The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 27, 2013

Background Press Briefing on Vice President Biden's Trip to China, Japan and the Republic of Korea

Via Teleconference

9:19 A.M. EST

MS. TROTTER:  Hi, everyone.  Thanks for joining us this morning to learn more about the Vice President’s trip to China, Japan and South Korea next week.  Our speakers today, who you can quote as senior administration officials, will get us started with some information about the Vice President’s schedule and goals during his trip, and then we’ll take some of your questions.  And if we could limit it to one question per person and outlet, that would be great.

And with that, I will let our first speaker get started.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thanks, everybody, for joining the call today.  I’ll spend a few minutes at the top giving a broad outline of the purpose behind the trip, and then the main elements at each of the three stops, and turn it over to one of my colleagues to provide some more context and color, and then we’d be happy to take your questions.

As most of you know, the Vice President will be traveling next week to Japan, China and the Republic of Korea, leaving on Sunday, December 1st, returning to the United States on Saturday, December 8th.  And above all, the trip will underscore the administration’s strong commitment to the rebalance, and to our enduring role as a Pacific power.  It is an opportunity to give lift to our treaty alliances and to advance our very important relationship with China.

As the Vice President has said before, we, right from the top of this administration, the President on down, we’re all in on the rebalance in all of its dimensions -- economic, strategic and values-based.  And this trip will cap a very active year of engagement by this administration in the Asia Pacific region.  Just in the last few months, you’ve seen Secretary Hagel visiting both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia; Secretary Kerry, Secretary Pritzker, Secretary Moniz, Secretary Lew, Ambassador Froman, all making trips out to the region and engaging on a variety of issues across the spectrum of our engagement.  And of course, last week our National Security Advisor Susan Rice gave an important speech on the second-term agenda for Asia Pacific policy at Georgetown University.

So the list of engagement at the Cabinet level and higher goes on, but fundamentally the message is clear and simple:  The United States is a resident Pacific power, we’re here to stay, and we’re actively engaged on the full spectrum of issues in the region. 

Now, in addition to that broad message that the Vice President will carry with him to each of his stops, there’s obviously a range of urgent and immediate issues that will benefit from high-level attention on this trip.  And we’ll look forward to discussing some of those during the question and answer session -- our efforts to complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership, our efforts to bring about a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, our efforts to contribute to the lowering of tensions and the advance of diplomacy on the East China Sea and the South China Sea, our efforts to strengthen our economic relationship with China coming out of their third plenum, and to enhance implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and of course important alliance issues in both Japan and Korea.

And it’s especially important, I think, at a time when there is the potential in the region for some miscalculation, some mistrust, that we continue to amplify our messages -- that we are and always will be there for our allies, and that there is a way for two major powers in the U.S. and China to build a different kind of relationship for the 21st century.  So this is an important moment in the Asia Pacific and an important moment in our relationships with all three of the countries the Vice President will be visiting. 

So just a couple of minutes on the specific elements of the agenda on each of the three stops.  In Japan, the Vice President will travel to Tokyo where he’ll meet and have a working dinner with Prime Minister Abe.  He’ll also meet with members of the Diet, including Deputy Prime Minister Aso.  And he’ll be joined by the Ambassador for Global Women’s Issues Cathy Russell and Ambassador Caroline Kennedy for an event to highlight the role of women in the Japanese economy and the reform agenda on this set of issues being pursued by the Japanese government.  And in that regard, he will be touring a local technology company that’s owned and run by a woman entrepreneur, and he’ll host a roundtable discussion to explore the challenges faced by women as they enter and remain in the workplace.

He will then move on to Beijing, where he will have bilateral meetings with President Xi, Vice President Li and Premier Li to cover the broad range of bilateral, regional and global issues.  And here he will pick up where President Obama and President Xi left off after Sunnylands and the G20, with the kind of high-level, personal engagement between the top leaderships of our two countries that is an essential part of advancing the U.S.-China relationship in the 21st century.

In Seoul, the Vice President will meet with President Park and Prime Minister Jong.  He’ll deliver keynote remarks at Yonsei University on the U.S.-Korea relationship, which will -- it has its 60th anniversary of the alliance this year, as well as on the U.S. approach and policy towards the Asia Pacific at large.

The Vice President will also have the opportunity with -- to meet with both of our countries’ troops and to receive a briefing on security on the peninsula.  And he will also lay a wreath at a cemetery honoring those Americans who gave their lives six decades ago to help secure a free and democratic South Korea.

With that, let me turn it over to my colleague to add a little bit of texture, and then we’ll be happy to open it up to your questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great, thanks.  This is a long-planned trip by the Vice President.  And as my colleague just said, it’s part of a continuum of U.S. engagement in the Asia Pacific, and the capstone of which really has been an extraordinary year of high-level interaction in Washington as well as in the region with leaders from both North and Southeast Asia.

I think the fact that Vice President Biden has extraordinarily close and warm relations with the leaders of each of the three countries that he’s going to be visiting next week is quite an important factor in diplomacy and in the rebalance. 

Vice President Biden spent a considerable amount of time with Prime Minister Abe.  He had a very good meeting in Washington with President Park.  And I would say he knows President Xi as well or better than probably any American, and possibly virtually any leader.  So this matters.  And I think that what you will see is that this relationship enables him to conduct a high-level and a high-quality dialogue that’s particularly valuable today among these three countries.  I would say all four of us -- the U.S. and the Japanese, the Chinese and the South Koreans -- share quite a rich agenda across the spectrum of economic and security and global and regional issues, so it warrants this kind of high-level, close coordination.

And we all share an interest in addressing a lot of the regional and the global challenges that my colleague has mentioned, as well as addressing some issues and regional tensions that need to be talked through calmly and directly.  So I would look at this visit as an opportunity to consult, to discuss, to explain, to clarify, and to do so at a very senior level at a very important time.

Thanks.

Q    The Wall Street Journal.  Good morning, thanks so much.  Would it be accurate to say that Vice President Biden’s trip to China will have the goal of de-escalating the military confrontation there?  Any comments on that appreciated.

Also because I stepped away for a moment, if you could repeat the ground rules for how to attribute this and the name of the other speaker, that would be great.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I’ll turn it over to my colleague to answer the substantive question.  The ground rules are that this is a call on background, with attribution to senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Fine.  Well, I’m going to take a guess that what you mean by confrontation is the issue of the recent Chinese decision or announcement to create an air defense information zone in the East China Sea.  Because the fact of the matter is that in terms of U.S.-China military-to-military, our relations, we’ve had a number of very strong mil-mil programs throughout the year, high-level exchanges, quite a good dialogue.  And this military-to-military engagement is a very important part of our overall bilateral relationship and a place where we are seeking to maintain continuous and open dialogue.  This was very much the topic of discussion in previous visit by Vice President Biden.  And we’ve seen good progress since then.

On the issue of the air defense information zone, we have already gone on the record from the Pentagon and elsewhere what the basic U.S. policy is.  And I won’t rehash that.  But clearly the visit to China creates an opportunity for the Vice President to discuss directly with policymakers in Beijing this issue to convey our concerns directly and to seek clarity regarding the Chinese intentions in making this move at this time.

It also allows the Vice President I think to make the broader point that there is an emerging pattern of behavior by China that is unsettling to China’s own neighbors, and raising questions about how China operates in international space and how China deals with areas of disagreement with its neighbors.

But at the same time, to put it in perspective, the Vice President of the United States is not traveling to Beijing to deliver a demarché, let alone on a single issue.  He’s going to have a very high-level and a very wide-ranging dialogue with senior Chinese leadership that covers a wide range of shared interests, along with areas of concern, areas of cooperation, and areas of de-confliction.

Q    Reuters.  Thanks very much for holding the call and for taking my question. 

I wanted to continue to ask about how the Vice President will address the issue of the air defense identification zone that appears to be causing some tensions in the region.  My question is:  What is his role going to be with regard to that issue?  Will it be to mediate between China and Japan?  Or will it be to back up the Japanese who are a key U.S. ally? 

Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We’re talking about international air space.  We’re not talking about overflights of sovereign territory, and so there is legitimate interest by the United States, as well as by the international community in as much as commercial airlines and civil aircraft and in some cases military aircraft routinely overfly the area that is bounded by the ADIZ that China has declared.

So in the first instance there is a need for China to clarify its intentions, to answer a number of questions that this move generates, both as a civil aviation matter, but also as a strategic matter.  I think that the U.S. commitment to the alliance with Japan and the alliance with the Republic of Korea -- both countries whose own existing air defense information zones, zones that have existed and functioned effectively for decades -- that our commitment to our allies is beyond question.  But I don't think that is the matter at hand.

Others, including Taiwan, have a similar problem with respect to an overlap in the ADIZ.  And, as I said, planes from countries throughout the world routinely overfly this.

In Japan and then in Korea, as I said, both of whom are directly affected by China's actions, and along with the U.S. and the international community, both of whom have a huge stake in freedom of overflight, in aviation safety, in lowering tensions, and in careful handling of these kinds of issues, the Vice President will have an opportunity to confer.  And I think that is an important part of his role.

