Home • Readout of the Vice President’s Meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu

Being Biden Vol. 17: Standing with Ukraine

November 26, 2014
11:20 AM EST

The audio series Being Biden is an opportunity for the Vice President to give you a window into his daily life, and share some of his most memorable experiences.

In this episode, Vice President Biden talks about what it was like on his recent trip to Ukraine to visit a memorial that honored those who were killed during protests in Kyiv last year. The woman with the Vice President is reporter and activist Myroslava Gongadze, who lost her husband more than a decade ago because he spoke out against a then-undemocratic government. Today, she stands with those calling for a free, whole, and prosperous Ukraine. Listen to this edition of Being Biden:

Statement by the Vice President on International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women

As the world recognizes the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, I am deeply concerned by the continued magnitude of this problem. Approximately one in three women across the globe is physically or sexually abused during her lifetime; many at the hands of an intimate partner. Too many women and girls are victimized by practices like human trafficking or forced marriage. Violence against women creates and maintains poverty. It threatens peace. Perhaps, most importantly, it degrades all of humanity. We all must work together to fight gender-based violence around the world, and the abuse of power in all of its forms. Today we join with the international community in renewing this commitment.

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 25, 2014

Readout of the Vice President’s Call with Romanian President-elect Klaus Iohannis

Vice President Joe Biden called Romanian President-elect Klaus Iohannis to congratulate him on his election victory, noting the impressive voter turnout as a sign of a strong and healthy democracy. The Vice President underscored the strength of the bilateral relationship and expressed appreciation for Romania’s contributions to NATO, its support for Ukraine, and its efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL. The Vice President expressed his condolences for the loss of life in the November 21 helicopter accident and thanked Romania for its sacrifices as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Finally, the Vice President and President-elect Iohannis discussed the critical importance of rule of law reforms, both as a driver of economic growth and as a national security issue.

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 23, 2014

Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Trip of Vice President Joe Biden to Morocco, Ukraine and Turkey

Hyatt Istanbul
Istanbul, Turkey
(November 22, 2014)

7:13 P.M. (Local)

MR. SPECTOR: Thanks for joining us tonight. We have a number of senior administration officials with us who are looking forward to talking to you and taking your questions. So with that, if somebody wants to begin.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually, let me just make sure everybody is up to speed about exactly what we actually did. I think you know the itinerary. We spent two hours last night, fresh off the plane from Ukraine and went straight into a working dinner with Prime Minister Davutoğlu. It went for two hours. It was a very good conversation.

Then we got up this morning. The Vice President gave public remarks at the Atlantic Council, which some of you may have seen, on energy security with a particular focus on Europe. After that he had a short follow-up conversation with Prime Minister Davutoğlu. And then we went off and had a meeting with a civil society network known as the Checks & Balances Network, which is the funded by the National Democratic Institute. Then we went to what turned out to be a four-hour session with President Erdoğan; about half that time was spent just the two of them one-on-one; and then we had a working lunch, although it happened at 3:00 p.m. So that's maybe longer personally -- whatever time it was, and time lost much of its meaning by that point. But it was also -- so that's what we did.

But just to economize your time, why don't you ask me the questions you're most interested in. And I’ll invite my colleagues to chime in if they have their way to talk about it. And we’ll do this -- obviously, we’ll do it on background. But if there’s -- if at some point I need to pivot, we need to pivot to off-the-record, we’ll do that. But start on background.

Q They came out and they only gave like general and brief comments about all these things that they're going to accomplish -- trying to get the train-and-equip mission going. There was hardly anything on that. No mention of Incirlik. No mention of Assad really. It looks to us that if they made any deals behind closed doors, they certainly didn't want to announce anything. So was there -- you say progress was made, but how do we quantify that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the way I would describe is that the conversation has evolved and is quite dynamic to begin with. You're right that they didn't sit there and sign their names on the bottom line on a whole host of agreements. But actually, I think we came to a much greater clarity about where we need to go from here. There were some additional questions that went unresolved, and both of our systems have to noodle over those in the coming days. But I actually think that we have a much better understanding about what each other’s needs and constraints are on these issues.

And let me just give you a sense for where I think the conversation focused. Look, I know there’s been a lot made about whether we're close or far apart from the Turks on the ISIL issue and the Syria issue in particular. I will say that I think coming out of these conversations we are convinced we have a lot more in common than there is disagreement on these issues. Just let me point to three areas in particular.

We are in complete agreement that ISIL needs to be defeated. Complete agreement. It’s a threat not only to the United States and our other allies in the region, but it’s a threat right on Turkey’s border. They take it very seriously. They want to work with us to combat the threat. They're already working with us to combat the threat. They want to look for ways to expand their cooperation with us. And we want to work with them to combat the threat. There is agreement on that.

The second is we are both in agreement that just like in Iraq you basically need an effective ground force to work alongside our air force to defeat -- to degrade and then defeat ISIL in Iraq. You're not going to have that type of -- that in Syria unless you have a viable force on the ground.

We are in agreement that that viable force to defeat ISIL on the ground in Syria is not Assad; and instead, is the moderate Syrian opposition, the Free Syrian Army, and that we need to do more in that space to train and equip. We obviously have our own program. The Turks have signed up to host one of those training bases. But we talked about whether there might be some other ways that we can expand cooperation, grow the moderate Syrian opposition faster, make it more effective. There are no final decisions on that, but that's not a bad thing. We're moving -- I think we're moving in a very positive direction about getting a fuller understanding about how we might accelerate the training and equipping of the moderate Syrian opposition.

And the third thing that we agree on is that the conflict in the Assad regime is a magnet for extremism in the region. We need a political transition away from Assad. We agree about that, as well.

So they talked a lot about that. I should also say with the Prime Minister, who was just back from Iraq, there was a lengthy -- I would say most of the dinner last night was about Iraq. And what’s interesting is -- it’s no surprise that the Turks did not have the smoothest of relationships with the previous Iraqi government. The relationship with Prime Minister Maliki was quite scratchy. And I think they agree with us that Prime Minister Abadi is serious, that he is committed to forming a more inclusive government, and importantly committed to figuring out a way to really get Sunni buy-in at the local level to include standing up national guard elements, mobilizing tribes to flip against ISIL, and in other areas of Iraq, making sure that Erbil and Baghdad are working together. The Turks have been supportive of this interim oil revenue-sharing agreement that Erbil and Baghdad just struck. Both we and the Turks and most importantly Baghdad and Erbil have, I think, an interest in pivoting off this interim agreement towards a more enduring and lasting solution to the oil-revenue issue. And so we talked a lot about Iraq too.

