The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Joint Statement on Multinational Cooperation on High-Density Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Development

Belgium, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea and the United States, the parties to this joint statement recognize that the ultimate goal of nuclear security is advanced by minimizing highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian use, which is affirmed in the Washington and Seoul Summit Communiqués and is also a key issue on the agenda of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

In continuation of the Joint Statement on Quadrilateral Cooperation on High-density Low-enriched Uranium Fuel Production made in Seoul, the original four parties plus Germany are working together to develop and qualify new high-density low-enriched uranium LEU fuels as part of an effort to convert research reactors from HEU fuel to LEU fuel.

High performance research reactors use significant quantities of HEU each year and require unique and complex fuels to operate. The five parties are pooling their expertise and resources to develop, qualify and fabricate new high-density LEU fuels with the ultimate goal of converting the remaining high performance research reactors in the world to operate on these fuels when technically and economically feasible.

The parties are focusing their efforts on uranium molybdenum (UMo), both as a monolithic fuel foil and as UMo powder dispersed in an aluminium matrix. In the last years the parties have had particular yet not exclusive technical foci. Europe (Belgium, France and Germany) manufactured and tested in-pile full-scale fuel plates based on coated UMo powder technology; the United States manufactured and tested in-pile full-scale fuel plates based on coated monolithic UMo technology. As laid out in the 2012 Joint Statement, the Republic of Korea manufactured and made available to the community UMo powders based on advanced atomization technology, and intends to continue producing and providing such UMo powders for further qualification tests of new high-density dispersion fuel.

We express our shared confidence that this international cooperation among Belgium, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea and the United States to develop high density LEU fuels will be strengthened by intensified and coordinated collaboration that will contribute directly to the ultimate goal of minimizing HEU in civilian use.  Cooperation and support from the international community are crucial for making available LEU fuel that is suitable for high performance research reactors, and we agree to share the benefits of all technology developed together in this joint effort, with conditions to be set out in due time.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Joint U.S.-EU Statement on Combating Illicit Trafficking

The European Union and the United States of America, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), each understand the importance of nuclear security and embrace the shared international responsibility to develop and promote systems and measures for the prevention of, detection of, and response to nuclear or other radioactive materials out of regulatory control.  In recognition of this international responsibility, and in support of the Nuclear Security Summit Key Topic of Combating Illicit Trafficking, and in line with the conclusions of the successful “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts” organised by the IAEA in Vienna on 1–5 July 2013, we are taking the following initial steps:

  • The IAEA Nuclear Security Series, specifically the Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, emphasizes the importance of detection instruments in the context of a national level Nuclear Security Detection Architecture.  In support of this principle, the European Commission Directorate General for Home Affairs (EC-HOME), the Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have collaborated through the Border Monitoring Working Group in the conduct of the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP+10) test campaign. 

The ITRAP+10 effort demonstrates a crucial facet of nuclear detection as outlined in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, namely the evaluation of nuclear and radiological detection technologies against a set of common performance goals.  Over the past three years, this international partnership tested about 70 different models of detection and identification equipment against international guidance and standards.  Now that testing has been completed, we pledge to share the findings of this test campaign to inform, as appropriate, future revisions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and other relevant international standards.  Furthermore, we intend to make available scientific and technical data on commercially available detection systems with the international community with the aim of documenting detection instrument capabilities, exemplifying proper usage and deployment, and promoting new research and development efforts.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

FACT SHEET: U.S. - Kazakhstan Cooperative Activities in Nuclear Security

For many years, the United States and Kazakhstan have engaged in a broad set of cooperative activities to enhance and improve Kazakhstan’s nuclear security capabilities.  Recent and ongoing examples of such successful cooperation include:

Nuclear Security Training Center

The United States is working with Kazakhstan to develop a Nuclear Security Training Center (NSTC) in order to improve indigenous security and safeguards training capabilities for all nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan.  U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) support includes constructing and equipping the NSTC as well as curriculum development for physical protection and material control and accounting specialists.  The current projected completion date is before the end of 2015.  The United States, led by the Department of State and in coordination with the Departments of Energy and Defense, is collaborating with Kazakhstan to develop a counter nuclear smuggling curriculum at the Center and other related nuclear security training.

Second Line of Defense

Since 2006, the DOE/NNSA Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program has been working cooperatively with the Kazakhstan Customs Control Committee (KCCC) to install radiation detection equipment at ports, land border crossings, airports, and other international points of exit and entry.  To date, SLD has completed the installation of radiation detection systems at twenty-nine sites.  During 2014, SLD continues to work on the deployment of radiation detection systems at an additional three sites, as well as a National Communications Systems pilot project that will relay radiation detection system state of health and alarm data in near-real time from the crossing points to the Kazakhstani Customs headquarters in Astana.  Also, SLD is working with the State Border Guard Service and internal law enforcement on mobile detection.

Reactor Conversion

The United States is working with the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Alatau and the Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) in Kurchatov to convert the final three reactors in Kazakhstan from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel.  At the INP, DOE/NNSA is working to ensure that the reactor can be converted as quickly as possible.  Activities also are underway with the Russian fuel fabricator (Luch) and the IAE to fabricate fuel samples to verify that the two remaining IAE reactors can be converted.

HEU Removals

The United States has been working with Kazakhstan to eliminate its excess HEU since the completion of Project Sapphire in 1994, when the two countries cooperated to remove and ship to the United States approximately 600 kilograms of HEU from Kazakhstan.  In recent years, the DOE/NNSA Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has returned almost 75 kilograms of HEU spent fuel to Russia and has downblended all remaining fresh HEU (33 kilograms) in-country.  Once the final three research reactors are converted to LEU, DOE/NNSA will work with Kazakhstan to return the remaining 85 kg of HEU at these facilities to the Russian Federation for disposition.  The next shipment will take place in late 2014 from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Alatau. 

HEU and Plutonium Security and Disposition

The United States has worked with Kazakhstan to complete the transportation of 10 metric tons of HEU and 3 metric tons of plutonium – enough material to make 775 nuclear weapons – from the Kazakhstan BN-350 facility in Aktau to a secure facility in the northeastern part of the country.  Currently, Kazakhstan is in the processing of performing a feasibility study to evaluate options for final disposition of this material.

Emergency Management

The United States, through DOE/NNSA, is working with emergency management authorities in Kazakhstan to enhance Kazakhstan authorities’ capabilities to effectively respond to potential nuclear/radiological emergencies that may endanger workers, the public, and the environment.  In 2013, DOE/NNSA conducted an equipment demonstration and a training course for first responders from multiple government agencies in Kazakhstan.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Joint Statement by President Obama and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in the Sphere of Nonproliferation and Strengthening Nuclear Security

The Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States of America have confirmed a shared commitment to nonproliferation and strengthening nuclear security.

The Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States of America note with satisfaction the successful efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and will continue to strengthen the physical security on the former Semipalatinsk Test Site.

The United States of America will continue to partner with the Republic of Kazakhstan to strengthen its joint efforts to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials.

The United States of America welcomes the Republic of Kazakhstan’s activities to strengthen nuclear security and implement decisions of the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits, including by converting the VVR-K research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, downblending the INP’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) material and removing the HEU spent fuel from the reactor. The United States and Kazakhstan will continue to work together to convert Kazakhstan’s remaining HEU reactors to LEU fuel and eliminate all remaining HEU research reactor fuel as soon as technically feasible.

The United States of America supports the efforts of the Republic of Kazakhstan to host the IAEA LEU Bank, establish a Regional Nuclear Security Training Center, and strengthen its emergency preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities.

The Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States of America attach importance to Nuclear Security Summit process.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine

On the occasion of the third Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, the United States and Ukraine today reaffirm their strategic partnership and emphasize the important role of nuclear nonproliferation in that relationship.  The United States values its 20-year partnership with Ukraine on these issues.  Our nonproliferation partnership dates from Ukraine’s 1994 decision to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state.  In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland welcomed these Ukrainian actions, and they reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine.  The United States government reaffirms that commitment today to the new Ukrainian government and the people of Ukraine, including in Crimea.  The United States government condemns Russia’s failure to abide by its commitments under the Budapest Memorandum with its unilateral military actions in Ukraine.  Russia’s  actions  undermine  the foundation  of  the global  security  architecture and endanger  European  peace  and  security.  Ukraine and the United States emphasize  that  they  will  not  recognize Russia's illegal attempt to annex Crimea.  Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine.  The United States will continue to help Ukraine affirm its sovereignty and territorial integrity.  As the people of Ukraine work to restore unity, peace, and security to their country, the United States will stand by their side.

The United States and Ukraine reiterate their commitment to upholding their nuclear nonproliferation commitments.  The United States recognizes the importance of the 2012 removal of all highly enriched uranium from Ukraine.  This removal again highlighted Ukraine’s leadership in nuclear security and nonproliferation, as we collectively work together to secure the world’s vulnerable nuclear material.  As part of its support for this effort, the United States committed in 2010 to work with Ukraine to construct a Neutron Source Facility at the Kharkiv Institute for Physics and Technology.  This month construction of the Neutron Source Facility was completed.  The facility, equipped with the most up-to-date technology to operate at the highest safety standards, provides Ukraine with new research capabilities and the ability to produce industrial and medical isotopes for the benefit of the Ukrainian people. 

This state of the art facility is representative of the modern, European state the Government of Ukraine is committed to building.  To build on this important cooperation, the United States will continue to provide technical support for the Neutron Source Facility as Ukraine completes the necessary final equipment installation, testing, and start-up to make the facility fully operational as soon as practical.

This successful effort reflects broad U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation.  Our countries recently extended the U.S.-Ukraine Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Umbrella Agreement and the U.S.-Ukraine Agreement Concerning Operational Safety Enhancements, Risk Reduction Measures, and Nuclear Safety Regulation for Civilian Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine. 

The United States and Ukraine intend to continue to partner to prevent nuclear proliferation by improving Ukraine’s ability to detect nuclear materials on its borders, to provide physical protection at sites with nuclear or radioactive materials, and to maintain an adequate export control system in order to help realize the goals of the Nuclear Security Summits. 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

President Obama Signs Washington Emergency Declaration

Today, the President declared an emergency in the State of Washington and ordered federal aid to supplement state and local response efforts due to the emergency conditions resulting from flooding and mudslides beginning on March 22, 2014, and continuing.

The President's action authorizes the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to coordinate all disaster relief efforts which have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local population, and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, and to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in Snohomish County.

Specifically, FEMA is authorized to identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency.  Emergency protective measures, limited to direct federal assistance, will be provided at 75 percent federal funding. 

W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security, named Michael J. Hall as the Federal Coordinating Officer for federal recovery operations in the affected area. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION MEDIA SHOULD CONTACT:  FEMA NEWS DESK AT (202) 646-3272 OR FEMA-NEWS-DESK@DHS.GOV

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Background Briefing on the G7 Meeting

Filing Center

9:00 P.M. CET

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So I'll just give a readout of the meeting and go through some of the key points in the statement, and take a couple of questions.

So, first of all, the President hosted the meeting and led the discussion.  He kicked it off with opening comments about the seriousness of the situation in Ukraine, the challenge to the international community, and the need for a strong and unified response.  All of the leaders spoke during the course of the meeting and then the President summarized the way forward at the conclusion of the meeting.  And there was agreement on The Hague Declaration, which is a very strong joint statement that hits all of the key elements that we were seeking to get out of this G7 meeting.

I'll just go through what we believe the key points of that statement are.  First of all, there’s a very clear statement that what Russia has done is a violation of the principles on which the entire international system is built.  And this was a key part of the discussion, that the challenge in Ukraine goes beyond simply the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; it goes to the heart of the principles of international law upon which the international system is founded.

In that vein, there was a condemnation of the illegal referendum held in Crimea and a reaffirmation that neither the referendum, nor the annexation of Crimea are recognized by the G7 countries, who, of course, represent countries in Europe, North America and Asia.

Furthermore, there was a strong statement from the G7 that Russia’s actions will have significant consequences.  We've already imposed a cost on Russia in the sanctions that we've issued in coordination with Europe, Canada, and Japan as well.  But, importantly, going forward, the G7 made clear that they have a variety of sanctions that can be carried out against Russia and individuals and entities responsible for what’s taking place in Ukraine.  But importantly, the G7 made clear that they’re ready to intensify actions, including coordinated sectoral sanctions that will have an increasingly significant impact on the Russian economy if Russia continues to escalate the situation.

So this reference to sectoral sanctions tracks very much the executive order that the President issued several days ago, signaling our willingness to sanction sectors of the Russian economy.  This would obviously have a significant impact on the Russian economy going forward and gives the international community a very powerful tool to hold Russia accountable and to impose costs on Russia if they do not reverse course.

There was a point taken to make clear that there is a diplomatic avenue open to Russia to deescalate the situation, that part of that must mean that Russia engages in discussions with the government of Ukraine, and that the international community stands ready to provide mediation and monitoring associated with the de-escalation.  In that vein, there was a reference to the monitors from the OSCE that are already in Ukraine that provide one constructive avenue for monitoring both against any violation of the rights of the citizens of Ukraine and also any mediation effort.

Furthermore, in addition to the economic measures referenced, a clear statement of Russia’s political isolation was issued by the leaders.  They made clear that they will not be participating in the Sochi summit, that they are suspending the G7’s participation in the G8 with Russia until Russia changes course and there is an environment in which the G8 could have a meaningful discussion.  In short, Russia is suspended from the G8 pending its current activities in Ukraine, and the necessity is now on Russia to deescalate to avoid this continued isolation from the international community.

So in place of the G8 in Sochi in June, the G7 will be meeting in Brussels to discuss the broad agenda that would have been discussed otherwise at the G8.  They’ll obviously continue to focus on the situation in Ukraine.  Furthermore, they cancelled the foreign ministerial that was scheduled for April in Moscow.

In addition, a decision was taken that the G7 energy ministers should meet in the coming weeks to strengthen the collective energy security of the G7.  And this provides a forum to discuss ways, for instance, to diversify energy supply for Europe as we consider potential sectoral sanctions, including on the energy sector in Russia. 

At the same time, there was broad support for the government and people of Ukraine.  The reform agenda announced by the Ukrainian government was welcomed, and the G7 expressed its support for the IMF taking a central role in providing a robust package of economic support for the government of Ukraine and integrating the economy of Ukraine in the multilateral system.  With that IMF support, the countries also made clear that that would unlock additional assistance from individual nations, from the World Bank, from other financial institutions including the EU and, again, bilateral sources as well. 

So to step back and summarize: clear political isolation of Russia in terms of suspending participation in the G8; determination to hold the G7 in Brussels in June; a clear reference to sectoral sanctions as a step that the G7 could take to intensify its pressure on Russia going forward, particularly if the situation continues to escalate; and a clear expression of support for the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people, with an IMF package at the center of that and individual contributions from nations to supplement that.  And of course, the United States is working on our own package of support as a part of that effort.

The only other thing I’d mention is that there was also a discussion around NATO and the need to continue to provide reassurance and support for Eastern European allies in particular.  This is something that the President will be discussing in Brussels with the Secretary General.  We stand prepared to provide additional support to Easter European allies as we already have with Baltic air policing and additional aviation deployments to Poland.  We’re prepared to build out on that effort and we are discussing with NATO allies how they might also come with us and provide additional support. 

And I’ll take a couple of questions here.  Julie.

