The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

White House Releases the United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan

Today the White House released the United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan.

The United States has long been a leader in maritime security, including in countering the threat of piracy.  Since 2009, the United States has organized and led the international effort that has seen successful pirate attacks decline off the coast of Somalia dramatically. 

In the spirit of this leadership and in ensuring safety at sea, the United States developed the Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan.  This Plan implements the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea.  The United States will continue to seek to strengthen regional governance and rule of law to maintain the safety and security of mariners, preserve freedom of the seas, and promote free flow of commerce through lawful economic activity. 

The Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan provides clear strategic guidance for counter-piracy efforts and outlines that the United States will use all appropriate instruments of national power to repress piracy and related maritime crimes.  The Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan focuses on three core areas: Prevention of Attacks, Response to Acts of Maritime Crime, and Enhancing Maritime Security and Governance; and provides specific frameworks for the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea regions.  These frameworks establish the tailored and specific methodology for these regions and provide guidance on how the United States will respond to the regional threats associated with the varying geographic, political, and legal environments. 

The “Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan” supersedes the “Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan” of 2008.

Read the full report here.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

FACT SHEET: The United States and New Zealand: Forward Progress

President Obama and Prime Minister Key today reaffirmed the longstanding friendship and common values shared by the United States and New Zealand and joint efforts to advance our sustained collaboration on multiple fronts.  In that spirit, the United States applauds New Zealand’s recent decision to open a consulate in Hawaii to expand and deepen the bilateral relationship.

Increasing Economic Growth, Jobs, and Trade

The United States and New Zealand are committed to creating new opportunities by increasing trade and opening markets, and we are working together to strengthen our economic relationship bilaterally as well as regionally.  The President and the Prime Minister share a commitment to completing a high-standard, comprehensive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that achieves the objectives to which TPP Leaders and Ministers agreed in Honolulu in 2011 as soon as possible.   This agreement, will contribute to economic growth and job creation in both of our countries and in the Asia-Pacific region and will build on our work together in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Security, Defense, and Rule of Law

The United States and New Zealand share the goal of a stable and secure world, buttressed by the principles of peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for universal rights and freedoms.  Our two countries work side-by-side to support peace and stability both in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. 

In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and New Zealand recognize the importance of regional institutions that promote rules and norms and foster cooperative efforts to address shared challenges.  As such, both countries are working with fora such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Pacific Islands Forum to strengthen these rules and norms. 

Regarding regional maritime disputes, the United States and New Zealand are united in supporting the peaceful resolution of disputes, the respect for international law and unimpeded lawful commerce, and the preservation of the freedom of navigation and overflight.  In the South China Sea, the President and the Prime Minister called on ASEAN and China to reach early agreement on a meaningful and effective Code of Conduct.  In discussing the need for diplomatic and dialogue to resolve disputes, the two leaders rejected the use of intimidation, coercion, and aggression to advance any maritime claims.  The two leaders reinforced the call for claimants to clarify and pursue claims in accordance with international law, including the Law of the Sea Convention. 

The United States and New Zealand are also collaborating to support free and fair elections in Fiji, which will enable that nation to return to democracy and the rule of law.

The United States and New Zealand share in joint efforts to build and sustain a peaceful, secure, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.  The United States welcomes New Zealand’s participation in RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise), the world’s largest multinational naval exercise.  This will mark the first time a New Zealand navy ship will dock at Pearl Harbor Naval Base in over 30 years, a symbol of our renewed engagement on mutual defense and security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beyond the Asia-Pacific region, the President and the Prime Minister share a deep commitment to advancing global nuclear security, and our countries both contribute to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund.  We are both members of the “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” and are working together to support mobile detection capabilities in Africa and Latin America.  We have also been active participants in the Nuclear Security Summit process, including the recent successful Summit hosted by the Netherlands in The Hague in March.

The United States welcomes New Zealand’s partnership with NATO.  As one of the Alliance’s global partners, New Zealand has contributed to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Bosnia, as well as counter-piracy efforts.  We look forward to continuing our political dialogue and security cooperation with New Zealand in the NATO context. 

The United States and New Zealand are committed to increasing our partnership in support of multilateral peace operations, including both United Nations peacekeeping as well as non-U.N. missions, such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, which remain important tools for advancing global security.  New Zealand is providing military instructors to the U.S.-led Global Peace Operations Initiative, which trains peacekeepers prior to deployment, and both countries remain committed to making investments in the countries that contribute forces to U.N. and other peacekeeping operations. 

The United States welcomes New Zealand’s strong positions on other international issues, such as Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea, the conflict and ensuing humanitarian tragedy in Syria, and the continuing provocative actions of North Korea.  The United States welcomes New Zealand’s contribution to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to help people displaced by the current fighting in Iraq.  We are also working together in high-value, high-impact areas, such as developing amphibious as well as humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities.

Science, Climate Change, and the Environment

The United States is New Zealand’s most significant research, science and technology partner, sharing a long history of scientific cooperation, especially in Antarctica.  The U.S. Antarctic Program, operated out of Christchurch for over five decades, supports diverse scientific work ranging from astrophysics to biology, climatology, and volcanology.  Our two countries support efforts by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources to establish the world’s largest Marine Protected Area in the Antarctic Ross Sea. 

The United States and New Zealand continue to cooperate on science, technology, and health issues through the Joint Commission Meeting on Science and Technology Cooperation, which will next be held in New Zealand in August 2014.

The United States and New Zealand share a recognition of the threat of climate change and are taking a number of steps in the Pacific region and globally to address its effects.

·  As we take action at home to reduce carbon emissions, we are cooperating closely in pursuit of an ambitious 2015 climate change agreement applicable to all Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.  Our two countries intend to put forward our intended post-2020 mitigation contributions well in advance of the Paris climate conference.

·  As founding members of the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, we work together to promote climate resilient sustainable development and renewable energy in the Pacific region.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the New Zealand National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research are working to build climate adaptation and resilience through new and improved climate services for Pacific island nations.

·  We lead efforts under the APEC “Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform.”  New Zealand will undertake a fossil fuel subsidy peer review in support of this effort.

People-to-People Ties

The United States and New Zealand celebrate our strong cultural and people-to-people ties. 

The President and the Prime Minister welcomed the creation of a $1.7 million New Zealand Harkness Fellowships Endowment Fund to support outstanding mid-career New Zealand leaders from the public, private, or NGO sector to undertake research and study in the United States.  Over the years New Zealand Harkness Fellows have made a significant commitment to New Zealand and to New Zealand’s relationship with the United States, and this Endowment Fund will ensure that legacy continues.

Since 1948, when the Fulbright commission was established in New Zealand, more than 3,000 U.S. citizens and New Zealanders have participated in educational and cultural exchanges.  Each year, Fulbright offers approximately 80 scholarships to New Zealand and U.S. citizens to study, research, teach, or present their work in one another’s countries on issues ranging from climate change and energy, to public policy, business, law, and the arts.  New Zealand also hosts 15 National Science Foundation fellows each year. 

The United States and New Zealand recently committed to jointly fund the Fulbright Distinguished Awards in Teaching Program to send twenty or more teachers to each other’s countries over the next three years.  There are more than 3,000 U.S. citizens studying in New Zealand and 1,200 New Zealand students studying in the United States, a nine percent increase over the previous year.

The indigenous peoples of the United States and New Zealand share deep historical ties, and the United States has sponsored Maori business leaders in the United States in an effort to connect Maori with Native American and Alaskan leaders. 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Readout of the Vice President’s Call to President Juan Orlando Hernández of Honduras

Vice President Joe Biden spoke by phone with Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández on his way to Guatemala to discuss a regional strategy to address the influx of unaccompanied children coming from Central America to the U.S.-Mexico border. The Vice President previewed his meeting in Guatemala with the Presidents of Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as representatives from the governments of Mexico and Honduras to discuss the urgent humanitarian issue. He asked President Hernández to work in close cooperation with other regional leaders to develop concrete proposals to address the root causes of unlawful migration from Central America.

The Vice President also reiterated that arriving migrants will not qualify for legalization under proposed immigration reform legislation or deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA).

