Their website is: http://jmc.state.gov/. Evaluations are conducted to evaluate program effectiveness and to identify areas for improvement. All evaluations conducted at USAID are made available to the public at-large for review. Viewers are able to view how current programs fare and where recommendations are made for improvement. Evaluations and cost effectiveness studies are available at http://dec.usaid.gov/ and IG audits are at http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/aud_usaid.htm. Management deficiencies are also addressed through USAID's Business Transformation Executive Committee (BTEC). This committee, made up of senior officials, meets monthly to discuss progress and obstacles to reforming USAID's management systems and improving organizational performance as noted in the Welcome to the BTEC Website, a message from the Deputy Administrator and Chairman of USAID's Business Transformation Executive Committee, http://inside.usaid.gov/BTEC/misc/welcome.html. The FMFIA Memo submitted by USAID's Asia and Near East Bureau to the USAID Administrator provides details on the assessment of the adequacy of management controls in all areas of Agency operations, including program, administrative, and financial management. Following the review by the Management Control Review Committee of this memo and those submitted by other Bureaus, USAID's Administrator reports major deficiencies and plans to correct them to Congress and OMB via the Performance and Accountability Report, also submitted. Many of the challenges and proposed solutions from question 3.4 are outlined in USAID's Getting to Green Plan, March 15, 2007 include Phoenix, Manage to Budget, and Expanded Object Class Codes.

Are grants awarded based on a clear competitive process that includes a qualified assessment of merit?

Explanation: Yes. Federal and Agency regulations require grants and contracts to be awarded through a clear, competitive process. Requests for proposals are posted at www.fedbizopps.gov. Assistance programs are announced in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (www.cfda.gov), and requests for applications and annual program statements are posted at www.Grants.gov. All solicitations include selection criteria. USAID is the primary implementing agency for this program, and a significant majority of USAID's grants and contracts are awarded based on a competitive process through which an independent panel scores and ranks proposals. Seventy seven percent of the grants in this PART are considered competitive. Exceptions are made according to federal and USAID procurement regulations when full and open competition would impair programs, when urgency is critical, or when an organization is the only one suited to undertake the work. Justifications for Other Than Full and Open Competition and unsolicited proposals demonstrating a unique, innovative, and propriety capability must be documented and approved by officials with the authority to approve non-competitive awards. USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance reviews and provides oversight to ensure adherence to federal regulations and Agency guidance on competition. USAID has led a major push in the past few years to reach out to new and unconventional partners, including faith-based organizations, small businesses, and minority serving institutions. In an effort to expand the range of implementing partners, all operating units are required to justify a partner receiving more than 15% of the program budget, which is then approved by the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance through the Operational Plan approval.

Evidence: Federal and Agency regulations require grants and contracts to be awarded through a clear, competitive process. Requests for proposals are posted at www.fedbizopps.gov. Assistance programs are announced in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (www.cfda.gov), and requests for applications and annual program statements are posted at www.Grants.gov. All solicitations include selection criteria. The following evidence lays out federal and agency acquisition and assistance processes. ADS 300 provides overall guidance on procurement, including competition requirements (ADS 302.5.8 for Contracts and 303.3.6 for Grants http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/) A sample request for proposals includes Afghanistan RFP-306-06-006 APSO Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program at www.fedbizopps.gov. A significant majority of USAID's grants and contracts are awarded based on a competitive process through which an independent panel scores and ranks proposals. (AIDAR Part 706 - Competition Requirements www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/aidar.pdf) Exceptions are made according to federal procurement regulations when full and open competition would impair programs, when urgency is critical, or when an organization is the only one suited to undertake the work. For example, USAID/Afghanistan Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition was approved for the emergency procurement of diesel fuel. USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance reviews and provides oversight to ensure adherence to federal regulations and Agency guidance on competition. (ADS 202.3.9 on Avoiding Conflict of Interest, Ensuring Procurement Integrity, Complying with Ethics Rules, and Meeting Audit Responsibilities http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/202.pdf) USAID has led a major push in the past few years to reach out to new and unconventional partners, including faith-based organizations, small businesses, and minority serving institutions. (AAPD 03-10, issued October 31, 2003, "Prohibition on Requirement for Prior USAID-Specific Experience in Evaluation Criteria for Award of Agency A&A Instruments" & Creating Opportunities for USAID: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/)

Does the program have oversight practices that provide sufficient knowledge of grantee activities?

