The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 27, 2012

Joint Statement on National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

On the occasion of their participation in the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, the governments of Australia, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, affirm their support to the initiative of Indonesia to draw up a National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security.

The National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security can help States develop a more comprehensive national legislation on nuclear security in accordance with their own respective internal legal processes. It can provide States with references to a wide array of consolidated elements and provisions from different nuclear security conventions/treaties, as well as international legal instruments and frameworks. The action to create a single and friendly reference kit shall involve all international organizations relevant to nuclear security, with the IAEA coordinating the task.

After the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, States supporting this initiative will continue to backstop and encourage the IAEA and other relevant international organizations to explore concrete ways forward to draw up the national legislation implementation kit, particularly after the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 27, 2012

Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers

On the occasion of their participation in the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States note their intent to collaborate in the form of the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSCs) aiming to build up a cadre of highly qualified and well trained nuclear security personnel, provide specific technical support required for effective use and maintenance of instruments and other nuclear security technical systems, as well as provide scientific support for the detection of and the response to nuclear security events in a country.

In accordance with its Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-13 approved by the Board of Governors in September 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Office of Nuclear Security supports these member states through coordination of the activities of the Network. The IAEA’s Nuclear Security Web Portal (NUSEC) provides a platform to facilitate coordination and sharing of best practices.

These NNSCs enhance nuclear security at the national level and promote many of the elements of the Communiqué and Work Plan of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the Communiqué of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. In particular, they support human resource development and education and training in nuclear security, enhance nuclear security culture, and maintain a well-trained cadre of technical experts.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 27, 2012

Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the Washington Nuclear Security Summit we agreed on a Communiqué and Work Plan that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. We recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, recovering nuclear and radiological material outside of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials. Making good on these pledges, on a voluntary basis we have taken the following actions individually and together.

Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America since or before the Washington Summit have taken steps to build national capacities to counter nuclear smuggling. Although not universal to all countries in this list, the types of capabilities include increased law enforcement and intelligence efforts to investigate nuclear smuggling networks, increased use of radiation detection systems and measures to find materials outside of regulatory control at and inside borders, increased capability of nuclear forensics to trace material origin and illicit movement, and increased legal training for prosecutors to assure conviction as appropriate. Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Philippines, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America pledge to take steps towards building these capacities by the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, and The United States of America have passed new laws, regulations, guidance, or policies to combat illicit trafficking and Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Italy, The Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America have committed themselves to pass new laws, regulations, guidance, or policies by the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America recognize that nuclear smuggling networks can have international connections, and the consequent importance of bilateral, multilateral, and international cooperation as outlined in the Washington Work Plan, and have therefore shared information on nuclear smuggling cases with partner countries.

Jordan, Canada, The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America note the value of sharing lead information through INTERPOL as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation. The United States of America has donated resources to INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit or to help build counter nuclear smuggling capacities in other countries. Canada, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Sweden, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom and The United States of America pledge to make resources and lessons drawn from experience available for counter nuclear smuggling capacity building projects by the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

February 16, 2012

President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts

WASHINGTON – Today, President Barack Obama announced his intent to nominate the following individuals to key Administration posts:

Erica L. Groshen – Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
Jeffrey D. Levine – Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia, Department of State
Peter Mahurin – Member, Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Major General John Peabody – President, Mississippi River Commission

President Obama said, “These individuals have demonstrated knowledge and dedication throughout their careers. I am grateful they have chosen to take on these important roles, and I look forward to working with them in the months and years to come.”

President Obama announced his intent to nominate the following individuals to key Administration posts:

Dr. Erica L. Groshen, Nominee for Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
Dr. Erica L. Groshen is Vice President and Economist in the Regional Analysis Function of the Research and Statistics Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a position she has held since 2010. Dr. Groshen joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 1994 and has held a number of positions prior to her current role, including Vice President and Director of Regional Affairs in the Communications Group (2006 - 2010); Assistant Vice President in the Microeconomic and Regional Studies Function (2000 - 2006); Head of Domestic Research (1997 - 1999); and Head of International Research (1994 -1997). From 1999 to 2000, she was also a Visiting Economist at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. From 1993 to 1994, she was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics at Barnard College at Columbia University. Dr. Groshen began her career at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, where she served as an Economic Advisor from 1991 to 1993 and as an Economist from 1986 to 1991. She is a Member of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Users’ Advisory Committee and serves on the editorial board of Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society. Dr. Groshen earned her B.S. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and her M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Jeffrey D. Levine, Nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia, Department of State
Jeffrey D. Levine, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, has served as the State Department’s Office Director of Recruitment, Examination and Employment since September 2010. Prior to this position, he was Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, Hungary from 2007 to 2010. From 2003 to 2006, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Sofia, Bulgaria. Other overseas positions include: Management Counselor in Brasilia, Brazil (1999-2002); Management Officer in Nicosia, Cyprus (1995-1998); Consular/General Services Officer in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (1988-1990); and Consular/Political Officer in Lima, Peru (1985-1987). In Washington, Mr. Levine served as Special Assistant in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management (1994-1995), Hungary Desk Officer in the Office of Eastern European Affairs (1993-1994), and Watch Officer in the State Operations Center (1992-1993). He holds a Bachelor’s Degree from Humboldt State University and a Master’s Degree from National Defense University.

Peter Mahurin, Nominee for Member, Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Peter Mahurin is Chairman of Hilliard Lyons Financial Services, a position he has held since 2008. Mr. Mahurin has worked for Hilliard Lyons since 1968 in various capacities. In addition to his work at Hilliard Lyons, Mr. Mahurin serves as a board member for Houchens Industries, Albany Bancorp, Cecelia Bancorp, Gray Construction, Jackson Financial, and the Governors Scholars of Kentucky. Prior to his time at Hilliard Lyons, Mr. Mahurin was a high school math and science teacher. Mr. Mahurin earned a B.A. in Chemistry from Western Kentucky University.

Major General John Peabody, Nominee for President, Mississippi River Commission
Major General John Peabody is Commander and Division Engineer of the Mississippi Valley Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Major General Peabody directs all U.S. Army Corps of Engineers water resources development in the Mississippi River basin, an area of over 370,000 square miles including all or parts of 12 states. He entered military service in 1980 upon commissioning as a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers, and has spent most of his career as a combat engineer, with operational deployments to Somalia, Kuwait, and Iraq. Major General Peabody is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College with a master's degree in Strategic Studies. He also received an M.P.A from Harvard University and studied as an Olmsted Scholar at El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico City.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 19, 2011

Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit

At the East Asia Summit (EAS) held on November 19 in Bali, Indonesia, President Obama and other Asia-Pacific leaders discussed the importance of cooperation on the region’s most pressing political and security challenges, including maritime security, non-proliferation, and disaster response.