In China, he will have an opportunity, as I said, to make clear to the Chinese leadership that we have concerns and that we have questions.  But I think that the underlying point here is that the strains caused by a series of actions by China in its relations with its Asian neighbors is not a good thing.  It's not a good thing for the United States, it's not a good thing for anyone.  And so I think that this visit allows the Vice President to discuss the issue of how China operates in international space, and how China deals with areas of disagreement with its neighbors. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  And I would just underscore that the Vice President will make clear that the United States has a rock-solid commitment to our allies, and at the same time, the United States also believes that the lowering of tensions and the avoiding of escalation in this region, when you're talking about the second and third largest economies in the world, is profoundly and deeply in the American national interest.  And he'll be carrying those messages with him throughout his trip. 

Q    Hi, thanks very much.  The Guardian.  So do I understand correctly that the Vice President will not call for the rollback of China's ADIZ, simply the clarification of its purpose?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I'm not going to have the Vice President's meetings for him on the phone with you before he gets there.  And the statements already by Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel lay out our view. 

We have real concerns with this move by the Chinese because it raises serious questions about their intentions.  It causes friction and uncertainty.  It constitutes a unilateral change to the status quo in the region, a region that’s already fraught.  And it increases the risk of miscalculation and the risk of accidents.  But I will leave it to the diplomatic channels to discuss and consult with the Chinese on what remedial actions they can take.

Q    Hi.  The Wall Street Journal in Beijing.  Can we move to the economic issues?  Can you give us a sense of what the Vice President will be looking for out of China in terms of its economic reforms?  The Treasury Secretary was just there and got a briefing from Xi.  What’s next?  What are you looking for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Part of what we're looking for is just a reaffirmation of the reform agenda.  Secretary Lew was there just as it was being released, as you know.  We believe that this is an important and an ambitious reform program, obviously the mentioning of the decisive role for the markets.  And the Vice President will take up with China how much we see it to be in China’s interest as well as in the interest of the United States and the global economy for China to have strong and balanced growth going forward.

And that, in turn, depends on them shifting successfully to a growth model that is based on domestic and consumer demand, in particular, going forward, which the reforms that they have committed to in the third plenum to allow a greater play of market forces and some deregulation of prices should certainly support.

Q    Thank you for taking questions.  Japanese NST TV (ph).  I have actually just a follow-up question about China setting up ADIZ and the relationship between China and Japan.  Is the Vice President going to ask Japan, China and South Korean leaders to set the dialogue to cool down the tension?  Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Encouraging dialogue among the countries in Northeast Asia to cool down tensions is both a matter of common sense and a matter of longstanding U.S. policy.  As my colleague said, among the four of us we have the three largest economies in the world, plus the Republic of Korea, which is large and growing larger.  We have a region that is central to the global economy, and we also have a region that can serve and should serve as a driver not only for global growth, but for solutions to global problems.

The partnerships are not merely a combination of bilateral relations; there is important trilateral cooperation.  At the trade level, for example, among Japan, Korea and China, there’s important trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the ROK. 

So the simple matter is that the region and the universal principles at stake are too important to allow tensions to escalate and to incur the risk of miscommunication.

So, yes, we do encourage and have encouraged, and it will be very much on the Vice President's mind, the need for good diplomatic and political dialogue to supplement the important economic relationships that exist among the major countries in Northeast Asia. 

Q    Hi, gentlemen.  Thanks for doing the call.  The New York Times.  I think I'm picking up on the previous question, but I wanted to sharpen it a little bit.  There's obviously been a good degree of personal animosity between Prime Minister Abe and President Park, and I wondered to what extent the Vice President hopes or believes it would be appropriate to try to mediate that dispute?  Or is he, as maybe you just suggested, going to keep it much more on a general level of lowering tensions as a good thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, look, the relationship between Japan and Korea is a hugely important one.  It's got very, very deep roots.  And it's important not to overstate or to hype the areas of tension or friction that occasionally arise.  We take them seriously.  I think Japan and Korea take them seriously. 

But this is in the context of two liberal, free-market democracies, two influential regional and global actors with very close economic relations, very close political relations, people-to-people, cultural and other ties with each other. 

There has been historically an ebb and flow in the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo.  There are some strains now, there's no question about it, and the Vice President will certainly make clear the U.S. interests -- the strong U.S. interest in having these two close friends and two close allies of the United States find ways to manage and mitigate and ultimately to resolve the areas of difference between them. 

The Vice President understands quite well that there are a number of difficult legacy issues remaining from the previous century, and that they continue to color the relations between Japan and Korea.  And the Vice President is not one to be shy about making our views known.  We consistently encourage Japan to work with its neighbors to address issues and sensitivities left over from the 20th century, and we encourage Japan's neighbors -- including the Republic of Korea -- to reciprocate any positive moves. 

And our consistent view is that no party should take action that will trigger problems for the other, so the watchwords here are restraint and tolerance and sensitivity.   That's not mediating.  That's both common sense and representing the best interests of the United States. 

Q    If no one else is going to ask a second question, again with The Wall Street Journal.  I just wanted to ask about -- the trade relations with Japan seems to be a major part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership dialogue that needs to be hammered out as early as this year.  I was wondering if Vice President Biden was going to get specific on that, and the political issues about Japan opening up its car market and agricultural markets.

Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, as you know, Ambassador Froman, the Trade Representative, will be going to discuss all of the TPP negotiations with the partners in early December, following the Vice President's trip.  And, naturally, in talking about close economic relations in the region, the issue of trade will be important.  And this will be something that I'm sure will come up in the meetings with Japan and the Vice President, because it's extremely important both to Japan and to the TPP that Japan should follow through on the so-called “third arrow” of Abenomics and make structural reforms.  And that is also of course critical to the United States to move to get more access to Japan's markets.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  And just to add briefly to that, the Vice President and Prime Minister Abe had a discussion about TPP and the role that it can play going forward in setting -- creating a new high-standard trade agreement for the region and for 40 percent of the world's economy when they met in Singapore.  And the Vice President looks forward to picking up on that conversation in this period where discussions about bringing TPP to a positive conclusion (inaudible).  So you can bet that it will be an important part of his agenda in Tokyo when he is there with the Prime Minister.

MS. TROTTER:  That's it for today.  Thanks, everyone, for joining us.  And stay tuned for more information about the Vice President's trip in the next few days.  Thanks.

END
9:48 A.M. EST

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 26, 2013

Statement by the President on the Passing of Civil Rights Leader Rev. T.J. Jemison

Michelle and I were saddened to hear about the passing of Reverend T. J. Jemison. With visionary spirit and charisma, he led the country’s first boycott of segregated seating on public buses 60 years ago, and he went on to help eradicate legal segregation and improve voting rights laws for disenfranchised Americans. As a founding member of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and former president of the National Baptist Convention, he inspired Americans across our country with the courage of his convictions and the depth of his faith.    

As we mark the 50th anniversary of the March on Washington for Jobs and Justice, we remember the legacy of trailblazers like T.J. Jemison, and commit ourselves to carrying that legacy forward in the years to come.  Our nation is a better place because of Reverend Jemison’s struggle and sacrifice, and our thoughts and prayers are with his family, friends, and loved ones. 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 26, 2013

President Obama Signs Illinois Disaster Declaration

The President today declared a major disaster exists in the State of Illinois and ordered federal aid to supplement state and local recovery efforts in the area affected by severe storms, straight-line winds, and tornadoes on November 17, 2013.

The President's action makes federal funding available to affected individuals in the counties of Champaign, Douglas, Fayette, Grundy, Jasper, La Salle, Massac, Pope, Tazewell, Vermilion, Wabash, Washington, Wayne, Will, and Woodford. 

Assistance can include grants for temporary housing and home repairs, low-cost loans to cover uninsured property losses, and other programs to help individuals and business owners recover from the effects of the disaster.

Federal funding is also available on a cost-sharing basis for hazard mitigation measures statewide. 

W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security, named Donald L. Keldsen as the Federal Coordinating Officer for federal recovery operations in the affected area. 

FEMA said that damage surveys are continuing in other areas, and additional counties may be designated for assistance after the assessments are fully completed. 

FEMA said that residents and business owners who sustained losses in the designated counties can begin applying for assistance tomorrow by registering online at http://www.DisasterAssistance.gov or by calling 1-800-621-FEMA(3362) or 1-800-462-7585 (TTY) for the hearing and speech impaired. The toll-free telephone numbers will operate from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. (local time) seven days a week until further notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION MEDIA SHOULD CONTACT:  FEMA NEWS DESK AT (202) 646-3272 OR FEMA-NEWS-DESK@DHS.GOV

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 26, 2013

Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

The health care law puts women and families in control of their health care by covering vital preventive care, like cancer screenings and birth control, free of charge.  Earlier this year, the Obama Administration asked the Supreme Court to consider a legal challenge to the health care law’s requirement that for-profit corporations include birth control coverage in insurance available to their employees.  We believe this requirement is lawful and essential to women’s health and are confident the Supreme Court will agree.