Q    When you talk about the sectoral sanctions, what kind of concerns did some of the European countries like Germany have, especially when you were talking about energy sector?  And then, what do you guys make of Lavrov’s meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, on the sectoral sanctions, I think there’s agreement on what the most important sectors are to focus on.  Energy is one of them; finance and banking is another; the arms sector is another.  And the leaders did discuss that moving to sectoral sanctions would bring economic consequences for the global economy and for some of the individual countries.  And everybody recognizes that there is a cost associated with those actions.

However, number one, the cost is far greater for the Russians who stand much more to lose from isolation from the global economy.  And we’ve, of course, already seen that impact on their market.  And, secondly, there’s a cost of inaction -- that if we fail to take steps in response to Russian escalation, ultimately that’s going to carry with it grave costs for the international system as a whole.  So putting these sectoral sanctions on the table sends a message to Russia to refrain from any escalation, particularly, for instance, going into Eastern or Southern Ukraine and to provide a framework for de-escalation. 

With respect to Foreign Minister Lavrov, look, it’s important that they do engage the Ukrainian government directly. So we see that as a necessary step.  The question is whether that engagement leads to de-escalation.  The Ukrainian government has been quite reasonable in saying that they are open to constitutional reform that could include discussion of autonomy, for instance, for regions like Crimea.  So we encourage that type of bilateral dialogue.  Secretary Kerry encouraged it when he met with Foreign Minister Lavrov, but we’ll have to see whether it leads to anything substantive.

Q    It sounds like the G7 is implying that if he doesn’t do anything else, if Russia doesn’t do anything else, but does sort of -- keeps Crimea, doesn’t pull back either -- then there’s no sectoral sanctions.  Is that the way we’re supposed to read this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, Chuck, it depends on -- there are a lot of different ways this could go.  Clearly, escalating by going into Eastern and Southern Ukraine would be the most likely trigger for these types of sectoral sanctions, and it’s meant to deliver that message.  But at the same time, we’ve seen Russia escalate in other ways to try to destabilize the situation inside of Ukraine, to try to stir up, for instance, instability in parts of Ukraine.  There are steps that they could take to escalate the situation in terms of violence in Crimea even.  So while I would identify that as the most immediate source of concern for escalation, I don’t want to suggest it’s the only source of concern. 

And I would also say that we’ve already taken steps based on what they’ve done in Crimea that go beyond individuals that go to a bank.  And we’re prepared to continue to look at additional steps in coordination with our G7 partners as well, based on what’s already happened. 

So, again, I would say that, yes, Eastern and Southern Ukraine is the clearest trigger for these sectoral sanctions.  But it’s on the table.  And the key principle in the statement is further escalation will bring further costs.  But the type of status quo that we’re currently in has already brought significant sanctions, and we reserve the right to move ahead with sanctions if we don’t see a --   

Q    I guess that’s what I’m trying to understand.  So status quo could still mean more in sanctions?  Could they mean sectoral sanctions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Status quo could mean more sanctions.  Well, it depends on how that status quo evolves, to be completely candid with you.  Again, to what extent is Russia seeking a de-escalation?  To what extent are they engaged in acts that attempt to destabilize the Ukrainian government?  We’ll have to assess all that going forward and calibrate our actions against that.  So, again, clearly the biggest hammer that can drop is sectoral sanctions.  The clearest trigger for those is Eastern and Southern Ukraine.  But I don’t want to suggest that we’re taking off the table the sanctions that we have already in place in our executive order.  We’ll have to calibrate it on how events transpire.

Q    If this is such a clear violation of international law, and as you said earlier today, the whole international system as we know it is at stake just over Crimea, not over anything else, why not use the sectoral sanctions now to register that condemnation in a much more tangible way to Russia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, Major, I think it’s already been tangible.  The people we’ve sanctioned are very close to President Putin, who have significant resources.  The bank that we’ve sanctioned, the additional sanctions that we -- the sanctions that the Europeans have also imposed for what’s happened in Crimea has had an impact on the Russian market, on the Russian economy, on Russia’s own economic forecast.  So we believe we’ve imposed a cost and we’re going to continue to impose a cost for what they’ve done in Crimea.  They’ve been suspended from the G8.  They’ve been isolated politically as well as economically.

So we believe that they’re already facing a cost.  What this gives us the ability to do is to ramp up that cost to calibrate it based on what the Russians do going forward.  And again, these would be significant actions that would have an impact -- a far-reaching impact on Russia.  We want to make sure that we are using those prudently.  Again, the clearest trigger is Eastern and Southern Ukraine, but we’re going to have to monitor the situation as it evolves on a daily basis.

Q    Ben, you just said that sectoral sanctions are the biggest hammer that could drop.  Does that mean that’s the maximum penalty for doing anything in Ukraine in terms of incursions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I think in terms of -- I think you can’t go beyond -- I mean, you can’t go bigger, frankly, than starting to designate and get at the -- I mean, these aren’t just sectors; these are basically the significant elements of the Russian economy.  If you look at energy, if you look at banking, if you look at -- we identified engineering; arms, of course, and defense.  So I think that that would impose a far-reaching consequence on the Russian economy.

Look, we have not said that we believe that military action, for instance, would be the right course for the West to take inside of Ukraine.  We’re focused on affecting Russia’s calculus through these economic and political measures.  And again, I think that if you moved in these sectoral sanctions you would see a far-reaching impact on the Russian economy.  You’ve already seen a very consequential impact from what we’ve already done in terms of their markets going down significantly; in terms of their economic forecast from their own ministries revising downward; in terms of their currency.  So we’re seeing an impact, and we can calibrate that impact based on how events transpire in the coming days.

Q    Can you explain the language in the kicking out of Russia?  You said that the G7 leaders are suspending themselves from the G8 as opposed to Russia being suspended.  Was there any consideration to a different suspension language?  Or is that just the way that you have to phrase something like this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So basically the G8 is the entity that includes Russia; the G7 is the entity that doesn’t.  So the G7 countries are removing themselves from the G8, and we’re going forward with the summit without Russia.  You should see that as Russia being suspended from participation in the G8 pending the de-escalation and resolution of this crisis.

Q    Ben, can you give us any color about the leaders and what they said?  And was there any disagreement at all about any of these issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  There really wasn’t much disagreement.  I think that, really, the tone was seeking to figure out the best way of solving this problem.  And so there was discussion, again, of the future of the G7.  There was discussion of how can we implement this IMF reform package in a way that helps Ukraine get on its feet as soon as possible, supplemented by additional assistance.  There was discussion of what types of sanctions would have the most impact.  And there was a discussion, as I said earlier, of what consequences there might be from those types of sectoral sanctions on different countries and different economies.

But again, I think the common thread was everybody was seized with the fact that it was worth taking those steps, as difficult as some of them may be, because the cost of inaction is far greater given the threat to the international system.  And again, there are ways to mitigate some of these costs, and having an energy ministerial is directly tied to looking at energy security, looking at diversification.  You saw another license from the Department of Energy today.  We can work with Europe, we can work with Ukraine, on dealing with issues associated with energy security.  So you can take into account some of those costs that we might foresee going forward.

So it was more about what is the best forward than resolving disagreements.  And again, I think that everybody was seized with the urgency of the situation.  The focus was entirely on Ukraine with the exception of some discussion of NATO reassurance for Eastern European allies in particular.

END
9:18 P.M. CET

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

The Hague Declaration

1. We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission met in The Hague to reaffirm our support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

2. International law prohibits the acquisition of part or all of another state’s territory through coercion or force.  To do so violates the principles upon which the international system is built.  We condemn the illegal referendum held in Crimea in violation of Ukraine’s constitution.  We also strongly condemn Russia’s illegal attempt to annex Crimea in contravention of international law and specific international obligations.  We do not recognize either. 