President Obama’s participation in the EAS was the first by a U.S. president and underscored the Administration’s commitment to deepening engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and playing a leadership role in its emerging institutions. The President has made clear that full and active U.S. engagement in the region’s multilateral architecture helps to reinforce the system of rules, responsibilities, and norms that underlies regional peace, stability, and prosperity.

The EAS was launched in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, bringing together leaders of the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and six other Asian countries. With the participation of the United States and Russia for the first time in 2011, the EAS now includes all the major powers of the Asia-Pacific region, including U.S. treaty allies Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as emerging regional powers India and China.

The Summit’s traditional agenda has covered a wide range of regional concerns, including education, energy and the environment, finance, avian influenza, and disaster response. While offering support for the existing EAS agenda – especially disaster response – President Obama called for a broadening of the leaders’ discussions to address strategic and security challenges. The President underscored the shared interest of EAS member states in reaffirming international rules and norms in these areas; enhancing partner capacity to address existing and emerging challenges; and promoting regional cooperation. Specifically:

1. Maritime Security

The Asia-Pacific region is home to some of the world’s busiest ports and most critical lines of commerce and communication. Recent decades of broad regional economic success have been underpinned by a shared commitment to freedom of navigation and international law. At the same time, the region faces a host of maritime challenges, including territorial and maritime disputes, ongoing naval military modernization, trafficking of illicit materials, piracy, and natural disasters.

During the EAS leaders discussions, President Obama enunciated the principles-based U.S. approach to maritime security, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the seas, as well as use of collaborative diplomatic processes to address disputes. The President expressed strong opposition to the threat or use of force by any party to advance its territorial or maritime claims or interfere in legitimate economic activity. Reiterating his support for the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as a responsible approach to disputed areas, he encouraged all parties to accelerate efforts to reach a full Code of Conduct.

The President also welcomed engagement by all EAS members in regional institutions devoted to maritime cooperation, including the ASEAN Maritime Forum, which provides a platform to advance common understanding of international laws, including UNCLOS, as well as cooperative efforts on maritime issues. He called on the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, and other groupings of EAS members to support maritime capacity-building measures, particularly in the search-and-rescue and disaster-response areas.

The United States is working with its partners in the Asia-Pacific region to build capacity and promote cooperation on maritime security issues, including by:

Providing training, assistance, and equipment to regional maritime police and civil authorities to enhance their capabilities to secure the maritime space and address transnational security challenges such as piracy, illicit trafficking, and illegal fishing;
Building facilities and providing equipment and technical support to enhance the ability of Southeast Asian nations to monitor the maritime domain and assess and share information;
Hosting regional workshops to promote adherence to standard operating procedures and protocols that ensure safety at sea, help build a shared vision of international norms and behaviors in the maritime domain, and foster discussion of interpretations of customary international law; and
Hosting and co-hosting multinational capacity-building exercises with regional military partners.

2. Non-Proliferation

The spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, material, their means of delivery, and expertise poses a grave risk to the international community. The Asia-Pacific region faces acute proliferation challenges requiring concerted international effort. The EAS is an important venue to advance President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons, as outlined in his April 2009 Prague speech, and to promote regional cooperation and capacity building to counter proliferation threats.

In support of these objectives, President Obama and other EAS leaders welcomed the successful conclusion of a 40-year long negotiation between ASEAN and the Nuclear Weapons States to enable the latter’s accession to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) protocol. All sides have agreed to take the necessary steps to enable the signing of the protocol and its entry into force at the earliest opportunity.

President Obama also called on EAS leaders to:

Reaffirm their full commitment to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in order to maintain peace and stability in the region;
Work together to ensure full compliance and implementation of relevant United Nations non-proliferation commitments and to pursue cooperation through other multilateral mechanisms;
Reaffirm their support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan adopted at the May 2010 Review Conference and for the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Seoul in March 2012, and agreed to work together toward a successful Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in December 2011;
Endorse efforts undertaken in other regional institutions, including the ARF, to strengthen the capacities of all EAS members to address the challenge of proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region;
Reaffirm their commitment to develop a culture of transparency throughout the Asia-Pacific region with regard to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, to increase cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to ensure the IAEA has the resources and authority it needs to carry out its role; and
Commit to sign and bring into force Additional Protocols to Safeguard Agreements with the IAEA with an aim to have the Additional Protocol in place throughout the Asia-Pacific region as soon as possible.

3. Disaster Response and Humanitarian Assistance

The Asia-Pacific region is prone to large natural disasters that have an impact beyond any single country’s ability to respond effectively. EAS member countries experienced eight of the world’s 10 deadliest disasters in 2009 and five of 10 in 2010. The United States has a strong record of working with EAS member countries in disaster preparedness and institutional strengthening, and of bringing a unique set of capabilities, skills, and expertise in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

In order to enhance the region’s disaster response capabilities and cooperation, President Obama:

Pledged further efforts to advance humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region, including through a proposal to further develop a Rapid Disaster Response Agreement to create a legal and procedural framework for accelerating deployment and acceptance of assistance personnel, supplies, and services in the event of future disasters;
Called for regular disaster relief exercises as a means to improve preparation and interoperability, noting Indonesia and Japan’s successful co-hosting of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Disaster Relief Execise (DiREx) in March 2011 and commending the Republic of Korea for its decision to host the next DiREx;
Endorsed an Indonesian-Australian paper on enhancing regional cooperation on disaster relief, including enhanced information-sharing, capacity-building, and interoperability; and
Encouraged efforts to build resilience and preparedness at the community level, including developing mechanisms to coordinate public and private sector efforts, such as the recently launched Pacific Rim Coordination Center, a virtual platform that facilitates disaster information-sharing and strengthens public-private partnerships in order to enhance the region’s disaster risk reduction and response activities.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 19, 2011

Background Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on the President's Meetings at Asean and East Asia Summit

Aboard Air Force One
En Route Anderson Air Force Base, Guam

5:10 P.M. WITA

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The two moving parts to the East Asia Summit were the plenary session, which was a fairly scripted discussion of the five somewhat arcane areas of focus, historical, from the beginning of the EAS six years ago, including things like avian flu and so on, where each leader -- intervention, and the leaders retreat, which was private, just the leaders plus one, with no separate -- no sound, anyway, in a note-taking room. So it really was a more intimate discussion.

Apart from the ritualistic recitation of some of the ASEAN steps on the specific historical agenda, the bulk of the plenary discussion focused on disaster relief and some of the initiatives that have been taken by member countries, including the U.S. proposal for a disaster relief mechanism that would allow for quick response by pre-cooking access agreements in advance of an emergency.

By far the most interesting element in the East Asia Summit was the leaders retreat, which followed a social lunch and lasted for just under two hours. Thereto, there were a number of ASEAN-specific issues that were touched on by many of the leaders, including as related to economic integration, free trade, education, continued discussion on disaster response and so on.

But the bulk of the discussions were a very robust conversation on maritime security and the South China Sea. By my reckoning, 16 of the 18 leaders addressed maritime security in varying levels of specificity. And most of them talked specifically about the South China Sea. The early speakers were -- included ASEAN members Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, as well as Australia and India.