And I think we and the Turks are -- I mean if there’s a Venn diagram, it’s like this on Iraq right now. So I think we feel really good about our conversations with the Turks.

So you're right. There weren’t a ton of details I guess after the remarks, but I think you heard from both leaders that the relationship and our discussions on these issues are in a good place.

Q So what do you still disagree on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know -- I think we have to -- I think we agree on the major objectives of the strategy, right, which is we have to do everything we can to defeat and degrade ISIL. We have to stand up a viable ground force in Syria to be able to do that. That's not the regime. It’s got to be the moderate Syrian opposition. And we need to facilitate a political transition.

Where we still are -- it’s not disagreement. But I think where we still need to get across the goal line in terms of our agreement is how our military-to-military cooperation is going to be synced up in those areas. But that's not disagreement. I just think that -- now that I think we are in a good place about what we're trying to accomplish, we need to figure out what’s the best way for our militaries to work together to make that happen.

Q Talking the moderate Syrian opposition, there are lots of stories about FSA and guys going in to fight for FSA and coming out fighting for somebody else. A lot of fluid lines between the various groups in Syria.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There’s no question. And it’s been our position from the beginning, and I think the Turks agree, which is whatever we do -- and we're going to do in the train-and-equip mission already, but to the degree that we're cooperating with the Turks and other allies in the region to stand up a moderate Syrian opposition, we're going to have to be good about vetting these groups.

And by the way, we're not always probably going to agree. But to the degree that we're partnering on standing up these forces, then it’s on those forces that we agree that we trust, and it will take Syria in a better place and are committed to combating ISIL on the ground. So there will have to be a vetting criteria that's agreed to by parties.

Q What about the other two conditions that the Turks have placed for cooperation -- the no-fly zone and the buffer zone, the safe zone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I want you to ask the Turks about that. But here’s the point that I would make about that. Those are not ends in and of themselves. The question is: What is the purpose of it? And this was part of the discussion. What is the purpose of the no-fly zone? Or what is the purpose of a buffer zone along the Syria-Turkish border? The purpose is to create a space where a moderate Syrian opposition dominates the ground, pushes out extremists and carve out territory where refugees don't have to flow into neighboring countries, where people can contemplate returning back to these safer zones.

And so if you think about a strategy -- go back to the three things that I talked about -- if you think about a strategy of how can you push ISIL out of these areas, look at where they're operating in the north. If you look at the Euphrates Valley and go north to that, ISIL is crawling all over the border areas between Syria and Turkey. So how do you push them out, how do you stand up a moderate force that can fill in that void as they get pushed out? And how can you do it in a way hopefully that leads to a political transition away from the current regime?

None of this, by the way, is going to be instantaneous. But the whole point I’m making is that I think sometimes we get too fixated on the buzzwords like no-fly zone, buffer zone, safe zone. We may or may not end up with certain labels. It’s the objectives, though, that we share in common.

Q What’s the military-to-military problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There’s not a problem. There’s not a problem. It’s that we haven’t -- well, once you agree on the objectives, we have our militaries work together to figure out how it is that we can fill in the white space here.

Q There was a military delegation here for two days --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there’s a couple. We’ve had a number of delegations here. So we had a delegation in a number of weeks ago from CENTCOM and EUCOM, the two --

Q There was one just last week --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are military folks here all the time. We had -- let me go off the record for a minute.

*** OFF THE RECORD ***

Q (Inaudible)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So we can go back on the record. Look, the PYD -- I think you all are tracking -- but the Turks have concerns because the PYD, some of the actors fighting ISIL in Kobani have ties to the PKK, which the Turks obviously have to contend with a longstanding insurgency with the PKK. And their concern always with Kobani was, they didn't like ISIL, but they weren’t (inaudible) with PYD too. So they were stuck. They had all these refugees coming over the border. But once the town was basically empty, they kind of looked at the town, they saw two enemies.

And so we had this conversation that senior official number two mentioned with the Turks about, okay, well, then let’s facilitate a way -- if you're not crazy about the PYD, and we get that, let’s figure out a way to allow reinforcements and resupply from Iraqi-Kurdish Pesh, transiting through Turkey, to resupply fighters against ISIL. It’s a win-win. Because it continues to support the fighters fighting ISIL, and it’s a win because it balances out some of the concerns you're worried about on the PYD side of the equation. That was the deal.

The only issue was there came a point where it was our assessment that the fighters in Kobani were a couple of days away from running out of ammunition. So we did an emergency airdrop. Not to preclude the arrival of the Pesh, but to buy time for the arrival of the Pesh. And that's what we explained to the Turks. And you’ll notice we did the airdrop. And since then the Pesh have moved in. There are also some FSA, I believe, operating there. So senior official number two is right. This is an area where -- even in the case where we and the Turks did not have identical views of the situation on the ground, we worked it out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think the issue there was that we both wanted ISIL out. They didn't want ISIL replaced with a group that they think has been responsible for terrorism in Turkey. We both agreed that the Peshmerga were a reliable force to hold, and the Peshmerga and the FSA working together were an even better combination. So we had an overlapping interest. We were able to prove concept that you could clear space and hold it with forces that we have confidence in to have our same long-term interests and objectives.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let’s also keep our eye on the prize here that we and the Turks agree ISIL is a huge threat. But for us, ISIL is the most important issue here. And the biggest reason we have been engaged in Kobani, to cite General Austin, is they’ve been providing a lot of targets, so we’ve been servicing those targets. They have literally lost hundreds and hundreds of fighters in Kobani because of the airstrikes there. And they just keep coming. They just keep coming from other parts of Syria. So as long as they're going to keep coming to Kobani, which by the way our sense is that now as the momentum has tipped against them, they keep coming. As long as they keep coming, Lloyd Austin's guys are going to keep coming too.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What did Allen say? He said, they are impaling themselves on Kobani.