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

FACT SHEET: Unaccompanied Children from Central America

The Administration remains greatly concerned by the rise in unaccompanied children from Central America who are crossing into the United States. These children are some of the most vulnerable, and many become victims of violent crime or sexual abuse along the dangerous journey. There has also been a rise in the number of very young children, female children, and adults with their children that are making the journey. The vast majority of these individuals rely on dangerous human smuggling networks to transport them up through Central America and Mexico. 

To address the situation, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate a government-wide response to this urgent situation. Our first priority is to manage the urgent humanitarian situation by making sure these children are housed, fed, and receive any necessary medical treatment. We also are taking steps to improve enforcement and partnering with our Central American counterparts in three key areas: combating gang violence and strengthening citizen security, spurring economic development, and improving capacity to receive and reintegrate returned families and children.

In Guatemala, the Vice President is meeting with regional leaders to address the rise in the flow of unaccompanied children and adults with their children to the United States, to discuss our work together with the countries of Central America, and to discuss our efforts to help address the underlying security and economic issues that cause migration.

Partnering with Central America and Mexico

New Programs

  • The U.S. Government will be providing $9.6 million in additional support for Central American governments to receive and reintegrate their repatriated citizens. This funding will enable El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to make substantial investments in their existing repatriation centers, provide training to immigration officials on migrant care, and increase the capacity of these governments and non-governmental organizations to provide expanded services to returned migrants. 

  • In Guatemala, we are launching a new $40-million U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program over 5 years to improve citizen security. This program will work in some of the most violent communities to reduce the risk factors for youth involvement in gangs and address factors driving migration to the United States.

  • In El Salvador, we are initiating a new $25-million Crime and Violence Prevention USAID program over 5 years that will establish 77 youth outreach centers in addition to the 30 already in existence. These will continue to offer services to at-risk youth who are susceptible to gang recruitment and potential migration.

  • In Honduras, under the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), we will provide $18.5 million to support community policing and law enforcement efforts to confront gangs and other sources of crime. In addition, USAID will build on an existing initiative to support 40 youth outreach centers by soon announcing a substantial new Crime and Violence Prevention program to further address root causes.

  • USAID is calling for proposals to support new public-private partnerships through the Global Development Alliance to increase economic and educational opportunities for at risk youth in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

  • The United States also plans to provide $161.5 million this year for CARSI programs that are critical to enabling Central American countries to respond to the region’s most pressing security and governance challenges. Our assistance will help stem migration flows as well as address root cause of the migration. This assistance will include:

    • Approximately $65 million for Rule of Law, Human Rights and Transparency programs, including activities to prevent at-risk youth from joining gangs and encourage their involvement in community crime prevention efforts and programs to expand education and job training.

    • Another approximately $96.5 million will go toward peace, security, stabilization, and other related rule of law programs to strengthen immigration, law enforcement, and judicial authorities and promote anti-gang and human rights programs.

Ongoing Programs

  • The United States is providing almost $130 million in ongoing bilateral assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala for a variety of programs related to health, education, climate change, economic growth, military cooperation, and democracy assistance.   

  • We are collaborating on campaigns to help potential migrants understand the significant danger of relying on human smuggling networks and to reinforce that recently arriving children and individuals are not eligible for programs like Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, commonly called DACA, and earned citizenship provisions in comprehensive immigration reform currently under consideration in the Congress. 

Increased Enforcement

  • The Department of Justice and DHS are taking additional steps to enhance enforcement and removal proceedings. We are surging government enforcement resources to increase our capacity to detain individuals and adults who bring their children with them and to handle immigration court hearings – in cases where hearings are necessary – as quickly and efficiently as possible while also while also protecting those who are seeking asylum. That will allow ICE to return unlawful migrants from Central America to their home countries more quickly.

  • These new measures build on a strong existing record of enforcement and removal of Central Americans entering the country unlawfully. In FY 2013, ICE removed 47,769 individuals from Guatemala, 37,049 from Honduras, and 21,602 from El Salvador. This represents approximately 29% of all ICE removals.

  • The Vice President will reiterate that unaccompanied children and adults arriving with their children are not eligible to benefit from the passage of immigration reform legislation or from the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) process.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Statement by the President on World Refugee Day

Today I join people around the world in commemorating World Refugee Day.  It is an opportunity to honor the resilience of those who flee violence and persecution and the dedication of those who help them. 

The forces that shatter communities and uproot their residents are difficult to tame.  This year we mark a grim milestone.  Over 51 million people are now refugees, asylum seekers, or internally displaced persons, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. That is more than at any time since World War II. 

Nearly half of all Syrians – 45 percent – have been driven from their homes.  A quarter of them – more than 2.8 million – have become refugees in neighboring countries.  Conflicts in the Central African Republic and South Sudan have each forced over a million people to flee.  In just the past few days, turmoil gripping Iraq has displaced hundreds of thousands and threatens many more. 

Refugee crises reveal what is worst and best about us.  The huts set on fire, the apartment buildings flattened, the bullets sprayed at innocent civilians, show the depths of our capacity for hatred and callousness.  But those who aid and protect refugees demonstrate the opposite:  our potential for valor and compassion. 

The United States provides more humanitarian assistance to refugees than any other nation.  In the last year alone, the generosity of the American people, and the dedication of those who deliver food, medicine, shelter, and other emergency assistance, have helped to save hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of lives.

Our commitment does not end overseas. Some refugees simply cannot return home because the risk of violence and persecution is too great. The U.S. admits more refugees for permanent resettlement than any other nation.  Last year nearly 70,000 came to the United States and we expect to bring in the same number this year. 

The ordeals refugees survive and the aspirations they hold resonate with us as Americans. This country was built by people who fled oppression and war, leapt at opportunity, and worked day and night to remake themselves in this new land.  The refugees who arrive in the United States today continue this tradition, bringing fresh dreams and energy and renewing the qualities that help forge our national identity and make our country strong. 

Addressing the Needs of Working Families in Rural America

This was originally posted on the Huffington Post, and is part of a series of essays about the issues facing working families, leading up to the White House Summit on Working Families on June 23, 2014.

You can learn more about the Summit and how you can get involved at www.workingfamiliessummit.org.


Last Wednesday, I participated in a regional forum of the White House Working Families Summit that was held at Virginia State University in Petersburg, Virginia. Coming from a small town in Southwest Georgia myself, I can relate to the unique challenges that rural Americans face. Growing up, my father worked seven days a week on our peanut and cattle farm with help from my mother. To make sure our family had a constant source of income and health insurance, my mother also worked off the farm at the local independent bank. I am fortunate to be the product of hard working parents who provided my sister and me with the best opportunities possible.

All families have a right to have access to a good education system, affordable healthcare and jobs. Our rural families are concerned about creating strong prospects for their children, whether it is on or off the farm. But it is also essential that there are opportunities that will attract young people back to rural areas and help us secure the future of agriculture.

The Obama Administration is committed to providing opportunities for working families across the country. That's why earlier this year President Obama created the Made in Rural America Export and Investment Initiative to help rural businesses and leaders take advantage of new investment opportunities and access new markets abroad.

Krysta Harden is Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

New Steps to Protect Pollinators, Critical Contributors to Our Nation’s Economy

Today, President Obama issued a memorandum directing U.S. government agencies to take additional steps to protect and restore domestic populations of pollinators, including honey bees, native bees, birds, bats, and butterflies – critical contributors to our nation’s economy, food system, and environmental health.

Pollinators contribute substantially to the sustainability of our food production systems, the economic vitality of the agricultural sector, and the health of the environment. Honey bee pollination alone adds more than $15 billion in value to agricultural crops in the United States each year, and pollination by other species adds another $9 billion. In addition, pollinators help wild flowering plants grow, making ecosystems stronger and more resilient.

But for decades, pollinator populations in the United States have been falling. The number of managed U.S. honey bee colonies dropped from 6 million colonies in 1947, to 4 million in 1970, 3 million in 1990, and just 2.5 million today. And last winter, the Monarch butterfly migration across North America was smaller than all previous migrations on record, and there is a risk that this iconic migration could end. These numbers highlight the importance of taking immediate steps to address these alarming declines and ensure the sustainability of our nation’s food production systems, economy, and environment.