All of those countries spoke directly to the South China Sea. The only two countries that didn’t mention the maritime security issue were Cambodia and Burma. So I think that gives you a sense of how the conversation shaped up.

There was clearly widespread consensus on a number of principles. Not every leader invoked every single principle, but certainly the earlier speakers were more extensive and more fulsome. And as the sequence of speakers unspooled, increasingly leaders referred to previous comments and associated themselves with what other leaders had said rather than going through an explication.

But the principles, beginning with the initial speakers -- Singapore, Philippines and Vietnam -- included the importance of protecting freedom of navigation in the maritime domain in general and in the South China Sea in particular; the importance of adherence to the rule of law in approaching and settling disputes; the applicability of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the importance for all nations to abide by its terms.

Nearly all of the speakers invoked the importance of a peaceful resolution and they also talked about the need to make progress on a code of conduct, something that ASEAN and China had agreed in 2002 in principle to pursue, but towards which there had been very little movement, if any, certainly for the first eight years, and really only since the ARF meeting in Hanoi in July of 2010 has there been progress in developing and implementing guidelines on the declaration of conduct and an increased push to try to make progress on, first, elements, and then an actual code of conduct itself.

Several speakers stressed the importance of protecting legitimate commerce in the maritime domain and particularly in the South China Sea, and a number also called for a multilateral resolution of the conflicting territorial claims by the parties themselves.

I think, frankly, the best single presentation, with the exception of President Obama, was by the Malaysian Prime Minister Najib who began by noting that he had had the same presentation of principles in his intervention at an internal ASEAN leaders retreat and described near consensus among the ASEANs. And he was speaking -- he made a similar comment in the ASEAN-U.S. meeting the day before.

And he went through principles that are very similar to what the U.S. has also articulated with respect to the need to resolve the issue peacefully through dialogue, the need to make progress on a code of conduct, the principle of respect for international law, the applicability of UNCLOS, the need for a multilateral process to resolve these territorial disputes among parties, and adherence by all to the guiding principles.

I would describe the overall discussion as constructive. It was neither acrimonious, nor was it averse to -- was it indirect. The leaders were not equivocating; they were not speaking ambiguously.

Several leaders, including the Russian Foreign Minister, and most importantly the Chairman of the EAS, President Yudhoyono of Indonesia, pointedly said that they thought that maritime security issues were appropriate and important issues for the EAS to discuss. After all -- after 16 of the 18 leaders had spoken -- and there were other -- obviously other security issues that they discussed, which I'll come back to -- President Obama made his intervention.

I won't go through it in detail unless there's a strong desire, because it was a principled outline of the position that the United States has frequently articulated -- consistently articulated, namely that while we are not a claimant in the South China Sea dispute, and while we do not take sides, we have a powerful stake in maritime security in general, and in the resolution of the South China Sea issue specifically -- as a resident Pacific power, as a maritime nation, as a trading nation, and as a guarantor of security in the Asia Pacific region. He articulated the U.S. position that there should be a clarification of claims on the basis of international law, and that claims to -- claims should be based on geographic land features.

After the President made his statement, Premier Wen Jiabao asked for the floor. I would say that even though he started off maybe a little bit grouchy, by and large it was very measured and interesting -- I would say a positive intervention. Positive in the sense that he was not on a tirade, and he did not use many of the more assertive formulas that we frequently hear from the Chinese, particularly in public. So to be more specific, he said -- he began by saying that he did not -- China didn't think that the EAS was an appropriate forum for a discussion of this issue.

Now, that was not an assertion that carried a great deal of force in the wake of the statements by others, including the chairman, that it was an appropriate subject for the EAS. He said that he had not wanted the subject of South China Sea to be raised, but that since it had been, he would respond. He then went on to say that China shares the desire articulated by the ASEAN countries, for a cooperative process to reach a code of conduct on the South China Sea.

Now, what struck me about that statement is not what he said, but what he didn't say. Typically, the Chinese public posture has been to be vaguely positive about the idea of reaching a code of conduct, but then to qualify it by saying, at an appropriate time and when the circumstances are propitious. He conspicuously omitted both of those caveats.

Now, far be it from me to say where the Chinese actually are, or what they're going to say in the future, but it --

Q What was the second -- "at the appropriate time" -- what was the other?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When circumstances are right or at the appropriate -- in the appropriate time and appropriate circumstances. I don't think anyone, including the ASEANs, ever knew what "appropriate circumstances" or "propitious circumstances" meant. In any event, that seems to have -- at least in the context of the discussion today, which was, after all, the highest level, broadest strategic discussion of the South China Sea anywhere to date -- those qualifiers and caveats were conspicuously absent.

Another thing -- another dog that didn't bark was when he went on to say that China believed that the disputes should be resolved between the states or the interested parties directly. What he didn't say, and that -- what we invariably have heard from the Chinese, was the word "bilaterally." Now, here, too, I can't say that the Chinese have abandoned their position that the South China Sea competing claims need to be resolved one-on-one, "mano a mano," China versus each one of the small other claimants. They may not be abandoning that position, but he didn't say it. And he made his statement on the heels of the repeated point by other leaders, that there needed to be a process among -- a peaceful -- among the claimants for a peaceful resolution.

He affirmed that China wants this issue resolved peacefully, and volunteered that China had committed to that in the original declaration of conduct. He then went on to say, as we've heard the Chinese say before in the ASEAN regional forum and elsewhere, that there really isn't a problem because China, after all, protects the sea lanes in the South China Sea; that China goes to great pains to ensure that the shipping lanes are safe and free.

But, in sum, he made clear that he wanted to -- China wants to make progress.

Following that, the Indonesian president, as chair, again took the microphone and he said, "I would characterize the discussion today" -- "we all discussed the South China Sea in a very constructive fashion," and he said he thought that the leaders had demonstrated that it's possible for the East Asia Summit to make progress on the code of conduct.

So, in sum, I think that, from the U.S. point of view, we certainly hit the mark, not by -- no confrontation; this was not "Showdown at the O.K. Corral." This was a clear manifestation of an overwhelming consensus among ASEAN and the other participants in the East Asia Summit about the principles that President Obama has articulated throughout. This was spontaneous combustion, and not artifice. These leaders were speaking openly and on their own behalf. I think it was constructive, and one has to believe that the Chinese premier will go back to Beijing with the sense that the center of gravity in the Asia Pacific area is around the adherence to the principle of the rule of law, peaceful resolution, and a constructive, rules-based approach to the resolution of territorial disputes.