We do not comment on specifics of a case pending before the Court.  As a general matter, our policy is designed to ensure that health care decisions are made between a woman and her doctor.  The President believes that no one, including the government or for-profit corporations, should be able to dictate those decisions to women.  The Administration has already acted to ensure no church or similar religious institution will be forced to provide contraception coverage and has made a commonsense accommodation for non-profit religious organizations that object to contraception on religious grounds.  These steps protect both women’s health and religious beliefs, and seek to ensure that women and families--not their bosses or corporate CEOs--can make personal health decisions based on their needs and their budgets.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 26, 2013

President Obama Signs Nebraska Disaster Declaration

The President today declared a major disaster exists in the State of Nebraska and ordered federal aid to supplement state and local recovery efforts in the area affected by severe storms, winter storms, tornadoes, and flooding during the period of October 2-6, 2013. 

Federal funding is available to state and eligible local governments and certain private nonprofit organizations on a cost-sharing basis for emergency work and the repair or replacement of facilities damaged by the severe storms, winter storms, tornadoes, and flooding in the counties of Adams, Dawes, Dixon, Howard, Sheridan, Sherman, Sioux, Thurston, and Wayne.

Federal funding is also available on a cost-sharing basis for hazard mitigation measures statewide. 

W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security, named Elizabeth Turner as the Federal Coordinating Officer for federal recovery operations in the affected area. 

FEMA said additional designations may be made at a later date if requested by the state and warranted by the results of further damage assessments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION MEDIA SHOULD CONTACT:  FEMA NEWS DESK AT (202) 646-3272 OR FEMA-NEWS-DESK@DHS.GOV

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 25, 2013

Readout of National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice's Meeting with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan

At the end of her three-day trip to Afghanistan to visit American troops and civilians and to assess conditions in the country, Ambassador Rice met with President Karzai, at his invitation, for a working dinner at the Palace.

Ambassador Rice conveyed to President Karzai that the United States welcomes the Loya Jirga's overwhelming endorsement of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and is prepared to sign the agreement in the coming days. Ambassador Rice underscored the opportunity provided by the BSA to sustain the partnership between the United States and Afghanistan to support Afghans in achieving lasting peace, security and development. In response, President Karzai outlined new conditions for signing the agreement and indicated he is not prepared to sign the BSA promptly.

Ambassador Rice stressed that we have concluded negotiations and that deferring the signature of the agreement until after next year's elections is not viable, as it would not provide the United States and NATO allies the clarity necessary to plan for a potential post-2014 military presence. Nor would it provide Afghans with the certainty they deserve regarding their future, in the critical months preceding elections. Moreover, the lack of a signed BSA would jeopardize NATO and other nations’ pledges of assistance made at the Chicago and Tokyo conferences in 2012. Ambassador Rice reiterated that, without a prompt signature, the U.S. would have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 future in which there would be no U.S. or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan.  The United States will continue to work with Afghanistan to support a smooth security transition and to help ensure free and fair elections.

Ambassador Rice conveyed the overwhelming and moving support she found among all the Afghans with whom she met for an enduring U.S.-Afghan partnership and for the prompt signing of the BSA. In closing, Rice highlighted the American people’s friendship and support for the people of Afghanistan as embodied in the extraordinary sacrifices of our service-men and women and the unprecedented investment Americans have made in Afghanistan.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 25, 2013

Statement by NSC Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden on National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice’s Travel to Afghanistan

On her first foreign trip as National Security Advisor to the President, Susan E. Rice is in Afghanistan November 23-26 on a long planned trip to visit our troops and civilians around the holidays, while also assessing the situation on the ground.  Afghanistan continues to be one of the United States’ top national security priorities, and this trip is an opportunity for Ambassador Rice to take stock of our efforts and meet with American troops serving in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and our civilians at the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan. On behalf of President Obama, she is thanking the men and women who are away from their families this Thanksgiving and serving in harm’s way. She will hear directly from U.S. troops, diplomats, and development professionals about our efforts as we move toward the responsible conclusion of our combat mission at the end of 2014 and as we continue to strengthen Afghanistan to ensure that it can provide security, governance, and opportunity for its people.  Ambassador Rice will also meet with Afghan civil society leaders and Afghan officials, as well as visit U.S.–supported assistance projects.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 24, 2013

Readout of the President’s call with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu

President Obama called Prime Minister Netanyahu today to discuss the P5+1’s first step agreement with Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program.  The two leaders reaffirmed their shared goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  The President noted that the P5+1 will use the months ahead to pursue a lasting, peaceful, and comprehensive solution that would resolve the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program.  Consistent with our commitment to consult closely with our Israeli friends, the President told the Prime Minister that he wants the United States and Israel to begin consultations immediately regarding our efforts to negotiate a comprehensive solution.  The President underscored that the United States will remain firm in our commitment to Israel, which has good reason to be skeptical about Iran’s intentions.  The President and Prime Minister agreed to stay in close contact on this issue as the P5+1 and Iran negotiate a long-term solution over the next six months. 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 24, 2013

Press Gaggle by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest Aboard Air Force One en route Seattle, Washington

Aboard Air Force One
En Route Seattle, Washington
 
3:27 P.M. EST
 
MR. EARNEST:  Good afternoon, everybody.  Welcome aboard Air Force One for our three-day trip out west.  Before we get to your questions, I do have a quick -- at the top a little bit of news.
 
Prior to departing the White House this afternoon, the President called Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel today to discuss the P5-plus-1 first-step agreement with Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program.  The two leaders reaffirmed their shared goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  The President noted that the P5-plus-1 will use the months ahead to pursue a lasting, peaceful and comprehensive solution that would resolve the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
 
Consistent with our commitment to closely consult with our Israeli friends, the President told the Prime Minister that he wants the United States and Israel to begin consultations immediately regarding our efforts to negotiate a comprehensive solution.  The President underscored the United States will remain firm in our commitment to Israel, which has good reason to be skeptical about Iran’s intentions. 
 
The President and Prime Minister agreed to stay in close contact on this issue as the P5-plus-1 and Iran negotiate a long-term solution over the next six months.
 
Q    Josh, has that readout been made public yet?
 
MR. EARNEST:  It has not, or -- I guess it has now.  (Laughter.)
 
Q    What was the Prime Minister’s reaction?  Can you tell us that? 
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, we traditionally don't read out their side of the calls.  I can tell you that the call lasted about a half hour, and it was a useful discussion.
 
Q    The Prime Minister has called it a “historic mistake” that the President specifically addressed those concerns. 
 
MR. EARNEST:  What the President was focused on was ensuring that the Prime Minister understood that the United States remains completely committed to closely consulting with Israel throughout this process.  He also reiterated that the United States and Israel are committed to the same goal, which is ensuring that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.  That is, for rather obvious reasons, in the clear national security interests of the nation of Israel.  That’s why the Prime Minister -- that’s why Prime Minister Netanyahu has made his views on this topic so clearly known. 
 
It’s also the President’s view that ensuring that Iran doesn't obtain a nuclear weapon is also in the national security interests of the United States, not just because of our enduring security alliance with the nation of Israel, but because of all -- but also because of the significant destabilizing consequences for an already volatile region of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.  So our position on these topics has been clear for some time. 
 
The one other thing that I'll note is something that has also been noted publicly, which is that some of the aspects of this interim phased agreement that was announced late last night directly address many of the concerns that both the United States and Israel share about Iran’s path to obtaining a nuclear weapon; that there are three clear paths that the United States and Israel have been concerned about.  And each of them is addressed in this agreement.
 
The first is, there is the obvious concern about the plutonium heavy water reactor that Iran is constructing at Arak.  Under this agreement all activities at that -- to build that reactor have stopped.  The second is the obvious concern about Iran’s stockpile.  And Iran has agreed to neutralize an important portion of that stockpile. 
 
The third concern that’s been harbored, again both by the United States and the Israelis, is that Iran would use the cover of talks to continue to make progress on their nuclear program.  But under this agreement, that progress has been halted, and in some cases, as I pointed out with respect to the stockpile, has been rolled back. 
 
So there is an opportunity in this six-month window for diplomacy to work toward achieving the goal that the United States and Israel share, which is ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.
 
Q    Josh, is there a timetable for the next round of talks?  The Iranians have said they’ll be ready to start right away.
 
MR. EARNEST:  I don't have a date to announce at this point, but based on what I said about the President’s desire to immediately begin consultation with the Israelis, that should be an indication to you that the President -- or that the United States, in coordination with our P5-plus-1 allies, are eager to get to work in this six-month window that is before us right now. 
 
Q    And can you talk at all about some of the main White House players in this negotiation and in this dialogue over the last several months?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, I know that there has been some reporting on this overnight about some of the bilateral communications that have occurred between the Obama administration and the Iranian regime.  I don't have a lot of details to fill in.  Suffice it to say that there was a robust debate during the President’s first run for this office back in 2007 about the wisdom of bilateral communications between the U.S. and Iran. 
 
So this is something -- I only raise that to remind you that these kinds of conversations are something -- is something that the President has long advocated.  The other thing that I would reiterate is that those conversations -- or those communications between the U.S. and Iran were useful in informing the P5-plus-1 process.  They were useful in generating some ideas that could contribute constructively to that process.  But they were in no way a replacement or a substitute for what we believe is the proper venue for this agreement -- for an agreement to be reached, which is the P5-plus-1 talks.
 
But we have been pretty candid about the letters that the President has exchanged with Iranian leaders.  We have talked about some of the bilateral communications that have occurred in the context of U.N. meetings.  And I know there’s been some reporting on some other aspects of that communication, but there’s nothing that I can get to -- into detail from here.
 