Bob Perciasepe is the Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Krysta Harden is Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Related Topics: Energy and Environment

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Fact Sheet: The Economic Challenge Posed by Declining Pollinator Populations

Pollinators contribute substantially to the economy of the United States and are vital to keeping fruits, nuts, and vegetables in our diets. Over the past few decades, there has been a significant loss of pollinators—including honey bees, native bees, birds, bats, and butterflies—from the environment. The problem is serious and poses a significant challenge that needs to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of our food production systems, avoid additional economic impacts on the agricultural sector, and protect the health of the environment.

Economic Importance of Pollinators:

  • Insect pollination is integral to food security in the United States. Honey bees enable the production of at least 90 commercially grown crops in North America. Globally, 87 of the leading 115 food crops evaluated are dependent on animal pollinators, contributing 35% of global food production.
  • Pollinators contribute more than 24 billion dollars to the United States economy, of which honey bees account for more than 15 billion dollars through their vital role in keeping fruits, nuts, and vegetables in our diets.
  • Native wild pollinators, such as bumble bees and alfalfa leafcutter bees, also contribute substantially to the domestic economy. In 2009, the crop benefits from native insect pollination in the United States were valued at more than 9 billion dollars.

The Challenge of Pollinator Declines:

  • The number of managed honey bee colonies in the United States has declined steadily over the past 60 years, from 6 million colonies (beehives) in 1947 to 4 million in 1970, 3 million in 1990, and just 2.5 million today. Given the heavy dependence of certain crops on commercial pollination, reduced honey bee populations pose a real threat to domestic agriculture. 
  • Some crops, such as almonds, are almost exclusively pollinated by honey bees, and many crops rely on honey bees for more than 90% of their pollination. California’s almond industry alone requires the pollination services of approximately 1.4 million beehives annually—60% of all U.S. beehives—yielding 80% of the worldwide almond production worth 4.8 billion dollars each year.
  • Since 2006, commercial beekeepers in the United States have seen honey bee colony loss rates increase to an average of 30% each winter, compared to historical loss rates of 10 to 15%. In 2013–14, the overwintering loss rate was 23.2%, down from 30.5% the previous year but still greater than historical averages and the self-reported acceptable winter mortality rate.
  • The recent increased loss of honey bee colonies is thought to be caused by a combination of stressors, including loss of natural forage and inadequate diets, mite infestations and diseases, loss of genetic diversity, and exposure to certain pesticides. Contributing to these high loss rates is a phenomenon called colony collapse disorder (CCD), in which there is a rapid, unexpected, and catastrophic loss of bees in a hive.
  • Beekeepers in the United States have collectively lost an estimated 10 million beehives at an approximate current value of $200 each. These high colony loss rates require beekeepers to rapidly, and at substantial expense, rebuild their colonies, placing commercial beekeeping in jeopardy as a viable industry and threatening the crops dependent on honey bee pollination. The loss rates have driven up the cost of commercial pollination: for instance, the cost of renting honey bee hives for almond pollination rose from about $50 in 2003 to $150-$175 per hive in 2009.
  • Some of the viral agents that are impacting honey bee colonies are also now reported to be adversely affecting native pollinators, such as bumble bees, and the pollination services they provide.
  • Population declines have also been observed for other contributing pollinator species, such as Monarch butterflies, which migrate from Mexico across the United States to Canada each year, returning to overwinter in the same few forests in Mexico. The Monarch butterfly migration, an iconic natural phenomenon that has an estimated economic value in the billions of dollars, sank to the lowest recorded levels this winter, with an imminent risk of failure.

Administration Actions:

In response to the challenges to commercial bee-keeping, the President’s 2015 Budget recommends approximately $50 million across multiple agencies within USDA to: enhance research at USDA and through public-private grants, strengthen pollinator habitat in core areas, double the number of acres in the Conservation Reserve Program that are dedicated to pollinator health, and increase funding for surveys to determine the impacts on pollinator losses.

Building on this budget initiative, President Obama today issued a Presidential Memorandum on Creating a Federal Strategy to Promote the Health of Honey Bees and Other Pollinators that takes a number of important steps to tackle the problem of pollinator declines, including:

  • Directing the Federal Government to use its research, land management, education, and public/private partnership capacities to broadly advance honey bee and other pollinator health and habitat;
  • Establishing a new Pollinator Health Task Force, co-chaired by United States Department of Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency, to develop a National Pollinator Health Strategy. The Strategy will include: a coordinated research action plan to understand, prevent, and recover from pollinator losses, including determining the relative impacts of habitat loss, pesticide exposure, and other stressors; a public education plan to help individuals, businesses, and other organizations address pollinator losses; and recommendations for increasing public-private partnerships to build on Federal efforts to protect pollinators;
  • Directing Task Force agencies to develop plans to enhance pollinator habitat on federal lands and facilities in order to lead by example to significantly expand the acreage and quality of pollinator habitat, consistent with agency missions and public safety; and
  • Directing Task Force agencies to partner with state, tribal, and local governments; farmers and ranchers; corporations and small businesses; and non-governmental organizations to protect pollinators and increase the quality and amount of available habitat and forage.

In line with these efforts, the Federal Government will also work to restore the Monarch butterfly migration using research and habitat improvements that will benefit Monarchs as well as other native pollinators and honey bees. These actions support the February 2014 Joint Statement by President Obama, Prime Minister Harper of Canada, and President Peña Nieto of Mexico to renew and expand collaboration between North American nations to conserve the Monarch butterfly.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Iraq

Via Telephone

June 19, 2014, 2:27 P.M. EDT

MS. HAYDEN:  Hi, everyone.  Thanks very much for joining us.  I appreciate your patience.  I know the schedule has changed a little bit today.  We have three senior administration officials to talk to you today about what you heard the President say in the briefing room.  They are on background as SAOs.  There is no embargo on this call.  And I’ll turn it over to our first senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great.  Thanks, everybody, for getting on the call.  I’ll just very briefly review what the President said and then turn it over to my colleagues to go into a little bit more detail on the political and diplomatic side, and on the security side.

The President has been meeting regularly with his national security team over the course of the last week to both monitor and review options to respond to the situation in Iraq.  He has been guided by a number of priorities that include the security of our personnel operating inside of Iraq, our support for Iraq's stability and for an inclusive political process in Iraq, and to get at the safe haven that we do not want to allow ISIL to establish inside of Iraq. 

In that vein, you heard him point to several different lines of effort where we have made decisions and are moving forward with a range of different tools.  First, as you know, we have taken additional steps to secure our embassy and our personnel inside of Iraq.  And the President made clear that that will remain a top priority going forward.  Second, we needed to get a better picture and understanding of what was taking place inside of Iraq.  Therefore, we have significantly increased our ISR and our ability to get a better picture of the circumstances inside of Iraq, and specifically what is ISIL doing, where they are located, and what types of activities we must most closely monitor.

Then we’ve been focused on this question of how do we build the capacity of Iraqi security forces to provide for the security of Iraq to combat the threat from ISIL and, importantly, to provide assurance to all of the different communities inside of Iraq.  We’ve been steadily ramping up our training and equipping of those security forces over the last year. 

Today, the President announced some additional steps that we will be taking to include creating joint operation centers in Baghdad and northern Iraq that can facilitate our coordination with Iraqi security forces.  Also, a decision to send an additional number of American military advisors -- up to 300 -- who can help provide an additional assessment of how we can train, advise, and support the Iraqi security forces.  And my colleague from the Defense Department can speak in greater detail.

Importantly, I know many people have been focused on the question of whether the United States will take additional military action.  As the President said, we now have significantly more intelligence resources.  We also have prepositioned additional military resources that will enable us to make decisions going forward, both as we develop potential targets and as we determine whether that will be an effective course of action, given our belief that the best solution to the security challenges inside of Iraq are capable Iraqi security forces and an inclusive Iraqi government. 

But as the President made clear, we’d be prepared to do what is necessary if we make a determination that the situation on the ground requires U.S. military action. 

