FACT SHEET: United States-Japan Nuclear Security Working Group

The United States and Japan established a bilateral Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG) in 2011 in response to a shared desire to demonstrate leadership in strengthening nuclear security worldwide and in support of the Nuclear Security Summit process.  This group developed a Roadmap containing tangible actions in support of shared objectives and goals.  When taken together, these goals constitute a layered approach to nuclear security including:  reducing quantities of nuclear material and/or its attractiveness, reducing the vulnerability of material to theft or diversion, and strengthening response and forensics capabilities.  Achievements outlined in the nine goals of the NSWG Roadmap below have benefited both countries’ nuclear security expertise, strengthened our nuclear security posture, and have fundamentally reduced the threat that terrorists would acquire nuclear material.

Goal 1:  Cooperation within the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)

Since the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) established the ISCN in December 2010, as the first new Center of Excellence of its kind in the region, JAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have successfully collaborated on the development of ISCN programs for strengthening international capacity in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security.  This bilateral cooperation has included:  state-of-the-art training courses on physical protection of nuclear material and facilities for approximately 250 participants from 27 countries; developing physical protection training tools and technology performance testing capabilities; and enhancing scenario analysis and tabletop exercise (TTX) capabilities at ISCN.

Goal 2:  Research and Development (R&D) of Nuclear Forensics, Measurement and Detection Technologies, and Sharing of Investigatory Best Practices 

Building on a series of initial meetings and workshops to facilitate information exchange on nuclear forensics, JAEA and DOE have strengthened forensics capabilities through four new technical cooperation projects.  Nuclear forensics experts from Japan and the United States continue to collaborate through these projects on joint R&D in nuclear material signatures, including uranium age dating measurements and characterization of nuclear fuel for forensics purposes, and the establishment of a proto-type national nuclear forensics library at JAEA.

Goal 3:  Cooperation on Safeguards Implementation

In February 2013, DOE and JAEA celebrated 25 years of official cooperation to develop advanced technologies for effective and efficient implementation of nuclear safeguards.  Some of the techniques pioneered through this collaboration have facilitated the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) transition to a modernized international safeguards system, increasingly reliant on remote and automated verification measures at a wide range of fuel cycle facilities.  Since 2011, JAEA and DOE have further expanded this cooperation by launching 10 new safeguards implementation projects of high priority, including joint work on:  safeguards measurement techniques for spent fuel; safeguards equipment for J-MOX; advanced measurement for plutonium solutions; and technologies for safeguards application at Fukushima.  DOE and JAEA held a technical meeting on safeguards technologies with possible application to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in February and September 2013.  Both sides have also continued to increase coordination and cooperation in the area of safeguards training. 

Goal 4:  Sharing Best Practices for Nuclear Security in New Facility Design

Both countries conducted reciprocal visits to Rokkasho and Savannah River to observe the construction sites of MOX fuel fabrication facilities.  JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) together developed a Security-by-Design Handbook for third countries as a joint research project to identify best practices for incorporating security considerations early into the design process of new nuclear facilities, and are exploring opportunities for further joint outreach to other stakeholders in the international community.

Goal 5:  Cooperation on Transport Security to Reduce the Chances of Theft or Sabotage 

For the purpose of achieving mutual understanding of the structure of transport security and its implementation in line with international guideline INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, both countries conducted a TTX on Transport Security March 26 – 28, 2012 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Following this a TTX Workshop was held in Tokyo on August 26-29, 2013.  The goal of this workshop was to discuss how TTX are developed and used to ensure security of nuclear material in transit via road and sea.  The workshop also helped prepare for the transport security gift basket event held in Tokyo on November 12-14, 2013.

Goal 6:  Convert Reactors to Reduce the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Complete Down-Blending Operations 

Both countries continue to work towards the conversion of highly enriched uranium-fueled research reactors, where technically and economically feasible, and the timely removal and disposal of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them.  In a major step forward in this effort, the governments of the United States and Japan have decided to remove and dispose all HEU and plutonium from JAEA’s Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) and extend research reactor spent fuel returns from Japan by ten years.  Both countries intend to work together closely to execute this important commitment in a timely manner.  Additionally, both countries remain committed to feasibility studies for converting the Kyoto and Kinki University Reactors to the use of low-enriched uranium, the down-blend of HEU from the Yayoi reactor and the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), and the shipment of HEU from JAEA’s Japan Materials Testing Reactor Critical Assembly (JMTRC) reactor to the United States for disposition.

Goal 7:  Implement INFCIRC / 225 / Rev.5

DOE and JAEA have continued to help promote better understanding and implementation of the new nuclear security recommendations in the document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 through joint workshops at the ISCN, and both continue to support the development of Implementing Guides for INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 for eventual publication by the IAEA.  Both countries have also launched a series of technical meetings for further collaboration and information exchange to facilitate INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 implementation, including on: protective strategies against sabotage and effective interfacing of safety and security measures; insider threat evaluation and protection methodologies; and the development of effective cybersecurity measures for nuclear facilities.