Q    Can you say who’s been advising the President the most on this particular issue?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, the President -- a number of the President’s national security team have been very involved in this.  The most public aspects -- or those who have been most publicly involved in this process have obviously been the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary of State, Wendy Sherman, who has been our point person for a lot of the P5-plus-1 talks. 
 
But obviously, Susan Rice and Ambassador Power, in their roles at the United Nations, have been instrumental to all of this.  But there are a number of members of the President’s national security team at the White House that have been involved, as well.  And they will continue to be involved in that process moving forward.
 
Q    Any examples?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Nothing that I can share at this point.
 
Q    Josh, what kind of outreach has the President and other members of the White House been making to Capitol Hill since last night?  Have there been calls this morning?  Are they reaching out the senators and House members?  How is that working?
 
MR. EARNEST:  I can’t go into any detail about those specific conversations, but given the late hour in which the agreement was struck yesterday, some of those conversations didn't happen as promptly as we would otherwise plan for them to occur. 
 
But last night, and certainly over the course of today, there have been a number of conversations between senior White House officials and members of Congress.  These discussions in the context of the P5-plus-1 have attracted a lot of attention on Capitol Hill for very good reason.  And we have worked very closely with Congress throughout this process to keep them informed about those conversations. 
 
As we pointed out a couple of times, Congress has played a really important role in this broader process.  It was Congress that passed the important sanctions that took effect a couple of years ago that have had a decimating impact on the Iranian economy.  We’ve seen the Iranian currency plummet as a result of some of the steps that Congress has passed.  So we are committed to working closely with Congress to ensure -- well, let me back up.  Because of those sanctions, Iran has taken advantage of a diplomatic opportunity.  Those sanctions are what brought the Iranian regime to the table. 
 
So we want to continue to work closely and strategically with Congress as we pursue the opportunity that’s been presented by this diplomatic window to actually achieve our ultimate goal here, and that’s to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
 
Q    And some Republican lawmakers have been sharply critical of the deal, including Senator Cornyn, last night, who said it was a distraction, or -- I don't know if he used exactly that word, but some variation of that in a tweet from the health care rollout.  And I’m wondering if the White House has any response to that.
 
MR. EARNEST:  I don’t have any direct response to that.  I know that there are many people who took a rather dim view of that perspective, both for its plausibility and for its -- what it says about our foreign policy priorities in this country.  So I’ll leave it to others to make that assessment.
 
Q    If Congress passes new sanctions, will the President veto them?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, I think what you have -- what we’ve seen from Senator Reid, Majority Leader Reid and others is that -- I think even Senator Corker made this comment after meeting with the President earlier this week -- that the Congress had agreed to hold off on passing additional sanctions because of the need to act strategically.  And so there is a sense that we want to work closely with Congress, and I think despite the impertinent tweets of some members of the Senate Republican conference, that most senators recognize that there is a constructive and important role for congress to play as we move forward.  And we will certainly be consulting closely with them as they do that.
 
Q    What is the final goal of the final round of this agreement?  Is it full dismantlement of the centrifuges or is it something less?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, I think we’ve been crystal clear from the beginning about what the goal is, and that is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  That goal hasn’t changed.  That is a goal that is shared by all of the P5-plus-1 partners.  That is a goal that is shared by the Israelis.  That is a goal that is shared by the Saudis. 
 
So we’ve been pretty clear about what exactly we are seeking to achieve here.  And that’s what so valuable about this first phase of this agreement, which is that it does for the first time in nearly a decade halt any progress that Iran has made on its nuclear program and rolls back some key aspects of it that were of particular concern to the U.S., our P5-plus-1 partners and our Israeli allies, and that was the plutonium reactor, the stockpile of -- some of their uranium stockpiles, as well as this idea that Iran would use diplomatic talks as cover to continue to make progress on its nuclear program.
 
So while this phased agreement is only a first step, it’s a really important first step because we are achieving something that we haven’t achieved in nearly a decade.
 
Q    Josh, back to sanctions.  Senator Schumer today said that this agreement more likely will bring Democrats and Republicans together in December to pass more sanctions.  So how damaging to this agreement would congressional action on further sanctions be, even if the President were to veto them?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, the goal -- sanctions have always been a means to an end.  And the first -- the sanctions that have been passed by Congress thus far have been instrumental, as I pointed out, to achieving the end, which is opening up a diplomatic window, bringing Iran to the table so that we could try to resolve our differences with Iran -- and when I say our differences with Iran, I mean the international community’s differences with Iran -- that we could resolve those differences peacefully.  That has been -- that is, in the President’s view, as the Commander-in-Chief, it’s his view that that’s the most enduring way for us to achieve our ultimate goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 
 
What’s important about that is that these sanctions were successful not just because they imposed severe limits on commerce between Iran and the United States, but rather that these were sanctions that were implemented in coordination with countries all around the world that, frankly, because of the President’s leadership on the international community, that we went out and have worked closely with the Russians and the Chinese on implementing these sanctions.  We’ve worked closely with India and South Korea, who have strong commercial relationships with Iran to enforce these sanctions.
 
And the concern is that rather than capitalizing on the diplomatic window that’s opened up, doubling down on sanctions at this point would actually undermine the international coalition that we built.  And that is why we have urged Congress to act strategically, as they have thus far, to bring pressure on the Iranian regime to reach a diplomatic solution, but do that in a way that it doesn’t actually undermine the broad international pressure that’s been brought to bear that’s been so critical to getting us to this place.
 
Q    Josh, you mentioned that the President talked about this in 2007 and 2008.  What role has he played in these talks and in this issue over the last several months?  And at what point did the White House see the possibility for an agreement like the one that was signed this morning?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, I mean, you’ll remember, Jeff, that there is a -- that this has been a theme -- that the President’s desire to extend an open hand to the Iranian regime to try to resolve our differences diplomatically and peacefully has been a theme of the President’s foreign policy since the first day he took office.  The President’s commitment to trying to achieve a diplomatic solution to achieve our goals was a prominent theme of the President’ first inaugural address, and has been ever since.
 
So this has been a priority for some time.  In terms of the turning point, I think that a lot of observers rightly point to the election of President Rouhani in June, that he was somebody who was elected with what many people assessed to be a clear mandate to try to relieve the economic pressure that Iran was feeling as a result of the sanctions that the United States had put in place, and as a result of the close international coordination and implementation of those sanctions.  So there’s no doubt that that was an important marker in the road to progress. 
 
But, again, what we have achieved so far is only a first step.  It’s an important first step in that it does halt and roll back some of the Iranian nuclear program for the first time in a decade, but over the course of six months.  This is a really important period here to try to resolve our differences with Iran peacefully.  That is certainly something that the American people strongly support.  It reflects the view of the international community that this is something that we should try to resolve peacefully.  It’s also the view of the President that the agreement would be more enduring and would provide greater security to Israel, to our allies and partners in the region, and to the international community if we can resolve our differences on this issue peacefully.  So that’s why --
 
Q    Does he feel vindicated at all by this, given the context of the campaign?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Well, I don’t know if he feels vindicated, but I think any impartial observer would acknowledge that the strategy that the President has been talking about for more than six years has yielded some important, if preliminary, results.
 
Q    Josh, Foreign Minister Zarif said that if there are any new sanctions, the deal is off.  So is it also the administration’s understanding that if sanctions are passed in Congress, by Congress, even if they don’t kick in for another six months, that this deal falls apart?
 
MR. EARNEST:  The President has been very clear that he does not believe that Congress should pass additional sanctions at this time.  And that’s something that we’ve been pretty clear on for some time.  That’s why we were pleased to see the comments of Senator Corker and Senator Reid and other influential senators who have been following this closely who recognize that taking a strategic approach to applying our sanctions regime is the best way to for us to make progress and ultimately achieve success in this endeavor.
 
Q    I also have a question on Obamacare.
 
Q    -- just one more.
 
MR. EARNEST:  We’ll come back to your question.
 
Q    Six months puts you kind of at the heart of next year’s midterm elections, and I’m wondering if the President has considered what the consequences of failure would be to the politics of this country, what it would do to Democrats if there were to be a failure in negotiations coming at that particular time.
 
MR. EARNEST:  I haven’t asked the President this specific question, but I feel confident in saying that the President is concerned about the consequences of reaching a final agreement on a whole host of things that are more important than politics.  The stakes here are high, which I think is -- I think you guys all recognize that.  That's why we're spending so much time talking about this on a Sunday afternoon. 
 
The stakes are high insofar as the consequences of failing to make progress and reach an agreement are much bigger than politics; that the enduring threat posed by Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon does pose a significant threat to the national security of Israel, who is our closest ally in the region.  It does pose a significant national security threat to other allies and partners that the United States has in the region.  It could have a destabilizing impact on what is a volatile part of the world that would be bad for our own national security interests.
 
So we have to walk quite a ways through the priority list before we get to the political implications of these conversations.
 
Q    I just have one technical question.  The sanctions relief has been numbered around $7 billion, I think $6-7 billion. How much of that are U.S. sanctions, and how much of that are the other -- world sanctions from other allies, if you know? 
 