And then you heard the President speak to the fact that we want to engage in a diplomatic effort both inside of Iraq, where we are working to support an inclusive political process, and in the region, where we want to see all of our allies and partners and all the countries in the region more generally support an outcome that provides for a more inclusive Iraqi government and that pushes back on the threat from ISIL, which does pose a risk not just to the Iraqi people but to the surrounding governments as well.  And Secretary Kerry will be meeting with a number of our regional counterparts in the coming days as he travels to the Middle East and North Africa.

So I think the President gave a clear sense of what direction we’re headed in, in terms of building Iraqi capacity, providing additional resources so the United States has options to build Iraqi capacity and to take additional actions as necessary, and of course, supporting political progress inside of Iraq and in the region that can mitigate the risk of descent into civil war, and support a more stable Iraq going forward.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  This is [senior administration official] out in Baghdad, and I’ve been out here the last couple weeks, including during this entire crisis.  Let me just say a few words about the nature of ISIL and the threat.  This is an enemy that we know very well.  It is al Qaeda in Iraq, which used to be led by Abu al-Zarqawi, and it’s an outgrowth of that movement.

They have a specific agenda, which has been their agenda, as expressed in his earliest communications all the way back in 2004, which is to carve out his own authority in this part of the world, establish a caliphate from which to expand their influence.  At times, that agenda has sounded preposterous but you can see what they’ve done over the last 18 months, and they’re trying to move deliberatively to carve out what is effectively a zone of control and a state across the Iraq-Syria border.

If you just look at some of their attack statistics and take a comparison of how shrewd they are and how well-timed this most recent offensive was -- in December 2005, there was an election here that went very well.  And as the Iraqi leaders were getting on with trying to form a new government and we had large Sunni turnout during that election, the AQI at the time, al Qaeda struck the Samarra mosque at the end of February 2006, which started this slide into civil war here.

Similarly, the attack in Mosul, which led to a precipitous kind of psychological morale collapse of the Iraqi security forces, was timed directly at a period during the political calendar that was a time of really heightened vulnerability.  And if you look at their attack trends during the two comparisons, they’re almost dead even.  AQI back at the time -- we measured this by suicide bombs and vehicle bombs -- they were averaging about 80 a month.  And the three months before the April 30th election here, it was the same.  We saw almost 50 suicide bombers in the country the 30 days before the April 30 election.  And we assessed that nearly all of the suicide bombers in Iraq -- and there were nearly 300 last year -- are foreign fighters, global jihadis who had come into Iraq from Syria.

So what they’re trying to do is really rip apart the very delicate fabric of this country.  They prey on very legitimate political grievances, and they’re very effective at it.  So that is really what they’re trying to do.  What happened starting on Sunday with the collapse of the 2nd Army Division in Mosul, and then from there we had a kind of real precipitous -- two days of advance by these guys joined by Naqshbandi and some of the former Ba’ath elements was a psychological collapse in the country, particularly on the Iraqi security forces, and a threat increasingly to the capital here.

As my colleague said, we had some immediate responses, but first we had to make sure we were protecting our people -- our people both at the embassy and our sites, and also American citizens elsewhere.  And that required a big deal of our time and effort.  We also had to make sure that we were seeing better across the country, and that had to do with what the President discussed about our surge in ISR and our ability to see in this country is significantly enhanced.

Third, we had to think about how we could respond more aggressively, and the President laid out options and what we’re going to consider doing going forward. 

And finally, and most importantly, we had to keep the political process on track.  And this is just important to think about where we are.  On April 30th, the Iraqis had an election with about 62 percent turnout; 14 million Iraqis turned out to vote.  Over a million Iraqis turned out to vote in Nineveh Province, where the capital is Mosul.  The parliament, which has served for four years, went out of session for good just last week.  And at the time of this crisis when it began, we were in a bit of a constitutional vacuum period, in which one parliament is out, and until the election is certified there is no call for the new parliament to convene. 

So we had to work with the Iraqis very deliberately to get this federal court back in town and to certify the election -- that takes some time.  It took about four months in 2010 to certify the election; this time they did it much faster.  They finally did it last week.  And that’s the start ad-hoc to form a new government, as the President discussed in his statement.

The first step will be convening the parliament, and that has to happen no later than the 30th of this month.  It can happen sooner; they have to agree on a nominee for speaker before they convene and that is going on now.  After that, they will have 30 days to name a president.  Again, that can happen sooner if they coalesce behind a presidential candidate sooner.  And then the president will have 15 days to nominate a new prime minister.

So we had to keep that constitutional political process on track, and we think right now it is on track, both with the courts certifying the vote, with the national leadership meeting we had here in Baghdad about 48 hours ago with all the major leaders together and committed to the constitutional timeline.  And now we’re looking to convene the parliament really as soon as possible.

So a combination of keeping our people’s faith; trying to help the Iraqis figure out what’s going on in the country and how they can effectively respond; trying to keep the constitutional process on track -- because that’s going to be critical over the long term; and then determining what we can do effectively to respond in a more deliberate, methodical, and aggressive way has really been the core of our focus since this crisis began two weeks ago.

I’ll leave it there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Just real briefly, sort of three areas that the President covered in his comments that I’ll just try to add a little context to.  One is intensifying our ISR support over Iraq.  This is something that really started in earnest at the request of the Iraqi government well more than a week ago, and we continue to add to the effort and to increase the effort, even this week.  It is a combination of both manned and unmanned aircraft, and we are now capable of around-the-clock coverage over Iraq of those areas of interest and we’re mostly focusing on those where we know ISIL is active.  So that’s the ISR effort.

The second piece was the President’s announcement that he is considering sending up to 300 advisors into Iraq.  And I just want to put some of this into context.  First of all, it’s just part of a comprehensive effort here to help Iraqi security forces break the momentum of ISIL.  The mission of these advisors is going to be to assess and to advise Iraqi security forces as they confront ISIL, and of course what we believe to be a very complex security situation on the ground.  They’re also going to help give us better visibility into that situation on the ground and to provide information and intelligence that we need to make any follow-on potential decisions regarding military options inside Iraq.

We’re going to start with small teams, several small teams of special operators.  The teams are about a dozen or so each.  They’re going to be embedded mostly at the higher headquarters level within the ISF, perhaps down as well at the brigade level.  And they’re going to be doing -- they’re going to help us establish these joint operation centers that the President talked about, the two of them.  They’re going to help us determine what the proper resources and staffing need to be for those things.

They’re going to assess the situation, as I said, and provide basic advice and recommendations.  But the first job is really assessing.  They’re going to go in there and get us a little bit better sense of the state, the cohesiveness, and the capability of Iraqi security forces, and then be able to give us some advice and recommendations about the future role of any additional advisors.  So we’re going to start small and then we’ll see what we learn from that.

And then lastly, just the President made it clear that unilateral military action and any strikes certainly remains a possibility, discreet and targeted, once we have better information.  And so I think it’s just important to remind folks about our presence in the region.  In the Central Command area of responsibility there in the Middle East, we have more than 30,000 troops at sea and ashore, including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. 

As you know, we’ve bolstered our presence in the region in just the last several days.  As you followed over the weekend, the President and Secretary of Defense ordered the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush into the Arabian Gulf.  She entered the Arabian Gulf over the weekend with two additional escort ships, warships -- a cruiser and a destroyer.  And then later on, earlier in this week, we ordered the amphibious ship USS Mesa Verde with more than 500 Marines onboard as well as Osprey aircrafts into the Arabian Gulf as well.

Now, these ships added to already two destroyers that had been on previously scheduled forward-deployed missions inside the Arabian Gulf and several supply ships as well.  So the naval presence has been bolstered. 

And then on the ground, as you know, we ordered 270 additional security force personnel to assist with security at the embassy in Baghdad and associated facilities -- sorry, 170 of them are actually in Iraq and 100 of them are being held outside of Iraq as a contingency force just in case we need them.

So we’ve done quite a bit in the recent past, but also over the last several months to continue to advise and assist the Iraqi security forces and to help them with their capabilities and their competence.  And that work will continue, and that’s essentially what these advisors will do.  They’ll help us learn more, and they’ll eventually help the Iraqis with their competence and capabilities in the field.  And that’s it for me.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great.  Operator, we’ll move to questions.