Goal 8:  Integrating Response Forces into Dealing with Theft and Sabotage at Facilities

The U.S. side had the opportunity to observe the integrated exercise with the joint participation of the police, the coastguard, and operators held at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and to conduct the force-on-force exercises workshop in Tokyo in December 2010.  Likewise, the Japanese side had the opportunity to observe force-on-force exercises at Cooper Nuclear Station and participated in the workshop at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) headquarters in November 2011.  In 2013, the NRC and DOE hosted a meeting with Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) on the physical protection and response requirements at Category III facilities, to discuss the graded approach to security used at facilities with different levels of risk.  Through these occasions, both sides exchanged views and ideas to enhance the mutual capacity of integrating response forces into dealing with theft and sabotage at facilities.

Goal 9:  Joint Study on Management of HEU and Plutonium:  Reduction of Material Attractiveness

Both countries successfully completed a joint scientific study on evaluation of and potential approaches to reduce the attractiveness of nuclear materials that could be used by terrorists to create a nuclear explosive device. At the “Global 2013” International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Conference in September 2013, both countries shared the results of the U.S./Japan scientific study on the evaluation of and potential approaches to reducing the attractiveness of nuclear materials to terrorists, which was conducted under the Working Group’s auspices.  As a next step, Japan is currently considering a U.S. proposal for a joint impact analysis study investigating the realities of implementing the study’s recommendations.  Both countries have decided to conduct an exchange and a peer review of papers on materials attractiveness with France and the United Kingdom.

Joint Statement by the United States and the Netherlands on Climate Change and Financing the Transition to Low-Carbon Investments Abroad

The Netherlands and the United States share a common interest in urgent action to address global climate change.  We affirm the importance of reaching a global climate change agreement in 2015 that can attract broad and ambitious participation.  The agreement should reflect the continuous evolution of capabilities of countries in tackling this global challenge.  It should also take account of the important role played by the private sector, sub-national actors, and civil society in finding solutions to addressing carbon pollution while improving the resilience of nations to the impacts of climate change.  Our two countries pledge to continue our cooperation towards adopting such an agreement at the United Nations climate conference in Paris in 2015.

We reaffirm our support of internationally agreed commitments to scale up the mobilization of climate finance and recognize that different forms of financing are needed to support countries making the transition to a low-emission, climate resilient economy.  We strive to deploy public resources to catalyze private climate finance in and to developing countries.

We emphasize that our work to scale up climate friendly investments in developing countries is most effective when combined with reducing public incentives for high-carbon infrastructure.  To this end, the Netherlands is joining the United States, the United Kingdom, and others in agreeing to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants abroad except in rare circumstances.  This includes our bilateral development finance institutions and projects financed through the multilateral development banks, where it should be noted that the Netherlands is a member of mixed constituencies.  Complementing action already taken by the United States, our two countries are working together to promote a technology-neutral standard in the OECD Export Credit Group that limits support for high carbon intensity power plants by export credit agencies.

FACT SHEET: Advancing Global Nuclear Security

In 2009, President Obama launched an ambitious global agenda to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.  During his visit to Prague, the President called on the international community to prevent terrorists from getting access to the building blocks needed for a nuclear bomb by putting an end to dedicated production of weapons-grade materials and securing all of the world’s vulnerable nuclear material within four years.  He urged countries to lock down sensitive materials, break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt their trade.

Translating ambition into action, the President convened an unprecedented Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC in 2010.  Forty seven countries from every region in the world committed to work together to ensure that nuclear materials could not be sold or stolen and fashioned into nuclear weapons.

The stakes are high and the threat is real.  The danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to our collective security.  The hardest part of making a nuclear weapon is getting the material.  Even a small amount of nuclear material could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people.  Terrorist networks could acquire the materials to assemble their own nuclear weapon, wreaking havoc on global peace and stability, and resulting in extraordinary loss of life and global economic damage.

Since 2009, the world has made substantial progress.  The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1887, endorsing a comprehensive agenda to secure all nuclear materials.  Individual countries have taken specific and concrete actions to secure nuclear materials in their countries and to prevent illicit trafficking and smuggling.  The world has worked to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to ensure it has the resources and authorities it needs to meet its responsibilities.  And we have worked to build the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into a durable international institution.

Earlier this year, the United States and Russia completed implementation of the 1993 U.S.-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement, one of the most successful non-proliferation programs in our history.  Low-enriched uranium derived from 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium blended down from 20,000 Russian nuclear warheads, became fuel for U.S. nuclear power reactors.  The program supplied nearly ten percent of all U.S. electricity over the last fifteen years.  Since 2010, the U.S. has also blended down 24 MT of excess Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from our own weapons program, and assisted in removing or confirming the disposition of over 2400 kilograms of HEU and plutonium from other countries.

