The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

President Obama Announces Douglas M. Brooks, MSW, as Director of the Office of National AIDS Policy

WASHINGTON, DC – Today, President Obama announced the appointment of Douglas M. Brooks, MSW, as the Director of the White House Office of National AIDS Policy (ONAP). A leading HIV/AIDS policy expert, Douglas most recently served as Senior Vice President for Community, Health, and Public Policy at the Justice Resource Institute (JRI).  As the Director of ONAP, he will lead the Administration’s work to reduce new HIV infections, improve health outcomes for people living with HIV, and eliminate HIV health disparities in the United States.

“Douglas’s policy expertise combined with his extensive experience working in the community makes him uniquely suited to the task of helping to achieve the goal of an AIDS-free generation, which is within our reach,” President Obama said.  “I look forward to having him lead our efforts from the White House.”

A component of the White House Domestic Policy Council, ONAP coordinates the ongoing implementation of the National HIV/AIDS Strategy  and the HIV Care Continuum initiative, while working together with public and private partners to advance the federal response to HIV/AIDS. ONAP also works with the White House National Security Council,  the State Department’s Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, and international bodies to ensure that America’s response to the global pandemic is fully integrated with prevention, care, and treatment efforts around the world. Through the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) initiative, the U.S. has made enormous progress in responding to the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, working with countries heavily impacted by HIV/AIDS to help expand access to treatment, care, and prevention.

Brooks, a person living with HIV, was most recently the Senior Vice President for Community, Health, and Public Policy at JRI , a health and human service agency based in Boston. He served as executive director of the Sidney Borum Jr. Community Health Center at JRI, has managed programs in urban and rural environments and has served as a consultant to domestic and international governments and non-governmental organizations assisting their efforts  to serve populations living with and at greatest risk for HIV/AIDS. Brooks was a Visiting Fellow at the McCormack School Center for Social Policy at the University of Massachusetts, Boston and was Chair of the Board of Trustees of AIDS United in Washington, DC. 

In 2010, Brooks was appointed to the Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (PACHA) and served as its liaison to the CDC/HRSA Advisory Committee and successfully led those bodies to achieve the tasks assigned to them in the National HIV/AIDS Strategy .  He has directly managed federally funded programs, meeting or exceeding targets for Ryan White projects, CDC Prevention for African American/Black youth, a HRSA Special Project of National Significance (SPNS), and a HOPWA SPNS. Brooks received a Master of Social Work degree from Boston University and is a licensed clinical social worker.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

Statement on Enhancing Radiological Security

This gift basket records the intent of Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States, who choose to join to secure IAEA Category 1 radioactive sources within their territory by 2016, consistent with the actions outlined below:

  • We the parties to this additional statement declare our commitment to secure IAEA Category 1 sources consistent with the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and with consideration of Nuclear Security Series 14: Nuclear security recommendations on radioactive material and associated facilities and Nuclear Security Series 15: Nuclear security recommendations on nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, giving particular attention to the following activities:

    • Support a regulatory body whose regulatory functions are effectively independent of other functions, with the authority to oversee and enforce security at sites (legislation, regulations, inspections, human resource qualifications, etc.);

    • Establish a comprehensive lifecycle management plan (import/export controls, secure storage, orphan source recovery, disused source management, national registry, etc.);

    • Develop a comprehensive plan for sources out of regulatory control (Search & Secure), notification of neighboring countries and IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database;

    • Assess the domestic threat and develop a national response plan (exercised periodically);

    • Implement site level security measures (physical protection measures, procedures, training, performance testing, maintenance, awareness, trustworthiness of individuals involved in the management of radioactive sources, etc.); and

    • Provide rapid response to any attempted or actual unauthorized access to radioactive material (exercised periodically) 

  • Cooperation with other States and multilateral organizations is encouraged to complete the above-listed radiological security measures. 