Q    Thank you very much, gentlemen.  If I could ask whether the use of military force targeted, as you’ve described it, discreet and targeted, would be conditional upon a change of posture by the government and a more inclusive government -- something that Maliki has so far refused, barring some unforeseen emergency circumstance.  Is that what has to happen first before the President would seriously consider the next military steps?

SENIOR ADMINISTRAITON OFFICIAL:  I’ll take that, Andrea.  First of all, I’d say that as a general matter, the United States will take action if we believe it’s in our national security interest.  So for instance, if we see our personnel or our facilities threatened, or if we see a threat from ISIL – emanating from ISIL – that could endanger other U.S. interests or the U.S. homeland, as we would anywhere else in the region or the world, we’d reserve the right to take direct action, including military action.

So there is certainly a set of options available to the President as it relates to ISIL targets that would be very much in the United States’ interest if we felt that our personnel or our core interests were threatened.

With respect to the Iraqi government, I think we will be making an assessment, based on the intelligence that we’re receiving from this ISR and based on the additional assessment that we’ll receive from the military advisors who are going into Iraq, about whether there is targeted U.S. action that could support stability, that could prevent a descent into civil war, and, importantly, provide space for an inclusive government to form. 

And so I don’t want to suggest a strict conditionality on a set of Iraqi actions, but I do think it’s important that any action we take, whether it is increased training and equipping, or potentially targeted U.S. action, we would want to support the formation of an inclusive government -- that as my colleague outlined, we’re entering a window that is very important politically inside of Iraq over the next several weeks -- and all of the U.S. actions that we’ll be pursuing.  We want to be in support of the formation of a broad-based and inclusive Iraqi government.

So it’s something that we’ll be assessing on a regular basis, and it’s something that will include both our political and diplomatic efforts on the ground.  And it also will influence how we calibrate our military assistance.

Q    Just to follow up, I know that we can’t pick and choose, but are there viable alternatives to Maliki that are now being considered by his own coalition members?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I’d like my colleague in Baghdad to speak to that.  The only thing I’d say really quick is that we’re not going to put forward some preferred candidate of the United States.  We don’t pick Iraq’s leaders.  We have made clear what type of government we think is most likely to succeed, which is one that is inclusive. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, on April 30th, the vote was just certified.  The vote was for a parliament of 328 seats.  So it takes about 165 seats to form a government -- probably a lot more than that, just based on kind of the consensus-based nature of some of this.  Maliki’s party has about 91 or 92 seats.  So whether or not he can get enough to remain in office remains to be seen.

As I said about the steps, there’s a step-by-step process.  There’s the Speaker and then the President and then Prime Minister.  In past years, this has all been done as a single package at once.  This year, we’re encouraging the Iraqis to accelerate this as much as possible, just given the situation in the country. 

And I think as my colleague said, we’re not in the business of picking and choosing winners.  It really is an Iraqi political process, but certainly everybody now is engaged in this process, which is critical.  The National Unity leader meeting they had two days ago -- certainly, a meeting like this doesn’t change the world in one night, but it gets everybody together, including some pretty fierce political adversaries, because they have a lot to do in terms of bargaining and horse trading to form this government.  And so we are encouraging all of them to stay remained in the process and to figure out who is going to lead the country over the next four years.  This is the selection process to form a government for a four-year term, and it’s going to be vitally important.

But just as my colleague said and as the President emphasized, given the situation in the country, all leaders of all sides of all parties have to treat the situation with extreme urgency and begin in a very serious and concerted way the negotiations for the makeup of the government to lead the country over the next four years.  And that government, in our view, in order to provide stability in the country, has to be a broadly inclusive one, including the critical mass of all the major components in Iraq.

Q    Thank you very much.  Probably for the first senior official -- President Obama has ruled out sending American forces into combat in Iraq, and I’d like to make sure I understand how this should be interpreted.  Would this preclude the deployment of small teams of American Special Forces to call in airstrikes on behalf of Iraqi forces?  And such teams might not be in combat, but they could be on the battlefield, sort of on the model of Afghanistan.  So would small U.S. teams to call in airstrikes, or small teams with intelligence officers or contractors be permissible under President Obama’s guidelines?  Or is his statement really meant to preclude that?  Again, I’m not asking about future plans, I’m just asking how the President’s statement should be interpreted.  Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I’d say a couple of things, and my Pentagon colleague may want to add.  First of all, the principal purpose of the teams that are deploying to Iraq is to provide an assessment of both the situation on the ground and the state of the Iraqi security forces so that we can determine what is the best way that we can continue to train, advise and equip them.  So that’s the first order of business.

Secondly, I think the broad approach the President wants to pursue is one in which the Iraqis are in the lead for taking action against ISIL and providing for security in country.  Insofar as the U.S. considers taking direct military action, I think that would be in a more targeted and focused way if we felt that there was a target on the ground that demanded our unique capabilities.  So, again, not a situation in which we’re planning to establish the type of campaign that we have had in Afghanistan, for instance, that you referenced, but rather a capacity-building mission on the ground, a broader intelligence mission that includes a significant amount of ISR.  And then we’ll be making decisions about specific targets. 

So, again, the function of these teams is very much to assess and advise.  They will add to the broader intelligence picture that includes our ISR.  But we are not, with the decision the President announced today, embarking on the type of sustained campaign that we pursued in Afghanistan.

Q    Can I just ask -- I understand that’s not the purpose of these advisors being announced today.  All I’m asking is, would the President’s guidelines allow for sending small teams of Special Forces to call in airstrikes for the Iraqis?  Or would it preclude it?  Or is this something you simply haven’t made a decision on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, we have not decided to have essentially these types of teams, as you put it, calling in airstrikes.  However, it is the case that one of the things that you can do at a joint operations center or in partnership with Iraqis is share information and help them as they develop targets and plans for pursuing ISIL. 

So, again, clearly we’d be supporting their efforts in that regard.  But tactically speaking, it’s not an instance where their mission is to support that type of campaign.  But my colleague may want to add to that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I think you handled it pretty well there.  I would just say that when they get their orders, their orders are going to tell them that their job is two-fold.  One is to assess -- assess both the state of the Iraqi security forces and assess the need and feasibility of any future advising teams.  And then, number two would be should we get to that point where we’re going to actively start to advise.  That will be the second component of the mission.

And I’d also just like to remind you that this is not unlike many other missions we perform around the world.  We have special operators in more than 70 countries all around the world, and they’re doing these kinds of advising, assisting and assessing in places like Africa, the Americas, even the Philippines.  So this is not an uncommon mission for these types of troops.  They’re well equipped, well trained for it.  And that is what their orders are going to read when they get them.

Q    So are these forces locked down in these joint operations centers, or are they going out into the field?  And do they have the legal protections you fought for at the end of 2011 and ultimately did not get?  Do you need a new status of forces for these guys, and did you get it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I’ll say a couple of things and my colleague may want to add.  On the second question, we currently have some military advisory personnel in Iraq based out of our embassy.  They have the protections that are necessary for them to be there.  And we are confident that these additional forces would have the necessary protections and authorities to be there, particularly as the Iraqis have requested them.  Given the size and scope of this mission, this is not the type of thing that would require a new Status of Forces Agreement along the lines that was being negotiated in 2011 when we were in discussions about -- in the neighborhood of 10,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.  That obviously carries with it a very different set of necessary authorities and privileges and immunities.

So, again, I think our personnel who are already there, our military advisory personnel have the protections they need based on our agreements with the Iraqi government.  And we’re confident that these additional ones will, as well.

I’ll begin the second question.  Again, my colleague will probably want to add.  These teams will not just be at the joint operations centers.  The joint operations centers are one component of what we will be doing and adding to our advisory personnel inside of Iraq.  Some teams that will be deployed will also be working with Iraqis at the additional headquarters in brigade level.   

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  That covers it pretty well.  Especially the first -- as they said, we’re going to start small with just several small teams of about a dozen each.  And they will mostly be at the higher headquarters level, perhaps down at the brigade level.  But we haven’t gotten to that level of specificity yet.