MR. EARNEST:  I don't think that I do.  I actually would refer you to the Treasury Department.  David Cohen is somebody else who has been intricately involved -- to go to your earlier question -- somebody who has been intricately involved in putting the sanctions regime in place.  He's something of an expert on the subject.  And so you might try to track him down either today or tomorrow.  He can answer some of the more technical questions about the impact of the sanctions relief that has been under -- the subject of so much discussion. 
 
Any other Iran questions that we want to cover?
 
Q    Any other calls planned?
 
MR. CARNEY:  Not that I know of right now.  But if we're in a position to read out additional calls I'll definitely let you know.
 
Q    So on the announcement that the January 1st enrollment deadline has been pushed from December 15th to -- by another eight days.  Some insurance companies say they're not certain they can meet that deadline and it’s going to depend on how many people sign up in those final days.  So the question I have is, first, did the administration consult with the insurance companies to make sure they could meet the deadline?  And then, secondly, is there a contingency plan if these enrollments aren’t processed in time?
 
MR. EARNEST:  Throughout this process as we've worked to implement the Affordable care Act, we have been closely consulting with insurance commissioners in individual states as well as insurance companies themselves.  Over the last couple of weeks you've seen the President himself meet with the leaders of -- or executives of some of the largest insurance companies in the country, and the President met with some of the representatives of insurance commissioners all across the country.
 
That is only one example of the extensive ongoing coordination between the administration and people who have a significant stake in the implementation of the Affordable Care Act.  So, yes, we have been in close communication with insurance companies about the best way to implement some of these aspects of the law. 
 
I hadn’t seen the comments that you're referencing, but I can assure you that we'll be in close coordination with those who have made those comments to try to work with them to ease this transition period.  That ultimately is what we're talking about here -- that implementing the Affordable Care Act over the course of the next six months, this is essentially a transition period for a lot of Americans and for a lot of companies.  We're building on top of and trying to reform the private health insurance market, and so we anticipated all along that there would be some glitches and some problems that we had to iron out. And that's what we're working to do. 
 
And the whole reason for extending the enrollment period for eight days was to try to make that transition period a little bit easier, both for insurance companies and providers, but also for customers who want to take action and who want to buy insurance policies so that there's not a lapse in their health insurance coverage.  And we'll be continuing to work with insurance companies and insurance commissioners to make that transition as smooth as possible.
 
Q    The President, on this trip, is going to be raising money for the various campaign committees.  And I'm wondering now, given the problems with the health care rollout, if he's confident that Democrats can win back control of the House of Representatives in 2014.
 
MR. EARNEST:  The President is very confident that can happen, and the President thinks there's good reason for that -- specifically, Democrats have laid out a very clear agenda for what they hope to achieve in the next Congress.  Democrats have been very clear about putting the interest of middle-class families at the top of the agenda, and that expanding economic opportunity should be a top priority of the United States Congress.
 
And what we've seen, unfortunately, with this current Congress are steps taken by Republicans in Congress to undermine our economic recovery and our ability to bounce back from the worst recession since the Great Depression.  And what we've seen is a pretty coherent plan from Democrats who believe that rather than trying to play political games that undermine the recovery, that we should be -- that Congress and the administration should be working together to put in place policies that will actually support the recovery and help the private sector move forward in creating jobs and bouncing back from the worst recession since the Great Depression.
 
So that is the platform on which Democrats all across the country will be running.  That is the platform of which the President is very strongly supportive.  And the President is committed to working with members of either party, frankly, who share that goal.  Unfortunately, what we've seen is, we've seen that it's almost exclusively Democrats who are articulating that as their priority.  And that is, in my view, to the detriment of Republicans who are running for reelection and hoping to enter the Congress.
 
But, look, we'll have the opportunity to have a pretty robust debate about this next year.  But the President feels good about the chances that Democratic candidates all across the country will have to win elections on a platform that puts the interests of middle-class families and their economic well-being first.
 
Q    Should Democrats not be running on health care then, given that the new health care law is being implemented now?  Should that not be a focus of their campaigns?
 
MR. EARNEST:  I think one reason that for generations we've seen that middle-class families have been worried about their economic well-being is because of our broken health care system; that for too long, middle-class families went to bed at night worried that they were just one illness away from having to declare bankruptcy. 
 
And there was an interesting story in your newspaper today about families in Kentucky who were overjoyed about the prospect of having health care coverage that would allow them to go to the doctor, and the impact that would have on the pocketbook and the budget of their family.  So running on health care and talking about the consumer protections that are in place thanks to the Affordable Care Act is certainly an important part of the kind of economic stability that's so critical to so many middle-class families, and I'm sure will be the subject of intense debate in the next election.
 
But Democrats who make the case that these important reforms to our health care system are good for middle-class families, are good for small businesses, are good for reducing the deficit have a really strong case to make and a strong platform from which to run.
 
Q    The President is going to two states that have had some success with health care enrollment, but he's going to be talking about immigration and the economy instead.  Is he trying to kind of stay away from the subject now and highlight two other issues that probably play more to his base?
 
MR. EARNEST:  No.  I wouldn't rule out that the President might say something about health care in either of these places. I thing the value of the two events that the President has planned for Monday and Tuesday that aren’t related to campaigning are an opportunity to remind all of you and the American public that the economy is the President's top domestic priority, and specifically, strengthening the economy and expanding economic opportunity for middle-class families. 
 
He'll do that on Monday where he'll talk about reforming our broken immigration system.  There are significant economic benefits of finally passing the compromise bipartisan measure through the House that's already passed through the Senate.  It would significantly add to economic growth I think over the next 20 years -- something like $1.5 trillion would be added to the economic growth.  And we would actually see the deficit decline by about $850 billion over that same period. 
 
So there's significant economic benefits for passing common-sense immigration reform.  The President will talk about that on Monday. 
 
And then on Tuesday, the President is going to visit one of the most powerful engines of economic growth in Southern California, the entertainment industry, on Tuesday.  And in his visit to DreamWorks, he'll talk about how some of the policies that the President has put in place and has urged Congress to pass stand to do more to support our economic recovery.  And so that should be an opportunity for the President to focus on that priority at that event.
 
But each of those things is related to the economic well-being of middle-class families in the same way that ensuring that every middle-class family has access to quality, affordable health insurance is critical to their economic well-being as well.
 
Q    Do you have a sense that the President is planning to do quite a bit more for the 2014 elections than he did for 2010? Just looking at the fundraising schedule alone, it seems like there's a stepped-up effort on his part.
 
MR. EARNEST:  At the beginning of this year, the President did make a commitment to the party committees that he would participate in a set number of events to benefit their committees' fundraising efforts, and that is a commit that the President has lived up to. 
 
In an off-year -- in the year before an election like this, I think the most tangible way that an incumbent President of either party, frankly, can benefit his party's prospects in congressional races is to try to help them raise money.   And that's something that the President has been very committed to over the course of this year, certainly in the last several weeks, as anybody who has been paying attention to the President's travel schedule has surely noticed.  And I would anticipate that the President's efforts on that front will continue into next year.
 
But I don't have anything off the top of my head to announce about our plans for next year, but suffice it to say I anticipate the President will maintain a pretty busy travel schedule as he advocates for the election of Democrats in the midterm elections.
 
All right.  Thanks, everybody.  Enjoy the rest of your flight.
 
END
3:59 P.M. EST
 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
November 24, 2013

Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on First Step Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Program

Via Conference Call 
 
11:34 P.M. EST, November 23
 
MS. HAYDEN:  Hi, everyone.  Thanks for joining us tonight.  We really appreciate your patience.  I know this is starting a little later than we had hoped, but hopefully everyone got a chance to see Secretary Kerry speaking in Geneva.  That’s what we were waiting on.
 
Tonight’s call is on background with senior officials.  So there’s no embargo on this call.  Again, the call is on background.  These are senior administration officials.  And with that, I'll hand it over to senior administration official number one.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thanks, everybody, for getting on the call.  And again, thanks again for waiting.  We were letting, of course, Secretary Kerry complete his remarks in Geneva.
 
I'll just make a few opening comments here.  I know you have the fact sheet, but I think it’s still worth running through some of the key elements of the agreement.  And then my colleague will speak to the sanctions piece of our policy, as well as the limited relief in the agreement.  
 
First of all, it’s important to understand that this builds on a several-year effort, one of the leading priorities for President Obama, which is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.  And the P5-plus-1 is the forum through which we negotiate with the Iranians, and this, as the President said, is the most meaningful agreement we’ve reached with the Iranians since we took office.
 
We have described this as a first step towards a comprehensive agreement, and it’s a first step in that it halts the progress of the Iranian program, rolls it back in some important respects, but then provides a six-month window for us to test whether we can reach a comprehensive agreement.  
 
Why a first step agreement?  We believe it’s very important that Iran not be able to make progress with its nuclear program during the course of the negotiation.  One of the concerns in the past has been that Iran would use the cover of a negotiation to advance its program, and indeed were we not to reach this type of agreement, six months from now Iran could make significant progress in increasing its stockpiles and selling advanced centrifuges, moving towards bringing their reactor in Arak online.  That is the outcome that we prevent with this agreement, by halting the progress of the program and rolling it back.
 