The last thing I'll mention is that President Obama also spoke about nonproliferation. He welcomed the agreement between the ASEAN countries and the Perm-5 to move ahead towards signing a protocol on what's called SEANWFZ -- the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone. He welcomed some of the steps towards either agreeing to or ratifying the IAEA additional protocol among the members. And he, along with a number of other leaders, referenced North Korea and the importance of the countries in the region ensuring that North Korea is not allowed to proliferate or to violate the U.N. Security Council resolutions; that they continue to make nonproliferation a priority, in order to protect the infrastructure of international trade and commerce and several other -- I didn’t count them up, but a number of other countries also made reference to the importance of denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula, and in a moderate and constructive way called on North Korea to take the necessary steps that will permit a resumption of the six-party talks.

So, I’ll stop there.

Q So based on the subtle differences that you’ve heard in these last engagements with the Chinese, are you willing to say -- does it appear to you that their position on South China Sea is evolving, and I guess I should say evolving in a positive way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can’t make a characterization beyond describing how Prime Minister Wen spoke in this meeting and how he approached it. But what I heard is consistent with the proposition that the Chinese will come away from the meeting believing that a heavy-handed approach on the South China Sea will backfire badly and that there is a genuine consensus on the importance of a constructive process to find a peaceful way forward.

I would be watching from this point on for signs that China is engaging directly and seriously with the ASEANs on elements that could constitute a code of conduct. This is not going to be a quick set of steps. No one who knows the issue is under any illusions that there will be a quick fix. It’s a long process. But the content of the interventions today, including the Chinese intervention, were quite positive.

Q Can you talk about the omission of certain phrases that Premier Wen used? Was there surprise in it -- was the President surprised, were other leaders surprised that he didn’t use the language that he had used in the past?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don’t have any way of judging the reactions of other leaders, and it may be that because this is my day job, I’m several orders of detail more alert to some of the nuances than one would expect a President or a Prime Minister.

No, I wouldn’t use the word “surprise,” simply that I noticed and accorded some significance to it, but it’s still very early days. The Chinese positions don’t shift radically or quickly. One should be alert for gradual indications of an evolution in their position.

If these sorts of indications are reliable bellwethers to the direction that China is moving, it would be a positive thing.

Q Can I ask you, so far throughout the entire week, probably, there’s been quite a lot of discussion about sort of what the U.S. asked of China in terms of a more flexible currency rate and intellectual property respect and South China Sea -- abide by international norms. What did China ask of the U.S.? And specifically today, was there discussion of the military troop buildup or -- I don’t know if that’s the right term -- but putting the troops in Australia? Did the Prime Minister ask you anything about that, you know, the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the meeting that I participated in, there was no reference by Premier Wen to the U.S. force posture announcements or, frankly, the U.S. military presence in Asia.

The President, however, has said directly to his Chinese interlocutors, and in fact restated to Premier Wen Jiabao this morning, that we would speak to the issue of the South China Sea in the East Asia Summit and that we would make clear our view about the guiding principles that should govern China and the other claimants. He made clear that this is, in our view, a legitimate topic for discussion and that he would approach it on the basis of principles and in a constructive way.

Q But just -- I mean, just broadly, also at the bilateral meeting in Hawaii, was there specific things that the Chinese asked of you or even a tone-downed rhetoric and anything like that? I mean, was there any sort of message they were trying to deliver in an active way or more active way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The thrust of the Chinese comments to President Obama, both particularly in Hawaii but also here in Bali, were that China places great importance on U.S.-China relations and on U.S.-China cooperation on global issues as well as regional issues in the Asia Pacific, and that they see it important, particularly in light of the global financial challenges, for the U.S. and China to find constructive ways to engage.

Q I assume it wasn’t any coincidence that 16 out of the 18 members spoke on the maritime security. How much pre, or advance -- how much does the U.S. and the President’s work ahead of time account for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don’t know to what degree foreign governments and foreign leaders are persuaded by the logic of what the President has said clearly and publicly about the principles that should guide approaches to the South China Sea and to resolving the territorial conflicts and how much stems from their own assessments, their own approaches and their own values.

The President didn’t lobby other governments to say one thing or another, or to say anything at all. In his bilateral meetings -- and by the way, he didn’t meet all 16 of the leaders who spoke out on maritime security -- he told them what he would say, and he made clear that he thought it was important to have a constructive discussion and not an acrimonious confrontation.

Q Can I just ask a question -- at the dinner last night, on TV you could see the President and Prime Minister Wen talking a lot. Can you describe the tone of the conversation, and did South China Sea come up in that conversation at the dinner?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I could not hear the conversation, so I can’t describe the tone.

I am unaware of the South China Sea coming up in that discussion at dinner last night. I know that they spoke about economic and trade issues. I do know that the President raised it this morning in his conversation with Premier Wen Jiabao, as I said earlier.

Q On Burma, given that the next ASEAN is to be hosted by Burma, is there any concern that the -- what’s that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Cambodia is next.

Q Cambodia is next?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, then Burma.

Q Then Burma?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, Cambodia is next, then Brunei, then Burma. So the ASEANs made a decision to designate Burma as the ASEAN chairman for the year 2014. So Cambodia takes over for the year of 2012, and Brunei takes over for 2013.

Q Thank you very much.

END
5:41 P.M. WITA

President Obama at the East Asia Summit

Matt Compton

November 18, 2011
06:33 PM EDT

President Barack Obama poses for a photo with other leaders at the start of the US - ASEAN summit at the Bali Nusa Dua Convention Center in Nusa Dua, Bali, Nov. 18, 2011. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

President Obama is in Indonesia for the East Asia Summit. He's the first American president to attend the conference.

There, he's held bilateral meetings with the leaders of India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

He's announced that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Burma to discuss that country's efforts to institute important, democratic reforms.

But much of his work was focused on helping to open up markets to American exports. On this trip, the President was able to announce business deals worth at least $25 billion between American companies and countries in the region.

Those transactions will help to support around 127,000 American jobs.

Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Najib of Malaysia before Bilateral Meeting

Grand Hyatt
Bali, Indonesia

12:04 P.M. WITA

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, I just want to say how much of a pleasure it is to be able to see, once again, Prime Minister Najib. We just had excellent conversations and consultations at the APEC conference that we hosted in Honolulu. This allows us to expand discussions not only on our bilateral relationship, which is strong, and the cooperation that we've seen on issues like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but it also allows us to discuss how we can best use the East Asia Summit to assure shared prosperity and shared security across the region.

And so I appreciate the extraordinary cooperation that we've received on a whole range of issues. We want to be a strong partner with Malaysia, and Prime Minister Najib, I think, has shown great leadership not only in continuing to boost Malaysia's economy, but also in showing leadership on a wide range of multilateral fora.

So thank you very much, Prime Minister.

PRIME MINISTER NAJIB: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your very encouraging words. We believe we have a very, very productive relationship between our two countries. Before this, they've been very strong in the areas of trade and investment. The United States is our fourth-largest trading partner. On a comparative basis, you're still the largest investor in Malaysia. We certainly look forward to expanding trade and investment linkages. And with the TPP, hopefully we can meet the deadline next year. We see great prospects in terms of enhancing trade investment between our two countries. And certainly we look forward to working in other areas concerned.