Q    I’ve got two for you.  The first one is these targeted, precise strikes -- are those confined to Iraqi territory or could they range in Syria?  And the second one is, have you guys elaborated any kind of rules of engagement as regards the presence of possible Iranian fighters on Iraqi turf?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me take your first question.  The President is focused on a number of potential contingencies that may demand U.S. direct military action.  One of those is the threat from ISIL and the threat that it could pose not simply to Iraqi stability, but to U.S. personnel and to U.S. interests more broadly, certainly including our homeland.

In that respect, we don’t restrict potential U.S. action to a specific geographic space.  The President has made clear time and again that we will take action as necessary, including a direct U.S. military action if it’s necessary to defend the United States against an imminent threat.  Clearly, we’re focused on Iraq.  That’s where our ISR resources have surged.  That’s where we’re working to develop additional intelligence.  But the group ISIL, again, operates broadly.  And we would not restrict our ability to take action that is necessary to protect the United States.

Again, we’ve taken action in this region in Yemen against AQAP; in Somalia against al-Shabaab.  Recently, we took a direct action in capturing Abu Khatallah in Libya.  So, again, we’re going to do what is necessary.  Clearly, we’re focused on Iraq in terms of these additional resources.  But we’ll continue to focus on the evolving threat of ISIL as we consider different options.

On the rules of engagement, I’ll let my colleague at the Pentagon address that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We typically don’t talk about the specific rules of engagement for obvious reasons.  But what I can tell you is that our troops will have, as they have elsewhere in the world, the inherent right of self-defense.

Q    I guess what I mean is, if you guys are going to launch a drone strike, is there any reason to have direct or indirect coordination so that you’re not hitting -- I mean, I’m not going to call them allied forces, but so you’re not hitting people who are also fighting ISIL?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We’ve made clear that we are not going to coordinate military action with the Iranian government.  That’s not something that we are in the business of doing.  We rather would have a broader political conversation with them about Iraq’s -- about our efforts to support Iraq’s future.  So this is not a series of tactical discussions that we would have with the Iranians. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  The only thing I would add is we’re not at the stage where we’re preparing for airstrikes, obviously.  The President hasn’t asked us to do that.  But whenever it comes to that, and where and when we do those kinds of things, we do them in a very precise, targeted, deliberate, measured way with the best possible intelligence that’s available.

And I would suspect that if it gets to that point in Iraq, then we will follow the same very rigorous procedures we follow elsewhere around the world.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  And I should have added to that point -- part of the purpose of having the additional ISR assets, getting the additional situational awareness from these assessment efforts.  Again, that’s focused on Iraqi capacity-building and support for the Iraqis.

If there were to be a situation where we were to decide to take action, of course that would also provide us with the ability to be very careful that Iraqi security forces, civilians would not be put unnecessarily at risk.  So that’s part of the benefit of having additional intelligence.

Q    Great, thank you.  Two questions.  One, could you talk a little bit more about the advisors’ focus on the higher headquarters and BCTs?  Will this mostly be in and around Baghdad, or do you see them going farther north and west?  I think the President suggested that Baghdad has to be protected first and foremost to prevent the fall of the capital, so I’m just wondering if I’m interpreting this correctly, that they will mostly be around Baghdad.

And then if you could, in your -- I don’t know how many conversations you’ve had with Iraqi government officials over the last couple of weeks.  Have you seen any indication that Maliki is willing to step down?  And is it true that he recently banned the Mutahiddun political party from government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So on your first question, exact headquarters locations haven’t all been worked out, but I think it’s safe to assume that initially, certainly -- because we’re going to be starting with just small teams at first -- certainly we’re going to be focused on Baghdad, in and around Baghdad.  I think that’s safe to assume, but I wouldn’t -- I can’t at this early stage rule out that there won’t be some advisors embedded in headquarters outside of Baghdad.  But clearly, Baghdad will be the main first focus.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I would just say all of these discussions come in a context of whether or not you can build a coalition to form a government.  And because the elections just certified, that’s all kind of just starting now in a very intensive way.  So the leadership makeup -- Speaker, President, Prime Minister -- will be determined through that process. 

No, it’s not true that -- I’ve seen that quote.  There’s really been -- the last two weeks has been a bit of a kind of a house of mirrors, and foggy with -- all full of rumors all over the place.  That’s one of them that is also not true.  The coalition remains a part of the government.  Obviously, very intense disagreements between all parties on all sorts of things, but the government is continuing to function. 

And the meeting that was held 48 hours ago had everybody from the head of the Mutahiddun to a representative from the Muslim Brotherhood Party here to the Prime Minister’s party to Shia opposition parties, Ammar Hakim to the Christian leadership -- I mean, everybody was in the room -- and committing to the constitutional process for forming a government, and also, basically making very clear in a statement that ISIL is a threat to all Iraqis and they are very much united against it.

And some of the things ISIL is already doing in Nineveh in terms of seizing all sorts of -- burning down churches, seizing land, mass executions -- has galvanized the political class here against this movement.  And then it’s about mobilizing popular forces, eventually to be able to take them on.  And one of those things to help do that is basically we have to be able to see better and enable better, and help them target more effectively and do things more effectively, and also reconstitute some of their security forces.

So a lot of the measures obviously we’re discussing on the call on the security side are all geared towards that end.

Q    Okay.  But in your many conversations the Prime Minister -- and I know you’ve had multiple over the years -- has he ever indicated that he would be willing to step down for the better of the country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I meet with everybody here on all sides of the fence constantly.  And there was just an election, and the election -- I mean, the conversation is, let’s see how the election goes.  The election happened.  The election -- much of our focus over the last year was making sure the election actually happened.  It was quite a struggle to put all the pieces in place to have happen.

It happened.  It was a credible election.  The U.N. was very involved in this.  And we just had the vote certified.  And, again, nobody won a majority, so we’re going to have to see -- obviously, if you can’t form a majority, you can’t form a government.  And we’ll know this fairly soon because one of our messages to all parties is, try to accelerate this process as much as possible.  And the process will formally kick off, at the very latest, on the 30th of this month when the parliament convenes.

Q    Okay.  Well, let me try it this way -- this is my last one, I promise.  In 2011, around the Arab Spring time, as you know, the Prime Minister at that point said he would not seek a third term.  Has he ever repeated that since?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Publicly?  I don’t know.  You could look at the public record.  I’m not sure.  But I’m just -- I’m not going to get into my internal deliberations as there’s already some quotes in the press about some of my internal meetings here with the ambassador which are not true.  So I’m just not going to get into the internal deliberations.

Our message very clearly to all of them is, the constitutional process has to move.  It has to move rapidly.  It has to move on the constitutional timeline.  And all the Iraqi people who voted, many at great risk to their own lives -- and 14 million of them voted -- expect these newly elected leaders to come together and form a government as soon as possible that can move the country forward.

The country is in a serious crisis.  And it’s really incumbent upon all of them to come together.  And if it’s not possible to form a majority coalition, then -- if a prime minster candidate is trying to form a majority coalition and can’t gather the votes to do that, then obviously he won’t be able to form a government.

But I’m not going to get into our diplomatic communications out here.

Q    Okay.  Well since you brought it up, which parts of what’s been reported of your conversations are not true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Some of the quotes that are in our conversations -- we are urging a new candidate or something like that, and it’s just not the case.  We are very much -- as my colleague said, this is a sovereign country.  There was an election.  The election was a credible election.  It reflected the outcome of 14 million Iraqis who voted. 

And so our conversations to all of them are about accelerating the process by which the new leadership of the country will be stood up.  It is not about saying, this guy must go, this guy must come in -- because we both don’t have the ability to direct that type of outcome, and doing so I think would be counterproductive.

What is critical is keeping the constitutional process on track, and the constitutional timelines on track.  And there was some question 10 days ago whether that would actually happen because the election had not been certified.  And the judges and the court who had to come certify the vote were dispersed and all over the place, and many of them were out of the country. 

So the court came back, election is certified.  That kicked off the formal timeframe, as I said, 15 days to form a parliament, choose the Speaker, 30 days to name the President, and then 15 days to name a Prime Minister.  Those are the outer reaches of the timeline; it can be accelerated, and we are encouraging all of them to accelerate that timeline.