  • We also may consider instituting additional best practices for IAEA Category 1 radioactive source security.  These measures could include:

    • Robust physical protection access controls preferably with multifactor authentication to restrict access to radiological sources;

    • Monitoring systems designed with defense in depth; for example, redundant and timely alarms and video assessment from multiple sites sent to  a centralized monitoring facility staffed by  trustworthy  personnel;

    • Enhanced delay measures to allow response forces to arrive in time to address the security threat;

    • The active involvement of off-site response forces in both maintaining awareness of radiological sources and threats within the city/state/country, as well as engaging sites with radiological sources in planning and training activities (e.g., facility walk-downs, target folder development, tabletop and other exercises); and

    • A robust and holistic regulatory framework that governs secure source transportation, possession, and disposition.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China Before Bilateral Meeting

U.S. Ambassador’s Residence
The Hague, The Netherlands

12:48 P.M. CET

PRESIDENT OBAMA:  (In progress)-- We have made incredible strides over these past several decades, and I know that President Xi and I are both committed to continuing to strengthen and build a new model of relations between our countries. 

I want to, first of all, thank the President and the First Lady of China for being such gracious hosts when Michelle, Malia and Sasha first arrived in China.  And they’re still there.  They’ve seen the Great Wall; they’ve seen the Terracotta Warriors.  And from my phone calls with them, they’re having an extraordinary time.  So I want to thank the President for his outstanding hospitality towards my family.

And Michelle had an opportunity to meet with a number of young people in China, and these kinds of person-to-person ties are extremely important.  And she also played some table tennis, although I think this was not the high-level Ping-Pong diplomacy that we saw in the past.  (Laughter.) 

Today, in addition to the important work that we're going to be doing at the Nuclear Security Summit, we'll have the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues that are of mutual interest, including the denuclearization of North Korea, situations surrounding climate change, as well as world issues like the situation in Ukraine.

And because of the numerous meetings and fora that we've been able to establish, we're able not only to work on those issues of mutual interest and concern, but we're also able to work through frictions that exist in our relations around issues like human rights or dealing with maritime issues in the South China Sea and in the Pacific region in a way that's constructive and hopefully will lead to resolutions and improved solutions for all parties concerned. 

We'll also have the opportunity to discuss economic issues, which are a cornerstone of our relationship, and the importance of our trading relationship and making sure that we are both abiding by the rules that allow us to create jobs and prosperity in both of our countries.

I think it's fair to say that this bilateral relationship has been as important as any bilateral relationship in the world, and we've made great strides.  I believe ultimately that by working together, that China and the United States can help to strengthen international law, respect for the sovereignty of nations, and establish the kinds of rules internationally that allow all people to thrive. 

And so I'm very much looking forward to this conversation and to the interaction with President Xi during the course of this Nuclear Security Summit.

PRESIDENT XI:  (As interpreted.)  Mr. President, it's my great pleasure to meet you again.  First of all, let me thank you for calling me recently to express sympathy over the missing Malaysia Airlines flight and for instructing relevant U.S. agencies to join the search for the missing plane, and for sharing information with the Chinese side.  I want to thank you for that.

Before departing Beijing, my wife and I met your wife, Michelle, your mother-in-law, Mrs. Robinson, and your two lovely daughters, Malia and Sasha.  We had a very good conversation.  I know they’ve finished their tour of Beijing and Xi’an and they’re flying to Chengdu.  I'm sure it is a trip of friendship and exchange, and this trip will be remembered for them as a pleasant and memorable one.  When I was bidding farewell to Michelle in Beijing, she asked me to formally convey to you her best regards.  (Laughter.) 

Over the past year, you and I have stayed in close communication through meetings, phone calls, and exchange of letters.  We have arrived at a series of important points of consensus, and made important and positive progress in our bilateral relationship.

We are now in the 35th year of formal diplomatic relations between China and the United States.  We live in a complex world, and there is greater space where China and the United States are cooperating and where we need to and can work with each other. 

I have received and carefully read your recent letter to me, Mr. President.  In the letter you said that you remain committed to building the new model of major country relations with China.  You also said that China-U.S. cooperation can help to advance our two countries’ common interests, and we can address common challenges through practical cooperation.  I appreciate these statements.

I wish to emphasize that China is firmly committed to the set direction of building a new model of major country relations. We are committed to our position of no confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation with regard to the United States.  We’ll adopt a more positive attitude and more vigorous actions to strengthen cooperation with the United States, and also to effectively manage our differences and sensitivities and make sure the China-U.S. relationship will continue to move forward in a healthy and steady fashion.

