The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

2012 Nuclear Security Summit Deliverable: Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

We, the Partners of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, support the Summit’s goal of securing vulnerable nuclear material and radioactive sources around the world.  The Global Partnership is a multilateral initiative to reduce the risk of WMD terrorism through cooperative capacity building on specific projects.  The Global Partnership countries have contributed more than $55 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) since 2010.  The IAEA created the NSF in 2002 to support IAEA’s activities, including those to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.  We welcome the continuation of this crucial support as the IAEA principally relies on voluntary NSF contributions to carry out this vital mission.

The 24 Partners in the Global Partnership are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

Joint Statement on National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

On the occasion of their participation in the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, the governments of Australia, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, affirm their support to the initiative of Indonesia to draw up a National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security.

The National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security can help States develop a more comprehensive national legislation on nuclear security in accordance with their own respective internal legal processes. It can provide States with references to a wide array of consolidated elements and provisions from different nuclear security conventions/treaties, as well as international legal instruments and frameworks.  The action to create a single and friendly reference kit shall involve all international organizations relevant to nuclear security, with the IAEA coordinating the task. 

After the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, States supporting this initiative will continue to backstop and encourage the IAEA and other relevant international organizations to explore concrete ways forward to draw up the national legislation implementation kit, particularly after the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul, March 2012: Multinational Statement on Nuclear Information Security

1. In the principal communiqué here at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, all participants reaffirm their commitment to the security of nuclear information as follows:

We recognize the importance of preventing non-state actors from obtaining information, technology or expertise required to acquire or use nuclear materials for malicious purposes, or to disrupt information technology based control systems at nuclear facilities.  We therefore encourage States to: continue to develop and strengthen national and facility-level measures for the effective management of such information,  including information on the procedures and protocols to protect  nuclear materials and facilities; to support relevant capacity building projects; and to enhance cyber security measures concerning nuclear facilities, consistent with the IAEA General Conference Resolution on Nuclear Security (GC(55)/Res/10) and bearing in mind the International Telecommunication Union Resolution 174.  We also encourage States to: promote a security culture that emphasizes the need to protect nuclear security related information; engage with scientific, industrial and academic communities in the pursuit of common solutions; and support the IAEA in producing and disseminating improved guidance on protecting information.

2. Without prejudice to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we the parties to this additional statement on nuclear information security, declare our further commitment to:

a. Developing and strengthening our national measures, arrangements and capacity for the effective management and security of such information;

b. Enhancing our related national security culture;

c. Engaging with our national scientific, industrial and academic communities to further raise awareness, develop and disseminate best practice, and increase professional standards;

d. Supporting, drawing on and collaborating with the IAEA, other key international organizations and partner countries to facilitate mutual achievement of these aims.

3. In particular we commit to action including some or all of the following, as appropriate to our national contexts, standards and frameworks:

  • Conduct of a national assurance exercise to help identify strengths and areas for development in the current practice of information security;
  • Development and/or optimization of a set of national guidance and grading systems for nuclear information security, including on what information can be publicly disclosed;
  • Implementation into national practice of the IAEA’s guidance on Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities and its expected improved guidance on the Protection and Confidentiality of Nuclear Information;
  • Full national implementation of information security-related elements of international instruments such as UNSCRs 1540 and 1887 and, as appropriate, of export control regimes that assist in regulating material and technology transfers;
  • Recognition of the important role of industry in promoting and exchanging best practice as appropriate, including the promotion of the reflection in to national practice of best  practice guides related to nuclear security culture and communicating nuclear security information;
  • Promotion of the reflection in to national practice of international standards related to information security and cyber security, such as those produced by the International  Organisation for Standardisation and the International Telecommunication Union;
  • Further development of national expertise and skill levels in the practice of nuclear security, including information security, by drawing on the increasing opportunities offered by the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network and other international organizations;
  • Further improvement of security culture and information security practice through training or other professional development activities provided via existing or planned national and regional Nuclear Security Support Centres/Centres of Excellence;
  • Development and implementation of national legislation and/or regulation as necessary to ensure that all nuclear industry staff are vetted for security purposes to a high standard;
  • Specific provision in training or other professional development activities for raising awareness and skill levels among industrial security practitioners to reduce potential risk from the ‘insider threat’;
  • Encouragement and facilitation of the elaboration and implementation of ethical codes or other self-governance pledges on information security within the nuclear scientific and academic communities, including those working in dual-use areas; 
  • Development of government processes to monitor and control the export of nuclear information, knowledge and expertise from academic institutions, in line with international obligations as appropriate;
  • Encouragement of the formation of professional communities of interest to facilitate further outreach, discussion, promotion and research of best practice in information security.
     

Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul, March 2012

Multinational statement on Nuclear Information Security

Parties to the Statement

Algeria
Australia
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Hungary
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Republic of Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States of America
Viet Nam

31 in total

 

 

 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism

The governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and French Republic each understand the threat of nuclear terrorism and share the collective responsibility to inform and strengthen international measures designed to secure sensitive information, technology or nuclear material from access by terrorists, and to develop emergency response measures.  In recognition of these shared principles, consistent with our rights and obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, our three governments are taking the following initial steps:

  • INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 recognizes that nuclear security protection levels are critically dependent upon the attractiveness of nuclear materials to potential terrorist adversaries with intent to assemble a nuclear explosive device.  We will actively engage in international workshops to address graded approaches for the characterization of nuclear material attractiveness to further enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of physical protection measures.
  • We have the specialized knowledge and capability to diagnose, render safe, characterize and dispose of a nuclear threat device.  We have a focused effort to continually enhance the technical capabilities of our emergency detection and response assets to any such threat.  As such we will seek, wherever possible, to engage with the international community to further strengthen worldwide preparedness to contend with the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers

On the occasion of their participation in the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary,  Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States note their intent to collaborate in the form of the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSCs) aiming to build up a cadre of highly qualified and well trained nuclear security personnel, provide specific technical support required for effective use and maintenance of instruments and other nuclear security technical systems, as well as provide scientific support for the detection of and the response to nuclear security events in a country.

In accordance with its Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-13 approved by the Board of Governors in September 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Office of Nuclear Security supports these member states through coordination of the activities of the Network.  The IAEA’s Nuclear Security Web Portal (NUSEC) provides a platform to facilitate coordination and sharing of best practices.

These NNSCs enhance nuclear security at the national level and promote many of the elements of the Communiqué and Work Plan of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the Communiqué of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.  In particular, they support human resource development and education and training in nuclear security, enhance nuclear security culture, and maintain a well-trained cadre of technical experts.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

United States-Japan Nuclear Security Working Group Fact Sheet

Since the announcement of establishing the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Security Working Group at the U.S.-Japan Summit meeting in November 2010, this Group has successfully fulfilled its responsibility to identify and coordinate tangible outcomes for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, including the promotion of robust security for nuclear materials at civilian nuclear facilities and during transport, by making achievements in the following 9 areas:

Goal 1: Co-operation within the Integrated Support Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)
The ISCN was established under the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in December 2010 as the first of its kind in the region.  Both parties effectively collaborated on the development and execution of the ISCN programs for strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security capacity mainly for Asian countries, including an inaugural Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities for participants from 16 countries in October 2011.

Goal 2: Research and Development of Nuclear Forensics, Measurement and Detection Technologies, and Sharing of Investigatory Best Practices
Both parties moved towards a common understanding of and information sharing in nuclear forensics, and had fruitful discussions on the requirements for and capabilities of nuclear forensics over the course of several workshops and meetings.  Both parties initiated three technical cooperation projects on nuclear forensics to support joint R&D in nuclear material signatures such as uranium age dating measurements, and to establish parameters for a national nuclear forensics library.

Goal 3: Cooperation on Safeguards Implementation
Built upon a long history of significant cooperation on safeguards implementation, the JAEA and the Department of Energy (DOE)　expanded the scope of cooperation by signing five new safeguards implementation projects of high priority for effective and enhanced safeguards, and began increased coordination and cooperation in the area of safeguards training. Both parties recognise that the Exchange of Notes between the US and Japan on 9 March 2012 setting out the terms and conditions of their cooperation in the fields of nuclear security and other areas will facilitate those projects. 

Goal 4: Sharing Best Practices for Nuclear Security in New Facility Design
Both parties mutually visited Rokkasho and Savannah River to observe the construction sites of MOX fuel fabrication facilities. The JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) together are developing a draft Security-by-Design Handbook for third countries as a joint research project to identify best practices for incorporating security considerations early into the design process of new nuclear facilities.

Goal 5: Cooperation on Transport Security to Reduce the Chances of Theft or Sabotage
For the purpose of achieving mutual understanding of the structure of transport security and its implementation in line with international guideline INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, both parties will conduct a Table Top Exercise on Transport Security March 26 – 28 in Honolulu, Hawaii.

Goal 6: Convert Reactors to Reduce the Use of HEU and Complete Down-Blending Operations
Both parties moved towards converting highly enriched uranium-fuelled research reactors where technically and economically feasible and the timely removal and disposal of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them.  In Japan, the JAEA is preparing to down-blend the HEU of the Yayoi reactor and that of the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology.  Kyoto University and the DOE’s Argonne National Laboratory have continued to work together on the feasibility study for converting the Kyoto University Critical Assembly to the use of low-enriched uranium.  There is steady progress working toward the shipment of Japan Materials Testing Reactor HEU fuel to the United States.

Goal 7: Implement INFCIRC / 225 / Rev.5
The ISCN effectively conducted both a domestic workshop and a regional workshop on INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 in cooperation with the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration and SNL, to help promote better understanding and implementation of the new nuclear security recommendations in the document. Both parties also support the development of Implementation Guides for INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 for eventual publication by the IAEA.

Goal 8: Integrating Response Forces into Dealing with Theft and Sabotage at Facilities
The US side had the opportunity to observe the integrated exercise with the joint participation of the police, the coastguard and operators held at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and to conduct the force-on-force exercises workshop in Tokyo in December 2010. Likewise, the Japanese side had the opportunity to observe force-on-force exercises at Cooper Nuclear Station and participated in the workshop at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission headquarters in November 2011.  Through these occasions, both sides exchanged views and ideas to enhance the mutual capacity of integrating response forces into dealing with theft and sabotage at facilities.