Q How can you stop Assad barrel-bombing civilians, for example, say in the north, without a formal no-fly zone? And that was my first question. And then also, why is there so much sort of concern about figuring out who the moderate opposition are when America, as much of the Friends of Syria group, is already supporting moderate opposition rebels who have been vetted, why isn’t that vetting good enough going forward? And if you sort of supported -- if in Kobani, Turkey I think gives kind of advice on where to strike and stuff, why don't you want to do that in the rest of the country with the FSA, or do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me answer your second question first. And your first question, I’ll probably go off the record.

We are working with groups that we believe are committed to taking Syria into a better place, that is a political transition towards of more inclusive, more accountable, more just element.

But when we're talking about vetting groups that we're going to provide lethal assistance to through the train-and-equip mission, which the Department of Defense will oversee, we're talking about pretty high-level vetting. You got to have confidence that these guys are capable, can be trained, and if you -- when you train them and provide them with weapons, they're not going to go immediately in to switch sides or hand their weapons over to somebody else.

So the vetting and screening and training procedure is different and has to be more rigorous.

Q Isn’t America already giving lethal assistance through the Friends of Syria agreement, through the Asia regional command centers in Jordan and the Southeast?

*** Off the record ***

Q -- so the FSA can help?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think eventually as you train forces that you have confidence in, there’s the possibility that down the line, those forces can help you or make airstrikes. We see that in Iraq.

Q Just go back to the prize again. I understand that you're very happy about the way the meetings are going, about the common goals. But is there any evidence it’s working? Assad is still in power. Is there any evidence ISIS is seriously degraded other than the momentum might have been shifted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, so let’s be clear, the current campaign and strategy in Iraq and Syria is focused on ISIL, so let’s measure it against that.

I think it’s our judgment that a lot of the momentum that you saw over the summer -- first of all, you saw it earlier because when they did Fallujah and Ramadi, really, if Mosul was the tipping point in June, you saw Mosul, and then bang, bang, bang up and down the Tigris and Euphrates River. And when you look at the map now, I think the kind of blob which is the ISIL territory, that really emerged like that in the second half of the summer. I think it’s our view that a lot of ISIL’s forward momentum has been if not stopped substantially slowed, and that they're starting to get pushed back in other areas.

Obviously there are the kind of tactical defeats in places like Mount Sinjar or Amerli or others. But I think recently you’ve seen Iraqi security retake the Baiji refinery. I think you're starting to see some progress in other parts of the country, as well. I think you're seeing elements of the Iraqi security forces and the Peshmerga work together to fight ISIL in certain places. And I think what we're finding in Iraq is that ISIL is not 800-feet tall; that our airstrikes have forced them to fundamentally change the way in which they were operating. Like the days of them feeling comfortable having a hundred armed vehicles on a road in a convoy and rolling down the highway like a conventional army, those days are if not over, they are rapidly declining because when that happens, they're getting hit.

So they are I think pulling back into a more dispersed, diffuse entity, which can be tough to root out. And it’s also an entity that's a lot harder to gain a lot more. It’s a mobile operation. It makes it a lot more difficult to take and hold territory.

The other thing I think we're starting to see on the Iraqi side in particular, also to some degree in Kobani, is that when we have local forces who are well organized and committed to fight, have the equipment to do so, and can be backed up by American airpower, they can actually do some real damage to ISIL.

So the President was clear from the very beginning, this is a multi-year enterprise. I know Americans are impatient. But from the very beginning, the administration has been clear: This is going to take some time. And let’s remember, the objective is to degrade and eventually defeat. Well, we're doing a lot of degrading. And I’ll leave it up to you to judge in a couple of months or six months or a year from now whether they're on the path to defeat or not. But at the moment I think we're doing a heck of a lot of degrading.

Q Let me ask about Ukraine. Erdoğan said that you discussed -- Biden and Erdoğan discussed the crisis in Ukraine. You talk about ISIS a lot, are Ukrainian crisis -- is ISIS a bigger threat than Russian aggression in Ukraine? And do you consider that? And the second question is, Ukrainian -- talking to Ukrainians yesterday, they were a little bit disappointed with the results of the visit. And there is disagreement between Congress and the White House about assistance to Ukraine. They ask for more equipment, military equipment, and so on. Is there any movement in that regard? Did you discuss any further additional --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me do a couple of top lines, and then my colleague can give you some more detail.

I’m not sure it’s productive to think of is ISIL more or less of a threat. Let me put it this way, the Vice President, the President, the administration as a whole has I think been pretty clear that issues like ISIL, Ukraine, and Ebola, for example, are right at the top of our national security. Now whether you rank them one, two, three or three, two, one, that's not -- it’s just an ESPN. So it’s not productive to think that way. They're really important.

But in terms of the deliverables of the trip, I’ll make two points. One, we are increasing our security assistance to Ukraine. The first of our counter-mortar radars have arrived. More are on the way. We're providing excess defense articles like Humvees and other vehicles that are necessary. We’ve already provided $100 million. We're looking at tens of millions of dollars of additional money for training. We're working with Congress to secure tens of millions of dollars more.

But there’s a little bit, as it relates to the assistance package, writ large, I think what you've heard out of the meetings is a little bit of a chicken-and-egg problem, which is everybody recognizes that there is enormous need right now for assistance. And we are committed. The United States is committed to doing our fair share -- more than our fair share, frankly, to provide assistance. But we could not provide enough of it on our own. We need the IMF with us. We need the Europeans with us.

And I think what you heard not only from the Vice President yesterday, but from Prime Minister Yatsenyuk and President Poroshenko -- especially Poroshenko -- is that we have a new government. We will not be able to mobilize billions and billions of dollars of foreign assistance, nor get that next tranche of IMF money and move forward towards an official package or anything until there’s a government and we know who the ministers and what they're -- and what reforms they're committed to. So it’s a little bit of -- the government hasn’t formed yet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you laid it down well. With regard to the security assistance, as senior official one has said, we’ve done a lot. The conversation that we're having with the Congress is with regard to the European Reassurance Initiative, the big package with a billion dollars that the President has asked for for the NATO space and for the Eastern Partnership area. And there I think we anticipate that the Congress will be quite generous to Ukraine. But we haven’t gotten the appropriation yet. But then we’ll be able to increase, we hope, particularly the train-and-assist mission with that.