We will soon go into our meeting; just now you mentioned some issues, which might come up in our meeting.  It is like a menu, and a rich one at that.  I hope through this meeting we can further deepen our communication and exchange.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you, everybody.

END
1:00 P.M. CET

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

Joint Statement on Countries Free of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

Today, twelve nations agreed upon a joint statement marking the elimination of highly enriched uranium from within their borders. We welcome this statement and the leadership role these nations are playing in a  growing global trend away from highly enriched uranium in civilian uses.

Statement by Leaders of Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Hungary, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam

Gathered in The Hague on the occasion of the third Nuclear Security Summit, leaders of Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Hungary, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam, wish to highlight the elimination of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from within our borders.  Noting the extensive security measures and significant financial costs associated with the possession of this material, and the technology that has been developed to fuel research reactors with low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and to conduct the vast majority of experiments and to produce isotopes without the use of HEU, the removal of HEU from our territories has had clear and tangible benefits. 

We express our appreciation to the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for their assistance in converting research reactors from HEU fuel to LEU fuel and in related HEU removal efforts.  This material, once removed, shall be appropriately secured until ultimately disposed of or downblended to LEU and utilized for civilian purposes. 

We, along with Kazakhstan and Singapore, applaud other countries that have similarly eliminated HEU and encourage all countries to support HEU minimization efforts to the greatest extent feasible, including those in a position to do so to eliminate all HEU from their territories in advance of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit to be held in 2016.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

FACT SHEET: Italy Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals

Italy has been a global leader in nuclear nonproliferation, working with the United States since 1997 to eliminate more than 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium.

At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and Italy announced the successful removal of all eligible fresh HEU and plutonium from Italy.  These shipments were completed via a joint effort between the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Italy’s Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari (SOGIN).  This is the thirteenth shipment of material from Italy to the United States under this program.

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Italy and the United States pledged to work together to remove this material prior to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.  The material was located at three SOGIN facilities in Italy (EUREX Plant - Saluggia, IPU and OPEC Plants - Casaccia, and ITREC Plant - Trisaia).  More than 17 kilograms of HEU and plutonium were removed, including UK and U.S.-origin material stemming from research and development activities in Italy.  Prior to removal, the material was securely stored under International Atomic Energy (IAEA) safeguards.  In order to complete this project, GTRI and SOGIN needed to overcome significant technical challenges including:

  • Development of new gloveboxes for plutonium packaging;
  • The development of a new process to convert HEU from a solution to an oxide;
  • Coordination of uranium shipments from the three separate locations;
  • Development of novel packaging configurations for the consolidation of plutonium materials within Italy; and
  • Training and certification of personnel for specialized packaging operations.

Despite the significant technical challenges, the team was able to successfully complete the operation on schedule.  Other significant contributors included Italy’s nuclear regulator (ISPRA), which ensured the material was processed and packaged to allow for safe transport; Italy’s Ministries of Defense and Interior, which ensured the security of the shipment while in transport in Italy; and the UK’s International Nuclear Services, which provided for the secure transport of the material from Italy to the United States. 

This material will be stored at secure facilities in the United States until it is disposed of or downblended to LEU and utilized for civilian purposes.  The United States and Italy plan to continue to work together to eliminate additional stocks of special nuclear material to make sure they never fall into the hands of terrorists, and are prepared to help other countries do the same.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Rutte of the Netherlands After Bilateral Meeting

Gallery of Honor
The Rijksmuseum
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

10:49 A.M. CET

PRIME MINISTER RUTTE:  Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Netherlands.  Welcome to Amsterdam.  And, Barack, welcome to this very special location. 

We are standing here on historic grounds, surrounded by the finest paintings that Holland has produced and only a stone’s throw away from the house of John Adams, the first American ambassador to the Netherlands and second President of the United States.  It’s a location that symbolizes the enduring partnership between the U.S. and the Netherlands.  Our shared history and heritage go back a long way.