We are very committed to ensuring peace and stability. We're working with you in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. We're doing our part to make sure that Malaysia is not a transit point for illicit goods that can be used for nuclear proliferation. Working towards helping you in Afghanistan. And we're looking at new areas of cooperation -- including receiving 50 English teachers from the United States. They are coming in January.

So I'm excited about the prospects, and I look forward to deepening, strengthening, enhancing our bilateral ties. And I thank you for your leadership in this.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you.

Thank you, everybody.

END
12:07 P.M. WITA

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 13, 2011

APEC: Fact Sheet on 19th Annual Leaders Meeting Outcomes Creating Jobs, Growth, and Economic Opportunity with AELM Declaration & Annexes

Under the chairmanship of President Obama, leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum agreed today in Honolulu on a comprehensive set of measures to increase economic growth and job creation by expanding trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Leaders agreed to adopt market-driven innovation policies, reduce tariffs and eliminate other barriers to trade in environmental goods and services, and improve regulatory environments to reduce unnecessary burdens on businesses. These steps will help U.S. growth and jobs by expanding export opportunities in the world’s fastest growing region.

Since its first meeting at Blake Island near Seattle in 1993, APEC has served as the premier forum for U.S. engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. APEC’s 21 member economies comprise a market of 2.7 billion consumers, account for 44 percent of world trade, and represent 55 percent of global economic output (more than $35 trillion in 2010). Six of America’s 10 largest trading partners are in APEC.

The APEC Agenda: Creating Jobs and Growth

At a time of global economic uncertainty, continued focus on creating jobs and growth is vital. Strengthening regional economic integration will help U.S. businesses and workers compete more effectively in the Asia-Pacific. Strong, balanced growth in the APEC region helps keep U.S. businesses growing, innovating, and hiring. APEC plays a central role by removing barriers to trade and investment that U.S. companies face in the region, creating new business opportunities, jobs, and buying power for Americans. Since APEC was created, average tariffs in the region have fallen from 16 percent to 5 percent – on a volume of $2.3 trillion of trade between the United States and the Asia-Pacific economies. Since 1993, U.S. exports to other APEC member economies have nearly tripled.

In 2010, APEC economies purchased 61 percent of total U.S. goods exports ($774 billion in 2010), and over 37 percent of U.S. private services exports (over $205 billion in 2010), supporting five million American jobs.

In Honolulu, the United States and other APEC economies took a number of concrete steps towards building a “seamless regional economy” by agreeing to take action in three priority areas:

1. Increasing Trade and Strengthening Regional Economic Integration

Supporting the President’s goal of doubling exports in five years, APEC leaders agreed to reduce barriers to trade and investment by:

Setting a model for innovation that is market-driven and non-discriminatory, not government-directed and protectionist, in recognition of the key role entrepreneurship plays in increasing productivity and ensuring economic growth;
Showing leadership to launch negotiations to expand the product scope and membership of the WTO Information Technology Agreement, which could create significant market-enhancing opportunities for U.S. high-tech companies;
Making it cheaper, easier, and faster for businesses – particularly small and medium-sized businesses – to trade in the region by exempting more low-value shipments from customs duties and simplifying customs requirements and documentation;
Launching an APEC Travel Facilitation Initiative to make travel in the region easier, faster, and more secure;
Promoting domestic structural reforms in APEC economies to minimize barriers to market-based incentives and to facilitate competition and opportunities for U.S. exporters;
Improving food security by extending an APEC-wide standstill on agricultural export restrictions; and
Promoting growth by taking concrete actions to expand economic opportunities for women in the Asia-Pacific region.

2. Supporting Green Growth and Green Jobs

As part of our larger commitment to promoting a green economy, APEC leaders agreed to support sustainable growth and create green jobs by:

Developing a list in 2012 of environmental goods on which APEC economies will reduce applied tariffs to 5% or less by 2015, and eliminating non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services, including local content requirements, which will help lower their costs, increase the dissemination of clean technologies, and create more green jobs;
Pursuing a more aggressive target for reducing energy intensity across APEC economies by promoting technology and best practices in energy-smart buildings, transportation, and infrastructure;
Phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, which encourage wasteful consumption, and reporting on progress annually; and
Incorporating low-emissions development strategies into APEC economies’ growth plans.

3. Promoting Regulatory Practices that Facilitate Trade and Investment

Building on efforts at home to boost productivity and job creation while also protecting the environment and ensuring public health and safety, APEC leaders agreed on steps that will improve the quality of the regulatory environment for U.S. exporters in the Asia-Pacific region by:

Implementing a set of good regulatory practices, including ensuring internal coordination of rulemaking, assessing impacts of regulations, and conducting public consultation, in order to reduce unnecessary burdens on businesses, costing time and money;
Improving the quality of regulations and standards for emerging green technologies like smart grid, green buildings, and solar technologies to reduce technical barriers to trade in those products; and
Establishing a fund with USAID support at the World Bank to strengthen food safety collaboration in the Asia-Pacific, accounting for nearly half of global food production.

APEC Economies – The Basic Facts

APEC’s member economies include: The United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand, and Vietnam.

Number of Economies: 21 (6 of them among the top 10 U.S. goods export markets: Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Singapore)

Market Size: 2.7 billion consumers

Combined APEC GDP: $35.2 trillion in 2010 (56 percent of world economic output)

U.S. Benefits from Trade with APEC Economies

Total U.S.-APEC Trade: At least $2.3 trillion in goods and services in 2010 (56 percent of total)

U.S.-APEC Trade Increase: Goods and services trade up 150 percent from $1 trillion in 1994

U.S. Jobs Supported: 5 million jobs

Existing U.S.-APEC FTAs: 7 (Australia, Canada, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Peru, Singapore)

Top U.S. Markets in APEC:   Canada ($249.1 billion)
(Goods Exports 2010)            Mexico ($163.5 billion)
                                                    China ($91.9 billion)
                                                    Japan ($60.5 billion)
                                                    Korea ($38.8 billion)

Goods Exports to APEC:      $775 billion in 2010 (61 percent of total U.S. goods exports)
                                                  Up 26 percent from 2009
                                                  Up 53 percent from 2000
                                                  Up 139 percent from 1994

Key Export Categories:        Machinery ($116.2 billion)
(Goods 2010)                        Electrical machinery ($110.8 billion)
                                                 Vehicles ($69.7 billion)
                                                 Mineral fuel (oil) ($39.7 billion)
                                                 Optic and medical instruments ($37.9 billion)

Manufacturing Exports: $665.3 billion
Up 25 percent from 2009

Agricultural Exports: $83.3 billion in 2010
Up 17 percent from 2009

Top Agricultural Exports:   Soybeans ($15.8 billion)
                                                Coarse grains ($7.9 billion)
                                                Red meats ($7.3 billion)
                                                Cotton ($4.3 billion)
                                                Fresh fruit ($3.4 billion)

Services Exports to APEC: At least $204.9 billion in 2010
(Private)                                 Over 37 percent of total U.S. services exports
                                                Up 16 percent from 2009
                                                Up 82 percent from 2000
                                                Up 146 percent from 1994

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 13, 2011

Press Briefing by NSA for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes and Admiral Robert Willard, U.S. Pacific Command

Moana Surfrider Hotel
Honolulu, Hawaii

10:14 A.M. HAST

MR. RHODES: Good morning, everybody. Good to see you. Today we wanted to give you some additional context and briefing for the President’s trip. Yesterday, we were able to focus at length on the extraordinary economic dynamism of the Asia Pacific region and the U.S. interest in, again, expanding our own presence here in the region.