And with regard to the larger macro-financial that we need, we need a government. We need the reform program to begin to be implemented. We need to have a real partnership with this new government of Ukraine -- both on the security side and on the reform and financial side.

And I think we had -- it was good to see the program come forward. Now we need to see the personnel and just to reinforce what the Vice President said is, it’s a matter of the next six days, the next six weeks, the next six months for Ukraine will be crucial.

Q (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Putin is visiting here soon. Turkey has an intense interest in what happens in Ukraine, has been very supportive of our general transatlantic policy, but has a particular concern about the Crimean Tatars we talked about a bit today; but about the dire straits that they are in and about Turkey’s efforts to support them and our joint efforts to ensure that there are costs for Russia’s aggression in Crimea and everywhere else.

Q I just want to ask a question about the Incirlik base. This still is being discussed between the U.S. and Turkey? Or has the U.S. basically given up on this issue? Is it still on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, in what I referred to earlier, I think as we continue to have this high-level conversation about how we can act together to combat ISIL in both Iraq and Syria, to the degree our militaries are working together, we continue to have conversations about the ability of coalition aircraft and other assets to be able to use Turkish facilities. But I think the Turks have been clear that they want to get us all on the same page first before they open up -- what they would call open up their platforms a little bit more. So what I’m saying is I think we're making very good progress in that space. And hopefully when we get to the end, if we're all in agreement, then we’ll have expanded access for the coalition in Turkey. But, of course, that will be up to the Turks.

MR. SPECTOR: Okay, thank you.

END

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 23, 2014

Readout of the Vice President’s Call with Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades

Vice President Joe Biden spoke today with Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades. The Vice President updated President Anastasiades on his recent conversations with President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu of Turkey, and discussed developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Vice President noted the need to deescalate tensions in order to get back to a more constructive track in UN-mediated settlement talks on Cyprus and reinvigorate efforts to seek mutually beneficial solutions. Both leaders underscored their commitment to reunifying the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 22, 2014

Statement to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Erdogan

Beylerbeyi Palace
Istanbul, Turkey

6:20 P.M. (Local)

PRESIDENT ERDOĞAN: (English audio unavailable.)

VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN: Mr. President, I’m delighted to be here. We’ve been -- we’ve known each other for many years. And I’ve been the recipient of your hospitality in your city; last time I was here in your home with your family. And it is -- this city has come to define for me what hospitality really means.

As I told my fellow Americans during the President’s visit to Washington, you can’t understand the meaning of hospitality until you’ve been welcomed by a Turkish family into their home. And again, my thanks to you and your daughter and your son and your wife. And thank your wife for hosting my wife, Jill, today. She is anxious to see her again.

Mr. President, I’m not sure our teams are going to allow us to get together any more. We came to have lunch, and you and I ended up having a conversation that lasted almost four hours. So I don't think they're happy when we go off alone in a room together. When we came down, they looked very, very hungry. So I apologize to our collective staffs.

The President and I, as I said, have known each other for a long time. I have great respect for the President. And we have always had a direct, frank and open discussion on every issue because that's what friends do, that’s what allies do.

And the one thing that is absolutely clear is that the depth of that friendship and the resolve of that partnership is as strong as it has ever been. In spite of the fact that the world is facing and we collectively are facing some difficult problems right now.

The President and I have been talking about Iraq and Syria for a long time. We wanted to get to some of the detail today. We spoke about our work as part of an international coalition to degrade and eventually defeat Daash, ISIL -- and most people in this region and I’m comfortable referring to ISIL as Daash. And we talked about Syria’s future, as well.

We had a candid discussion, and we strategized together as allies and friends do and should. On Iraq, the President told me of his impressions of developments taking place in Iraq. I had an opportunity to spend several hours yesterday and again this morning with the Prime Minister who just returned from Iraq. And we're on the same page. We have the same view.

And we’re -- I was -- I told the President how impressed the new Iraqi government was at the fact that he and his government reached out a hand to the Iraqi government, and they're working in close coordination with Prime Minister Dr. Abadi.

Turkey has shown significant leadership in this regard. As I said, including the Prime Minister’s recent visit to Erbil and to Baghdad last week.

On Syria, we discussed in-depth the full range of issues that face us both and the options available to deal with those issues. Not only to deny ISIL a safe haven, and to roll them back and defeat them, but also to strengthen the Syrian opposition and pursue a political transition away from the Assad regime.

We spoke about our efforts to train and equip the moderate Syrian opposition forces, and the others protecting their communities.

Turkey, as a consequence of what’s going on in Syria today, is carrying a heavy humanitarian burden. There are over -- I’m told by the President -- close to 1.6 million refugees in Turkey. And Turkey is providing, as they do in humanitarian relief from housing, to health care, to food, to clothing. And it’s the government and the people of Turkey that have often cared for those displaced by this war. Accommodating so many is a costly proposition. And the United States has provided humanitarian assistance inside Turkey to refugee countries holding them, but it should not in any way underestimate the amount of the requirements that have imposed upon the President and the people of Turkey.

We have devoted -- because of what Turkey is doing, we’ve been able to devote roughly a little over $3 billion to this effort, including $200 million to Turkey, which is not nearly the cost they incur. But collectively we are working to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Turkey, the largest burden of that being thrust upon the Turkish people.

And beyond our humanitarian efforts, we’re both taking a -- talking to and working together to stem the flow of foreign fighters to and from the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, and to dry up their funding. And we thank Turkey for their leadership in this regard.

On Cyprus -- we spoke about Cyprus. I traveled to Cyprus in May, and I met with both Mr. Eroğlu and as well as President Anastasiades. And I’m told I didn't realize at the time I was the highest-ranking American in five decades to visit the island. Because our administration and the United States remains committed to supporting the U.N.-led effort to renew the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

Today, the potential exists -- if the political will is there -- to reach a solution that benefits everyone on the island and in the region. Right now that requires a focus on de-escalating tensions and returning to the negotiating table in Cyprus. Given the significant energy potential in the Eastern Mediterranean, the rewards to both communities on Cyprus of finding a cooperative path forward has never been greater. The visit also gave me an opportunity to discuss the importance of our robust economic partnership with Turkey, as well.