As an historian, it was a special moment for me when earlier this morning I was able to show President Obama two original documents from our National Archives that played an important role in the age-old friendship between our two countries.  The first was our own Declaration of Independence, the Plakkaat van Verlatinghe of 1581, which inspired Thomas Jefferson and his peers.  The second was the American-Dutch Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1782, another remarkable document from an age when peace between countries was usually a heartfelt affair.  And today, friendship is still at the heart of the relationship between the United States and the Netherlands, along with trade, shared values, and joint responsibilities.

Since that first treaty we have worked together in the growing awareness that economic prosperity, a safe and stable world and international cooperation go hand in hand.  With this in mind, the President and I talked about a wide range of subjects, starting with a joint climate initiative and the new steps we will take today in that regard.  The Netherlands is joining with the United States and a group of other countries in a bid to stop international public funding of new coal-fired power plants, for example, by multilateral development banks.  We want to achieve an international level playing field to ensure that private and public parties invest in green growth wherever possible.

We also discussed the important topic of the Transatlantic Investment Partnership between the EU and U.S.  Once concluded, this agreement will create more economic growth and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.  Importantly, it will set new standards that will benefit global trade and third countries as well.  This partnership will bolster our excellent bilateral economic ties even further.

During our conversation I stressed how much we value this partnership.  The Netherlands is the world’s third largest investor in the United States and we are home to some 1,800 American businesses. 

And of course, we also spoke about the major international security issues in Syria, Iran and Ukraine.  Concerning the last, we both regard Russia’s attempts to annex the Crimea as a flagrant breach of international law and we condemn its actions in the strongest possible terms.  The presence of so many world leaders in the Netherlands this week presents an important opportunity for the international community to discuss this subject, as well as other pressing issues that affect our common interests.

Finally, we looked ahead at the Nuclear Security Summit today and tomorrow.  President Obama deserves all the credit for getting this topic high on the agenda.  In 2010, Washington hosted the first summit on this seat.  In 2012, it was Seoul’s turn.  And now the Netherlands is proud to host the summit today and tomorrow in The Hague that will bring us closer to the goal of securing potentially dangerous nuclear material.

Barack, your presence underlines the importance of the summit, and this event, too, demonstrates the strength of the bilateral ties between our countries and of our joint commitment to peace, security and democracy.  I’m delighted to be able to hear from you publicly here at this splendid location.

Again, thank you for coming.

PRESIDENT OBAMA:  Mark, thank you.  And it is a splendid location.  I’m so grateful for your kind words.  We were very pleased to welcome you back in 2011 to the White House, and I appreciate your warm welcome today.  This is my first visit to Amsterdam and to The Hague and to the Netherlands, and I’m so pleased that I’ve had a chance already to meet some wonderful students.  I want to thank the Mayor and the curator for their hospitality as well.  I’m proud to be with some of the Dutch masters who I studied in school, and to see just the extraordinary traditions of this great country. 

I’d be remiss if I did not mention that I’m proud of both of our teams at the Olympics.  So in addition to painting, you really know how to speed skate.  (Laughter.)

As the Prime Minister said, we just had an excellent opportunity to experience the museum and to see those documents, including the Treaty of Friendship that John Adams negotiated more than 200 years ago, as a reminder of the historic ties between our countries.  And this is -- of all the press conferences I’ve done, this is easily the most impressive backdrop that I’ve had to a press conference. 

Of course, we’re here for our third Nuclear Security Summit. And I want to thank His Majesty, King Willem-Alexander, as well as Mark, the people of the Netherlands, for all the preparations that go into bringing together so many heads of state.  This is just one more example of Dutch leadership -- not just on nuclear security, but on many global challenges. 

As you know, the Netherlands is one of our closest allies, and our cooperation underscores a larger point -- our NATO allies are our closest partners on the world stage.  Europe is the cornerstone of America’s engagement with the world.  And today we focused on several priorities -- in Europe and beyond.

First, we obviously spent a considerable amount of time on the situation in Ukraine.  Europe and America are united in our support of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people.  We’re united in imposing a cost on Russia for its actions so far. Prime Minister Rutte rightly pointed out yesterday the growing sanctions would bring significant consequences to the Russian economy.  And I’ll be meeting with my fellow G7 leaders later today, and we’ll continue to coordinate closely with the Netherlands and our European partners as we go forward.