3. Today, we reaffirm that Russia’s actions will have significant consequences.  This clear violation of international law is a serious challenge to the rule of law around the world and should be a concern for all nations.  In response to Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to demonstrate our determination to respond to these illegal actions, individually and collectively we have imposed a variety of sanctions against Russia and those individuals and entities responsible.  We remain ready to intensify actions including coordinated sectoral sanctions that will have an increasingly significant impact on the Russian economy, if Russia continues to escalate this situation. 

4. We remind Russia of its international obligations, and its responsibilities including those for the world economy.  Russia has a clear choice to make.  Diplomatic avenues to de-escalate the situation remain open, and we encourage the Russian Government to take them.  Russia must respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, begin discussions with the Government of Ukraine, and avail itself of offers of international mediation and monitoring to address any legitimate concerns.

5.  The Russian Federation’s support for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is a step in the right direction.  We look forward to the mission’s early deployment, in order to facilitate the dialogue on the ground, reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation, and we call on all parties to ensure that Special Monitoring Mission members have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine to fulfill their mandate.

6.  This Group came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities.  Russia’s actions in recent weeks are not consistent with them.  Under these circumstances, we will not participate in the planned Sochi Summit.  We will suspend our participation in the G-8 until Russia changes course and the environment comes back to where the G-8 is able to have a meaningful discussion and will meet again in G-7 format at the same time as planned, in June 2014, in Brussels, to discuss the broad agenda we have together.  We have also advised our Foreign Ministers not to attend the April meeting in Moscow.  In addition, we have decided that G-7 Energy Ministers will meet to discuss ways to strengthen our collective energy security.

7.  At the same time, we stand firm in our support for the people of Ukraine who seek to restore unity, democracy, political stability, and economic prosperity to their country.   We commend the Ukrainian government’s ambitious reform agenda and will support its implementation as Ukraine seeks to start a new chapter in its history, grounded on a broad-based constitutional reform, free and fair presidential elections in May, promotion of human rights and respect of national minorities.

8. The International Monetary Fund has a central role leading the international effort to support Ukrainian reform, lessening Ukraine's economic vulnerabilities, and better integrating the country as a market economy in the multilateral system.  We strongly support the IMF's work with the Ukrainian authorities and urge them to reach a rapid conclusion.  IMF support will be critical in unlocking additional assistance from the World Bank, other international financial institutions, the EU, and bilateral sources.  We remain united in our commitment to provide strong financial backing to Ukraine, to co-ordinate our technical assistance, and to provide assistance in other areas, including measures to enhance trade and strengthen energy security.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes

Via Videoconference 

3:52 P.M. CET

MR. CARNEY:  Thank you for being here.  Thank you for joining us on this trip.  Ben Rhodes, the President’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, is joining me today.  He can go over the meetings the President has had today thus far as well as preview some of the meetings he will have later today.  He’ll take questions on those subjects or any other subjects that you have for him and I will stand by for questions on other matters.
 
With that, I give you Ben Rhodes.
 
MR. RHODES:  Thanks, everybody.  And thanks for people joining us virtually.  I’ll just give a brief readout of the President’s meetings this morning. 
 
You saw his comments with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands after their meeting.  I’d just note in particular that there was strong agreement in their meeting about the need to support the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian government; to continue to impose costs on Russia for its actions.  And as one of our key allies here in Europe and in NATO, we’ll be consulting closely with the Dutch going forward. 
 
We also very much welcome the announcement made today by the Dutch to join the effort that the United States is leading to end financing for coal-fired plants abroad as part of our efforts to combat climate change.
 
Turning to the meeting with President Xi of China, first of all, the President expressed his thanks, as he did publicly, for the welcome and hospitality the First Lady and his family has received in China.  The President also indicated his condolences for the loss of life in the recent terrorist attack in China, and also noted our determination to work with the Chinese to continue to try to locate the Malaysian airliner that has gone missing, and expressed his sympathies to the Chinese families.
 
In terms of issues, the President reviewed a number of global and bilateral issues with China.  On climate change, the President stressed a need for the United States and China to work together to set a strong example in terms of reducing our emissions as we head into the 2015 climate negotiations; also noted the importance of continuing to work together to phase out HFCs, something that was committed to at Sunnylands.  And we’re working to bring other countries into a global effort to phase out the use of HFCs.
 
On the situation in North Korea, the President underscored the need for close coordination in sending a clear message that there needs to be denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and that any discussions or dialogue among the six parties around the situation in North Korea needs to be based upon actions taken by North Korea, which has not yet demonstrated its willingness to come to the table seriously.  We’ve had good cooperation with China in applying some pressure on North Korea, but we as an international community need to continue to insist that North Korea abide by its obligations.
 
On Iran, the President welcomed China’s leadership within the P5-plus-1, where they’ve been a constructive partner.  The two leaders agreed that we have a good opportunity here to reach a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue. 
 
The President reviewed a number of bilateral economic issues, including our desire to continue to see China move to a more flexible and market-based exchange rate, expressing our concerns in that regard.
 
The President also discussed a range of other economic issues, including our continued interest in seeing China move forward with the economic reform package that President Xi has put forward, the importance, for instance, of transparency in Sino enterprises, and also the potential for greater energy cooperation between our two countries.
 
On cybersecurity, the President once again underscored the need for the U.S. and China to cooperate closely on this issue.  He raised, again, our concerns about the theft of trade secrets for commercial purposes, reiterated that the United States does not engage in intelligence for the purpose of gaining a commercial advantage. 
 
The two leaders welcomed the good progress that’s been made on military-to-military exchanges and agreed to continue to expand those exchanges.  On maritime security and regional security issues, the President reiterated our concern over the Chinese ADIZ that was recently announced.  He also expressed a concern over the need to reduce tensions in the East and South China Sea, noting that the United States is not a claimant.  He underscored the need for resolutions to these issues based on dialogue and international law, and expressed continued U.S. support for that effort.  In that context, of course, the President reiterated his support for the security of our allies, Japan and the Philippines.
 
The two leaders also discussed the need to cooperate on counterterrorism issues.  The President also raised issues related to human rights and the rule of law in China, specifically expressing concern over the recent lack of visas to U.S. media outlets like The New York Times and Bloomberg and Voice of America.
 
On Ukraine, the President reiterated our interest in seeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine respected, reaching a diplomatic resolution that deescalates the crisis and allows for the Ukrainian people to make decisions about their own future.
 
With that, we’d be happy to take your questions on this or any other matters.
 
Yes, Steve.
 
Q    Did it come up, the NSA report having to do with China? Did the Chinese President bring that up?  And, secondly, how do you interpret this Russia troop buildup along the border?  Is that an ominous sign?  Do you see signs of --
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, President Xi did raise those recent reports in the context of their discussion on cybersecurity.  What President Obama made clear to him is that, again, the United States does not engage in espionage to gain a commercial advantage.  We don’t share information with our companies. 
 
Both the United States and China, understandably, like other countries in the world, engage in intelligence activities on behalf of our national security.  But there’s a clear distinction, in our view, between intelligence activities that have a national security purpose versus intelligence activities that have a commercial purpose.  And what we’ve tried to stress to the Chinese in our cyber dialogue is that while we understand that different nations are going to have approaches to cybersecurity and intelligence collection, that we need to cooperate in setting clear rules of the road that wall off theft of tradecraft related to commercial entities, theft of intellectual property.  And so that was President Obama’s message on those issues generally, including when those recent reports were raised.
 
With respect to the Russian troop movements, we’ve been very concerned by the potential for escalation into eastern and southern Ukraine.  We’ve monitored very closely Russian troop movements along the border of Ukraine and, frankly, it underscores the need for there to be a de-escalation because any further steps into eastern and southern Ukraine would represent a very dangerous escalation of the situation.
 
At the same time, I think we’ve sent a clear message that we are prepared to continue escalating our response to Russia and imposing costs for that type of activity.  To take one example, the executive order the President signed gives us the authority to sanction and designate major significant sectors of the Russian economy.  And the message to Russia is clear:  They’re already facing consequences.  They’re already going to face costs.  Should there be any further escalation, we have the ability, together with our partners here in Europe and around the world, to dramatically escalate those costs on Russia.
 