I'll now just go through the elements of the first step. Then my colleague can speak to the relief.  Then I'll say a few words about the comprehensive solution that we’re seeking.  Then we’ll take your questions.
 
First of all, Iran has committed to halt all enrichment above 5 percent and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5 percent.  Iran has committed to neutralize its stockpile of near 20 percent uranium, and this is, of course, what has been of principal concern to us in terms of their stockpile.  It will dilute below 5 percent, or convert to a form that is not suitable for further enrichment, its entire stockpile of near 20-percent enriched uranium before the conclusion of this six-month phase.
 
So just to go through those elements specifically:  Iran will also not install additional centrifuges of any type.  Iran will not install or use any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.  Iran will leave inoperable roughly half of all centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordo so they cannot be used to enrich uranium.  Iran will limit its centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines so that Iran cannot use the six months to stockpile additional centrifuges.  And Iran will not construct additional enrichment facilities.
 
Iran will also commit to halt progress on the growth of its 3.5 percent stockpile.  And this is an important point, because not only are they neutralizing the 20-percent stockpile, they, at the end of the six months, cannot have increased their stockpile of 3.5 percent.  So that allows for the rollback on the 20 percent and the halting of any increase in the 3.5 percent stockpile.  
 
Furthermore, Iran has committed to no further advances of its activities at Arak, and to halt progress on its plutonium track.  Specifically, Iran will not commission the Arak reactor. Iran will not fuel the Arak reactor. Iran will halt the production of fuel for the Arak reactor.  There will be no additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.  Iran will not install any additional reactor components at Arak.  Iran will not transfer fuel and heavy-water to the reactor site.  Iran will not construct a facility capable of reprocessing.  And without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel.  
 
So just to pause here, there are essentially three different pathways towards a bomb that have been of concern to us.  One is the 20 percent enrichment stockpile -- the 20 percent stockpile of enriched uranium.  That goes away with this agreement at the end of the six months.  The other is the combination of the 3.5 percent stockpile together with the advanced centrifuges that Iran has developed should they install them and move to break out.  That is halted with this agreement, because they can’t grow the 3.5 percent stockpile or install those advanced centrifuges.
 
And then the third track that we were concerned about was the Arak reactor.  And this would give them a new pathway to having a heavy-water reactor, a plutonium track towards a weapon. That is halted.  
 
So these are very important concessions and the most significant progress that has been made in halting the progress of the uranium program in a decade.
 
Along with those agreements come an unprecedented transparency and intrusive monitoring of the Iranian program.  Iran has committed to daily access by IAEA inspectors at Natanz and Fordo.  This daily access will permit inspectors to review surveillance camera footage to ensure comprehensive monitoring.  This access will provide even greater transparency into enrichment at these sites and, of course, shorten the detection time for any noncompliance, so, therefore, also, getting eyes into those facilities in a way that would immediately detect any effort to break out or, of course, violate the agreement.  
 
The IAEA will also have access to centrifuge assembly facilities, also, to centrifuge rotor component production and storage facilities, and also access to uranium mines and mills.  So, importantly, these are not just inspections and access to the nuclear facilities; we also have access to the production facilities, whether it’s a centrifuge production facility or even the raw materials at the uranium mines and mills.  This is much more extensive monitoring than we have today, and it is a significant portion of this agreement.  
 
Furthermore, Iran has agreed to provide design information for the Arak reactor that we have sought for a long time.  This will give us insight into the reactor that that has not been previously available.  They will also provide more frequent inspector access to the Arak reactor, and they will provide certain key data and information that is called for in the additional protocol to Iran’s IAEA safeguard agreement and, in modified code, 3.1.  
 
So, again, taken together these verification steps will allow us, of course, to detect any Iranian noncompliance with the agreement, will allow us to have unprecedented access to their facilities, and frankly, will allow us to learn a lot more about the Iranian program and its various elements.  
 
The IAEA will perform many of these verification steps consistent with their role in Iran, but in addition, the P5-plus-1 in Iran have committed to establishing a joint commission that will work with the IAEA to monitor implementation and address issues that may arise.  So this joint commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, including the possible military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s activities at Parchin.  So, importantly, over this course of several months, we will be getting together those questions that we have about any potential military dimension associated with Iran’s activities.
 
So, taken together, again, a halt of activities across the Iranian program, a rollback in certain important elements, and extensive and intrusive monitoring.
 
With that, I'll turn it over to my colleague to walk through the relief piece.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thanks.  And good evening, everybody.  I want to describe the contours of the limited relief in this deal, which we assess is worth at most about $6-7 billion.
 
The components are as follows:  We will pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales.  This means Iran’s oil exports will remain steady at their current level of around 1 million barrels per day, which is down 60 percent since our oil sanctions took effect in late 2011.  And with one exception, the revenue that Iran earns from these sales over the next six months will continue to be restricted by our sanctions, meaning that those funds will not be available to Iran for repatriation or cross-border transfer.
 
The one exception is that we will allow Iran to transfer $4.2 billion in revenue from these sales in installments over the six-month period.  
 
We will suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports.  This could allow Iran to generate some revenue, which we estimate to be a maximum of a billion dollars in new revenue over the six-month period.  We will suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran’s trade in gold and precious metals.  There is no economic value to Iran from this provision because Iran will have to spend its limited unrestricted foreign currency for any gold purchases. Iran cannot use restricted oil earnings to buy gold.
 
We will suspend U.S. sanctions on exports to Iran’s auto industry.  This could provide Iran some marginal benefit on the order of about $500 million if Iran is able to resume its prior levels of production and revitalizes its auto exports.  However, Iran’s auto industry suffers from many problems beyond sanctions, many of which would have to be solved for Iran to benefit from this provision.  Moreover, Iran would need to use some of its limited foreign currency to pay for car kits it would import from abroad.
 
We will allow $400 million in governmental tuition assistance to be transferred from restricted Iranian funds overseas directly to recognized educational institutions in third countries to defray the tuition costs of Iranian students.  We will license safety-related repairs and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines, and we will establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade in food, agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical devices for Iran’s domestic needs.  Humanitarian transactions have been explicitly exempted from sanctions by Congress, so this channel will not provide Iran access to any new source of funds.
 
Finally, to the extent permissible within our political system, we have committed to refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.  That does not prevent us from implementing and enforcing our existing nuclear-related sanctions, which, of course, we will do, or from imposing new sanctions targeting Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism or its abysmal human rights record.
 
Let me just make a few additional comments.  First and most importantly, this relief is limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible.  It is designed so that the core of our sanctions, the sanctions that have had a tremendous bite -- the oil, banking and financial sanctions -- all remain in place.  So in that very important respect, this deal is limited.  
 
It is temporary in that the relief automatically expires at the end of six months.  It is targeted in that it allows Iran access to a set amount of funds in a controlled and controllable manner, and to permit specific additional commercial activity with quite limited upsides to the Iranians.  It does not allow any open-ended financial or economic activity.
 
And it is reversible.  If Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, the financial component, which is doled out in increments, can be turned off, and the sanctions that have been suspended can be put right back in place.
 
Second, the relief that Iran gets under this agreement is insignificant economically.  The total maximum value of this deal, as I said, is about $6 billion to $7 billion.  Compare that to the economic distress that Iran currently faces.  Over the past year, Iran’s economy has contracted by more than 5 percent. It’s currency, the rial, has lost around 60 percent of its value against the dollar since 2011.  Inflation is about 40 percent.  Iran is in a deep recession.  Because of our banking sanctions most of Iran’s major banks, including its central bank, are unable to transact internationally.  And because of our financial sanctions, the vast majority of Iran’s $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings are restricted or inaccessible.  
 
Iran’s oil exports currently average only around 1 million barrels per day.  That, as I’ve noted before, is down 60 percent, from an average of about 2.5 million per day in 2011, and is costing Iran today about $5 billion per month in lost sales.  In fact, over the past two years, Iran has lost about $100 billion in oil revenue due to sales it has not been able to make.  That is lost revenue that Iran will never recoup.  
 
None of this changes with this deal.  In fact, looking ahead during the six-month duration of this first step deal, our oil sanctions alone will cost Iran around $30 billion in lost revenues, or close to $5 billion per month.  And as for the oil revenue that Iran will earn during this time, those funds will continue to be restricted in overseas accounts due to our existing sanctions.  
 
So just looking at oil revenue alone, Iran will actually be worse off at the end of this six-month deal than it is today.  Its restricted foreign reserves will continue to grow and its budget gap -- estimated to be about $36 billion -- will not be closed.  What’s more, the relief I just described is the sum total of the relief.  All the rest of our sanctions remain in place and will be zealously enforced.  
 
So, in addition to the sanctions that limit how much oil Iran can sell, our sanctions against the central bank of Iran and approximately two dozen other major Iranian banks and financial actors remain in place.  Those banks will continue to be de-SWIFTED -- that is unable to access the SWIFT international financial messaging service.  
 
Our key secondary sanctions that threaten to cut off from the U.S. any bank that does business with designated banks, individuals and entities in Iran remains in place.  Sanctions on the over 600 individuals and entities targeted for supporting Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile program remain in effect.  Sanctions on several sectors of Iran’s economy, including shipping and shipbuilding, remain in effect.  Sanctions on long-term investments in or providing technical services to Iran’s energy sector remain in effect.  
 