Second, I thanked the Prime Minister for the Netherlands’ strong commitment and contributions to NATO.  Dutch forces have served with distinction in Afghanistan and joined us in confronting piracy off the Horn of Africa.  Through NATO, the Netherlands contributed to the deployment of Patriot air batteries in Turkey and are making important investments in NATO defense capabilities.  Dutch forces are also making critical contributions to the international stabilization mission in Mali. So, across the board, the Dutch are making their presence felt in a very positive way, and we’re very grateful for that.

Third, we discussed how we can keep expanding the trade that creates jobs for our people.  We’re already among each other’s largest trade and investment partners, but we can always do more. And so I appreciated the Netherlands’ strong support for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or T-TIP, which can fuel growth both in the United States and in Europe, especially for our small and medium-sized companies.

Fourth, we discussed a range of global challenges.  And as the United States and the P5-plus-1 partners continue negotiations with Iran, we have the basis for a practical solution that resolves concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.  But at the same time, I think it’s important that everyone remember during these negotiations we’ll continue to enforce the overall sanctions architecture that helped bring Iran to the table in the first place. 

I also wanted to commend the Netherlands for its leadership in the international effort to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons, and that includes your role as the host of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  And more broadly, our two countries are going to keep working together to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people.

And, finally, we reaffirmed our shared determination to confront climate change and its effects, including rising sea levels, which obviously is something that the Netherlands is concerned about, given your experience with seas and tides.  We’re pleased that the Netherlands has joined our initiative that will virtually end all public financing for coal-fired plants abroad.  It’s concrete action like this that can keep making progress on reducing emissions while we develop new global agreements on climate change.

So, a final note.  When John Adams was negotiating the treaty that we saw earlier, he wrote that the Dutch have -- and I’m quoting here -- have always “distinguished themselves by an inviolable attachment to freedom and the rights of nations.”  That was true then; it remains true today. 

So, Mark, I want to thank you and the Dutch for your hospitality, for your organization, for your partnership and for your leadership on the world stage.  And I want to thank you for sharing these extraordinary paintings with me this morning.

Dank u wel.  Thank you.  (Applause.)

END
11:00 A.M. CET

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

Joint Statement by the United States and Italy on the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit

Italy and the United States of America are pleased to announce that they have jointly completed the removal of approximately 20 kilograms of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from Italy.

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Italy and the United States pledged to work together to remove this material prior to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.  This removal entailed extremely complex operations that required the development of new gloveboxes for plutonium packaging, the development of a new process to convert HEU from a solution to an oxide, the coordination of uranium shipments from three separate locations, the development of novel packaging configurations for the consolidation of plutonium materials within Italy, and the training and certification of personnel for specialized packaging operations.

The material was safely packaged in transport containers certified by regulators in both the United States and Italy.  The United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) worked seamlessly together and in accordance with all relevant regulations and internationally-recognized recommendations throughout the operation to ensure the safe and secure transport of this material.  Despite the significant technical challenges, the team was able to successfully complete the operation on schedule.

Italy and the United States plan to continue to work together to eliminate additional stocks of special nuclear material to make sure they do not fall into the hands of terrorists.  They also pledge to work with others in the international community to assist them with the elimination of such materials.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo of Belgium on the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit

Belgium and the United States of America are pleased to announce that they have jointly completed the removal of a significant amount of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from Belgium.  

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Belgium and the United States pledged to work together to remove this material prior to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.  This removal entailed extremely complex operations that required the joint team to develop a new glovebox facility for plutonium packaging, to train and certify personnel in specialized packaging operations, to validate certificates for a U.S.-designed nuclear material package in Belgium, and to address materials in unique and unusual forms.  Despite the significant technical challenges, the team successfully completed the operation on schedule.

The material was safely packaged in transport containers certified by regulators in both the United States and Belgium.  The United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) worked seamlessly together and in accordance with all relevant regulations and internationally-recognized recommendations to securely transport this material to its final destination. 

