This is historical material “frozen in time”. The website is no longer updated and links to external websites and some internal pages may not work.

Search form

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release

Statement on Enhancing Radiological Security

This gift basket records the intent of Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States, who choose to join to secure IAEA Category 1 radioactive sources within their territory by 2016, consistent with the actions outlined below:

  • We the parties to this additional statement declare our commitment to secure IAEA Category 1 sources consistent with the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and with consideration of Nuclear Security Series 14: Nuclear security recommendations on radioactive material and associated facilities and Nuclear Security Series 15: Nuclear security recommendations on nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, giving particular attention to the following activities:
    • Support a regulatory body whose regulatory functions are effectively independent of other functions, with the authority to oversee and enforce security at sites (legislation, regulations, inspections, human resource qualifications, etc.);

    • Establish a comprehensive lifecycle management plan (import/export controls, secure storage, orphan source recovery, disused source management, national registry, etc.);

    • Develop a comprehensive plan for sources out of regulatory control (Search & Secure), notification of neighboring countries and IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database;

    • Assess the domestic threat and develop a national response plan (exercised periodically);

    • Implement site level security measures (physical protection measures, procedures, training, performance testing, maintenance, awareness, trustworthiness of individuals involved in the management of radioactive sources, etc.); and

    • Provide rapid response to any attempted or actual unauthorized access to radioactive material (exercised periodically) 

  • Cooperation with other States and multilateral organizations is encouraged to complete the above-listed radiological security measures. 

  • We also may consider instituting additional best practices for IAEA Category 1 radioactive source security.  These measures could include:

    • Robust physical protection access controls preferably with multifactor authentication to restrict access to radiological sources;

    • Monitoring systems designed with defense in depth; for example, redundant and timely alarms and video assessment from multiple sites sent to  a centralized monitoring facility staffed by  trustworthy  personnel;

    • Enhanced delay measures to allow response forces to arrive in time to address the security threat;

    • The active involvement of off-site response forces in both maintaining awareness of radiological sources and threats within the city/state/country, as well as engaging sites with radiological sources in planning and training activities (e.g., facility walk-downs, target folder development, tabletop and other exercises); and

    • A robust and holistic regulatory framework that governs secure source transportation, possession, and disposition.