The longstanding and broad U.S. restrictions on trade with Iran remain in effect, depriving Iran of access to virtually all dealings with the world’s biggest economy.  All U.N. Security Council and EU sanctions remain in effect.  And all of our targeted sanctions related to Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, its destabilizing role in the Syrian conflict, and its abysmal human rights record, among other concerns, remain in effect.
 
And one final point.  We will in utmost good faith work to deliver our commitment under this agreement.  If Iran lives up to its obligations and commitments, it will get the benefit of its bargain.  But at the same time, we will not turn a blind eye to sanctions evasion, circumvention, or any other attempts to take advantage of this situation by anyone or any person or any entity anywhere.
 
As I just described, the vast bulk of our sanctions remain in place.  And as the President said just this evening, you can be sure that we will enforce those sanctions vigorously.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great.  I’ll just say a couple of comments quickly about the comprehensive piece, and then I know we’ll want to get to questions.
 
So, first of all, essentially what happens now is we have with this framework in place six months to see if we can negotiate a comprehensive resolution.  It’s an important point that this is an agreement that will have a duration of six months, and it would only be continued if it was mutually agreed upon.  So there is an expiration date as it relates to the terms of the first step, unless there is either a comprehensive resolution agreed to or there is a mutually agreed decision to continue.
 
In terms of the end state, we do not recognize a right for Iran to enrich uranium.  That is a specific issue that has, of course, at stake in the negotiation.  What we are going to explore with the Iranians and our P5-plus-1 partners over the next six months is whether there can be an agreed upon comprehensive solution that assures us that the Iranian program is peaceful.  
 
And with respect to that end state, there are many issues that will have to be addressed.  I would note that in the agreement it is made clear that Iran will have to address the outstanding U.N. Security Council resolutions in which they have previously claimed to be illegal throughout the course of that negotiation.  So there is not an end state that can be arrived at unless we address those U.N. Security Council resolutions.
 
Moreover, nothing is agreed to with respect to the end state until everything is agreed to.  So when it comes to the various components of an end state, including those alluded to in the document today, which we can discuss, those are not agreed to unless we actually reach an comprehensive resolution that, again, gives us that assurance that the Iranian program is peaceful.
 
However, we have an opportunity here, as the President said -- our goal has always been to resolve this issue peacefully through a diplomatic resolution, both because we believe that that is the more durable way of solving the problem, because diplomacy allows you the assurance that you have an agreement that is verifiable and puts limits and constraints on the Iranian program that can be checked over time; and similarly, because, of course, the enormous costs and consequences that would come with any potential military action were it to come to conflict.
 
So this is an opportunity that we aim to seize, but we have no illusions that it will be easy to do.  These are going to be tough negotiations, but we're going to give it our very best shot.  
 
And with that, we'll move to questions.
 
Q    Thanks very much.  How real is the danger that the sanctions regime would have unraveled if this agreement had not been reached?
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Scott, I'll say one thing and then my colleague may want to add.  The purpose of sanctions were not to just have sanctions in place.  They were to change the calculus of the Iranian government.  We began to see that with the election of a new President who ran on a mandate to achieve sanctions relief through a more moderate foreign policy towards the West.  And we had an opportunity, the best opportunity we've had in five years, to test whether we could get an agreement through diplomacy.
 
We achieved that agreement in this third round of talks in Geneva.  It’s important to note that it isn't simply the unilateral sanctions that have had a bite on the Iranian economy. What’s made a difference is countries around the world cooperating with the sanctions regime reducing their purchases of Iranian oil, for instance.  And that depended upon a great amount of political will from those countries.  But the reason that those countries cooperated with us is because they wanted to support a diplomatic resolution and because it was pretty clear to the world that Iran had been the recalcitrant party in previous negotiations.
 
Our point has been that were we to walk away from the table here, were we to move to additional U.S. unilateral sanctions before we had tested diplomacy, that the political will on behalf of our partners would have been tested in severe ways, and essentially, you could have seen an unraveling of the sanctions regime from those countries that felt like we were not negotiating in good faith.  
 
And so the risk was that in refusing to test diplomacy, which was the purpose of the sanctions in the first place, the U.S. would have been alienated not just from our P5-plus-1 partners but from other countries around the world.  And that could have put at risk our ability to have the type of coalition we've had during enforced sanctions.
 
I don't know if you have anything to add to that.  
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  No, I think that's exactly right.  The effectiveness of the sanctions regime that's in place is not dependent solely on the force of our sanctions and the sort of coercive impact of our enforcement -- although that's obviously an important aspect of it -- it’s also that we have galvanized the international community to join us in this effort, and so we have a great deal of voluntary cooperation and collaboration with others around the world.  And that depends in very great extent on the recognition that we are approaching this in a sensible way and not applying sanctions for sanctions’ sake.
 
And I think that there was obviously a danger -- it’s hard to quantify, but obviously a danger if we discarded this opportunity and just moved to layering on additional sanctions unilaterally, that that important international coalition would not hold together.
 
Q    Thank you both very much for doing this.  What is your response to the arguments from the Israelis -- and you’ll hear from the Prime Minister tomorrow, I’m sure -- that this actually weakens our leverage because the sanctions were working, were getting Iran to be so serious, and now Iran knows and other countries know, and businesses around the world will know that Iran is going to be back in business and that they can start finding ways around the sanctions that have been so successful, that you’ll see this -- you’ll see a big change in rial and you’ll see a lot more flexibility for Iran.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Andrea, to your question, I’ll say a couple of things, and I’m sure my colleague will want to add.
 
First of all, just to step back, we believe that this agreement aims to address a number of concerns that Israel has expressed over the years.  First of all, Israel has expressed concern that Iran could use the cover of negotiations to advance their program.  We are halting their program in its tracks and rolling back elements of the program while we test whether we can reach an agreement.
 
The Prime Minister has raised concerns in the past about the growing stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium.  This would neutralize that stockpile, eliminating one of the most important paths that Iran could have towards a breakout to a bomb.
 
We and the Israelis were concerned about the Arak reactor coming online or a variety of reasons, including the fact that it would give them a plutonium track towards a weapon.  And we believe that this halts Arak in its tracks for the first time while we have the space to negotiate.
 
We had a tactical difference on this question of a first step or an end state agreement.  We, frankly, again, just believe that you weren’t going to get to an end state from a standing start, so we needed to put this in place to halt the progress of the Iranians while we negotiate that final step.  And we’ll consult with the Israelis.  And after every one of these negotiations, we brief our Israeli friends and I can tell you that Israel has been briefed by the United States on the elements of this agreement.
 
I’ll just say one comment on the sanctions before going to my colleague.  My quick comment would simply be I don't think that this limited and reversible agreement suddenly makes Iran a good bet for businesses to invest.  The sanctions are still in place and the sanctions are still going to be enforced.  And even in the categories where there are these limited suspensions for a time-bound period of six months, that's not exactly a fruitful climate for investment.  
 
But I’ll turn to my colleague on that.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I’d make two points, picking up on the last one there.  Iran is not back in business and anyone who makes the mistake of thinking so I think will be met with some serious consequences.  
 
The deal that was struck is very limited in terms of the additional business that Iran can engage in.  It’s able to sell petrochemicals and able to sell/export automobiles.  That's it; full stop.  There’s no other business activity that is permitted under this first step deal with Iran.  And anyone who thinks they can now go in to develop Iran’s oil fields, go into shipbuilding, shipping with Iran, any of the other sectors that are subject to sanctions will I think swiftly come to realize that we are quite serious about maintaining -- and robustly maintaining -- the sanctions that are in place.
 
Secondly, with respect to the impact of this deal on Iran’s economy, as I noted before, we do not judge this to be economically significant.  The $6 billion to $7 billion maximum value of this deal -- which I think probably overstates its actual commercial value -- will be realized over the course of six months.  And in comparison to the hole that Iran’s in, its foreign exchange needs, which are more than 10 times that amount, its budget deficit, which is in the order of about $35 billion, this very limited package of relief will not move the needle economically for Iran.
 
Q    Just a question.  I want to clarify the right to enrich piece.  The Secretary said earlier that there is no right to enrich in the document.  But we’ve heard that some of the Iranian officials are claiming there is if not an explicit right to enrich, then an implicit right to enrich.  Can you tell me exactly what the document says or doesn't say?  And is it an issue for the next round of negotiations if the P5 is claiming there isn’t a right to enrich and the Iranians are claiming there is a right?
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes, that's a good question, Mark.  The Iranians have asserted this, as you know, for some time.  And it is just the fact that as a matter of policy, the United States has not recognized a right to enrich for the Iranian government, nor do we intend to.  The document does not say anything about recognizing a right to enrich uranium.  
 
In terms of the end state, what essentially the next six months will determine is whether there can be an agreement that deals with the Iranian program and gives us an assurance that the Iranian program is peaceful; an agreement that puts limits and constraints on the Iranian program and that has strict verification measures so that we have a certainty that Iran cannot use that program to develop a nuclear weapon.
 