Belgium and the United States plan to continue their cooperation to eliminate additional stocks of excess special nuclear material, consistent with their commitment to prevent nuclear terrorism.  They also pledge to work with others in the international community to assist them with the elimination of such materials.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

FACT SHEET: Belgium Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals

Belgium has been a global leader in nonproliferation, working with the United States since 2006 to minimize highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium inventories in Belgium through the return of a significant amount of HEU and plutonium to the United States.

At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and Belgium announced the successful removal of all excess fresh HEU and plutonium from Belgium.  This shipment was completed via a joint effort between the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Belgium’s Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie - Centre d'Étude de l'énergie Nucléaire  (SCK-CEN).  This is the third shipment of material from Belgium to the United States under this program.

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Belgium and the United States pledged to work together to remove this material prior to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.  The material supported research and development activities in Belgium and was located at two sites - the SCK-CEN facilities in Mol and the European Joint Research Center Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) in Geel.  Prior to removal, the material was securely stored under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  In order to complete this project, GTRI and SCK-CEN needed to overcome significant technical challenges to address materials in unique and unusual forms including:

  • Development of a new glovebox facility for plutonium packaging;
  • Training and certification of personnel in specialized packaging operations; and
  • Validation of certificates for a U.S. - designed nuclear material package in Belgium.

Despite the significant technical challenges, the team was able to successfully complete the operation on schedule.  Other significant contributors included Belgium’s nuclear regulator (FANC), which ensured the material was processed and packaged to allow for safe transport; Belgium’s Ministries of Interior and Economy, which ensured the security of the shipment while in transport in Belgium; and the UK’s International Nuclear Services, which provided for the secure transport of the material from Belgium to the United States. 

This material will be stored at secure facilities in the United States until it is disposed of or downblended to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and utilized for civilian purposes.  The United States and Belgium plan to continue to work together to eliminate additional stocks of special nuclear material to make sure they never fall into the hands of terrorists, and are prepared to help other countries do the same.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
March 24, 2014

FACT SHEET: United States-Japan Nuclear Security Working Group

The United States and Japan established a bilateral Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG) in 2011 in response to a shared desire to demonstrate leadership in strengthening nuclear security worldwide and in support of the Nuclear Security Summit process.  This group developed a Roadmap containing tangible actions in support of shared objectives and goals.  When taken together, these goals constitute a layered approach to nuclear security including:  reducing quantities of nuclear material and/or its attractiveness, reducing the vulnerability of material to theft or diversion, and strengthening response and forensics capabilities.  Achievements outlined in the nine goals of the NSWG Roadmap below have benefited both countries’ nuclear security expertise, strengthened our nuclear security posture, and have fundamentally reduced the threat that terrorists would acquire nuclear material.

Goal 1:  Cooperation within the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)

Since the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) established the ISCN in December 2010, as the first new Center of Excellence of its kind in the region, JAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have successfully collaborated on the development of ISCN programs for strengthening international capacity in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security.  This bilateral cooperation has included:  state-of-the-art training courses on physical protection of nuclear material and facilities for approximately 250 participants from 27 countries; developing physical protection training tools and technology performance testing capabilities; and enhancing scenario analysis and tabletop exercise (TTX) capabilities at ISCN.

Goal 2:  Research and Development (R&D) of Nuclear Forensics, Measurement and Detection Technologies, and Sharing of Investigatory Best Practices 

Building on a series of initial meetings and workshops to facilitate information exchange on nuclear forensics, JAEA and DOE have strengthened forensics capabilities through four new technical cooperation projects.  Nuclear forensics experts from Japan and the United States continue to collaborate through these projects on joint R&D in nuclear material signatures, including uranium age dating measurements and characterization of nuclear fuel for forensics purposes, and the establishment of a proto-type national nuclear forensics library at JAEA.

Goal 3:  Cooperation on Safeguards Implementation

In February 2013, DOE and JAEA celebrated 25 years of official cooperation to develop advanced technologies for effective and efficient implementation of nuclear safeguards.  Some of the techniques pioneered through this collaboration have facilitated the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) transition to a modernized international safeguards system, increasingly reliant on remote and automated verification measures at a wide range of fuel cycle facilities.  Since 2011, JAEA and DOE have further expanded this cooperation by launching 10 new safeguards implementation projects of high priority, including joint work on:  safeguards measurement techniques for spent fuel; safeguards equipment for J-MOX; advanced measurement for plutonium solutions; and technologies for safeguards application at Fukushima.  DOE and JAEA held a technical meeting on safeguards technologies with possible application to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in February and September 2013.  Both sides have also continued to increase coordination and cooperation in the area of safeguards training. 