Q    I do have a couple questions -- can you just help me with the number?  I didn’t hear it earlier when we were talking.  You said Maliki’s party has got 91 or 92 votes now, and he would need X number, 100 and some.  My other questions are can you give us any more [on the record] about Secretary Kerry’s trip?  Will he be meeting with the Iranians?  Can you detail who he is going to be meeting with?  You said to expect a resolution fairly soon on the question of Maliki, but I mean, what’s your timetable for how long you can wait?  And finally, who controls the oil refinery now, the largest oil refinery?  Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I’ll start there and my colleague can speak I think more to the specific numbers associated with the State of Law party and some of the timelines, which he’s spoken to. 

And State will speak to Secretary Kerry’s travel.  Our expectation is that he will be leaving this weekend, as the President said; that he will have stops in both the Middle East and in Europe; that on those stops, he’ll have an opportunity to meet with many of his counterparts and many leaders from the region and many European leaders.  That would include, for instance, discussions with our Gulf allies and partners about the situation.  But I’ll leave it to State to provide more specifics about his travel.  I would not anticipate that he would be engaging with the Iranians as a part of that trip. 

With respect -- well, I’ll leave the other questions to my colleague, who is in the best place to handle them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes, I mean, if you want the numbers, it’s a parliament of 328 seats; it takes a majority of about 165 seats to form a government.  There are certain thresholds built into the system, such as a two-thirds requirement for choosing a President, but if there isn’t a President with two-thirds, you could still elect one by a majority.  But I think they usually try to hold to that two-thirds timeline. 

And just as of the numbers, yes, Maliki’s party, State of Law, has 92 seats.  And just to kind of put that in perspective, other kind of major coalitions here -- Mutahiddun which was mentioned earlier, which is led by Osama Najafi, one of the main Sunni lists, has 23 seats.  Another main Sunni list, Arabiyya headed by Saleh Mutlaq, who I saw today has 10 seats.  Some of Maliki’s rivals in the Shia camp, Ammar Hakim and Muwatin, which is an ISCI list, they have 29 seats.  The Sadrists, who are also another opposition among Shia parties, have 28 seats.  And then the Kurds have about a total of 62 seats divided among their different parties. 

And that’s the election, that’s kind of the political framework.  And it is a political system out here.  And if you break down the votes of the election, I’d be happy to get you those numbers, we have them all.  You can see kind of where the votes came from, who did well, who didn’t do well.  And that does kind of define the terrain.  But 92 seats is a good showing, but it is certainly not enough to form a government, and it’s going to require a coalition to do that. 

So I would anticipate that the leadership makeup of the new government will demonstrate significant changes.  And part of that is because the coalitions that ran in this election were far more diverse than anything we’ve ever seen before.  So it’s a much more fractured political class. 

As you might remember, Iraq has had three elections.  The first one in -- end of 2005.  There was really only like three choices -- there was the Kurdish list, the Sunni list, the Shia list.  In the 2010 election, that was a little more diverse.  There was a Kurdish list, there were two Shia lists, and there Iraqiya, which was all the Sunni parties together, and also Ayad Allawi’s party.

  This election was really completely different.  You had a whole array of Shia lists.  You had on the Sunni side about three or four main competing lists.  Ayad Allawi ran on his list and did fairly well, and then the Kurds also ran on some separate lists. 

So the permutations of the coalitions that can come together to form a government -- there are just a whole number of them.  But our message to all of them is you all have got to come together; you have to get into the parliament hall and begin to negotiate to form this government -- who is going to be the speaker is the first choice, who is going to be the President is the second choice, and who is going to be the prime minister.

  So all of this will be a lot of horse trading, but the country is in crisis and there isn’t that much time for the usual tug and pull of political jockeying.

Q    So just to clarify, I know that you’re saying that the U.S. is not wanting to actively remove Maliki and install someone else.  But are you also saying that the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. is not actually talking with any of the opposition politicians about alternatives to Maliki, or are you trying to do your homework to figure out who you may be dealing with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  No.  As I said, we talk to everyone all the time.  And if someone says, look, there’s no chance for Maliki to be the prime minister, obviously the question is okay, what is your plan, what’s the alternative path? 

So we’re talking to everybody about what they’re thinking about how this might go, and there is a number of different ways how it might go.  And our consistent message with everybody is to keep it moving forward, and -- because that is something the country desperately needs.  And this country is in a critical part of a very vital region.  And over the next coming weeks, when this process moves it’s going to be very important for Iraqis in the region and the world to see them moving this process forward.  I just cannot predict now how it’s going to come out.

Q    On the oil refinery?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes, this is another question of kind of a lot of rumors and fogginess.  And there’s been a major battle at the oil refinery going on, and it has gone back and forth.  And it’s quite a large site.  And I just have not had a report over the last four to five hours on that.  The last one I saw, the Iraqi security forces had taken back part of the site but I just can’t confirm where it stands right now.  I’d have to go look again.

Q    Just two very quick on specifics.  When -- and forgive me if you answered this in the very beginning -- when will the first of these special forces be arriving in Baghdad?  And you mentioned that it won’t be the full contingent, 300 at first.  What’s your rough sense of how many are going in this first wave?  And how many locations are we talking about?  You referenced northern Iraq, Baghdad around a brigade headquarter level.  How many potential locations around the country are we talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We don’t have an exact number of the locations.  As I said to a previous question, the major focus of this initial tranche would be in and around Baghdad, but I can’t rule out that they would be sent to higher headquarters at several other places. 

Now, as I said, we’re going to start with several teams of a dozen each.  So the initial will be in the dozens, several dozens in the initial tranche here that are going in to assess the situation.  Most of these teams will come from units that are already in the central command area of responsibility.  I mean, they’re already in the region.  And I can’t give you an exact date when they’ll get there.  I mean, we can certainly provide that for you when we have a better sense but it will be very soon, because they will be largely coming from units and forces that are already in the region. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  And I’d just add that we’ve had an advisory function at the embassy in Baghdad, so we already have a number of U.S. military personnel who have been able to provide advice and discuss our equipping relationship with the Iraqi government.  So this will build upon a foundation that is in place, but give us greater capacity to carry out the functions that the President spoke about that we’ve spoken about on this call -- again, without reintroducing U.S. forces into a combat mission in Iraq, but rather providing that assessment of the state of play of the Iraqi security forces and making determinations about how we continue to better provide them with training advice and equipment going forward. 

Look, thanks everybody for getting on the call.  I want to thank my colleagues, who were hugely helpful here.  This is obviously an ongoing process as we make assessments based on the steps that the President announced today, and as we respond to events on the ground in Iraq, and as we aim to work with Iraqi leaders.  I think in addition to tracking the deployment of these teams, Secretary Kerry’s trip will obviously be a very important diplomatic effort in the coming days.  So we will be looking to Secretary Kerry to be having those consultations with some of our key partners on this subject.  And he will be in frequent touch with the President throughout his travel, I’m sure.

MS. HAYDEN:  This is Caitlin.  Just a quick reminder, I know Margaret in her question asked for something to be on the record.  Just a reminder to everybody that this entire call is on background.  These were senior administration officials.  And if you need more help after this, you know how to find us.  So thanks.  Have a great day.

END 
3:17 P.M. EDT

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Presidential Memorandum -- Creating a Federal Strategy to Promote the Health of Honey Bees and Other Pollinators

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Creating a Federal Strategy to Promote the Health of Honey Bees and Other Pollinators

Pollinators contribute substantially to the economy of the United States and are vital to keeping fruits, nuts, and vegetables in our diets. Honey bee pollination alone adds more than $15 billion in value to agricultural crops each year in the United States. Over the past few decades, there has been a significant loss of pollinators, including honey bees, native bees, birds, bats, and butterflies, from the environment. The problem is serious and requires immediate attention to ensure the sustainability of our food production systems, avoid additional economic impact on the agricultural sector, and protect the health of the environment.

Pollinator losses have been severe. The number of migrating Monarch butterflies sank to the lowest recorded population level in 2013-14, and there is an imminent risk of failed migration. The continued loss of commercial honey bee colonies poses a threat to the economic stability of commercial beekeeping and pollination operations in the United States, which could have profound implications for agriculture and food. Severe yearly declines create concern that bee colony losses could reach a point from which the commercial pollination industry would not be able to adequately recover. The loss of native bees, which also play a key role in pollination of crops, is much less studied, but many native bee species are believed to be in decline. Scientists believe that bee losses are likely caused by a combination of stressors, including poor bee nutrition, loss of forage lands, parasites, pathogens, lack of genetic diversity, and exposure to pesticides.