We would have to negotiate over the course of those six months whether that can be achieved with some type of limited enrichment capability for the Iranians.  But the point is that nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.  So there is nothing in this agreement that gives Iran something in terms of the end state that they can hold onto unless all of our concerns are met, with Arak, with Fordo, with Natanz, with strict limitations and constraints on the type of program that the Iranians have and with verification measures.  
 
So that's what the next six months are going to be about:  Can we define what an end state is that is mutually agreeable to the P5-plus-1 and the Iranian government.  That won’t involve a recognition of a right to enrich from us because we just simply do not recognize that there is a right to enrich for Iran under the NPT.  
 
So that's what will have to be explored over the next six months of negotiations.  We’ve also -- just to make a couple of points I referenced earlier -- made clear that the U.N. Security Council resolutions must still be addressed and that is something that Iran will have to deal with over the course of the next six months; and similarly, that Iran must come into compliance with its obligations under the NPT and its obligations to the IAEA.  So those aspects of Iran’s commitments to the international community hold and will have to be addressed.
 
But we’ll see whether we can achieve an end state agreement that allows for Iran to have peaceful nuclear energy, an access to peaceful nuclear energy and clearly some domestic component of a nuclear program that provides for that peaceful nuclear energy with constraints and limitations and verification measures that are acceptable to us so that we have the certainty their program is peaceful.  
 
And so again, that's precisely what the negotiation will be about over the next six months.  But it does not enshrine any right for the Iranian government to enrich.
 
The other thing I’d just reiterate that I said earlier is that this first step agreement is not a permanent state.  This has a six-month expiration date on it unless we get a comprehensive resolution, or unless there is a mutually agreed upon decision to continue the negotiation with this first step in place beyond that timeline.  
 
So again what that means is Iran cannot point to anything in this first step agreement as some type of permanent acknowledgement of their current nuclear capability.  It is not a new status quo.  It is a first step that is giving us the time and space to negotiate that entity.
 
Q    Thanks for doing this call at this late hour.  There is an Associated Press story that has just come out in the last several minutes that said there were some high-level talks going on in the months preceding this agreement and obviously the months preceding what took place in Geneva.  I was just curious if you can provide some details to the rest of us about that.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Sure, Jim.  I was just made aware of that story.  I’d just make a couple of comments.  Number one, when President Rouhani was elected and indicated a new direction, we decided to take that seriously and to test it.  And that effort commenced with President Obama writing a letter to President Rouhani, which, of course, we have made public.  And that letter I think was delivered in early August.
 
The second point I’d make is the United States has always been crystal-clear that the P5-plus-1 is the venue for negotiations with Iran towards an agreement on the nuclear issue. At the same time, we’ve also made clear that we were open to having bilateral discussions with the Iranians to supplement and feed into those P5-plus-1 negotiations.  So, again, any discussions we had with the Iranians on a bilateral basis were meant to reinforce and ultimately be a part of the P5-plus-1 negotiations.  
 
And some of this has been quite public.  President Obama spoke to President Rouhani.  Secretary Kerry has had bilateral meetings with Foreign Minister Zarif,  Wendy Sherman has had bilateral meetings on the margins of these P5-plus-1 talks.  In addition to that, we’ve also had a small number of bilateral discussions with the Iranians since President Rouhani’s election, again, with the aim of discussing ideas that could then be merged into the P5-plus-1 negotiations.  
 
So over the course of the last several months of very intensive diplomacy in September, October and November of this year, we had some limited bilateral discussions with the Iranians in addition to the P5-plus-1 discussions that, again, were aimed at developing ideas that we could provide in the P5-plus-1 negotiations.  And then the text itself, importantly, was negotiated in these Geneva rounds with the P5-plus-1.  
 
I'd also just add that our bilateral discussions with the Iranians insofar as they deal with substance -- we brief our P5-plus-1 partners on it so that they have an understanding of any discussions we’re having, just as our P5-plus-1 partners can brief us on their discussions that they may be having with the Iranians.  We also keep our Israeli friends informed of our substantive discussions with the Iranians.  This is something that we brief them on just as we brief them on the content of the P5-plus-1 talks. 
 
Q    I just wanted to be clear on the sanctions relief, I just wanted to hear your explanation for why you don't believe that this requires any congressional authorization.  Can you just outline that a little and get, if I could, maybe your sort of outlook on the Hill, how you think this will be received and what sort of diplomacy the President needs to prevent sort of further sanctions in the coming months?
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  A few points on that.  First of all, the sanctions that have been passed by Congress continue to be enforced, so it is not as if we need to unwind the legislative architecture of sanctions.  Again, this limited relief, as my colleague described, is very limited, reversible, and doesn't dismantle in any way the architecture of sanctions we have in place.  
 
With respect to new sanctions, the introduction of new sanctions would, we believe, derail the agreement, and we believe that people in Congress understand the importance of testing whether we can get to a comprehensive solution over the next six months.  And we have been having this discussion with members of Congress for several weeks now.  They’re fully briefed on what we’ve been discussing with the Iranians.  We’ve been making calls to the Hill tonight and will continue to do so in the coming days.
 
I'd just make a couple points about that.  First of all, if the Iranians violate the agreement, or if we can’t reach a comprehensive resolution, we have said that we will move to additional sanctions.  So we are open to working with Congress in the event that this agreement is violated, or that we get to the conclusion of this six months and we don't have a deal and we don't believe that we should continue negotiations.  So that will be an ongoing discussion with Congress.  
 
But I'll let members of Congress speak for themselves.  What I would say is I think most members of Congress have been clear that they do believe that this issue should be resolved peacefully through diplomacy, and that they have been key partners with us in providing the sanctions regime that brought us to where we are today.  And as the President said, we wouldn’t be here without these sanctions.  They helped bring Iran to the table.  But I think members of Congress also understand that a peaceful outcome to this is far preferable to the alternative, and that’s why we’re going to continue to test this over the course of the next six months.  
 
And we’ll have to continue to make our case to Congress, but, again, I think the broad majority of members of Congress would agree that a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear program is in the U.S. interest, and that using the sanctions as leverage in those negotiations rather than doing anything that would derail the negotiations is similarly in the U.S. interest.
 
We have time for one more question.
 
Q    Hi, gentlemen.  Thanks for doing the call.  I wanted to just clarify, on Israel, has the President spoken with Netanyahu one-on-one about this tonight, and do you have any assurances from the Israelis that they’re not going to do anything within the next six months?  
 
And then I have a technical question.  Can you give us any detail on the EU lifting insurance and shipping sanctions on oil spills?  We know a little bit about that from the Farsi version of the deal, but it’s not in your fact sheet, so if you could help with that that would be appreciated.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I'll take the first question, and then my colleague can take the second one.  
 
With respect to Israel, you can be sure that President Obama will speak to Prime Minister Netanyahu, and in fact, we have every expectation that he will do so tomorrow -- or maybe I should say today, since it is already Sunday.  We brief the Israelis after every one of these rounds of discussions.  And the President has had basically five years of conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu on this subject.  
 
And let me just say this.  We understand that there have been some differences, but we share the same objective here, which is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.  That’s in America’s interest; that’s in Israel’s interest; that’s in the world’s interest.  That’s what this is about.  And we work through these issues in a spirit of great candor and we have dialogue at every level -- from the President to the Secretary to our negotiator, and also in our security establishments, military and intelligence -- a very regularized dialogue with the Israeli government.  And we will continue to do so.  
 
And again, ultimately, we understand and appreciate why Israel is particularly skeptical about Iran, given the threats that have been made about Israel from Tehran.  We understand why Israel would want to make sure that this is the best deal possible, and make sure that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon.  One point we’d make is this is not simply about trusting the Iranian government.  There are strict verification measures through these intrusive inspections involved in making sure that Iran is meeting its commitments under this agreement.  
 
I would say that what we have now is a six-month period to test whether the new leadership in Iran continues to follow through on their commitment to move Iran in a new path.  The Iranian President has said they will not develop a nuclear weapon.  The Supreme Leader of Iran has said that there is a fatwa to development of a nuclear weapon.  What we will know after six months is whether there can be a solution that is enshrined in an agreement that gives us assurance that their program is peaceful.  That would be good for the United States; that would be good for the world; and we believe that would be good for the security of Israel, for our Gulf partners and for the region.  
 
And we’ll just conclude with my colleague taking your second question.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes, and just very briefly, the relief provisions in here, to the extent that there is additional business activity, also cover associated services.  So I assume that the -- I haven’t seen the Farsi version myself -- that it was referring to that, to the associated service.
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thanks, everybody, for getting on the call.  Something tells me this won’t be the last time we’ll be talking to you about Iran over the course of the next six months.  I just want to say, I know that this won’t be news to you that I think this, but I hope that we all at the very least appreciate the negotiators for the United States -- John Kerry, Wendy Sherman, and the whole crew out there in Geneva who have been -- who are up at 6:00 a.m., still working, and have been literally working harder than anybody that I’ve seen over the course of my time in government -- of course, with the exception of our servicemen and women who are deployed.
 
But they have done extraordinary work.  They’ve been tireless.  And they have the personal -- the President is personally grateful for what they’ve done, and holds them in tremendous esteem for their efforts on behalf of this agreement for the United States.
 
Thanks everybody.
 
END
12:16 A.M. EST, November 24