Goal 4:  Sharing Best Practices for Nuclear Security in New Facility Design

Both countries conducted reciprocal visits to Rokkasho and Savannah River to observe the construction sites of MOX fuel fabrication facilities.  JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) together developed a Security-by-Design Handbook for third countries as a joint research project to identify best practices for incorporating security considerations early into the design process of new nuclear facilities, and are exploring opportunities for further joint outreach to other stakeholders in the international community.

Goal 5:  Cooperation on Transport Security to Reduce the Chances of Theft or Sabotage 

For the purpose of achieving mutual understanding of the structure of transport security and its implementation in line with international guideline INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, both countries conducted a TTX on Transport Security March 26 – 28, 2012 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Following this a TTX Workshop was held in Tokyo on August 26-29, 2013.  The goal of this workshop was to discuss how TTX are developed and used to ensure security of nuclear material in transit via road and sea.  The workshop also helped prepare for the transport security gift basket event held in Tokyo on November 12-14, 2013.

Goal 6:  Convert Reactors to Reduce the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Complete Down-Blending Operations 

Both countries continue to work towards the conversion of highly enriched uranium-fueled research reactors, where technically and economically feasible, and the timely removal and disposal of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them.  In a major step forward in this effort, the governments of the United States and Japan have decided to remove and dispose all HEU and plutonium from JAEA’s Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) and extend research reactor spent fuel returns from Japan by ten years.  Both countries intend to work together closely to execute this important commitment in a timely manner.  Additionally, both countries remain committed to feasibility studies for converting the Kyoto and Kinki University Reactors to the use of low-enriched uranium, the down-blend of HEU from the Yayoi reactor and the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), and the shipment of HEU from JAEA’s Japan Materials Testing Reactor Critical Assembly (JMTRC) reactor to the United States for disposition.

Goal 7:  Implement INFCIRC / 225 / Rev.5

DOE and JAEA have continued to help promote better understanding and implementation of the new nuclear security recommendations in the document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 through joint workshops at the ISCN, and both continue to support the development of Implementing Guides for INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 for eventual publication by the IAEA.  Both countries have also launched a series of technical meetings for further collaboration and information exchange to facilitate INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 implementation, including on: protective strategies against sabotage and effective interfacing of safety and security measures; insider threat evaluation and protection methodologies; and the development of effective cybersecurity measures for nuclear facilities.

Goal 8:  Integrating Response Forces into Dealing with Theft and Sabotage at Facilities

The U.S. side had the opportunity to observe the integrated exercise with the joint participation of the police, the coastguard, and operators held at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and to conduct the force-on-force exercises workshop in Tokyo in December 2010.  Likewise, the Japanese side had the opportunity to observe force-on-force exercises at Cooper Nuclear Station and participated in the workshop at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) headquarters in November 2011.  In 2013, the NRC and DOE hosted a meeting with Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) on the physical protection and response requirements at Category III facilities, to discuss the graded approach to security used at facilities with different levels of risk.  Through these occasions, both sides exchanged views and ideas to enhance the mutual capacity of integrating response forces into dealing with theft and sabotage at facilities.

Goal 9:  Joint Study on Management of HEU and Plutonium:  Reduction of Material Attractiveness

Both countries successfully completed a joint scientific study on evaluation of and potential approaches to reduce the attractiveness of nuclear materials that could be used by terrorists to create a nuclear explosive device. At the “Global 2013” International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Conference in September 2013, both countries shared the results of the U.S./Japan scientific study on the evaluation of and potential approaches to reducing the attractiveness of nuclear materials to terrorists, which was conducted under the Working Group’s auspices.  As a next step, Japan is currently considering a U.S. proposal for a joint impact analysis study investigating the realities of implementing the study’s recommendations.  Both countries have decided to conduct an exchange and a peer review of papers on materials attractiveness with France and the United Kingdom.