In addition, I had an excellent meeting with Turkish civil society earlier today. And, Mr. President, our countries have been allies for 60 years. I would posit today that our partnership is as strong as it ever has been. Today we're working closely together once again to meet the very pressing challenges of this moment, and to further strengthen the strategic partnership between Turkey and America.

I said earlier, we need Turkey. And I think Turkey believes that they need us, as well. We are close. We are going to continue to discuss how to approach each of these problems in the region. And as I said, I thank you, Mr. President, for your welcome and your hospitality and for your friendship to my country. Thank you.

END
6:28 P.M. (Local)

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 22, 2014

Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on European Energy Security to the Atlantic Council Energy and Economic Summit

Grand Tarabya Hotel
Istanbul, Turkey

10:58 A.M. (Local)

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, ladies and gentlemen, it’s an honor to be here. I would tell you, I say to my good friend, Jim Jones, former National Security Advisor, General. General, I have a new attitude toward birthdays. And there was a famous American athlete, a professional baseball player who did not get to play in what we call the Major Leagues until he was 45 years old. His name was Satchel Paige. He was a pitcher. And on his 47th birthday, the oldest pitcher pitching, he won a game. And the press went into the locker room after the game and said -- they referred to him as Satch. They said, Satch, how does it feel being 47 and pitching in the big leagues and winning a game?

He looked at them. He said, fellahs, that's not how I look at it. He said, let me tell you how I view age. I think of it this way: How old would you be if you didn’t know how old you are? (Laughter.) I am 42 years old. (Laughter.) And that's the way I think of it, and I’m standing by it, Jim.

It’s great to be speaking once again before the Atlantic Council. I’m pleased to be here in Istanbul, a perfect place to talk about the issues before us, and with my good friend and he is my good friend. I was kidding the Prime Minister last time we -- we’ve known each other a long time, and he used to be the Foreign Minister. And now he’s the Prime Minister. And I’m still the Vice President. (Laughter.) But he still likes me, and I still like him. (Laughter.)

But this is the perfect place to have this discussion sitting at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, a vital part of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. And I’ve just come from Ukraine, where the United States and our European partners are working shoulder-to-shoulder within the country’s democratically elected leadership to support Ukraine’s democratic development and its European aspirations.

Quite frankly, Russian aggression in Ukraine and its illegal occupation of Crimea remind us that we still have a good deal more work to do to guarantee the strategic vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

As I said when I spoke at a similar gathering at the Atlantic Alliance [sic] in Washington this May, this vision of Europe whole and free and at peace is the right vision. But we need to redouble our efforts to achieve it. At Wales, NATO renewed its determination to protect and defend every inch of NATO territory; to increase defense spending to 2 percent for all our NATO allies; to strengthen NATO’s readiness to deploy quickly whenever and wherever they are needed.

But as the story of Ukraine shows, there are multiple dimensions to European security. And the Prime Minister and I spoke of many of them last night for some time, as he was kind enough to host me for dinner. Obviously, one of the dimensions is hard military power. But we're also facing new weapons being used, and used by Russia and others.

First is a new development, the use of corruption and oligarchy-kleptocracy as a tool of international coercion. Second, is use of energy as a weapon, undermining the security of nations. Global energy security is a vital part of America’s national security. In East Asia, President Obama and President Xi just signed a historic agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the United States has launched an initiative to double the access to electric power. We call is Power Africa. And in the Caribbean and Central America, our administration has launched a new, regional energy strategy to help boost sustainable economic growth and diversity of energy sources.

But here in Europe, energy is -- energy security is an especially vital regional security interest because of Russia’s track record in using the supply of energy as a foreign policy weapon against its neighbors in violation of basic commercial and international norms.

This is a huge strategic problem for many countries that rely on Russia for their energy supply. But the truth is this is also a unique moment for Europe. Europe has a real opportunity to change their circumstances. We believe -- the President and I -- we believe that energy security is the next chapter in the European project of integration and market expansion that began decades ago with European coal and steel.

As a matter of economic and national security, that means we need governments and the European Commission to work hand-in-hand with the private sector to ensure diversity in sources of fuel from hydrocarbons to renewables; diversity in countries of origin, from North Africa, to the Eastern Mediterranean, to the United States; more interconnections, that supply routes that are more reliable -- everything from new pipelines to LNG facilities.

We have been aware that this single source of energy has been a problem for a long time in Europe. But now, now, now is the time to act. What’s happening in Ukraine only underscores the urgency. And my message here is not that Europe can or should do away with Russian imports. That's not the case at all. I have no doubt that Russia will and should remain a major source of energy supplies for Europe and the world.

This is about energy security. To achieve it, Europe needs to ensure it diversifies its resources, its routes and its suppliers.

Russia can and should be a player, but it has to play by the rules of the game. It shouldn’t be able to use its energy policy to play with the game.

True energy security in Europe is going to require some tough decisions, but there’s been progress. As you know, Europe experienced three energy crises in ’06, ’09 and again in 2014 when Russia shut off its supplies to Ukraine and other parts of Europe. Countries have stepped up to the plate; and with each successive crisis, we’ve made some progress.

For example, in 2008 [sic], when gas from Ukraine was cut off, Slovaks were shocked to find themselves suffering in the cold winter for two weeks, something they thought would never happen because their country lay on the route to Western Europe.

But then Slovakia adapted, and quickly built interconnections with its neighbors, enabling it to receive supplies from the Czech Republic within 24 hours in case of another such emergency. This time, this winter, there wasn’t even a threat. That’s progress.

At the same time, the U.S. and EU launched an aggressive energy diplomacy shortly after the 2009 cutoff to ensure that reserve flows -- reverse flows of gas could even be available to Ukraine from its neighbors during future crises.

The fruits of that diplomacy paid off this year, when Russia cut off the gas to Ukraine in June, and Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia quickly moved in to help.

Ukraine risked another crisis this winter. But through skillful European mediation and active U.S. engagement, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement that will keep the gas flowing this winter. That, too, is progress.