Today, we’re very lucky to have with us Admiral Willard, the head of United States Pacific Command, here in Hawaii. He’ll be able to give you some context on the U.S. commitment to the security of the region.

I’d note that the precise economic dynamism that we’ve seen here at the APEC Summit is very much underpinned by the longstanding U.S. presence in the region -- the U.S. commitment to be there for our allies and partners in the region, but also to serve as an anchor of stability in the region. And it’s precisely that effort over many decades that has enabled, I think, the peaceful development that we see so manifested here at the APEC Summit.

So with that, I will turn it over to Admiral Willard to give some opening comments, and then we’ll take your questions.

ADMIRAL WILLARD: Thank you, Ben. And good morning, everyone. I very much look forward to the exchange that we’ll have. My name is Bob Willard, and I’ve been the Commander of the United States Pacific Command for just over two years' time now.

In my previous assignment, I was the commander of United States Pacific Fleet -- same area of responsibility, but on the Navy side. So for the past four and a half years, I’ve had the opportunity to work very closely with the regional leadership, in providing -- helping provide security across the Asia Pacific region, which is the main thrust of U.S. Pacific command. It’s why we’re here.

The responsibility extends from the U.S. forces on the West Coast of the United States and Alaska to a dividing line between India and Pakistan. The command is comprised of 320,000 uniformed members, civilians, and contractors that help to contribute to Pacific Command’s mission.

We do have forces forward -- here in Hawaii, on the island of Guam, and located in Japan with our Japan allies, to the tune of about 50,000 forces. And there’s another 30,000 U.S. forces that are helping to maintain the armistice on the Korean Peninsula, alongside our allies, the Republic of Korea.

There are essentially five areas of principal focus within Pacific Command that I thought I might share with you to develop some context for the questions that you might ask. Of those five, one is managing our relationship with China, which is very obviously undergoing a tremendous change in the region, given China’s advancements, both economically and militarily.

One of my charters is to improve the relationship, mil-to-mil, between the United States and the Chinese. And we endeavor to do that across a large spectrum of engagement with China, wherever and whenever we can.

Second in that is managing the threat posed by North Korea. For more than 50 years, alongside our allies, the Republic of Korea, we’ve been deterring North Korea and maintaining the armistice across the Demilitarized Zone. And in this day, North Korea is posing additional challenges in terms of nuclearization, proliferation, the stability construct within North Korea, and of course, they’re undergoing succession.

We are tending to many of those things and attempting to contribute to the whole of U.S. government and international effort to see North Korea alter their trajectory. But our main focus is in our alignment with our allies in South Korea, continuing to deter provocation such as we encountered last year in 2010 with the sinking of the corvette Cheonan, and the attack against Yeonpyeong Island. And we’ll continue to reinforce the alliance, continue to strengthen it, as has been discussed in President Lee’s visit to the United States and President Obama’s comments on the region, and Secretary Panetta’s very recent visit to South Korea.

Thirdly, we deal with a great many transnational threats in the region. They range from proliferation to trafficking in humans and trafficking in drugs, to violent extremist organizations. We're laid down in the southern Philippines, continuing to contain the Abu Sayyaf group and Jemaah Islamiyah, two extremist organizations that threaten both the stability of the southern Philippines and the region.

And in South Asia, around India, we endeavor to contain Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani-based extremist organization that threatens India, attacked Mumbai, and we find ourselves working with partners in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Maldives to build their capacities to deal with this organization independently.

Thirdly, we have a special focus area on our relationship with India -- a strategic partnership that continues to grow, both government-to-government and military-to-military. India is the largest democracy in South Asia. It’s the most consequential military in the region. And it operates in a fairly challenging neighborhood. Our relationship with India is not very old. We were not particularly close during the Cold War, and when we did begin to reengage, those relationships were interrupted following nuclear tests in the last 1990s. From a military standpoint, we've been engaged with India for only about seven or eight years. And that’s not very long when you consider that this is the largest democracy in the world and a very large military.

Our relationship is now strong and growing stronger. We engage with the Indian armed forces across all the services, and we contribute to issues such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean region, and broader maritime security throughout the region. And we look forward to continuing to advance our Indian partnership along the way.

And then fifth is our overall alliances and partnerships in the region, and the responsibility that we bear to strengthen those. We have five treaty allies in the Asia Pacific, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and our Australia friends. These alliances form in many ways the basis for security in the region. And one of our endeavors is to improve those alliances and strengthen those alliances along the way.

We are obviously very close, having been hosted for many years in Japan and in the Republic of the Philippines. These are very advanced militaries, very interoperable with the United States and we work very closely together with their military leadership.

In the case of Australia, again, a very strong ally that we find alongside the United States wherever we’re operating in the world. And in the case of the Republic of the Philippines and Thailand, very old relationships, strong mil-to-mil relationships that continue to evolve and we hope advance.

And then we have a variety of partnerships, to include the likes of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and others in the region that we’re continuing to grow both the military relationship in order to contribute to broader security in the Asia Pacific region, as well as enable the very strong ties and engagement, government-to-government and economically, with the United States and with our other allies and partners.

With that, I’ll stop and open this to questions, and I very much look forward to the dialogue.

Q Admiral, thank you for doing this. A question about China’s actions in the South China Sea. Some Asia Pacific nations seem concerned about this. Is there anything the United States can do military to reassure them that we’ll assist and -- or take an interest in what -- China’s movements in the South China Sea?

ADMIRAL WILLARD: Well, thank you. Let me begin by just offering that the South China Sea is a very important maritime common for the entire region. The sea lines of communication that crisscross the South China Sea carry $5.3 trillion in bilateral annual trade, of which $1.2 trillion is U.S. trade. So the South China Sea region and the sea lines that it contains is incredibly vital to the region, to our partners and allies, and certainly to the United States.

We’ve maintained a presence there for nearly 150 years, and for the past 60 years have maintained a continual presence in and about those sea lines of communication to ensure the ongoing security and stability of the South China Sea region.

We work very closely with all the partners in the region with regard to its security against a variety of potential threats, such as piracy, over the years. And while the United States and our partners in multilateral forum such as ASEAN have expressed concern over the past year regarding assertiveness on the part of China in this region, we continue to seek to dialogue with China in those areas in order that they will constructively contribute to the security of this vital region as we and our partners are attempting to do.