Explanation: Yes. A cognizant technical officer (CTO) is designated for each contract and grant to audit grantee performance and assess compliance with the technical, price, and schedule provisions of their award. CTO responsibilities include reviewing and approving vouchers, monitoring contractor/grantee performance, conducting site visits, tracking financial expenditures to ensure that funds are used for their designated purpose, and overseeing sub-awards. Oversight is reinforced through a Strategic Objective Team approach, whereby a team routinely comes to together to discuss contractor and grantee performance and resolve performance or technical issues. Operating unit management is kept informed of program performance, progress, and issues via periodic portfolio reviews. For example, Nepal's annual portfolio review process resulted in memos being sent to the Mission Director for each Strategic Objective specifying results for that year, the status of obligations and expenditures, implementation challenges, and the way forward. Headquarters provides another layer of oversight through the annual report process, while audits, evaluations, and site visits enable sound oversight.

Evidence: Cognizant Technical Officers have a number of duties and responsibilities. These duties and responsibilities are specifically outlined in USAID's Automated Directive System/Employee Handbook. (ADS 303.3 defines CTO responsibilities http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/) In order to assess implementing partner performance and overall program performance, CTOs and Strategic Objective Teams routinely gather to discuss performance. ADS 202.3.6 on Monitoring Timeliness of Key Outputs outlines CTO responsibilities as they relate to monitoring contractor/grantee performance. (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/202.pdf) Afghanistan's Annual Report assesses the country's performance against targets/goals established in the country's performance plan for a particular fiscal year. USAID/Afghanistan's 2006 Annual Report; Audits conducted by USAID's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) are used to provide insight into how well the agency is operating, making recommendations when problems are found and acknowledging when things are going well. ADS 202.3.9.4 on Conducting Audits provides explanations on the purpose of USAID OIG audits and the types of audits performed. (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/202.pdf) Evaluations are available at http://dec.cdie.org, and IG audits are available at http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/aud_usaid.htm, for example see IG Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program.

Does the program collect grantee performance data on an annual basis and make it available to the public in a transparent and meaningful manner?

Explanation: Yes. Grantees and other funding recipients are required to submit performance information at least once a year. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State report on performance data in their annual Performance and Accountability Report, which is available to the public in print and on the agencies' internal and public websites. The report is also distributed in hard copy to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget. Program evaluations and contractors' and grantees' quarterly, semi-annual, annual, and final reports are also available to the public through USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse online database. Inspector General audits are also published, allowing the public to read objective assessments of performance.