Jim.
 
Q    In his interview with de Volkskrant, the President was asked what he would say the members of the EU with regard to imposing heavy sanctions against Russia and he said, “There have to be consequences.  And if Russia continues to escalate the situation, we need to be prepared to impose a greater cost.”   What the EU has announced has been short of what the U.S. has -- the steps the U.S. has taken.  The economic sanctions are not as specific as the executive order the President signed.  So I wonder what will we see from the G7 today and the EU tomorrow that goes beyond just harsh rhetoric against the Russians?
 
MR. RHODES:  Jim, I’d say a few things.  First of all, the EU has moved with us in a coordinated fashion and imposed sanctions on Russia.  They’ve implemented visa bans, asset freezes, designated individuals, often in coordination with us.  Their lists coordinate broadly with ours, for instance, in terms of the individuals who we've designated.  They’ve also moved to politically isolate Russia, cancelling several upcoming meetings and engagements.  So we've had good cooperation to date.  And in that European Council statement, they indicated clearly that there would be broader for the Russian economy going forward if the situation continues. 
 
In terms of the meetings coming up with the G7, I think what we want to send is a strong message in several respects -- number one, that there will be growing costs for Russia for its actions. And frankly, Jim, the type of consequences we’d like to see are what the President foreshadowed in his executive order.  So we identified sectors of the Russian economy.  We believe that those broader sanctions have the ability to send a powerful message to Russia that it will face costs.
 
And so, consistent with the European Council’s statement that foreshadows consequences for the Russian economy, I think out of that G7 meeting we're looking to send a message that we're not done with building out the types of sanctions that we would impose upon Russia for its actions.
 
We’d also, though, I think, importantly, with the G7, want to underscore our support for the Ukrainian government and people, our support for a very robust IMF package getting done as soon as possible, and our support for individual member states of the G7 and of the EU providing assistance to the Ukrainians as well.
 
Q    Is there any talk -- obviously a lot of those sanctions are something for the EU and in those countries.  Is there any talk in the conversation with the Chinese President about China putting any economic pressure on Russia?
 
MR. RHODES:  They had a good discussion on Ukraine.  Again, what the President said is China has always held sovereignty and territorial integrity as a core of its foreign policy and national security approach and that that principle needs to be applied to Ukraine, and that China’s interest should be in working with us to deescalate the situation in a way that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The Chinese leader did affirm again that the principle of the independence and sovereignty of nations was fundamental to their approach and that they did want to see a de-escalation and a political resolution to the conflict. 
 
In terms of economic pressure, the Chinese have not generally moved to the types of sanctions that we have with the Europeans, so I think that would be a more dramatic action on their part.  I think we would find it as a constructive step for them to continue to refrain from supporting Russia’s action, and to speaking out for the principle of the rule of law, international law, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.  Doing so I think further isolates Russia on the international stage, as they were at the U.N. when it was a 13-1-1 vote in the Security Council.
 
Q    Is there anything specific that the President asked the Chinese to do vis-à-vis Ukraine?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, I think his specific request is one that he would make of any country, which is that all of us have an interest in an international system that upholds the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and that that is the position that we would like to see China stand behind in its international engagements.  And we’re going to continue to work with them to try to deescalate the situation.  Furthermore, China has a relationship with Russia insofar as they can be constructive in urging de-escalation and a political resolution
-- they could play a constructive role in that regard as well.
 
Q    On the G7 meeting (inaudible) --
 
MR. RHODES:  We’ll also be discussing that at the meeting.  I don’t want to get ahead of it, but clearly we believe that there’s no reason for the G7 countries to engage with Russia going forward based on its behavior.  So I think the leaders will discuss the upcoming future of the G7 and the G8.  I think the very fact of a G7 meeting here in the Netherlands -- which is extraordinary in its own right; it’s not common for the G7 to meet in a country that is not a G7 country itself -- I think speaks to both the need for the G7 to mobilize as an entity to isolate Russia and support the Ukrainian people, but also speaks to Russia’s isolation from an organization that they’ve been a part of now for almost two decades.
 
Q    Are you looking for any G7 sanctions --
 
MR. RHODES:  No, we wouldn’t.  We are looking to coordinate our sanctions in the G7.  The G7 as an entity doesn’t impose sanctions, but every member state of the G7 has already imposed sanctions -- because in addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada and Japan have also come along with us in imposing sanctions as well -- Germany, of course. 
 
So what we want to do is take the G7 as a platform to coordinate the national actions that we’re taking and then to work with our European partners as they formulate responses through the EU and European Council so that we have the strongest unified voice in imposing sanctions -- because the more we coordinate the designation of individuals and entities and potentially sectors of the Russian economy, the more that’s going to have an impact on Russia.
 
Q    (Inaudible.)
 
MR. RHODES:  I think what you’ll have is you’ve seen a steady ratcheting up of the pressure on Russia.  You’ve seen a response to that ratcheting up, continued market plummeting in Russia, downgrading of Russia as a place to do business, investors staying away from Russia.  So we are already seeing the impact of sanctions. 
 
I think we would like to see a steady ratcheting up of that pressure.  I think the outcomes that we’re seeking in the coming days are a continued unified front in terms of our ability to impose sanctions and to go further as necessary; continued support for our Eastern European NATO allies to reassure them of our commitment to their security; and also, importantly, robust economic assistance from the IMF to individual member states to provide the support that the Ukrainian people in government really need at this time.
 
Q    So two questions -- and it was hard to hear some of the questions, so I apologize if I repeat, but are there specific things that you want to come out of this G7 meeting tonight, specific statements?  Are you hoping that there will be a formal declaration that Russia is no longer a part of the G8 and it’s now the G7?  And is there some way to measure how well the discussion goes by trying to get a sense of what you’re hoping the seven nations actually agree to coming out of it tonight?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, what I think we’d like to see coming out of it is, again, a foreshadowing of what economic sanctions Russia will be faced with if it continues down this course; a commitment to provide support to the Ukrainian people that’s going to lead to concrete outcomes -- an IMF package, economic assistance that reaches the people and government of Ukraine -- reassurance for the allies here in Europe who are eyeing very warily the events in Ukraine; continued political isolate of Russia.
 
And with respect to the future of the G7, that’s something that the leaders will discuss tonight.  Our view is simply that as long as Russia is flagrantly violating international law and the order the G7 has helped to build since the end of the Cold War, there’s no need for the G7 to engage with Russia.  And so I’m sure that that’s a topic that the leaders will take up as well.
 
Q    Not to put too fine a point on this, but are you saying that the President will be seeking expulsion of Russia from the G8?  Is that what you’re saying?  I know you’re saying you don’t want to get ahead, but it sure sounds like that’s what you’re suggesting.
 
MR. RHODES:  I don’t want to suggest -- what we’re looking at is how we engage with Russia in the coming months and years.  The G7 is an entity.  If there came a point where Russia would deescalate the situation and abide by international law, we would not want to foreclose the potential that the G7 would engage with them.  So I’m speaking more about how do we engage with Russia going forward here in the context of the crisis in Ukraine.
 
Again, the door is open for Russia to deescalate the situation, to abide by international law, to come back in line with the international community.  I think the message is, so long as they don’t do that, they’re outside the rules of the road.
 
And I’d just note one other thing, which is that people speak of a new Cold War.  The fact is Russia is leading no bloc of countries.  There’s no ideological entity, like communism, that Russia is leading that has global appeal.  There’s no bloc of nations, like the Warsaw Pact, that they’re leading.  They’re isolated in what they’re doing in Ukraine.  And I think that’s very much the message that we want to send at the G7, with the EU, with NATO over the course of the next several days.
 
Q    On flight 370, Malaysia flight 370 -- has the Malaysian government communicated anything to the White House in terms of what has happened to that flight?  What have you heard?
 