So, once again, the South China Sea, a vital interest to the region, a national interest to the United States, an area that carries an immense amount of commerce, and an area in which we must maintain maritime security and peace and not see disruptions as a consequence of contested areas in others.

So, very important to me. We continue to maintain a presence there. We haven’t really changed that presence in the time that I’ve been in command or previously in my career. We’ve always maintained a robust presence there, and that, in itself, is I think the security and assurance that we provide our partners in the region that we’ll continue to contribute to the peace in the South China Sea.

Q To follow on that, what do you think of the chances that there could be a miscalculation by the various powers who have territorial claims in the South China Sea --

ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think that’s precisely what the contributions of the United States military and the regional militaries are intending to prevent. We observe the peaceful negotiation that occurs with regard to the contested areas in the region. Remember that there are six nations involved in the various -- and contesting over the various features and islands throughout the South China Sea. And the United States’ position is that these contested regions will be ultimately resolved peacefully, hopefully through multilateral forums such as ASEAN and discussions that can take place in forums such as East Asia Summit, and through dialogue between the contesting partners.

In the meantime, I think it’s vitally important that the region remain peaceful and that the sea lines of communication remain uninterrupted by confrontation or any form of conflict that would take place. So we’re there to prevent it, and thus far we’ve been successful in doing that.

Q Admiral, describe the threat of the al Qaeda affiliates in the Philippines. Is it a threat to the Philippines, a threat to the United States? What’s your sense?

ADMIRAL WILLARD: We’ve been working with the armed forces of the Philippines in their support against, specifically, Abu Sayyaf group and Jemaah Islamiyah for seven years. And we believe that, by and large, we’ve achieved the containment of those particular groups. Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf group are -- were affiliates of al Qaeda, to include sanctuary that was being provided for purposes of financing and other endeavors. That has been, by and large, curtailed. We continue to contain them in that regard so that they don’t grow into -- to become a more significant threat to the region. And we may be at a point where we can work on a transition to a next phase of operations in the Philippines.

Q (Inaudible.)

ADMIRAL WILLARD: Well, we’ve got 500 special operators there now, and at the point in time when we believe that the extremist organizations themselves are sufficiently contained, then our government and the government of the Philippines may transition to a longer-term effort to set the conditions -- the longer-term, permanent conditions to minimize or eliminate the prospects that either of those extremist organizations could reemerge to become both a threat to the Philippines and/or a threat to the region and the United States.

Q Just through military, or is that through some sort of negotiation, or what's the --

ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think that’s through a whole government level of effort on the part of the government of the Philippines to work with the people and communities in southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, again, to set the conditions there that minimize any prospects of emerging violent extremism, or violent extremist organizations, these two in particular.

Abu Sayyaf group, as you know, has been around a long time, an organization that is, by and large, criminal, and in the containment effort that has been made by the armed forces of the Philippines over the last seven years, they’ve pretty much quelled their extremist efforts with the exception of ongoing criminal activity at a lesser level that continues to occur.

Q To what extent do you think the U.S. buildup, that military presence in Australia will reassure partners in the region regarding China and its claims on the South China Sea? To what extent will that serve as a counterweight to that? And could you also talk about to what extent you're expecting these issues around the South China Sea to be worked out or advanced during the upcoming East Asia Summit?

ADMIRAL WILLARD: Thank you. I would just -- I would offer that it's been very much a part of the public record that Australia made overtures to the United States to increase our engagement with the armed forces of Australia and our utility of the training facilities -- ranges, and so forth -- that are there. That was unprecedented and we're very grateful for that overture.

I'm not in a position to make any announcement with regard to the future plans. I would leave that to Prime Minister Gillard and to President Obama in the future.

So we have a very, very tight, close relationship with our Australian friends. We train in Australia on a fairly routine basis. There is a large-scale, combined arms exercise that we conduct annually, and the Australians are a very generous military insofar as access to their bases and to their training facilities are concerned.

In terms of the South China Sea and the East Asian Summit, again, I would leave that to our President and to our Secretary of State to discuss with the members there. This is the first opportunity for the United States in the summit and I think this is going to be a very positive outcome and opportunity for the United States and our partners to be part of the East Asia forum.

Q Well, putting aside whatever announcements may be coming later this week, Secretary Panetta has been clear about the fact that he wants to increase the U.S. military -- and intends to increase U.S. military presence in Australia and in the region. So speaking more generally, do you think that that would serve as any kind of a counterweight to China as far as our partners in the region are concerned?

ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think I'd put it a little different way. As you heard in my opening remarks, the forces that are forward in the Western Pacific are, by and large, biased to Northeast Asia, contained in -- or laid down in Japan and South Korea. As a consequence, in order for Pacific Command to be present conducting the engagement capacity-building with other militaries and respond to humanitarian needs and disaster in Southeast Asia, I'm forced to deploy and sustain forces that are located there. Any opportunities that we have to locate forces in the Southeast Asia region relieves some pressure on that need to, at great expense, deploy and sustain forces present in Southeast Asia.

I mentioned the ongoing presence in the South China Sea. Those are deployed forces either from the West Coast of the United States, transiting forces to and from the Indian Ocean region, or they're from the forward-deployed forces that are located in Japan and/or Korea.

So any rebalancing that can take place over time to permit the United States to more effectively be present in the region I think is a positive step -- and that includes South Asia as well.

So we very much look forward to scoping the posture needs of the Pacific Command and our forward forces, and adjusting them as required, as the security situation in the Asia Pacific dictates. Remember that our Army forces and our Marine Corps forces spend a great deal of time both being first responders to disasters -- currently assessment teams are in Thailand continuing to assess the flooding that the Thailand people have experienced. And in addition to responding to those disasters, we work very closely with other militaries in the region, their ground forces to improve their capacities and self-sufficiency as armed forces.

Q I was wondering if you could speak to what the Pacific Command is doing to counter China's heavy investment in anti-access and access-denial technology.

ADMIRAL WILLARD: I know you’ve all heard discussed many time the anti-access/area-denial investments that have been made not just by China, frankly, but around the world. And the United States armed forces continues to make the kind of investments, both in the tactics, techniques and procedures we use, and in the future technologies that we’ll acquire to enable us to operate anywhere in the world. And if there are area-denial technologies that are in play anywhere in the world, it’s important the United States military be able to access that space, regardless.

In terms of the Western Pacific, we are present in the South China Sea and East China Sea and elsewhere on a very routine basis. And we have no intentions of going anywhere.

Q The Defense Department recently announced that they started implementation of a joint (inaudible). And my question is, what is the implication of -- what do you expect from (inaudible)? Especially, I would like to hear about Japan.

ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes, thank you. The air-sea battle concept has been an ongoing process in the Pentagon for some time, intending to bring the capabilities of our Navy and the capabilities of our Air Force together, and, frankly, the contributions of our other services as well -- but to bring them together in a way that achieves greater synergy that we have in the past.