Evidence: Performance accountability reports (PAR) are required for all Federal agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Traditionally, PARs have enabled interested stakeholders such as the President, the Congress and the public at-large to assess the performance of an agency relative to its mission and demonstrate accountability. (USAID FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report http://www.usaid.gov/policy/par06/) Evaluations are conducted to evaluate program effectiveness and to identify areas for improvement. All evaluations conducted at USAID are made available to the public at-large for review. Viewers are able to view how current programs fare and where recommendations are made for improvement. Evaluations are available to the public on http://dec.usaid.gov/, for example see "Land Titling in Afghanistan: Evaluation of the Land Component of the USAID-funded Afghanistan State-Owned Enterprise Privatization, Excess Land Privatization and Land Titling Activity." Additional reports assessing USAID performance include: Semi-Annual Report from USAID/Nepal Contractor on Private Sector Hydropower Sector Project (July 1 - December 31, 2006) available at http://dec.usaid.gov/ and Audit of Afghanistan's Alternative Livelihoods Project - East Region available at http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/aud_usaid.htm.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Small Extent. Analysis of each long-term performance goal shows mixed results for the two Rebuilding countries in this assessment. For instance, the "Under-Five Mortality Rate in Afghanistan and Nepal has, on average, fallen from 202 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 166 in 2004. The goal of reducing the number of deaths to 66 in 2015 is thus ambitious yet achievable. The "Cost to Start a Business," as reported by the World Bank, also provides a mixed picture. While the cost of starting a business dropped in Afghanistan from 75.2% in 2005 to 67.4% in 2006, in Nepal it increased from 69.9% in 2005 to 78.5% in 2006. Previous years do indicate improvement in Nepal, however, as the cost was at 78% in 2003 compared to 69.9% in 2005, suggesting that internal conflict has led to the increase in cost in 2006. Similarly, the World Bank Government Effectiveness Index in Nepal does not show progress, decreasing from -0.63 in FY 2003 to -0.97 percent in FY 2005. The earlier improvement from -1.02 in 1998 to -0.47 percent in 2002 suggests the internal conflict is causing the results to drop. The Government Effectiveness Index does not show progress in Afghanistan, either, with a decrease from 0.49 in 2000 to 0.20 in 2005. This is largely due to the war and the index's broader, institutional measures that do not capture the incremental progress U.S. programs make in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has demonstrated progress on the "Political Stability and Absence of Violence" indicator, however, as its score improved from -2.19 in 2003 to -2.12 in 2005. A higher score indicates improved political stability, as scores range from -2.5 to 2.5. The median score for low-income countries in the Developing Countries category is -1.20, the 2015 target for Afghanistan. Although Nepal's score has decreased, it was last evaluated in 2005, when public discontent with the king's autocratic rule was high. In addition, violence between Nepal's Maoist insurgents and government security forces continued unabated. However, in April 2006, faced with massive public pressure, the king restored parliament and transferred executive authority to a multi-party government. The Maoists then signed on to an indefinite cease-fire and a peace process expected to culminate in a constituent assembly that will draft a new constitution for the country. Given these changes, we expect Nepal's future Political Stability/Absence of Violence ratings to improve. Despite these mixed results, there is evidence that the Rebuilding Country program is making progress. USAID consistently meets its annual targets for child mortality; Afghanistan is on target for both the crude death rate and under five mortality rate indicators; and there has been progress in improving the business enabling environment, which would mean a reduction in the cost to start a business. USAID and State will know whether the Rebuilding Country program is on track to meet its ambitious 2015 targets by assessing mid-level impact measures with are directly linked to U.S. Government assistance programs. Operating units establish mid-level indicators which provide the link between the annual output measures and long-term outcome measures. Program managers will use the performance data from these mid-level indicators to make management changes if the Rebuilding Country program is not on track to meet its targets. Although these mid-level indicators are not tracked by the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, the Office is examining the most efficient and accurate way to track each operating unit's specific mid-level indicators within its Operational Plans.

Evidence: Proof that the Rebuilding Country program is making significant progress toward these long-term targets can also be found in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) award-winning Performance and Accountability Report (PAR http://www.usaid.gov/policy/par06/. This report shows that the USAID consistently meets its annual targets for child mortality, and highlights how Afghanistan is on target for both the crude death rate and under five mortality rate indicators. It also shows great progress in improving the business enabling environment, which would mean a reduction in the cost to start a business. Specific indicators highlighting success in improving Afghan educational infrastructure and vocational training enrollment further demonstrate success in the Economic Growth Objective.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Small extent. The annual performance measures contribute to the long-term measures, and when combined with the mid-level impact indicators indicate whether the program is on track to meet its long-term, ambitious performance targets. The Rebuilding Countries program shows progress in achieving annual performance goals in some instances while failing to meet its targets in others. Of the nine annual measures listed in this assessment, two measures have shown progress by achieving their annual targets. For example, one annual measure - number of individuals who receive U.S. Government political party training in Nepal - well exceeded its 2006 target of 350 with 1318 individuals participating. Two indicators, however, do not meet their targets. This can largely be attributed to violence in Nepal and Afghanistan that prevent program implementers from reaching intended beneficiaries, rather than the programs themselves. For example, some indicators, such as vitamin A supplementation coverage in Nepal and kilometers of roads constructed in Afghanistan, show that the programs come close to meeting ambitious targets in 2006 (reaching 3,159,089 children of a 3,336,000 target and 619 km of a 730 km target, respectively). Due to foreign assistance reform and the new system of joint USAID and Department of State planning, performance data prior to 2007 is not available for five of the annual performance measures. However, operating units' Annual Reports (ARs) measure similar indicators that show previous year performance in child health, economic growth, and governance. For example, the indicator "number of rural households benefiting directly from U.S. Government interventions in Afghanistan" does not have prior year data. However, USAID's 2006 AR on Afghanistan measured number of people that received U.S. Government training in agriculture, which is one piece of impacting rural households. The U.S. exceeded its target of 800 in 2006 and trained 200,000 individuals in Afghanistan, compared to 593 in 2005. The 2006 AR also provides 2006 data on the "number of licit jobs created in USAID-assisted areas" (78,337 jobs in 2006). The mixed results on annual indicators correlate with the mixed results in long-term indicators.