MR. RHODES:  Yes, we’ve been in very regular contact, as you know, with the Malaysian government.  We have teams on the ground that are working with them on a daily basis.  The Prime Minister’s announcement today tracks with, frankly, where we’ve dedicated our assets, which is in the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of recovering the flight.  So we feel like we have very good lines of communication with the Malaysians.  We’re going to continue to support them.  We have resources dedicated, as we speak, not just to the investigation, but also to the recovery of the plane if we can locate it.  And we’re focused, as the Prime Minister said, on that southern corridor.
 
Q    How concerned are we about the Russian military movement on the border with Ukraine?  The comments from NATO military commander, concern about what they may be doing.  The Ukrainian Foreign Minister yesterday said he thinks chances of all-out war with Russia are higher than they have ever been.  And there was also the suggestion out of NATO that Russia may reposition itself to move into Moldova.  What is our current sense of how concerned we are about Russia’s next step?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, again, our current sense is that we are deeply concerned about Russian movements along that border.  We are watching it very closely, as is NATO, as is the Ukrainian government.  And again, we believe that Russia stands an enormous amount to lose in terms of economic pressure, international isolation should they take this escalatory step of moving into Ukraine.  There is a pathway to deescalate, but if they don't want to take that they’re going to be faced with growing pressure, condemnation, sanctions from the international community.
 
With respect to Moldova, similarly, the President met with the leader of Moldova recently at the White House.  So did the Vice President.  We've expressed our support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and we believe that there, too, we would strongly stand up for the principle that Moldova should be able to make determinations about its own future.  Again, that's further down the line.  We have not seen actions taken yet that directly compromise Moldova’s security, although we would note that we watch very closely the situation in Transnistria and our position is going to be very clear in support of Moldova and its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
 
Q    -- an army preparing to invade or is it consistent with the Russians’ plan, which is military exercises?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, the Russians have claimed a lot of things in recent days that didn’t bear out.  So they’ve said that these are for the purposes of exercises.  We'll see whether or not the troop movements are consistent with military exercises.  We believe that there’s every reason to be skeptical of Russian assertions, which is why we're watching the situation very closely, as are the Ukrainians.
 
I’d note that to date the Ukrainians have shown extraordinary restraint in how they’ve responded to the situation in Crimea, in particular, but also more broadly.  And that continues today with the manner in which they are pulling back their forces in Crimea.
 
Q    This is the first time a lot of these leaders have gotten together since the crisis in Crimea, and I wonder -- any atmospherics in the sense of either shock or dismay about what Russia has done, and if the President is bringing to this meeting a sense of urgency about what’s at stake for all the things he’s talked about, like collective security and international law, taking a stand against Russia.  Is he using this as an opportunity to identify this as a huge turning point, potentially?  And is that working?
 
MR. RHODES:  Absolutely, we come here, Major, with a sense of urgency.  And it's not just because these are things the President has spoken about.  These are things that all of these institutions have built over many years in terms of respect for international law, respect for nations to make their own decisions, leaving behind the days in which major powers made decisions about the futures of other countries over their heads. That's what the EU is about.  That's what NATO is about.  That's, frankly, what the United Nations is about.
 
And so what Russia has done is in violation of that entire international order that has been built up over many decades.  And it's for that purpose that we are focusing on this issue here.  We have the right people at the table to have that discussion at the G7 here today, and on Wednesday in Brussels, the President will meet with leaders of the European Union, with the leaders of NATO, to underscore that message.  And we do feel that leaders are coming to the table with a sense of urgency because this is a matter of not just European security, it's a matter of whether the international order that all of us are so invested in can stand up to this Russian aggression.
 
And as I said, what’s different about the past, what’s different about now versus the Cold War, is that Russia is finding itself totally alone.  It does not have some bloc of nations that is standing with it in support of its position in violating Ukraine’s sovereignty.  They are isolated among these nations that are gathered here at the Nuclear Security Summit and they are going to find themselves more isolated if they do not take steps to de-escalate this crisis and engage in dialogue with the government in Kyiv and to pull back their forces.
 
Q    Quickly back to the plane.  I just wanted to specifically try -- the Malaysian Prime Minister also said that he believes all lives have been lost on that plane based on the new analysis they’ve had.  I just wonder, specifically, has the President been briefed on that piece of information either by the Malaysians or by White House officials, and does that assessment square with what the U.S. believes about the flight?
 
MR. RHODES:  Ed, we'll have to get our own independent confirmation on that.  We obviously noted the Malaysian Prime Minister’s statement.  They are very much in the lead for this investigation.  We're sharing information.  But I don't want to indicate that we have independent confirmation of the fate of the passengers on that plane.  What we are focused on is the same southern corridor space where we've dedicated our resources in trying to recover the plane.  And so that's where our current focus is. 
 
The President is briefed on a daily basis about our efforts to support the Malaysian government and to locate the airliner.  We’ll continue to do that.
 
Q    This is on Ukraine.  Mitt Romney went on CBS yesterday and claimed that he believes the President is naïve on Ukraine and Russia.  Dick Durbin, another Democrat, pushed
back on that, but I wonder if the White House wants to weigh in.
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, look, we’ve been very clear-eyed about our Russia policy from when we came into office, which is that we will cooperate when we have common interests and we can form common positions, but we’ll be very clear when we have differences.  And it was the right thing to do to pursue cooperation in the beginning of the administration that helped us put in place Iran sanctions; that helped us supply our troops in Afghanistan; that helped us reach the New START Treaty; and frankly, helped us to advance in some of the nuclear security objectives we were talking about here at the summit, like the removal of highly-enriched uranium from a number of countries.
 
At the same time, we’ve stood up to Russia when we’ve had differences.  And there’s nothing new about the United States and Russia having differences.  I would note that, as we’ve said before, we’ve heard this criticism that somehow the President’s inaction in terms of taking military -- using military force in Syria has anything to do with the situation in Crimea or Ukraine. When George Bush was President we went to war in Iraq, we went to war in Afghanistan; that did not in any way deter Russia from going into Georgia in 2008.
 
So time and again, we have seen the Russians push the boundaries of international law, particularly when it relates to countries that are near their borders.  And what we’re doing is standing up to that aggression and mobilizing the entire international community to stand up to that aggression.  And, frankly, in terms of the steps that we’ve outlined and the steps that we’re taking, they go far beyond any previous steps that have been taken in response to Russian aggression.
 
In terms of the sanctions that you saw not just on Russian officials but on members of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, in terms of designating for potential sanction sectors to the Russian economy, that goes well beyond any response, for instance, to the incursion into Georgia.
 
So we believe we have a record of standing up for our interests.  Again, that means working with countries when we have overlapping interests, which was the case with Russia earlier in the administration.  But, increasingly, as Russia has taken a different turn, particularly under President Putin, that involves standing up and mobilizing the international community to isolate Russia when they take the types of steps that they’ve taken.
 
Q    Hey, Ben, I want to go back to your readout on China.  When you were asked specifically if China would participate in any of the sanctions, you essentially said, no, that they’d talked about the importance of sovereignty.  And then you said before that everybody that’s attending this summit is basically of the position of isolating Russia.  Is there something substantial that China is going to do vis-à-vis Russia in punishing them in some way or participating in this isolation, beyond this readout? Is there something tangible that you can point to?
 
MR. RHODES:  Look, I think it matters -- Russia cares a lot about its standing in the world, its world position.  And it matters if traditional friends of Russia cannot express support for their position, and indeed -- or express support for the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity that Russia is currently violating.
 
We’ve said that the costs that Russia is going to face run across the board.  A big piece of those, and the most significant thing we can do, frankly, is impose economic costs on Russia.  And that’s what we’re doing with our sanctions, and those are already sinking in.  We’ve said we can politically isolate them by separating them from institutions like the G7; by cancelling the types of engagements that the U.S. and the EU traditionally has with Russia.  But also, it’s a blow to their international standing when they are not able to look and find support for their positions.  That’s what happened at the United Nations.
 
So that is a consequence for Russia.  It is going to lead to an erosion of Russia’s position in the world.  And I think the reason is, is because they’re in violation of the international order.  And as I said, China, as they speak to their own national security interests, has always put front and center this notion of sovereignty and territorial integrity when you look at different regions of China, like Tibet.  And so it’s very much in their interests to stand up for the notion that a nation should make decisions about its own future and not have external actors come in and make those decisions for them.  And that’s the conversation we’ll continue to have with China going forward.
 
Q    So you’re saying because China is not supporting the Russian government in their move in Crimea, that that in itself is significant?
 
MR. RHODES:  I would say that if you look at the pattern, Chuck, just of voting at the U.N. Security Council, generally China and Russia are aligned.  Generally, they’re aligned on political and security issues on the world stage.  And it says something when Russia is completely isolated as they were at the United Nations Security Council.  And it, I think, foreshadows a future that Russia is going to face if they continue down this course where they can't even look at traditional places for full support for their positions.  And they’re just going to face continued isolation if they don’t take this opportunity to deescalate the situation.
 
Q    (Inaudible.)
 
MR. RHODES:  We are -- the way -- we are in the sense that when you target certain individuals and entities, it has a chilling effect on the broader economy.  So I think it’s important to understand that when we sanction individuals with significant resources who are in President Putin’s inner circle, when we sanction a bank that is associated with one of those individuals, not only does that have a direct impact on them, but it has a broader chilling effect on the Russian economy that makes investors think twice about putting their money into Russia.  That has an effect, a knock-on effect on the ruble, on the Russian market in ways that sanctioning me does not have on the U.S. market and the U.S. currency.
 
Q    I know we talked a lot about the possibility still of de-escalation, but can you give us a sense, even a general sense, of what de-escalation would be at this point?  Because wouldn’t you agree that there’s really no way Russia is going to leave Crimea at this point?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, again, the path to de-escalation is open to Russia in part because the government in Ukraine has indicated a willingness to have a discussion about how to ensure that ethnic Russians, for instance, are protected within their territory.  For instance, the government of Ukraine has indicated an openness to having a dialogue on constitutional reform.  As a part of that, they could look at autonomy for regions like Crimea.  They can look at different solutions to provide an assurance that people in different regions and people of different ethnicities are being protected.
 
But, frankly, they should not have that conversation in the context of military threats and coercion.  So what we’ve said to the Russians is:  Deescalate the situation; put it back onto a political and diplomatic track; pull back your forces; engage in a discussion directly with the government in Kyiv -- not over their heads.  The international community will support that process.  And precisely because the government of Ukraine has indicated a willingness to pursue constitution reform, and precisely because they have an election coming up in the spring, there is a pathway that could be taken that could lead to a de-escalation of the situation.
 
We have not seen Russia take that pathway yet, which is why we’ve pivoted to the pressure that we’ve applying, but we’ve kept the diplomatic lines open and we’ll continue to urge the Russians to engage in that dialogue directly with the Ukrainian government.
 
Q    Just one quick question, Ben.  There are 58 leaders here; is the President going to try to build consensus among them so that maybe something can be written up against what Russia has done in Crimea?  Something will appear in the declaration or on the side of the declaration?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, I think we’re engaging with enough nations and entities that we can send that message through the outcome of the G7 meeting, through the U.S.-EU Summit that is upcoming on Wednesday, through the meeting with NATO on Wednesday, and some of the President’s bilateral engagements.
 
The Nuclear Security Summit is going to remain focused on the agenda at hand, which is securing nuclear materials so they can't fall in the hands of terrorists.  We had some important announcements today, including Japan taking an historic step to get rid of an enormous quantity of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium.  We want to continue to encourage other nations to take similar steps and build up their security practices.
 
I’d note that Ukraine was one of the countries that showed leadership in recent years in getting rid of its highly-enriched uranium as well.  So the Nuclear Security Summit is going to continue to tackle that agenda, but if you look at all the President’s other engagements with the relevant transatlantic and European security and political entities, as well as his bilateral engagements on the margins of the summit, we will be able to touch a broad representation of that leadership that is here at the summit in The Hague, and I think sent a clear message on where we are in Ukraine.
 
Q    I want to talk real quick on the plane crash.  Is the announcement by the Malaysian Prime Minister today -- and I know Malaysia is handling the investigation primarily, but does the announcement this afternoon give you guys any more clarity on what presumably happened to this plane, whether it was a mechanical failure or something more sinister?
 
MR. RHODES:  I don’t want to get ahead of that determination yet.  I think the Malaysian Prime Minister was speaking above all to the location in which they’re focused now in the southern corridor.  So I don’t think determinations have been made about the cause.  But we’ll continue to support them as they work to locate the plane and also to try to make a determination on the cause.
 
Q    Is the FBI still investigating?
 
MR. RHODES:  The FBI is still working with the Malaysians, as is the NTSB, the FAA, and all our other entities.
 
Q    Are you facing any reluctance from the Europeans to go along with the sort of wide sanctions that you’re wanting to do against Russia -- financial sector, energy sectors?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, look, clearly, we know that those have an enormous impact.  And as the President said in his own statement, those would be an impact on the global economy; those would have an impact on the European economy.  But we believe it’s necessary to be prepared to use that leverage and to impose those costs on Russia.  And we’ve had, frankly, good talks with the Europeans about it.  Their announcements, again, the other day tracked roughly what we were announcing in terms of political isolation, individual designations, but also an indication that we would move towards broader consequences for the Russian economy going forward.  So I think they get it.
 
Obviously, they are critical in making that cost higher for Russia, given the interconnection between the European and Russian economy.  But we believe we’ve had good cooperation.  The President has talked to Chancellor Merkel about this, Prime Minister Cameron, President Hollande.  We believe that they are moving with us in lockstep in terms of how we’re looking at sanctions.
 
We’re also looking at things like energy cooperation in terms of how we deal with the current situation.  And the President has designated Secretary Kerry and Secretary Moniz to engage in a dialogue with Russia -- sorry, with Europe about how they can continue to diversify some of their energy sources, which could be a mitigating factor in terms of their concerns about the sanctions that may be imposed on Russia, including on the Russian energy sector.  So we’ll continue that side of the dialogue as well in the days to come.
 
Q    In stressing economic sanctions to Ukraine you’re still facing a problem with Congress in trying to get that package through, and reluctance from House Republicans to accept the IMF quota reforms.  Is the administration willing to decouple those two in order to get this through quickly and to provide an example to the rest of the Europeans?
 
MR. RHODES:  The fact is, Jim, that you can’t decouple the IMF quota reform from the support package to Ukraine because it has a direct impact on the ability of the IMF to provide a more robust assistance package to the Ukrainian government on the order of several billion in additional funds that could be available in an IMF package.
 
So we believe that the bill that is making its way through the Senate is, frankly, the right approach, because it couples, again, both punitive measures on the Russian government, $1 billion in loan guarantees and additional technical assistance for the Ukrainian government, but also that quota reform, which is going to allow for a substantially larger IMF package for the Ukrainian government.
 
So people in the House who talk about supporting Ukraine can’t decouple the IMF piece from what the Ukrainians need because, frankly, the best thing that could happen for the Ukrainian economy today is for a very robust IMF package to be put in place.  That would stabilize their economy.   That would strengthen the government in Kyiv.  That would allow them to move forward with reform.  That would allow them to meet the basic needs of their people and strengthen them vis-à-vis any Russian attempt to destabilize the government.
 
So our message is clear to Congress:  If you want to support the Ukrainian government, you need to support this IMF package as well as the loan guarantee program that is making its way through the Senate.
 
Q    Hey, Ben, it’s Julie.
 