You might consider that for nearly 30 years we’ve been attempting to perfect joint warfare. And at one point, we looked at a land-air battle construct where the Army and Air Force attempted to compare their respective capabilities and improve on those, and achieve synergies over land that would cause us to make an evolutionary step from -- or within the joint warfare concept.

Air-sea battle is essentially the same effort being made between the maritime service and the air service to try to and maximize our capabilities together, to operate in any space denied or otherwise.

Q Admiral, can you talk a little about your own impressions or feelings -- we had heard Secretary Panetta talk just a few days ago about possibly inviting aggression by cuts that would take place if the congressional committee can’t come through with the plan they need to come through with. And he talk specifically about -- he said, “Ship without sailors, brigade without bullets” -- things like that. What effect could that have on our ability to maintain a forward presence in the Asia Pacific?

ADMIRAL WILLARD: Thank you. Well, I think, first and foremost, I mean, we’re all very aware that we’re coming off of a period of long-term warfare for the country. I mean, we’re eventually transitioning from two wars, and we’re facing budgetary challenges as a nation that have to be addressed. So the Department of Defense, in realizing that, is scoping what those outcomes may mean for the Department of Defense. And as a senior military leader, I’m part of those discussions and certainly interested in the outcomes.

You mentioned specifically the prospect of sequester. And I know that it’s shared broadly that sequester would be a rather draconian approach to the problem and it would complicate the budgetary approaches that the Department of Defense if scoping right now considerably, were it to occur.

Shifting from that, and that ongoing discussion that has to occur in Washington and has to occur in the Pentagon, I would offer that as the commander in the Pacific, I have been well served, even during the course of two wars in our country, with regard to the forces that I’ve had on hand, their readiness and their ability to respond to the issues that we faced here in the Asia Pacific.

And I have every confidence that in the decisions that our government makes, that our administration makes, and that are made in the Pentagon, given the importance of this region to the world, and the importance of this region to the United States, that Pacific Command will continue be well served and able to carry out its mission of assurance and deterrence where required into the foreseeable future.

MR. RHODES: One more question. Over there

Q Thank you, Admiral. How would you assess the threat of piracy right now in the Asia Pacific region? And moving forward, what are your greatest challenges, do you think, to deal with this threat?

ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes, thank you. Piracy still exists in the Asia Pacific region. As you know, if you range back about seven or eight years, we had a significant piracy problem that was manifesting itself in the Strait of Malacca. And it was the nations of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand that came together and began to patrol in earnest the Strait of Malacca and quelled piracy quite a bit.

Typically, when you drive pirates out of one region they tend to appear in another. And in the south portion of the South China Sea, we’ve experienced some piracy that has reemerged, and have to patrol for that and account for that, and continue to work with our partners on seeing that done away with.

In the Indian Ocean region, due to the challenges that we have with the Horn of Africa and Somalia, the Somali pirates have driven merchant traffic hundreds of miles into the Indian Ocean. So this is a good illustration, given our earlier conversation, on how any disruption to the sea lines of communication can be costly. If you can imagine now that merchant ships emanating from the Gulf of Aden are swinging so far to the east that they are entering Pacific Command area of responsibility, in and around India’s exclusive economic zone, in the Sri Lankan economic exclusion zone, and that of the Maldives.

And so we’re teaming now with India and those nations to attempt to contain the piracy that is reemerging in the Pacific Command AOR, due to the effects of the Somali pirate challenge that we’re faced with there.

So in the region, piracy continues to be a challenge. And we continue to observe for it, respond to it, and we’re seeking the long-term solutions, especially in the less governed areas like Somalia, to see it done away with completely.

In terms of greatest challenges for PACOM, I would venture that those five that I outlined for you are, in fact, remaining the areas of focus for PACOM into the future. We’ll continue to work to manage the relationship with China, hopefully in a positive trajectory where China emerges as a constructive partner in the overall security of the region. We’ll continue to deal with North Korea and hopefully see and end state that meets the needs of South Korea, meets the needs of the region and the broader international community. And I know that involves denuclearization and affecting the other factors in North Korea that are a challenge.

We’ll continue to deal with violent extremism and other transnational challenges. And we’ll continue to build our partnerships with India and with our allies and partners overtime.

The purpose of Pacific Command is the security of the Asia Pacific region. We’ve been I think helping to enable prosperity here for the past six decades. It’s an unprecedented time of growth and expansion, economically, for the region. And we intend to continue to contribute to the overall security and stability here so that that prosperity can be advanced. And that is both the mission and focus of U.S. Pacific Command and the Department of Defense in this part of the world.

Thank you very much.

MR. RHODES: Thanks, Admiral.

We’re going to have to stop it there. But I just wanted, again, to reinforce that I think this is a -- will provide a very important and useful context going forward. I think you’ll see in the coming days the President speaking to the range of issues that the Admiral touched upon, both in his trip to Australia and then of course to the East Asia Summit.

And of course, I’d say it’s no coincidence, for instance, that after a successful state visit from President Lee, we’ll be meeting with our other four treaty allies on the course of the trip. He already met with Japan. Going forward, we’ll obviously go to Australia and meet with the Philippines, Thailand. We’ll be addressing a number of the issues the Admiral spoke about, whether it’s, again, the U.S. presence in the region, but also our commitment to maritime security at the East Asia Summit.

And then, finally, I think what President Obama, again, has been very focused on is responding to both the extraordinary interest we have in the region, but also a demand, an interest from the nations of the region for the United States to play a role -- whether it’s on a bilateral basis of building partnerships, or on a multilateral basis of the United States being deeply engaged with ASEAN, being engaged at the head-of-state level for the first time at the East Asia Summit, precisely so we can address the range of challenges that confront the region.

So I think all the questions that you hit upon in the course of the briefing are precisely in line with the types of things we’ll be discussing in Australia and in Bali. So this is, again, a great opportunity. And we thank again Admiral Willard for giving a very comprehensive presentation here today.

Q Hey, Ben, do you have anything on this explosion in inr at an Iran Revolutionary Guard base? We have reports out of -- they're calling it mysterious.

MR. RHODES: We’ve seen those reports. I don’t think we have anything specific in terms of comment on it, other than to say that we’re obviously monitoring it and --

Q Do you know if it's a missile site?

MR. RHODES: Again, I wouldn’t get into the specifics of the site. We understand that it’s associated with the IRGC. But beyond that, I don’t think we’d get into any specifics on it.

Q Do you have anything on a report from the South Korea of riots that are related to the free trade agreement there?

MR. RHODES: We don’t. Again, I think we just saw those reports as well, so we’ll take a look at that. Obviously there’s been robust debates around these issues of trade within Korea for many years. But, again, I think we’re just aware of those reports and we’ll take a look at that and let you know if we have further comment.

Thanks, everybody.

END
10:46 A.M. HAST