Evidence: Qualitative and quantitative data from USAID FY07 Nepal Operational Plan, 2006 Afghanistan Action Plan Annual Review and FY08 Afghanistan Mission Performance Plan (at http://spp.rm.state.gov/spp800X600template.cfm?id=61 ) show strong performance in education, child health, creating a more conducive business enabling environment, and agricultural gains.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: No. A key objective of foreign assistance reform is to improve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in achieving program goals. Under the processes described in 3.4, a standard administrative cost ratio of 12% has been established as the initial target for each operating unit implementing the program. Because this is a new baseline, USAID is unable to identify cost savings from improved efficiency initiatives at this time.

Evidence: Guidance on the target efficiency ratio is in the FY 2007 Operational Plan Guidance and USAID Administrator's Memorandum for Senior Staff, USAID/Washington and overseas re FY 2007 and FY 2008 Operational Budget Request Guidance (August 1, 2006). Evidence of the program's commitment to improved efficiencies is in USAID's OMB Presentation: Going to Green - Manage to Budget Implementation (March 28, 2007) and USAID's Getting to Green Plan (March 15, 2007). As discussed in 3.4, the Consolidating and Eliminating Duplication in Shared Administrative Support Services State Cable in December 2005 sought to decrease inefficiencies by combining administrative services for the two bodies.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: Yes. The Rebuilding Countries program performs favorably in comparison to other government and donor programs with similar purposes and goals. In general, , the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is often recognized by other donors and host governments for its ability to respond quickly to challenges and opportunities and its leadership of coordination with other donors. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness highlights the importance of devolving responsibility to field staff, the hallmark of USAID's programs. The United States is also one of the only donors with a stringent, auditable performance management system that monitors and can report on results with good quality data. In its 1998 peer review, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states that, "among DAC Member-agencies, USAID has been one that has placed great emphasis in assessing its aid effectiveness, measuring and evaluating program performance, (including gender issues) and using this information 'to manage for results.'" Most donors, on the other hand, lack the capability to track their performance because they conduct development assistance through budget support. USAID and the Department of State also has a comparative advantage in implementing programs in high-threat environments because of the security resources at hand and on-the-ground presence. For example, the U.S. Government's ability to provide security to Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout Afghanistan allows the U.S. to support construction projects, training, and capacity building in a variety of sectors in hard - to - reach areas of Afghanistan, which are inaccessible to some of partners with less security provisions. USAID and the Department of State routinely seek out the best entity to implement foreign assistance programs, recognizing that different organizations have different strengths. Through full and open competition, USAID ensures that the implementing partner is the best-positioned to achieve the program's objectives. USAID also recognizes the private sector's comparative advantage in providing assistance in business-related sectors, and therefore, routinely partners with private sector and non-profit organizations to leverage funds and increase the program's impact. In addition, USAID and State transfer funds to another U.S. Government Agency if that Agency is better positioned to implement the activity, such as to the Army Corps of Engineers for infrastructure programs. The U.S. is often recognized for its leadership of country program coordination with other donors in rebuilding countries. The United States is the lead donor in Afghanistan, and has taken part in negotiations with other donors to encourage their continued assistance and to ensure programs complement each other, as seen in the Bonn Agreement, the London Conference, and the recent Stockholm conference. Similarly, the mission in Nepal has taken part in donor conferences and worked closely with the United Nations Mission in Nepal to support a free and fair election and secure the countryside to encourage the democratic transition in FY 2006 and 2007.

Evidence: The OECD-DAC Peer Review of U.S. Foreign Assistance 2006 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/57/37885999.pdf) and 1998 (http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2094661_1_1_1_1,00.html) cite the U.S. Agency for International Development for its strong field presence and flexible programming. USAID and the Department of State are often sited for their comparative advantage in implementing programs in high-threat environments because of the security resources at hand and on-the-ground presence; see Operating in High-Threat Environments Report.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Large Extent. Independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality programs indicate that the Rebuilding Countries program is effective and is achieving intended results that address the five objectives of the strategic framework. For example, the positive results of Chemonics International's independent evaluation of the ongoing RAMP's Rebuilding Agricultural Markets -Rural Finance Program shows progress towards both the peace and security and economic growth objectives in Afghanistan. While it was too early to determine long-term results, Chemonics noted that the "micro finance institutions were able to achieve the greatest outreach and impact in the shortest period of time, making nearly 90,000 loans, while reaching women and disadvantaged groups. The review also noted that the program's efforts to set up a small and medium enterprise financing companies had mixed results, as they successfully reached rural borrowers but start up time was longer than expected. In conclusion, the Chemonics noted that the RAMP project has been able to jumpstart lending to the agricultural sector in Afghanistan. In doing so, the RAMP project contributed to the U.S. Peace and Security Objective, as the more farmers could reach markets with licit agricultural goods, the less they would need to rely on poppy cultivation and narcotics trade. Likewise, the project demonstrated successful results in creating economic opportunities for rural farmers, a key program area of the Economic Growth objective. A second example is Brian Gilligan and R. Pulkit Choudhary's evaluation of Save the Children's HIV/AIDS IMPACT Mitigation through Mobilizing Affected Communities Project. This evaluation concluded that the program, with the exception of the replication approaches throughout the Kanchanpur District, substantially "increased the capacity of non-governmental organizations to facilitate and support community efforts to provide care and support for people living with HIV and their families, including children." In addition, the evaluators concluded that the program successfully "increased the capacity of the community support households affected by HIV/AIDS." Increasing a community's capacity to provide health care both improve the "delivery of critical social services," the main Investing in people objective for Rebuilding countries, and "Assist in creating and/or stabilizing a supportive environment for civil society," a key objective in Governing Justly and Democratically for Rebuilding Countries. These examples indicate the program is effective and achieving results in the four objective areas for Afghanistan and Nepal. Progress on these objectives will contribute towards transitioning these countries to the Development Country category, and therefore move these countries towards graduating from U.S. development assistance.

Evidence: The "Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program RAMP Rural Finance Impact Report", Chemonics International's independent evaluation of the ongoing RAMP's Rebuilding Agricultural Markets -Rural Finance Program, shows progress towards both the peace and security and economic growth objectives in Afghanistan. "HIV/AIDS IMPACT Mitigation through Mobilizing Affected Communities Project," Brian Gilligan and R. Pulkit Choudhary's evaluation of Save the Children's HIV/AIDS project, concluded that the program, successfully "increased the capacity of the community support households affected by HIV/AIDS." This progress clearly demonstrates progress in the HIV/AIDS element of the Investing in People objective, as well as the civil society area of the Governing Justly and Democratically objective in the strategic framework. "Mid Term Evaluation Enterprise-based Biodiversity Conservation - Nepal Project" at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABY814.pdf, recorded success towards improving the capacity of civil society, a key area in the Governing Justly and Democratically objective, as the community forest user groups improved their management skills and developed partnership and collaborative interactions.. "The Anti-Trafficking Program in Rural Nepal: Assessment of Change in Awareness and Communication among Adolescent Girls, Peers and Parents in Baglung District, 2002, an Endline Survey" found that the project was "successful in enhancing knowledge among the adolescent girls, peers, their parents and community members on different aspects of trafficking of girls such as signs of indicative of trafficking, and protection measures."