MR. RHODES:  Double AP here.
 
Q    Double AP.  You guys have glossed over this a little bit, including in Michelle’s question here -- but is Crimea gone? Can you just lay that out for us?
 
MR. RHODES:  If you look at the nations of the world, there is a broad rejection of the referendum.  So the United States doesn’t recognize the results of the referendum; Europe doesn’t recognize the results of the referendum.  I think if you look across Asia, Africa and the Americas, there are not a lot of takers for recognizing an illegal annexation of a part of another country.  So, in that regard, we're just not going to recognize a new status quo that allows for the annexation of one piece of Ukraine over the heads of the Ukrainian government.
 
Q    If the U.S. and other countries don't recognize it, does that change anything for Russia?  Is Russia going to in any way change the treaty that they signed for annexation?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, what I will be candid about, Julie, is that clearly we have to affect the calculus of the Russian government here over time.  And the tools that we are giving ourselves with these sanctions have the ability to do that.  And, frankly, what has to happen is the Russian leadership needs to see that ultimately this is leading into a dead-end for them of greater economic pain, of greater international isolation.
 
But we see Crimea as part of that.  To be clear, we've already taken steps based on what they’ve done in Crimea.  So while we're deeply concerned about escalation into eastern and southern Ukraine, which would be a very dangerous and destabilizing move by the Russian government, our concerns about what they’ve already done in Crimea stand.
 
Q    Just to go back to the readout of the meeting with President Xi, are China and the United States on the same page regarding Russia and Ukraine, or is there a difference there?  How would you describe that half of the meeting?
 
MR. RHODES:  Look, Jeff, candidly, obviously the United States in general is far more willing to move towards the use of aggressive, punitive actions like sanctions not just with respect to the situation in Ukraine, but with respect to other international issues -- precisely because, by the way, the Chinese have a principle of respecting the sovereignty of other countries.  So, clearly, we are going to go farther in terms of the punitive measures that we're going to impose on Russia. 
 
Where we want to be on the same page is on this principle that sovereignty and territorial integrity and the independence of nation states is the abiding principle of the international system and needs to be the abiding principle that deescalates and resolves the situation in Ukraine.
 
And there we believe the Chinese have been very clear in their expressions of support for de-escalation, a political resolution, and their general commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of nation states, including Ukraine.
 
Carol.
 
Q    (Inaudible.)
 
MR. RHODES:  I don't have any update on that.  You will have to go to State on that. 
 
Q    Can you talk about how (inaudible) Russia’s ability to veto efforts on other issues like Iran and Syria?  In the President’s interview, he said that it was Russia’s responsibility to (inaudible) on chemical weapons in Syria.  So you have to acknowledge the power that Russia has of -- its ability to (inaudible) transition in Syria.  So do you anticipate or have you seen any change in their posture (inaudible) in terms of Iran or Syria?
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, if you look at the Syria chemical weapons issue, that's actually moving in very good pace, and we're about at the 50-percent milestone in terms of Syrian chemical weapons being removed from the country, taken into the custody of the international community.  So on the chemical weapons issue we've seen continued cooperation.  Russia has invested a lot in that project.  Frankly, they have nothing to gain from seeing that project go off the rails, in large part because there are extremists in Syria that Russia doesn’t want to have -- gain access to chemical weapons who might pose a risk to them.  So on the chemical weapons issue we've had good cooperation. 
 
Frankly, more broadly, Russia has not been cooperative on Syria in general in terms of the political resolution, in terms of some of the humanitarian access that we sought.  So we'll continue, again, to try to pursue those ends, but it's not as if we were dealing from a position of very strong cooperation from Russia on non-chemical weapons-related issues in Syria.
 
Similarly, on Iran, Russia has no interest in destabilization or nuclear proliferation or conflict in the Persian Gulf.  That's why they’ve been invested in the P5-plus-1 talks.  To date, we’ve seen no change in their posture in those talks.  The political directors just met last week in Vienna.  So we haven’t seen a change. 
 
And, frankly, Russia would only be isolating themselves from the world further if they were to walk away from an entity like the P5-plus-1 that they’ve been a part of for several years now.  And the last thing I’d say on this is that the Iranians, they have an interest in gaining access to the global economy, to European and other markets.  So the incentive for them is to not just make some agreement with Russia.  The incentive for Iran in these discussions is to reach a comprehensive resolution with all of the parties that are at the table.  Ultimately, that’s what’s going to bring the sanctions relief that they’re seeking.
 
Q    Ben, you just mentioned the Russian interests, and you’ve been telling us about how this really upended a lot of the architecture that’s been in place and a lot of assumptions made about Russia based on their behavior.  Ambassador McFaul argues that Putin pivoted away from his strategy, becoming more integrated in the world economy by doing this.  And I’m wondering if you have a clear sense anymore for what their interests are, and if the interests are the same of what you thought they’d be in a place like Iran or anyplace else.
 
MR. RHODES:  Well, I think Ambassador McFaul made a number of good arguments that, frankly, represent the type of analysis that we’ve had, which is that clearly by doing what he’s done in Ukraine, President Putin and the Russian leadership is acting with the knowledge that they’re going to face pressure from the international community and the United States.  Frankly, we believe that we can over-perform in terms of the types of sanctions that we put on Russia.  We believe that the types of sanctions that we put in place last week, for instance, went far beyond anything that Russia has faced in the post-Cold War era.  So they’re in new territory here, too.
 
The question is, to what lengths will President Putin and the Russian government go to, particularly in the countries that are on their borders, what lengths will they go to and at what cost to them in terms of international isolation and economic pressure.  Ultimately, what we’ve said very clearly since the Cold War is that we want to integrate Russia into the global economy, that Russia has a place in the community of nations and a significant place, given their role in the world.  However, that’s got to be based on them playing by the rules.  So they can’t have one set of rules in the former Soviet states and another set of rules in the rest of the world.
 
And I think that’s what’s at stake right now -- is that the same rules that apply in any country in the world have to apply in Ukraine, have to apply in Moldova; certainly apply in NATO allies like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.  And that’s really what’s at stake in this conflict.  And I think President Putin needs to understand over time that the costs to him are going to be extraordinary in terms of Russia’s international standing and its economic position.
 
So we’ll have the G7 meeting this evening.  And then the President has dinner hosted by the King and with the other leaders here at the summit.  And we’ll get you additional readouts of those meetings to come.
 
MR. CARNEY:  Thanks, everybody.  Thanks to everyone in the filing center.
 
END
4:40 P.M. CET

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Presidential Proclamation -- Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek and American Democracy, 2014

GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY: A NATIONAL DAY OF
CELEBRATION OF GREEK AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 2014

- - - - - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

Almost two centuries ago, the people of Greece laid claim to their independence and began a long struggle to restore democracy to its birthplace. Greek Americans crossed oceans to fight for the freedom of their ancestral homeland, and through two World Wars and a Cold War, Greece and the United States stood side-by-side. On Greek Independence Day, we honor the deep connections between our two nations and celebrate the democratic ideals at the heart of our shared history.

America's form of government owes much to the small group of Greek city-states that pioneered democracy thousands of years ago. Just as Hellenic principles guided our Founders, Greek antiquity has inspired generations, from writers and activists to architects and inventors. Greek Americans have contributed as leaders of culture, community, business, and government. Through the generations, they have helped shape our enduring democracy -- a Nation that accepts our obligations to one another and understands that we must rise and fall as one.

Greece is a valued NATO ally, and our friendship remains as strong as ever. As Greece takes tough action to rebuild its economy and bring relief to the Greek people, the United States offers our continued support. Today, let us reaffirm a bond that extends beyond government, connects our peoples, and inspires all who strive to choose their own destiny.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim March 25, 2014, as Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek and American Democracy. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fourth day of March, in the year of our Lord two thousand fourteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-eighth.

BARACK OBAMA