We saw other key milestones a few weeks ago when Lithuania inaugurated its liquefied natural gas terminal, appropriately named “The Independence.” I met with the Lithuanian Prime Minister in Washington in October, shortly before the launch.

In combination of this new facility, an emerging LNG deal between Finland and Estonia; and action by Baltic states to interconnect their electricity and gas supplies, both to one another and to Europe and Scandinavia as a whole; together, these things have the potential to make the Baltic “energy island” a thing of the past.

The region that was once almost entirely dependent on Russia has seized the initiative and now is on track to achieve greater energy securityand not incidentally greater freedom. All this marks a genuine advancement in our agenda. But we can’t rest on our laurels. You all know better than I we have to go much further. We have to finish the job.

That’s one of the reasons why I recently went to Cyprus -- the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Cyprus in five decades -- because I wanted to encourage the Cypriots to develop their energy resources in cooperation with all -- all -- their neighbors; and to make clear that everyone benefits if the entire Eastern Mediterranean can work together to become a hub for natural gas markets.

Promoting energy security was also a major reason why I recently visited Romania. Romania can be a linchpin in delivering gas to its neighbors and even become an energy exporter for its neighbors across Central and Eastern Europe. Croatia is another country with potential to become a regional energy hub if it makes smart investments now, with EU support, and works collaboratively with its neighbors.

When President Obama visited Poland in June and Estonia in September, he called on leaders across Europe to do far more to expand and diversify their energy supplies and to work closely with one another.

We are hopeful the new E.U. Commission’s focus on Energy Union will be a step in that direction. So what do we need to do now? What actually needs to happen?

Well, in our view, to start, we need to identify critical infrastructure projects, increase the interconnectedness between European countries -- from pipelines, to electric grids, to integration of renewables, to energy efficiency standards.

Last year the EU created a mechanism to identify and help fund the most important energy infrastructure projects. But more needs to be done to make the hard decisions to prioritize projects, to focus support, to integrate Central and Eastern Europe.

I know a major obstacle is building the infrastructure. Some of the projects I just mentioned -- the LNG terminal in Lithuania, for example; the reverse-flow interconnectors -- they require long term certainty to be commercially viable on their own.

And I know that current economic conditions make it hard for governments to support infrastructure that, strictly speaking, may not be requiredto meet the narrow definition of energy demand. But that’s what leadership is about. That's what this moment is about -- having the vision and making the choices today to ensure a better and more secure European future.

Leadership also requires nations to work togetheron common policy and investment strategy. If each state operates on its own, all will wind up in a weaker position. In this regard, I was glad to see the EU carry out region-wide energy stress tests, underscoring the importance of coordination.

Another part of improving energy security is to make way for the fuel mix of the future. What the EU has done to integrate renewable energy into its fuel mix is remarkable. The ambitious targets that the EU has set for renewables, for energy efficiency, to cut emissions set a strong example for the rest of the world. And we in the United States are partners in this effort, working toward the same goals.

We also need to help develop new opportunities to bring new sources of supply to Europe. Years ago when I was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations in the United States Senate, I worked with then President Clinton to launch what was called the Contract of the Century. This was the BTC Pipeline, which would bring Caspian oil to Europe and to the global markets. If you’ll remember -- not any of you women are old enough to remember this -- but if you remember, most believed it would never happen. But with U.S. leadership and the commitments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, it became a reality. Twenty years later, the BTC’s counterpart, the Southern Corridor is close to becoming a reality and should -- must -- become a reality.

With U.S. support, Turkish leadership, Azeri leadership, this ambitious project is traversing Azerbaijan through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Albania and Italy -- will bring gas for the first time from the Caspian to Europe, a game changer for energy security in Europe.

Today, the energy potential of the Eastern Mediterranean can also play significant strategic and economic dividends for the region itself and Europe as a whole.

For the region, it holds the promise of enhancing stability and prosperity by bringing together Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and hopefully one day Lebanon. It also has the potential to bring new supplies into Europe, to increase its energy security by diversifying energy resources.

This was a big part my message when I was in Cyprus in May, that energy can and should serve as the tool for cooperation, for stability, for security and prosperity. And I’ve asked the State Department’s Energy Envoy, Amos Hochstein, to continue this work. We have a chance to connect the promising developments in the Mediterranean with resources as distant as Azerbaijan and Iraq to ensure greater energy security and national security for all involved.

If we get it right, and it will be difficult, but if we get it right, all will benefit from greater stability, economic growth, jobs and prosperity; from functioning marketplaces for energy -- European energy -- with all the strategic benefits that that brings.

This is also a great moment for energy in Turkey, which has already been playing a role as the energy hub for oil and is poised to play a much bigger role in gas.

That's why I was encouraged to see the recent interim agreement between Baghdad and Erbil on managing exports and revenue sharing. And we continue to support the development of a strategic pipeline from Basra to Jehan. As the regional global energy picture evolves, Turkey’s strategic location is a major, major asset. Turkey will host the G20 next year. And we welcome Turkey’s leadership in carrying forward the important work of the G20 on energy efficiency and climate change.

Turkey’s domestic market potential is also significant. In fact, Turkey is only one of Europe -- is one of Europe’s largest gas markets. It’s the only one expected to grow in the next decade. So the United States stands ready to help Turkey realize its energy potential in any way they think we can be helpful.

This will require the development of competitive gas markets to attract private investment, improve infrastructure and strengthen Turkey’s ability to become a gas hub. And as Secretary Moniz, who was here last week, told our Turkish counterparts, we're already working on renewables together, Turkey and the United States.

As leaders in the formulation of energy policy around the world, it’s within your power to help make energy insecurity in Europe and many other places a thing of the past. That should be one of our goals. We have to keep our eye on the horizon, keep moving past old ways of doing business, keep making energy a tool of cooperation, not a tool of division.

If we can do that, we can achieve a Europe not just whole, free and at peace, but prosperous and secure, a leader in shaping the world’s energy future. That would be good for all of us. So let’s make it happen. Now is the time to act. Let’s not wait any longer.

Thank you for your hospitality and thank you for listening. (Applause.)

END
11:18 A.M. (Local)

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 22, 2014

FACT SHEET: Vice President Joe Biden Announces $135 Million in Additional Humanitarian Assistance for Syria Crisis

Vice President Joe Biden announced today in Istanbul, Turkey that the United States is providing nearly $135 million in additional humanitarian assistance to help feed civilians affected by the ongoing conflict in Syria. With this announcement, the United States has provided more than $3 billion in critical humanitarian aid since the start of the crisis, including $222 million for international humanitarian organizations working with the Government of Turkey as they continue to help those affected by the war in Syria.

The new funding will help feed vulnerable people inside Syria; Syrian refugees in Turkey; and Syrian refugees in other neighboring countries. Turkey has generously committed substantial portions of its national resources to hosting an estimated 1.6 million refugees from Syria. The world has watched with great concern as more than 190,000 Syrians from Kobani fled to Turkey in recent weeks. The United States is grateful that Turkey kept its doors open to people fleeing the brutality of ISIL as well as the appalling atrocities committed by the Assad regime.

Of this total new U.S. funding for the Syria crisis, more than $132.8 million will go to the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and other partners to respond to ongoing emergency food needs inside Syria and in countries hosting Syrian refugees, including Turkey. This includes $63 million for WFP’s operations inside Syria and $70 million for WFP’s operations benefiting Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. WFP’s operations, to which the United States remains the largest donor, feed millions of Syrians every month, including through household food ration deliveries inside Syria and distributions of food vouchers to refugees in neighboring countries.

Nearly $11 million of the new assistance will support the WFP in Turkey. WFP redirected hundreds of tons of food to the Suruc border district in response to the sudden recent influx of refugees and continues to work in close coordination with the Turkish government to feed hundreds of thousands of refugees daily. The new funding also includes nearly $2 million for the Turkish Red Crescent, through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies appeal for Turkey, to provide hot meals for Syrian refugees from Kobani. The work of WFP and the Turkish Red Crescent are critical to meeting the emergency food needs of Syrians seeking shelter in Turkish camps and urban settings.

Inside Syria, U.S. government partners keep people alive by reaching millions of people per month—often at great risk to partner staff—with household food rations and flour for bakeries. In neighboring countries, including Turkey, WFP’s food voucher program bolsters local economies stressed by the influx of Syrian refugees.

U.S. assistance to the Syrian people also includes a commitment to resettle thousands of the most vulnerable to the United States. As the largest resettlement country in the world, and one deeply committed to assisting the Syrian people, the United States will be a major participant in the international effort to resettle Syrian refugees from Turkey and elsewhere. The U.S. refugee resettlement program in Turkey is one of our largest programs worldwide. We intend to admit close to 7,000 refugees from Turkey in the coming year, including Iraqis, Iranians, and a growing number of Syrians.

The United States remains committed to supporting relief agencies working to meet the needs of Syrians throughout the region.

For more detailed information on the U.S. government’s response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, please visit: www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria.

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 21, 2014

Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Trip of Vice President Joe Biden to Morocco, Ukraine and Turkey

Aboard Air Force Two
En Route Istanbul, Turkey

Q Where do we stand on safe zones?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that things like no-fly zones, buffer zones, safe zones -- there’s a lot of terminology here -- but they're all means. In other words, I think what is -- a more productive conversation is to have less of a focus on the means and more of a focus on the objectives, right? And then you can have a discussion about how you best secure those objectives.

So I think where we and the Turks agree is on the need to do more to combat ISIL in both Iraq and Syria. And we also agree that we need to do more to stand up and facilitate the moderate Syrian opposition, which is opposed to both ISIL and the regime. So we agree on those objectives. And then the question is, what is the best mechanism to make that happen?

And part of it, obviously, is cooperation with the Turks on the train-and-equip mission. Part of it is a conversation with them about partnering with Turkey out of Turkish facilities to do more against ISIL. But I think it’s been our view that we should start with our common baseline of what we're trying to achieve and then continue to have a pretty rigorous dialogue of how best to achieve it.

Q But there’s not agreement about that at this point, is there? Yes, everybody agrees Assad must go. They don't agree on the sort of balance of -- and our saying Iraq comes first, Iraq is the priority, then we’ll worry about that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, we agree with the Turks that there needs to be a political transition away from Assad as part of the endgame here, all right? So we don't disagree with them on that. But you're right that at the moment our highest priority in Iraq and Syria is degrading and eventually defeating ISIL. We’ve stated that explicitly. We have ISIL-first, Iraq-first strategy. But not an ISIL-only, Iraq-only strategy.

As the President has said a number of times and other senior officials have said, because we're focusing on ISIL first and Iraq first, the campaign plan such that it is, is further ahead in Iraq than it is in Syria. And part of that is that the train-and-equip mission in Syria is going to take a while to get up to speed.

So that's why we're having conversations with the Turks about what we can do more now while we're ramping up the train-and-equip mission.

Q But the train-and-equip mission, as General Allen has said, and General Dempsey has said, is not -- they are expected to act in a defensive manner against ISIL and other groups, but that's not their primary mission. Their primary mission is to protect their own homes and livelihoods against ISIL.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think their primary mission is to defend their communities. And my sense is if you were able to stand up a robust opposition in the north of the country, then they would be able to clear safe zones from which to operate. Do you see what I mean? That's a different model than declaring -- having the international community declare this area is a safe zone. We will police it through X, Y and Z measures. What I’m saying is if the objective is to allow opposition groups to effectively clear, hold and build in their areas up in the north and thereby create safe zones that families can return to and that create a buffer between the conflict in Syria and Turkey, then the train-and-equip mission is actually relevant to that goal as well because you need to have viable partners on the ground to hold terrain.

Q Would they be expected to clear and hold it themselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As opposed to?

Q Us helping them, somebody helping them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are helping them by training and equipping them.

Q Right, but do you think you can train and equip them to the point where they can actually hold and defend land as a buffer zone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- we don't know. I think what we're seeing in Iraq is the degree to which we are able to provide some advice on what to do, actually make a meaningful difference on rolling back ISIL. And one of the reasons why it would be useful to have more access to Turkish facilities is that it would potentially open up our ability to do more in support of opposition forces, who are combating ISIL.

You see an example of this in Kobani already where you have a force that is dedicated and committed to fighting ISIL. ISIL has poured an enormous amount of resources into that fight, and they're getting hammered in the air from it. So you can imagine a scenario in which you have a more robust opposition on the ground that was more capable of clearing and holding terrain and also provided opportunities for us to do more to assist them. Does that make --

Q So basically you're going -- having discussions with the Turks trying to find a balance that sort of suits both of your needs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, we’ll see how the Turks-- I’m just saying I don't know how that conversation will go.

Q You both have to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’m just saying that the most useful place to start is what are we trying to accomplish, and then figure out what’s the best means to accomplish that; as opposed to starting with the means, and then working down from there.

Q But again to go back to where we were before, assuming the priorities of your -- your objectives may be the same, but priorities and when you achieve them may be somewhat different. So the idea is you maybe give a little to them, they maybe give a little to you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get out ahead of -- so let me -- we’re having a pretty robust dialogue back and forth. And it’s happening at all levels. It’s happening at our professional military level. It’s happening at the John Allen level. And in the next two days -- well, tonight and tomorrow, it will happen at the highest levels of our respective governments. I don't want to get out ahead of where things may or may not end up. But all of those things will be -- everything will be on the table when things are being discussed.

Q Do you expect to reach any kind of conclusions on this visit? Do you want -- would that be ideal? Do you expect this just to be part of the continuing dialogue? At what point does the dialogue reach some fruition?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think to some degree the dialogue -- no, no, no, it’s going to be ongoing. I’ll give you an example. We are very far along in executing our strategy in Iraq, but it doesn’t mean that we're not constantly engaged with Iraqi leadership about making adjustments in all sorts of ways. And it’s the same with our interactions with the Turkish government.

I think that there have been a lot of interactions at all different levels. They understand more about what we need. We understand more about what they need than was true a month ago. And so we’ll have a more developed conversation at a very high level than last time simply because we're further along in the conversation. But I don't expect that there will be any finality because the conversation will continue.

Q Just give us an overview of the Ukrainian trip? And what was the result? As I understand, Poroshenko didn’t ask to participate in any kind of dialogue or new discussions with Russians. He did not want United States to be part of it, part of this dialogue that he talked the day before. Did they ask about weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all I would say that a major focus of the discussion is what you actually saw the President -- President Poroshenko and the Vice President talk about in public, which was the urgency of moving from this national coalition agreement, which they arrived at early this morning actually to getting a government. And I think something the Vice President said, and you saw President Poroshenko nodding his head during this, is there’s actually a big difference between it taking six days versus six weeks or six months; that right now actors as diverse at the U.S. Congress, the Europeans, and the IMF are all looking at the Ukrainian government to see that there is one that is committed to reform and will partner with the international community to move forward. And frankly, it’s difficult to move forward on things like a large financial aid package; or additional sanctions et cetera in that (inaudible) -- so that was a major part of focus. And that was all out in the open.

Q (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what Ukrainians we’re talking a lot was a kind of catalogue of pretty blatant Russian violations of the Minsk agreement. So there was a lot of that. And there was a lot of conversation about what was necessary to send Russia a clear signal that what they were doing was unacceptable.

I think there was a clear sense that you don't want to start over from scratch; that you wouldn’t want to scrap the Minsk agreement and start over. We already have an agreement that lays out the basic parameters that the Ukrainian side continues to believe are the right parameters and the Russians agreed to. They just haven’t enforced.

So I think everybody is in agreement that at the right time there needs to be dialogue again.

Q When is the right time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But where I don't think we have finality yet is the timing and the modality for that. That is -- which party is what mechanism. So there were no decisions on that score. There was a lot of conversation back and forth about the need to put pressure on Russia to more live up to its Minsk agreements.

Q Did the Ukrainians actually say what they really want you to do? Do you have a clear understanding what you have to do? What kind of signal else you can send them because it’s not clear?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In general what the Ukrainians hope we do is what we hope to do, as well, which is find a way to mobilize the world to provide substantial economic assistance; mobilize European countries and others to put more pressure on the Russians; and to get a government in Ukraine that lives up to its reform agenda.

Q Are you planning to do any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None of those things -- the reforms are Ukraine -- but in terms of mobilizing the international community --

Q No, absolutely.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or any of those other things, that's very much about the United States.

Q My question is are you -- you and other Europeans maybe thinking about some kind of major plan for reconstruction for Ukraine, or for the east? Is there any discussion about that? Because I know what Ukrainians are saying. They want Marshall Plan. They want this kind so is there any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Terms like the Marshall Plan get thrown around a lot in a lot of different contexts. Let me put it this way, if by Marshall Plan you mean the need for an influx of a significant amount of macroeconomic assistance, there is complete agreement that that is required, right?

In other words, even though there’s a gas deal to get us through the winter, that Ukraine is going to face significant challenges as it relates to their reserves, as it relates to their energy, and that they're going to need a lot of help from the international community. We’ve signaled to them that we're willing to mobilize the international community -- to do our best to mobilize the international community, both the Europeans, the international financial institutions, et cetera to provide that assistance, but this is what I told you yesterday, it’s help us help you -- which is why this is all tied back to the government formation and reform agenda. These things are interdependent. And by the way, it’s not us telling the Ukrainian leaders this. They know this. From both the President and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, we received no pushback on that. They get it. They know.

Q Do you see any reason to believe that the Russians are getting the message at all? If anything, they seem to be going in the other direction.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So I think that there is a sense that Putin may have been a little surprised for how shunned and isolated he was at the G20. Has that kind of sense of isolation resulted in a new openness to compromise? I don't think we’ve seen it yet. Does it mean it won’t? We don't know. But certainly we haven’t seen it yet. But I do think there’s a little bit in the body language that they understand that they're the odd man out.

Q Don't you think that we project a little bit too much and we would act if people said things like that about us? Because they don't seem to respond. They don't seem to respond.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can ask the Russians whether they care or not.

Q Okay, thanks.

END

The White House

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

November 21, 2014

Readout of the Vice President’s Meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu

Vice President Joe Biden met today with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to discuss the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, the Cyprus settlement talks, and energy security. The two leaders agreed on the need to degrade and defeat ISIL, to work towards a political transition in Syria, and provide support for the Iraqi Security Forces and the moderate Syrian opposition.