Goal 9: Joint Study on Management of HEU and Plutonium: Reduction of Material Attractiveness
Both parties have successfully collaborated to conduct a joint scientific study on material attractiveness and practical methods to reduce material attractiveness against terrorist threats. As the joint scientific report is being compiled, both parties will explore the possibility of further expanding the scope of cooperation.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

Fact Sheet: Belgium Nuclear Security Summit

As one of the leaders in nuclear technology development, Belgium’s nuclear program has covered all aspects of nuclear fuel cycle including reprocessing and operated a reprocessing plant between 1966 and 1974.

  • Belgium signed the NPT in 1975 as a non-weapons state, but has retained a leading nuclear technology research center and derives over 50% of its energy from nuclear power using 7 power reactors.
  • SCK-CEN is one of the largest research centers in Belgium whose mission includes among other areas, the backend of the nuclear fuel cycle, decommissioning of nuclear sites, and countering nuclear proliferation.
  • At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Belgium has announced it will work jointly with the United States to eliminate its excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.
  • SCK-CEN has been working closely for the past year with NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), to identify materials that can be transferred to the United States for disposition.
  • Belgium and the United States will continue to work together to complete the removal of this material in connection with the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014.

Material quantities and locations are considered sensitive information so cannot be shared at this time.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

Joint Statement on Transport Security

1. In the principal communiqué here at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, all participants reaffirm their commitment to the security of civil transport of nuclear and radioactive materials as follows:
 
We will continue efforts to enhance the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials while in domestic and international transport, and encourage States to share best practices and cooperate in acquiring the necessary technologies to this end. Recognizing the importance of a national layered defense against the loss or theft of nuclear and other radioactive materials, we encourage the establishment of effective national nuclear material inventory management and domestic tracking mechanisms, where required, that enable States to take appropriate measures to recover lost and stolen materials.
 
2. We the participating countries, namely France, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan to this additional statement on transport security, express our further commitment to the followings:
 
1) The participating countries in this basket will hold working group meetings to address the transport security issues amongst the representatives of the governments and relevant international organisations with the participation of their officials and researchers;
 
(a) for effective implementation of INFRCIC/225/Rev.5
(b) for building close relationship among relevant agencies and Centres of Excellence(CoE) to strengthen transport security
(c) for development and research of equipment by related industries, relevant agencies and COE.
 
2) The first working group meeting will be held in Japan by 2013.
 
3) The participating countries in this basket may consider organizing training exercises, including table-top exercises for strengthened emergency preparedness.
 
4) Based upon exercises, a proposal will be submitted at the third Nuclear Security Summit, which should lead to the strengthened transport security.
 
5) This basket group should invite security-related officials from the IMO, ICAO and IAEA for these discussions.
 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 27, 2012

Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the Washington Nuclear Security Summit we agreed on a Communiqué and Work Plan that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials.  We recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, recovering nuclear and radiological material outside of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials.  Making good on these pledges, on a voluntary basis we have taken the following actions individually and together.

Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America since or before the Washington Summit have taken steps to build national capacities to counter nuclear smuggling.  Although not universal to all countries in this list, the types of capabilities include increased law enforcement and intelligence efforts to investigate nuclear smuggling networks, increased use of radiation detection systems and measures to find materials outside of regulatory control at and inside borders, increased capability of nuclear forensics to trace material origin and illicit movement, and increased legal training for prosecutors to assure conviction as appropriate.  Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Philippines, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America pledge to take steps towards building these capacities by the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, and The United States of America have passed new laws, regulations, guidance, or policies to combat illicit trafficking and Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Italy, The Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America have committed themselves to pass new laws, regulations, guidance, or policies by the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America recognize that nuclear smuggling networks can have international connections, and the consequent importance of bilateral, multilateral, and international cooperation as outlined in the Washington Work Plan, and have therefore shared information on nuclear smuggling cases with partner countries.

Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America note the value of sharing lead information through INTERPOL as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation.  The United States of America has donated resources to INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit or to help build counter nuclear smuggling capacities in other countries. Canada, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America pledge to make resources and lessons drawn from experience available for counter nuclear smuggling capacity building projects by the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 26, 2012

Joint Statement of the Presidents of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America Regarding the Trilateral Cooperation at the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site

The Presidents of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America have committed to combat the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

Since 2004 our three countries have been collaborating to implement a number of projects aimed at elimination of the remnants of the past nuclear testing activities within the territory of the former Semipalatinsk Test Site to bring it to a safe and secure state. The Presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and the United States of America have personally supervised the realization of these goals.

A significant volume of work has been accomplished by now. As a result of application of modern physical and technical means the level of security at the former site has been substantially enhanced.

This work is nearly complete and we consider it a highly successful example of the trilateral cooperation representing our shared commitment to nuclear security and non-proliferation.