Through the Summit process, we have established a global network of experts who work on nuclear security at senior levels in 53 governments and multiple international organizations.  We have expanded bilateral cooperation on nuclear security with dozens of countries worldwide.  And the trends we’re seeing are very positive:

The number of countries and facilities with HEU and plutonium is decreasing:

• Twelve countries have completely eliminated HEU or separated plutonium from within their borders.
• Twenty seven countries removed or disposed of nearly 3000 kilograms of HEU and separated plutonium.
• Twenty four HEU nuclear reactors in 14 countries were successfully converted to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel use or verified as shut down.

Security at storage sites is increasing:

• The United States has helped secure 218 buildings in 5 countries storing weapons-usable nuclear materials through physical security upgrades.
• We responded effectively to security issues at the Y-12 HEU site in Tennessee and are applying those lessons throughout our nuclear complex.

More countries are prepared to counter nuclear smuggling:

• The United States is working with 20 countries to enhance their ability to detect, interdict, attribute and prosecute nuclear smugglers.
• 260 sites and ports have been equipped with radiation detection systems, and 41 mobile radiation detection cans have been deployed to internal checkpoints in 15 partner countries.
• We are providing training to U.S. and partner nation officials in law enforcement, customs, and border security.

More countries are seeking international advice:

• The United States hosted its first-ever international advisory security review in October 2013.
• Twelve other countries have requested international advisory reviews since the first Summit.

The nuclear security architecture is stronger:

• Over two dozen countries have ratified the key nuclear security treaties since the 2010 Summit.  The United States continues to pursue ratification of these critical instruments.
• The IAEA’s nuclear security team has been elevated and better funded, and has a more rigorous standards development process.
• INTERPOL’s radnuke support team has been enhanced.

The United States is committed to continuing its leadership on this vitally important issue.  With our allies and partners, we will continue to work to put in place a strong and sustainable global nuclear security architecture designed to reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism while allowing countries to more safely and effectively pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We have fulfilled our commitments, improved security at our facilities, and forged new partnerships.  We have removed nuclear materials, and in some cases gotten rid of them entirely.  As a result, more of the world’s nuclear materials can never fall into the hands of terrorists who would use them against us.  While there is much more to be done, we should be proud of all that we have achieved since the first Summit in 2010, and seize this opportunity to move that progress forward.

Weekly Address: Rewarding Women's Hard Work and Increasing the Minimum Wage

WASHINGTON, DC— In this week’s address, President Obama highlighted the importance of making sure our economy rewards the hard work of every American – including America’s women. The President reiterated his call for Congress to ensure that women earn equal pay for equal work and increase the minimum wage to $10.10, which would give nearly 28 million Americans the raise they deserve. He underscored his belief that providing opportunity for working women and families is the right thing to do for our economy, because when women succeed, America succeeds.

The audio of the address and video of the address will be available online at www.whitehouse.gov at 6:00 a.m. ET, Saturday, March 22, 2014.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
March 22, 2014

Hi, everybody.  This week, I visited a community college in Florida, where I spoke with students about what we need to do to make sure our economy rewards the hard work of every American.

More specifically, I spoke about making sure our economy rewards the hard work of women. 

Today, women make up about half of our workforce, and more than half of our college graduates.  More women are now their families’ main breadwinner than ever before. 

But in a lot of ways, our economy hasn’t caught up to this new reality yet.  On average, a woman still earns just 77 cents for every dollar a man does.  And too many women face outdated workplace policies that hold them back – which in turn holds back our families and our entire economy.

A woman deserves to earn equal pay for equal work, and paid leave that lets you take a day off to care for a sick child or parent.  Congress needs to act on these priorities. 

And when women hold most lower-wage jobs in America, Congress needs to raise the minimum wage.  Because no woman who works full-time should ever have to raise her children in poverty.

Now, the good news is that in the year since I first called on Congress to raise the minimum wage, six states have passed laws to raise theirs.  More states, counties, and cities are working to raise their minimum wages as we speak.  Small businesses like St. Louis-based Pi Pizzeria, are raising their wages too – not out of charity, but because it’s good for business.  And by the way, Pi makes a really good pizza.  And in this year of action, I signed an executive order requiring federal contractors to pay their employees a fair wage of at least ten dollars and ten cents an hour. 

But if we’re truly going to reward the hard work of every American, Congress needs to join the rest of the country and pass a bill that would lift the federal minimum wage to ten dollars and ten cents an hour.  This wouldn’t just raise wages for minimum wage workers – its effects would lift wages for nearly 28 million Americans across this country.  It will give businesses more customers with more money to spend, and grow the economy for everybody.  So call up your Member of Congress and let them know it’s time for “ten-ten.”  It’s time to give America a raise. 

A true opportunity agenda is one that works for working women. Because when women succeed, America succeeds.  We do better when everyone participates, and when everyone who works hard has the chance to get ahead.  That’s what opportunity means – and it’s why I’ll keep fighting to restore it. 

Thanks, everybody, and have a great weekend.