Given the breadth, severity, and persistence of pollinator losses, it is critical to expand Federal efforts and take new steps to reverse pollinator losses and help restore populations to healthy levels. These steps should include the development of new public-private partnerships and increased citizen engagement. Therefore, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the following:

Section 1. Establishing the Pollinator Health Task Force. There is hereby established the Pollinator Health Task Force (Task Force), to be co-chaired by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition to the Co-Chairs, the Task Force shall also include the heads, or their designated representatives, from:

(a) the Department of State;

(b) the Department of Defense;

(c) the Department of the Interior;

(d) the Department of Housing and Urban Development;

(e) the Department of Transportation;

(f) the Department of Energy;

(g) the Department of Education;

(h) the Council on Environmental Quality;

(i) the Domestic Policy Council;

(j) the General Services Administration;

(k) the National Science Foundation;

(l) the National Security Council Staff;

(m) the Office of Management and Budget;

(n) the Office of Science and Technology Policy; and

(o) such executive departments, agencies, and offices as the Co-Chairs may designate.

Sec. 2. Mission and Function of the Task Force. Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, the Task Force shall develop a National Pollinator Health Strategy (Strategy), which shall include explicit goals, milestones, and metrics to measure progress. The Strategy shall include the following components:

(a) Pollinator Research Action Plan. The Strategy shall include an Action Plan (Plan) to focus Federal efforts on understanding, preventing, and recovering from pollinator losses. The Plan shall be informed by research on relevant topics and include:

(i) studies of the health of managed honey bees and native bees, including longitudinal studies, to determine the relative contributions of, and mitigation strategies for, different stressors leading to species declines and colony collapse disorder, including exposure to pesticides, poor nutrition, parasites and other pests, toxins, loss of habitat and reduced natural forage, pathogens, and unsustainable management practices;

(ii) plans for expanded collection and sharing of data related to pollinator losses, technologies for continuous monitoring of honey bee hive health, and use of public-private partnerships, as appropriate, to provide information on the status and trends of managed hive losses;

(iii) assessments of the status of native pollinators, including the Monarch butterfly and bees, and modeling of native pollinator populations and habitats;

(iv) strategies for developing affordable seed mixes, including native pollinator-friendly plants, for maintenance of honey bees and other pollinators, and guidelines for and evaluations of the effectiveness of using pollinator-friendly seed mixes for restoration and reclamation projects;

(v) identification of existing and new methods and best practices to reduce pollinator exposure to pesticides, and new cost-effective ways to control bee pests and diseases; and

(vi) strategies for targeting resources toward areas of high risk and restoration potential and prioritizing plans for restoration of pollinator habitat, based on those areas that will yield the greatest expected net benefits.

(b) Public Education Plan. The Strategy shall include plans for expanding and coordinating public education programs outlining steps individuals and businesses can take to help address the loss of pollinators. It shall also include recommendations for a coordinated public education campaign aimed at individuals, corporations, small businesses, schools, libraries, and museums to significantly increase public awareness of the importance of pollinators and the steps that can be taken to protect them.

(c) Public-Private Partnerships. The Strategy shall include recommendations for developing public-private partnerships to build on Federal efforts to encourage the protection of pollinators and increase the quality and amount of habitat and forage for pollinators. In developing this part of the Strategy, the Task Force shall consult with external stakeholders, including State, tribal, and local governments, farmers, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations.

(d) Task Force member agencies shall report regularly to the Task Force on their efforts to implement section 3 of this memorandum.

Sec. 3. Increasing and Improving Pollinator Habitat. Unless otherwise specified, within 180 days of the date of this memorandum:

(a) Task Force member agencies shall develop and provide to the Task Force plans to enhance pollinator habitat, and subsequently implement, as appropriate, such plans on their managed lands and facilities, consistent with their missions and public safety. These plans may include: facility landscaping, including easements; land management; policies with respect to road and other rights-of-way; educational gardens; use of integrated vegetation and pest management; increased native vegetation; and application of pollinator-friendly best management practices and seed mixes. Task Force member agencies shall also review any new or renewing land management contracts and grants for the opportunity to include requirements for enhancing pollinator habitat.

(b) Task Force member agencies shall evaluate permit and management practices on power line, pipeline, utility, and other rights-of-way and easements, and, consistent with applicable law, make any necessary and appropriate changes to enhance pollinator habitat on Federal lands through the use of integrated vegetation and pest management and pollinator-friendly best management practices, and by supplementing existing agreements and memoranda of understanding with rights-of-way holders, where appropriate, to establish and improve pollinator habitat.

(c) Task Force member agencies shall incorporate pollinator health as a component of all future restoration and reclamation projects, as appropriate, including all annual restoration plans.

(d) The Council on Environmental Quality and the General Services Administration shall, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, revise their respective guidance documents for designed landscapes and public buildings to incorporate, as appropriate, pollinator-friendly practices into site landscape performance requirements to create and maintain high quality habitats for pollinators. Future landscaping projects at all Federal facilities shall, to the maximum extent appropriate, use plants beneficial to pollinators.

(e) The Departments of Agriculture and the Interior shall, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, develop best management practices for executive departments and agencies to enhance pollinator habitat on Federal lands.

(f) The Departments of Agriculture and the Interior shall establish a reserve of native seed mixes, including pollinator-friendly plants, for use on post-fire rehabilitation projects and other restoration activities.

(g) The Department of Agriculture shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, substantially increase both the acreage and forage value of pollinator habitat in the Department's conservation programs, including the Conservation Reserve Program, and provide technical assistance, through collaboration with the land-grant university-based cooperative extension services, to executive departments and agencies, State, local, and tribal governments, and other entities and individuals, including farmers and ranchers, in planting the most suitable pollinator-friendly habitats.

(h) The Department of the Interior shall assist States and State wildlife organizations, as appropriate, in identifying and implementing projects to conserve pollinators at risk of endangerment and further pollinator conservation through the revision and implementation of individual State Wildlife Action Plans. The Department of the Interior shall, upon request, provide technical support for these efforts, and keep the Task Force apprised of such collaborations.

(i) The Department of Transportation shall evaluate its current guidance for grantees and informational resources to identify opportunities to increase pollinator habitat along roadways and implement improvements, as appropriate. The Department of Transportation shall work with State Departments of Transportation and transportation associations to promote pollinator-friendly practices and corridors. The Department of Transportation shall evaluate opportunities to make railways, pipelines, and transportation facilities that are privately owned and operated aware of the need to increase pollinator habitat.

(j) The Department of Defense shall, consistent with law and the availability of appropriations, support habitat restoration projects for pollinators, and shall direct military service installations to use, when possible, pollinator-friendly native landscaping and minimize use of pesticides harmful to pollinators through integrated vegetation and pest management practices.

(k) The Army Corps of Engineers shall incorporate conservation practices for pollinator habitat improvement on the 12 million acres of lands and waters at resource development projects across the country, as appropriate.

(l) The Environmental Protection Agency shall assess the effect of pesticides, including neonicotinoids, on bee and other pollinator health and take action, as appropriate, to protect pollinators; engage State and tribal environmental, agricultural, and wildlife agencies in the development of State and tribal pollinator protection plans; encourage the incorporation of pollinator protection and habitat planting activities into green infrastructure and Superfund projects; and expedite review of registration applications for new products targeting pests harmful to pollinators.

(m) Executive departments and agencies shall, as appropriate, take immediate measures to support pollinators during the 2014 growing season and thereafter. These measures may include planting pollinator-friendly vegetation and increasing flower diversity in plantings, limiting mowing practices, and avoiding the use of pesticides in sensitive pollinator habitats through integrated vegetation and pest management practices.

Sec. 4. General Provisions.

(a) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(b) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to any agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(c) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to require the disclosure of confidential business information or trade secrets, classified information, law enforcement sensitive information, or other information that must be protected in the interest of national security or public safety.

(d) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(e) The Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA