The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Readout of the President’s Call with Prime Minister Monti of Italy

President Obama spoke with Italian Prime Minister Monti earlier today, continuing his discussions with European leaders on economic developments in the eurozone.  Their conversation follows recent statements by European officials regarding their commitment to preserve the euro.  The President has been in regular contact with Europe’s leaders on the state of the European economy, and today he reiterated his support for decisive action to resolve the crisis.   The President also expressed his concerns about Syria and emphasized the need for close cooperation between the U.S. and our European allies in pressuring the Assad regime and supporting the Syrian people.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

On-the-Record Conference Call on Iran Sanctions

Via Telephone

2:34 P.M. EDT

MS. MEEHAN:  Hi, everyone, this is Bernadette over at the National Security Council.  Thanks for joining us today for this on-the-record call regarding the President’s announcement earlier today regarding additional sanctions related to Iran.  Today we have three senior administration officials joining us.  We’ll do a brief introduction from each of the three, and then open it up to your questions.

We have Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications; David Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the Department of Treasury; and Bob Einhorn, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the Department of State.

And with that, I will turn it over to Ben for an introduction.

MR. RHODES:  Thanks, everybody, for joining the call.  You should have a statement by the President as well as some additional releases and fact sheets that we put out.  But we wanted to walk you through the two actions that the administration announced today in terms of tightening and ramping up our sanctions related to Iran.

First of all, just to step back here, from the beginning of the administration we have steadily built the most comprehensive and biting sanctions regime that the Iranian government has ever faced.  We have taken the view that Iran has an opportunity, through diplomacy, to come in line with their international obligations with respect to their nuclear program.  However, we’ve also made it clear that if Iran fails to meet its obligations, we will steadily ratchet up the pressure.  And indeed, we have done so over the course of the last several years, such that we now have sanctions that are deeply impacting and biting upon the Iranian economy and the Iranian government’s ability to access revenue. 

We’ve done so in a variety of ways.  First of all, we’ve worked with Congress to develop additional tools as far as sanctions through the CISADA legislation and then the NDAA last year, which increased our ability to target, for instance, the Iranian Central Bank and the Iranian petroleum sector. 

But importantly, we’ve also worked to build an international coalition as well, so that our own actions are amplified.  So we were able to work through the U.N. Security Council to achieve Resolution 1929, which put in place the broadest and most comprehensive multilateral sanctions that Iran has ever faced.  And then, working from that basis, we’ve worked with like-minded nations to continue to increase the pressure on the Iranians. 

And since the passage of the NDAA, for instance, last year, we have worked to achieve an outcome in which every significant importer of Iranian oil has significantly reduced their imports of Iranian oil -- pointedly, the European Union, for instance, recently announced the completion of its embargo of Iranian oil.  And my colleague, Bob, here will talk in some length about what effect that is having on Iran.

So we’ve been building out -- working with Congress, we’ve been building out the tools that we have in working with our international partners.  We’ve been working to fully isolate and cut off Iran from the international financial system so that they feel a deeper isolation.  And what we’ve also done, however, is continually update our tools, and the steps that we’re taking today certainly increase those efforts.

First of all, the President has approved a new executive order that imposes new sanctions against the Iranian energy and petrochemical sectors, and my colleagues will talk about that executive order in some detail.  And secondly, we’ve taken the important step of holding responsible two institutions that have knowingly enabled financial transactions for designated Iranian banks -- the Bank of Kunlun in China, and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq, which have been sanctioned today under CISADA.  And David Cohen will be able to talk to you about the importance of those efforts.

I think, stepping back, this also comes at a time in which sanctions are having a significant impact on Iran and its economy.  You, for instance, don’t have to take my word for that.  President Ahmadinejad recently called these “the most severe and strictest sanctions ever imposed on a country.”  And we see those effects across the board.  We see it in the significant amount of Iranian oil that is coming off the market.  We see that in the fact that Iran’s currency has plummeted in value.  We estimate that the rial has lost almost 38 percent of its value in the last year, since we moved to ramp up our sanctions.  We’ve seen firms from all over the world divest themselves from doing business in Iran because they recognize the cost that comes with doing business in Iran.

So all of this is in service of a purpose, which is sharpening the choice for the Iranian government.  They continue to have the choice, through the P5-plus-1 negotiations, to come in line with their international obligations and to rejoin the community of nations.  However, with today’s actions we are once again sending a strong message to the Iranian government that they are going to face increasingly severe consequences for failing to meet those international obligations.

And with that, let me turn it over to Bob Einhorn here, who can talk to you a little bit about the executive order.  Then David Cohen can speak to the order as well as the CISADA designations.

Bob.

MR. EINHORN:  Ben, thank you very much, and thanks to all of you for joining the call.  I’d like to say a few things about our efforts to pressure Iran by reducing its revenues from oil and petrochemical sales, and about how our actions today build upon and intensify those administration efforts. 

The combined impact of the administration’s aggressive implementation of the National Defense Authorization Act sanctions, and the European Union’s oil embargo and ban on insuring oil shipments, has already been dramatic. 

As Ben mentioned, all countries that have been major purchasers of Iranian crude oil have decided to reduce significantly their purchases.  According to the International Energy Agency, Iran’s crude oil exports in 2011 were approximately 2.5 million barrels per day, and have dropped to below 1.5 million barrels per day in June of this year, which is a decline of about 40 to 50 percent.  And that amounts to roughly $9 billion in lost revenues for Iran in every quarter. 

And it’s important to recognize that the NDAA sanctions and EU oil embargo did not take full legal effect until a month ago.  The sanctions are not yet impacting with full force.  We would expect the effects to become even more severe in coming weeks and months.  And the actions we’re taking today will strengthen those efforts.

We’re currently seeing attempts by Iran to circumvent current oil sanctions.  The new executive order is aimed at closing loopholes and preventing circumvention.  It not only focuses on a specific payment mechanism for the purchase of petroleum and petroleum products, it also sanctions the underlying purchase itself, no matter how it is structured.  Rather than just targeting transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or other designated Iranian banks, this executive order sanctions purchases from any private or public Iranian individual or entity, including the National Iranian Oil Company, or NIOC, and the Naftiran Intertrade Company, or NICO, which is a trading arm of NIOC. 

Rather than just sanction banks, this executive order would sanction the refiners and any other purchasers of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.  Rather than just target formal financial transactions, this EO sanctions acquisitions through any payment mechanism -- formal, informal, or barter.  Consistent with the NDAA, these sanctions would not apply to financial institutions or persons in countries granted 180-day exceptions from making significant reductions in crude oil purchases from Iran. 

Today’s EO also substantially broadens existing sanctions on petrochemicals.  Petrochemicals are Iran’s second-largest export after petroleum and petroleum products, and they account for more than $9 billion in foreign revenue per year.  An earlier executive order sanctioned the provision of goods, services, and technology to Iran’s domestic petrochemical industry, inhibiting further development of Iran’s petrochemical capacity.

Today’s EO sanctions any individual, company, or financial institution that knowingly engages in a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran.  And these petrochemical sanctions are not subject to the exceptions provision of the NDAA.

So these and other provisions of the new executive order, as well as today’s actions under CISADA against two foreign financial institutions, will send a clear signal to Iran that the Obama administration is determined to continue increasing the pressure until Iran’s leaders make the decision to negotiate seriously and accept meaningful constraints on their nuclear program.

Let me turn it over to David.

UNDER SECRETARY COHEN:  Thanks, Bob, and thanks, everybody, for joining.  As Bob and Ben have explained, the administration is taking a number of measures today to further increase the pressure on the Iranian regime.  And I’ll take a moment to explain the specific steps that Treasury has taken as part of this effort.

First, we impose sanctions today under CISADA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act, which was enacted in July 2010 against two foreign banks -- Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq.  These banks have provided a financial lifeline to Iranian banks that we have previously sanctioned for links to Iran’s nuclear and missile proliferation activities, or Iran support for international terrorism.

As financial institutions around the world have cut ties with designated Iranian banks to avoid the risk of involvement in Iran’s illicit activities, Bank of Kunlun and Elaf Islamic Bank have done just the opposite.  They have continued to process significant financial transactions for designated Iranian banks, facilitating the movement of millions of dollars’ worth of international transactions for these banks.

Today’s action exposes these banks’ continued business with designated Iranian banks, and effectively cuts them off from the U.S. financial system.  It should also serve as clear warning to banks outside the United States of the risks of doing business with both of these banks, since they have knowingly provided their services to designated Iranian banks.

We expect that today's action will have a significant chilling effect on the ability of Kunlun and Elaf to operate anywhere in the world, as banks around the world take note of the fact that these two banks have knowingly transacted with designated Iranian banks. 

The message to banks worldwide should be clear:  If you provide financial services to designated Iranian banks, if you process significant financial transactions for those banks, you will face U.S. sanctions no matter where you are located.

Since the President signed CISADA into law in July 2010, we have used CISADA aggressively to target the activity of designated Iranian banks.  We have communicated with more than 120 foreign financial institutions and more than 60 governments to explain the risks of doing businesses with designated Iranian banks.  This global campaign has resulted in designated Iranian banks near total isolation from the international financial system.

Today's actions under CISADA are the first time we've had to impose CISADA sanctions against banks through business with designated Iranian banks in order to further cut those banks' access to the international financial system. 

In addition to the actions against Kunlun and Elaf, as Bob has explained, the President signed an executive order imposing new sanctions on Iran's energy sector and preventing Iran from using workarounds to circumvent existing sanctions.  With today's executive order, the President is authorizing the Treasury Department to impose sanctions for significant transactions involving the purchase or acquisition of Iranian oil no matter how the payment for that oil may be made.  Treasury is also authorized to impose sanctions against any financial institution that engages in any significant transaction with NIOC or NICO, whether oil-related or not.

NIOC and NICO and their related front companies, which Treasury has recently identified, have served as important payment channels for Iran to receive revenue for its oil; that, as of today, banks around the world will face sanctions if they facilitate transactions with these companies unless the financial transaction is for petroleum purchase, and the financial institution is in a country determined to be significantly reducing its crude oil purchases from Iran.

One other aspect of the executive order that I want to highlight is that it authorizes Treasury to take actions to prevent Iran from getting access to U.S. dollars and precious metals, such as gold.  As the Iranian regime struggles to try to stem the dramatic decline of the rial, accessing a hard currency and other durable stores of value has become increasingly important.  With today's action, it will be increasingly difficult for the Iranian regime to get access to dollars and gold.

These new measures, along with the actions against Kunlun and Elaf today, demonstrate that we will continue to use every means at our disposal to eliminate financial safe havens for Iran and increase the financial pressure on the Iranian regime. 

Thank you.

MR. RHODES:  Great.  Thanks.  And we’d be happy to take your questions.

Q    Thanks so much, gentlemen, for doing the call.  Thank you for your service.  I have one quick question for Mr. Einhorn and Mr. Cohen, and then one quick question for Ben.  First of all, for Mr. Einhorn and Mr. Cohen, what do you say to the criticism of your approach that this is a reactive, that this is like playing Whac-A-Mole in that the Iranians will always find some other scheme to get their business done, and this is not as official as a more comprehensive strategy that would seek -- that would prevent these transactions before they pop up and become problems?

And for Ben, I’d like to ask you -- does the administration, does the White House support the compromise Iran sanctions bill that was introduced in the House yesterday and it will come to the House floor tomorrow?  Is that something that the President is ready to sign? 

Thank you.

MR. EINHORN:  Hey, Josh.  I think the results demonstrate quite clearly that we have imposed broad-based, comprehensive, and highly effective sanctions against Iran.  We are proceeding on a number of different tracks, including, importantly, pressuring Iran’s ability to sell its oil as well as putting really quite extreme pressure on Iran’s ability to get access to the revenue that it earns from its reduced oil sales.

The combined effect of those actions and a number of the other sanction steps we have taken have resulted in very significant economic impact in Iran that Ben sketched earlier in this call. 

The actions that we’ve taken today with respect to Kunlun in China and Elaf in Iraq I think will further deepen the isolation of the designated Iranian banks, because not only have we now highlighted and exposed the activity of those two institutions, but I think it puts an exclamation point on the efforts that we have been undertaking over the last two years to dissuade any other foreign financial institution from doing business with designated Iranian banks.  And we think it will only heighten the wariness of banks around the world from engaging in any transactions with those designated banks in Iran.

So I think it’s not accurate to describe it as a game of Whac-A-Mole.  This is a game -- this is an effort to really on a very comprehensive basis apply very significant pressure, and I think it’s working quite well.

MR. RHODES:  Yes, Josh, it’s Ben.  Just two things.  First, to build on what David said, I think the proof of the success of the approach can be seen in the data.  That you have up to a billion -- up to a million barrels of oil a day that are off the market from last year speaks to the success of the sanctions regime and our diplomacy around it.

The fact that you have a currency that is plummeting in value and Iranian leaders acknowledging that these are the toughest sanctions any country has ever faced I think speaks to the fact that it goes far beyond a Whac-A-Mole approach. 

What we have made clear is that we are not going to tolerate or permit a workaround, and that we’re going to slam the door whenever we see them.  And frankly, that has the effect not only of addressing the specific workaround, it has a chilling effect in the sense that you see businesses pulling out of Iran because they don't want to take on the cost of doing business with a targeted entity.  And one or two years ago, I don't think people would have anticipated that we would be able to get at the banking sector, the petroleum sector, the petrochemical sector in the way that we have. 

That's a testament, by the way, not just of the sanctions regime, but to the diplomacy accompanying it.  This would not be nearly as effective if there wasn’t an international coalition and a multilateral effort.  Unilateral U.S. actions alone can have an impact, but the ability to go around the world and to see Iranian -- importers of Iranian oil significantly reducing their purchases is what allows us to really see sanctions bite. 

So the EU announcing a full embargo of Iranian oil, for instance, is a dramatic effect that is a testament to both our sanctions regime and also our diplomacy and the coalition we’ve built to deal with Iran, which, frankly, was not in place three and a half years ago.

On your question, we have worked closely with Congress to build this sanctions regime.  We’re using authorities and tools that Congress worked with us to develop with the CISADA designations today.  We obviously have been working with the NDAA legislation to get at the Central Bank of Iran and the petroleum sector.  So Congress has been an important partner in all these efforts. 

With respect to the current legislation, we’ve been working with Congress as they’ve developed that legislation.  We certainly share the goal, and we believe it can be an important tool in adding to the sanctions regime we have in place.  We are reviewing the specific text of the bill that was produced, but we’re quite optimistic that we’re going to be able to continue to work in lockstep with Congress with this new legislation that’s working its way through Congress as we increase pressure.

So the EO today is indicative of the President’s commitment to use his authorities, and we are very confident that, as we have in the past, we will work with Congress to develop additional tools to make sure that our sanctions are as robust as they possibly can be.

Q    Yes, thanks for taking my call.  So just following up on Josh’s question right now, this announcement today, these two announcements, are not an effort by the administration to derail the congressional push?

MR. RHODES:  Thanks for your question.  No, absolutely not.  In fact, these both grow out of extensive lines of effort that we’ve pursued over many months.  These two banks, for instance, are institutions we’ve had our eye on for some time now.  And, again, the fact that we’re taking this action under CISADA speaks to the partnership we’ve had with Congress in the way in which we use the tools that we developed in partnership with Congress.  Similar to the EO, it gets at our ability to make sure that we have as tight and successful a sanctions regime as possible. 

The congressional efforts can be complementary to what we’re doing.  And we’ve had a good dialogue with Congress as they’ve worked through the various pieces of legislation that have addressed Iran sanctions.  And we’re now reviewing the bill they’ve produced, and we’re confident and optimistic that we’re going to have an outcome that allows us to benefit from this EO and also from the congressional action that is still under consideration.

Q    Gotcha, thanks.

Q    Hi, thanks so much for doing the call.  I wanted to ask Ben, if you would respond to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s comments this week, where he said that all the sanctions and diplomacy have not set back the Iranian program “by one iota” -- which is different than saying that the sanctions -- whether the sanctions regime is good or bad.  But what he is saying is that it has not had any impact on the desired purpose, which is to slow down the Iranian program.

MR. RHODES:  Thanks, Andrea, for the question.  I’d just say a couple of things.  First of all, the purpose of the sanctions is to affect the Iranian calculus.  And it is certainly the case that Iran has not yet decided to come in line with their international obligations, which is why we’re continuing to build out the sanctions.  So we continue to be dissatisfied, as Prime Minister Netanyahu is, with Iran’s continued failure to live up to its international obligations.

What we do see is the sanctions having a significant impact on the Iranian economy and the Iranian government’s ability to access revenue.  Now, that has consequences ultimately for what they can spend money on, what technology they can procure for their program, as well as our WMD-related sanctions, which have access -- have an effect on what they can procure for their program.

But in addition to that, we do see the sanctions having an effect I think in terms of sharpening the choice for the Iranian government.  So, for instance, it was after we moved forward with sanctions on the Central Bank and the announcement of an EU oil embargo that we saw the Iranian government come back in to negotiations with the P5-plus-1.  We have seen Iranian leaders acknowledge the significant impacts of the sanctions, which, frankly, are a direct consequence of their own decisions.  Their decisions to continue to be outside of their obligations is the reason why they find themselves in such dire straits.

Also, we see, interestingly, divisions in the Iranian leadership.  And this is a point you’ve heard us make.  But, frankly, several years ago, it was the international community that was divided that had to deal with Iran, whereas the Iranian leadership was very united.  What we see today is not just a unified international community, but you see sharp divisions within the Iranian political system, far more so than we have seen in many years.  And I think that is a testament to the pressure that they’re under.

So, again, we agree that the Iranian leadership needs to make a different choice as it relates to their nuclear program, and come in line with their obligations.  But what we think we’ve accomplished is a steady ratcheting up the pressure that is increasing the cost for the Iranians in failing to make the right decisions.  And until they do shift course, we will continue to look for ways to increase the impact.

I’ll also add to something Bob said, which is that these sanctions are really beginning to sink in, in a different order of magnitude with the EU oil embargo coming in line, with the NDAA sanctions fully coming in line just this month.  So it's only going to get worse for the Iranian government.  And we believe that as that pressure sinks in, that we do have time and space to pursue a diplomatic resolution, but only if they do make a different choice and come in line with their obligations.

Q    But at the same time, why continue giving our allies such substantial waivers?  Couldn't you tighten the screws more by cracking down and not being as generous with your waivers, and by taking more action against some of the Central European authorities -- banking authorities -- that do control payments?  Because the Iranians seem very clever, you'd have to acknowledge, in creating new institutions as quickly as you shut them down.

MR. RHODES:  I'll just make a quick comment on that.  I'm sure these guys will want to jump in.  But I don't think we have been easy at all.  I think what we've seen is every purchaser of Iranian oil significantly reducing those purchases; the Europeans, in that instance, completely putting in place an embargo.

So the reason that we provided exceptions under the NDAA to those countries is only because of the steps they've taken that have caused up to a million barrels a day of Iranian oil to come off the market.  Secondly, I think with the action today against, for instance, Kunlun Bank, we're showing that no financial institution anywhere is off limits just on the basis of geography.  We are going to target institutions wherever we see noncompliance.

But I don't know if you guys have anything to add to that. 

MR. EINHORN:  Just to add to that -- I mean, the exceptions granted to these major purchases of Iranian crude oil are not waivers of sanctions.  They are a reflection of the decisions by these governments to make substantial cuts, significant reductions in terms of the law, in their purchases of Iranian crude.  And that's why you get the 1 million drop -- the drop in 1 million barrels per day in Iranian crude oil exports.  These exceptions are a reflection of how well the sanctions law is actually operating. 

UNDER SECRETARY COHEN:  And, Andrea, I'll just make one final point on this, and that's that the exceptions apply only narrowly to the purchase of Iranian oil.  And I think as our actions today demonstrate, the rest of our sanctions program, including the CISADA law, remains fully in effect.  And so any financial institution anywhere, whether it's in a jurisdiction that is significantly reducing or not, remains vulnerable to being sanctioned if they engage in significant transactions with designated Iranian banks.

And, finally, with respect to Iran trying to establish new financial institutions in Central Europe or elsewhere, you can be sure that if that occurs and when we see that, that we will take action against that; that would not only be something that would be in conflict with our sanctions laws, but the laws of many other jurisdictions, including the EU.

Q    Hi.  New York Times.  A question for Ben.  I'm wondering whether -- you've talked a lot in the past about the unity among the members of the P5 with respect to sanctions and the approach to Iran.  But, in the past few days, we've seen Mitt Romney go to Israel and line up very squarely with the Israeli government in advocating a tougher course toward Iran.  And I wonder whether, from the White House's point of view, having the Republican candidate out in a foreign country appearing to take a different line on Iran than the U.S. administration is something that could complicate your diplomatic efforts.  

MR. RHODES:  I'd say two things.  First, just as it relates to our approach, the purpose of unity is not an end of itself.  It's a means to achieving the pressure that we have in place on the Iranian government and the diplomatic strategy that we have in place.

Again, if the United States was acting on its own to impose sanctions, those sanctions would not be nearly as impactful as what we’ve managed to build internationally.  So the ability to have a multilateral sanctions regime in place, that was supported by Russia and China among others, has allowed us to broaden the consequences for the Iranian government.  And the ability to get like-minded countries in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere to significantly increase and build up from that foundation has only further sharpened the pressure on the Iranian government.

With respect to Governor Romney, I’d of course have to defer to the campaign to respond specifically to any political questions.  I didn’t necessarily see any policy comments that appeared to differ from the approach that we’ve taken with respect to sanctions.  We have put in place crippling sanctions on the Iranian government.  We have thrown the book at the Iranian government in terms of leaving no stone unturned in the sanctions regime.  And we are determined and committed to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

So with specific respect to any statements that were made, I have yet to see anything that differs from the approach that we’ve taken to applying pressure on the Iranian government.

Q    Thanks.

Q    Hi, I was wondering about the -- going back to the congressional bill that’s likely to be passed this week in its final form, it talks about preventing Iran from gaining a nuclear weapons capability as opposed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.  It sounds to me like you’ve been reluctant to say whether the President is going to sign this bill as is, but is that language that you’re comfortable with?

MR. RHODES:  Again, the President’s policy, as repeatedly articulated, is that we are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.  That has been clearly stated by him and by the administration repeatedly.  It continues to guide our policy approach. 

The Iranian government, of course, does not yet possess a nuclear weapon.  That is why we believe that there is time and space to pursue a diplomatic strategy that allows this pressure to continue to sink in, that increasingly sharpens the choice of the Iranian government, and that gives them an opportunity to come in line with their obligations through diplomacy while also making it clear that all options remain on the table for achieving the objective of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

I'd also note, of course, that in the context of those P5-plus-1 negotiations, that the international obligations that Iran must adhere to includes, for instance, the suspension of their enrichment activities consistent with existing U.N. Security Council resolutions.  So it is the basis of those P5-plus-1 negotiations that Iran would have to come in line with their international obligations, and that would mean adhering to not just increased safeguards on their program, but, of course, they have an existing obligation to meet U.N. Security Council resolutions that call for the suspension of enrichment.

Q    Do you believe Iran has such a capability to build a nuclear weapon?

MR. RHODES:  Well, I do not believe Iran has a nuclear weapon.  What Iran clearly has is a nuclear program that they have, number one, not been able to demonstrate is in line with peaceful purposes; number two, that is not fully in line with their IAEA obligations with respect to inspections and access to their nuclear facilities; and, again, number three, that is not in line with U.N. Security Council resolutions that have called for suspension of enrichment.

So clearly, Iran has a set of capabilities that have caused the international community to pass U.N. Security Council resolution after U.N. Security Council resolution.  They have, for instance, built a facility in Qom that was constructed as an illicit facility.  And doing so, of course, raises very significant questions about what the intent of the Iranian nuclear program is.  

So you would not see the level of effort that you’ve seen out of the United States government and our international partners were we not seriously concerned with the capability that Iran has developed to date, and the way in which they’ve developed that capability.

Again, what we’ve been clear about is we do not want Iran
-- and we are determined to prevent Iran -- from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and we’re going to continue to use all the tools at our disposal to achieve that objective.

We have time for one more question.

Q    Hey, Ben.  Thanks for doing the call.  I just wanted to get you to address Prime Minister Netanyahu’s comments, specifically.  Do you think the sanctions are slowing the Iranian nuclear program, specifically, the nuclear program at all?

MR. RHODES:  Thanks for the question.  Again, I’d say two things on this.  First of all, we have seen the sanctions have a significant impact on the Iranian economy.  We believe that sanctions have had an impact on the Iranian program insofar as they have denied the Iranian government access to revenue that they otherwise would have.

Secondly, we’ve seen through our WMD sanctions, for instance, sanctions making it much more difficult for Iran to procure technology that would be directly relevant to their program.  We’ve seen in 2010 the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Salehi, acknowledge that sanctions in some respect have delayed their program.  So we do see an impact on the Iranian government. 

Where we certainly agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu is on the fundamental question that we have not yet seen the Iranian government make a decision to come in line with their international obligations.  So we share very much the assessment of the Israeli government and Prime Minister Netanyahu that the purpose of the sanctions is to change the calculus of the Iranian government with respect to their nuclear program.  And until they make that decision, we need to continue to increase the pressure.

So we see an impact in our sanctions, but again, the ultimate goal here is for Iran’s leaders to make a different choice, and they have yet to make that choice.  And that's why we share the concern with not just Israel but a broad range of countries regarding the Iranian nuclear program.  And we’ll continue to coordinate very closely with Israel not just on the imposition of our sanctions, but with respect to our broader strategy of applying pressure and sharing our analytical assessment of the Iranian program and sharing our views of what our strategy is going forward.

I’ll see if Bob or David have anything to add to that.

MR. EINHORN:  Just to add quickly, Ben, we’ve been engaged for quite some time in an aggressive effort to thwart Iranian illicit procurement efforts.  We notify potential sources of supply for Iran’s nuclear missile programs of what Iran is shopping around for.  We urge them to exercise vigilance in preventing their manufacturers from supplying this kind of equipment.  We’ve had a lot of success in that.  We get information often about shipments of supplies destined for Iran’s nuclear or missile programs.  We contact countries along transit routes.  We contact shippers.  We do everything we can to try to interdict these supplies en route, and we’ve had a lot of success in that.

And we’ve had a lot of success in that because we’ve built a coalition of countries around the world who are prepared to cooperate with us in preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons.  We think all of these efforts -- and David may want to speak to the inhibiting effect of our financial sanctions on procurement -- but all of these efforts taken together have been significant impediments for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.  We haven’t stopped those programs, obviously, but we think these efforts have had an impeding effect.

UNDER SECRETARY COHEN:  I would just say one thing on this score, and that's -- one of the collateral benefits of the financial sanctions that we’ve imposed is that it is increasingly difficult for Iran today to make payments in the international financial system.  That makes it difficult for Iran to procure material for its nuclear program because they have difficulty paying for what it is they're trying to purchase.

And so, as we tighten the financial sanctions, one of the benefits of that is that it becomes increasingly difficult for Iran to acquire material internationally that it needs.  And that also has an impact on the development of their program.

MR. RHODES:  Great.  Thanks, everybody, for jumping on the call.  If you have any follow-up questions, you can be in touch with Bernadette here at the NSC, or, of course, with the State Department and Treasury Departments directly.  And we'll look forward to being in touch with you going forward. 

END
3:17 P.M. EDT

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Fact Sheet on the National Strategy for Biosurveillance

As a Nation, we need to protect the health and safety of our people from naturally occurring or intentional threats. Early threat detection and sustained situational awareness are critical to saving lives and improving outcomes when there is a national health emergency. The Administration’s new National Strategy for Biosurveillance aims to unify national effort around a common purpose and establish new ways of thinking about providing information to enable better decisionmaking.

The Strategy promotes an all-of-Nation approach that brings together Federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; non-governmental organizations; and international partners to identify and understand threats as early as possible and provide accurate and timely information to support life-saving responses.  The Strategy calls for focusing on the most important information, and shaping the enterprise to meet that need, so that we can do more with less. 

The Strategy emphasizes four key biosurveillance functions which are critical for the effectiveness of the biosurveillance enterprise.  They are:

•          Scan and Discern the Environment
•          Integrate and Identify Essential Information
•          Alert and Inform Decisionmakers
•          Forecast and Advise Impacts

Advances in technology, the advent of social media, and new science provide opportunities to strengthen our national biosurveillance enterprise.  As a next step, during the next 120 days, the Administration will lay out specific action steps going forward in an implementation plan.  It is by working together that we can best promote the resilience of the Nation and act to protect the American people.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

National Strategy for Biosurveillance

The National Strategy for Biosurveillance promotes an all-of-Nation approach that brings together Federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; non-governmental organizations; and international partners to identify and understand threats as early as possible and provide accurate and timely information to support life-saving responses.  You can read the “National Strategy for Biosurveillance” HERE.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Statement by the Press Secretary

The agreement reached by House and Senate leadership to fund the government through the first quarter of 2013 is a welcome development, and we are encouraged that both sides have agreed to resolve this issue without delay.  The President has made clear that it is essential that the legislation to fund the government adheres to the funding levels agreed to by both parties last year, and not include ideological or extraneous policy riders. The President will work with leaders in both parties to sign a bill that accomplishes these goals. 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Daily Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 7/31/12

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

12:46 P.M. EDT

MR. CARNEY:  Here we go.  Here we go.

Q    How's camp?

MR. CARNEY:  I really can't talk about it.  (Laughter.) 

Q    About what?

MR. CARNEY:  I was asked about -- I took my son to his first overnight camp yesterday.  And it's a big moment -- you say goodbye.  He's very excited.  I'm sure he's having a great time and I'm not at all worried about it.  (Laughter.) 

Q    -- watching this now?

MR. CARNEY:  No, you can be sure no TV allowed, I hope. 

Aside from that, I will -- I'm sorry, Connie, what?

Q    -- the mother and father.

MR. CARNEY:  He's supposed to write every day.

But I have no other announcements.  But thank you for asking.

Ben.

Q    Thanks, Jay.  A few topics.  Consumer confidence in July was better but not nearly at the level of a healthy economy, a healthy level of confidence.  Does the White House think that public attitudes about the economy are set now as to where they're going to be in November, or is there a sense that there's still time for things to move in either direction?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, the way I would address that question, Ben, is simply to say that the President is not satisfied with where the economy is.  He knows that the American people, by and large, are not satisfied with where the economy is.  And that's why he's doing everything he can, and he is urging Congress to do everything it can, to take action to help the economy grow faster and to help it create more jobs.

We're in a situation now where Congress is about to leave town.  The House should act to pass the tax cuts for the middle class -- 98 percent of American taxpayers -- and do what everyone in Washington agrees should be done, which is to extend those tax cuts, pass that law, the President will sign it, and it will create certainty for 98 percent of the American people.  It will give the economy certainty and it will help the economy grow faster and create more jobs.

This is the President's central preoccupation.  And it is I think the central issue for the American people in this election year.  That's why he's focused on it and that's why he continues to believe that while there are great disagreements -- and he talks about the stalemate that exists here in Washington, a stalemate that the voters can settle in November -- prior to that, there are things that we do agree on that we can act on:  tax cuts for the middle class. 

I think Republican Congressman Steve LaTourette has announced his resignation today, and he talked about his frustration over the fact that Congress finds itself arguing over no-brainers like building roads and bridges.  I have no doubt that the Republican Congressman and the President haven't agreed on all the issues, but they agree on this one -- Congress should pass legislation, as the President outlined in the American Jobs Act, that would put construction workers on the job building roads, bridges, highways, ports, schools. 

This is the kind of thing that has traditionally enjoyed bipartisan support.  It’s the kind of thing that pays benefits not just to the workers who are on the job, but to the broader economy in the near term because it generates economic activity, but also to the economy in the long term because better roads and bridges and highways, infrastructure helps our economy long into the future.  So this is, again, the President’s central preoccupation.

Q    We know that the President’s campaign is about to have a call about Governor Romney’s trip abroad, but I wanted to see if the White House had any comment about how you see the Governor’s trip as having gone, and whether it did anything to help or hurt his credentials.

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I think the campaign can handle some of that, and I think that the press will make its own judgments.  What I can tell you, having been both a reporter covering foreign trips by candidates as well as incumbent Presidents, and now as a staffer, I understand that these are high-stakes enterprises; that pulling them off is a lot harder than it looks; that they can be very tense, especially if they’re not going well, and -- (laughter) -- seriously, for reporters as well as staffers and the principal.  And I think one thing that the news reports remind us of is that when American Presidents, American senators and congressmen and would-be leaders go abroad, what they say is placed under a magnifying glass and it carries great impact.  And Presidents, senators, congressmen, former governors need to be very mindful of the impact because of the diplomatic implications of what you say overseas.

So without offering a broad assessment, which I’ll leave to the campaign, I think that it’s a reminder that this is a high-stakes situation; that the job of President -- even though the focus in this campaign and the focus of this President at this time is on the economy, the job includes as an enormous part of it the exercise of national security policy and diplomacy.  And it’s a very important part of the job, and getting it right matters greatly to America’s standing in the world and to the successful execution of American foreign policy.

Q    One other quick one on a very different topic.  The House is scheduled to vote on a bill that would ban abortions in the District of Columbia after 20 weeks of pregnancy.  I’m wondering the White House’s position on that.

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I haven’t spoken to the President about this particular piece of legislation, Ben, but the President’s position on a woman’s reproductive freedom is well known. 

I would note that, as I mentioned earlier, we’re on the verge of a recess here, and rather than focusing on controversial, divisive, social legislation, the House ought to be passing a tax cut for 98 percent of the middle class -- 98 percent of American taxpayers, for the middle class, that everyone agrees on.  That should be the focus of the House’s work right now.  That’s what the American people want.  It’s something that everyone agrees on. 

We can debate for the rest of this election cycle the merits of providing extended tax breaks to the top 2 percent of American earners, and that’s an important debate to have.  You know the President’s position; we know the other side’s position.  But here’s a situation where Republicans and Democrats agree -- and the President feels strongly about this -- that we should extend those tax cuts for the middle class.  And we should do that right away, and then debate about the issues that still divide us.

Q    Thank you.

MR. CARNEY:  Reuters, and then -- yes.

Q    Thanks, Jay.  House prices rose for the fourth straight month in May, and -- an indication that the market is gaining strength.  I wondered if it’s your assessment that the market has bottomed out, and how confident are you that the direction will continue?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I would leave the broader assessments about the state of the market to experts who analyze that.  This President has been very focused on taking every measure available, both administratively and legislatively, to assist homeowners who, through no fault of their own -- they’ve been responsible, they met their mortgage payments, but they find themselves underwater -- helping them refinance.  That’s been a very important initiative that this President has pressed. 

And we’re very mindful of the fact that the collapse of the housing market has contributed mightily to the great recession and has been a drag on the recovery.  So we need to continue to take the steps necessary to assist responsible homeowners to keep making their payments, to stay in their homes -- and obviously there’s a virtuous cycle here hopefully that begins to take effect gradually that will help lift the housing market and, with it, create some economic growth as a benefit.

But this is still a difficult issue for many, many Americans who find themselves, again, through no fault of their own, they’ve been very responsible, but find themselves underwater with their mortgages.  And that’s why the President has been focusing -- focused on getting the kind of assistance to them so they can take advantage of historically low interest rates that Washington can help provide.

Q    Did the improvement in prices reduce the urgency of debt forgiveness from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac?

MR. CARNEY:  I don’t have a specific reaction to that question.  I simply will say that we are far from where we want to be -- both broadly in the economy, as I was saying to Ben, but certainly in the housing market.  And I would -- I think it would be way premature to suggest that we don’t need to take more steps to assist homeowners.

Q    Just one other question.  North Korea has had some quite serious flooding.  There’s a U.N. team that’s on the way there to assess the needs and put together an aid plan.  Is the United States involved in that discussion?  Is there a plan to contribute humanitarian aid to North Korea if they need it?

MR. CARNEY:  I haven’t had any discussions about that issue here at the White House.  I would probably refer you to the United States mission at the U.N. or perhaps the State Department.  Obviously, for North Koreans who are suffering, our hearts go out to them.  But I don’t have anything specific on assistance.

Welcome, Nancy.

Q    Thank you very much, Jay.  You said that things can be tense when things aren’t going well.  Does that mean that the White House thinks that things for Mr. Romney on his overseas trip did not go well?  And is there anything that he said while he was abroad that was of concern to the President?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, again, I’ll leave the assessments to the media and to others about his trip.  I was trying to make a broader point about the significance of foreign travel for Presidents, for would-be presidents, senators, congressmen, because of the weight of their words when they travel overseas and the impact it can have on the execution of U.S. foreign policy.  Now, I think there are a number of things that have been said about the President’s foreign policy record that are inaccurate and that I’d be happy to contest, but I think --

Q    Notably?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, look, I think we’ve talked about, on the issue of missile defense, it is very clear that this President has pursued aggressively the development and implementation of a missile defense program in Europe that includes, notably, an installation in Poland, and that, contrary to suggestions to the contrary -- contrary to suggestions from critics, the Russians continue to oppose and we continue to press forward with that missile defense program because it’s the right thing to do.  It’s based on tested technology, and it’s the most effective missile defense program in terms of combating the threat from Iran.  That would be one issue where some of the criticism was off the mark, to say the least.

Q    On birth control, your new mandate for insurance companies goes into effect tomorrow -- they have to add birth control coverage to their plans.  Obviously there are already a number of challenges from businesses around the country on religious grounds.  Some of those challenges have been upheld in state courts.  Are you concerned that this is going to become the new front in the war over the Affordable Care Act?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I would simply point you to the President’s policy and the position that he oversaw and had developed that ensures that these important preventive services are available to all women and that also respects religious liberty. 

As you know, no religious institution, no university has to provide contraceptive services or -- and the President’s position was very clearly that there needed to be that respect for religious liberty that created that balance while ensuring that women get these important preventive services.  So we’re still implementing the rule, but I think the President sought and found the right position in terms of respecting religious liberty and making sure these services are provided.

Q    What do you think about these lawsuits that are going on all around the country?  How much does that hamper the administration’s ability to implement this rule?

MR. CARNEY:  I’m not going to comment on specific legislation or broadly -- I mean, litigation or even broadly on it.  I can tell you that we’re moving forward to implement this important rule that will ensure that women across the country have access to preventive services.  It’s a rule that also makes sure that religious liberty is respected.

Yes, Ed.

Q    Jay, I don’t know if this is related to the Romney trip or not, but the President had a phone call yesterday with the Turkish Prime Minister and the White House put out a photo and the President was sitting at his desk on the phone and he had a baseball bat in his hand.  Or maybe you were traveling yesterday. But the official White House photo --

Q    Was it aluminum or wood?

Q    He had a baseball bat in his hand.  Do you know did he get that from a Major League player, or is there some sort of back story about the foreign policy approach or -- (laughter) -- he was holding a baseball bat.

MR. CARNEY:  He’s a baseball fan.  What can I tell you.  As I think he said, White Sox but also watching the remarkable Washington Nationals.

Q    Can you take the question?

MR. CARNEY:  I can find out, yes.  (Laughter.) [The President is pictured talking on the telephone in the Oval Office holding an autographed baseball bat that was given to him by Hall of Famer Hank Aaron.]

Q    Perhaps it was a diplomatic gift?

Q    On the economy, there was a -- you talk a lot here at the podium about the President’s approach, the balanced approach, and how many Americans agree with that.  There was a Gallup poll in the last 24 hours or so that suggested that government corruption, job creation, other issues like that are far more important on voters’ minds right now.  And raising taxes was far down the list, I think around 8, 9, 10, in that range -- much further down the list.  How does that square with the claim that the American people support the balanced approach and that’s sort of what they want in this election year?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I think you’ve mixed a bunch of different elements here.  I think the documentation and the data that shows support for a balanced approach is very conclusive.  What is also true is that the American people are principally focused on the economy writ large, and on job creation and their own economic situation.  It doesn’t mean that most Americans wake up every morning thinking about how to implement a balanced approach to long-term deficit reduction.  It means that they want Washington to work in a way that helps the economy, helps it create jobs, and demonstrates the capacity of its leaders here to get America's fiscal house in order. 

And when we talk about what's the right approach, overwhelmingly the answer is a balanced approach that includes significant spending cuts to discretionary spending; it includes entitlement reforms that, while saving money, also strengthen programs like Medicare and Medicaid; and it includes revenues.  And that is the conclusion not just of the President, but of every outside, independent, bipartisan commission that’s looked at this.  It's the conclusion of the so-called Gang of Six, a bipartisan group of United States senators. 

And we have so much work that’s been done on this that there's not a lot of mystery about what it would take to achieve the amount of deficit reduction that would get control of our fiscal outlook, in excess of $4 trillion over 10 years.  And it's clear that the only way to do that without putting undue burdens on seniors, undue burdens on people who have children with disabilities, undue burdens on the middle class, is to do this in a balanced way. 

And the roadblock since last summer has consistently been a refusal by Republicans in Congress in anything like the numbers necessary to agree to the basic principle that everybody ought to pay their fair share, and a willingness to see the United States default, a willingness to see taxes go up on the middle class, a willingness to see defense cuts that are far deeper than anybody here in Washington thinks are responsible, all because of the principal judgment that what needs to be protected is tax relief for millionaires and billionaires.  That's just, understandably, not a position that has a great deal of support among the broader American populous.

Q    Jay -- and part of me knows the answer to the question, but I feel like I have to ask it anyway.

MR. CARNEY:  I'll take it anyway.  (Laughter.)

Q    Everything is an extension now here in Washington.  And I know you just went through a litany of reasons and you say it is all the Republicans fault.  But you just talked about sequester, and there is a tour going around -- John McCain is leading a tour on sequester.  And everything is -- do you guys have any responsibility here of the fact that we live in a town that only passes everything by six-month extensions? 

You have a six-month extension on the budget.  Everything is about avoiding the next delay.  The sequester, everybody is finger-pointing now, but it's -- I mean, it is just a kick the can -- and I understand you just went through and said, hey, it's all their fault.  It's all their fault?  You guys have no responsibility on this whatsoever?  Should you be having more summits here?  Should you be forcing Boehner to just sit there and not answer you?  I mean, I guess is there a different way you guys should be going about this? 

MR. CARNEY:  It's a fair question about what is the best way to bring about the kind of consensus that has been lacking.  And what I think all of us here have learned, and certainly those of us in the White House have learned, in the last year and a half is that getting things through this Congress that enjoy broad public support but which are opposed by a particularly powerful wing of the Republican Party, especially in the House, requires taking it to the people.  It requires making the argument out in the country. 

And I think you know, because you covered it, that we have tried it all ways -- both ways, if you will -- and that includes lots of negotiations and sitting across the table with leaders in Congress.  And I'm not precluding that in the future, but what we need is a demonstration of a seriousness of purpose by Republicans in Congress and a willingness to accept the premise that there needs to be balance in this.  There needs to be a willingness to ask the wealthiest Americans to pay a little bit more, so that the middle class doesn't get stuck with the burden so that --

Q    The last nine months you guys have had this sort of throw-up-your-hands approach.  You know what -- they're not willing to talk.  They're not willing to negotiate. 

MR. CARNEY:  But my point is that on a number of issues, including extension of the payroll tax cut, extension of unemployment insurance, including ensuring that student loans didn't double -- the rates didn't double for millions of young Americans across the country -- the President worked both here in Washington, but worked in raising the profile of these issues across the country.  And that had the effect, fortunately, of bringing about a vote in Congress that was the right one that broke the back, if you will, of what initially was opposition to the President's position.  And I think that's what we believe can bring about consensus here.

Q    Go back to the fundamental question:  Do you guys own any of this?

MR. CARNEY:  The President is President.  He has pushed a lot of policies.  He has implemented a number of policies, and very significant ones, that reversed the course economically that we were on in this country that was cataclysmic of economic decline that we hadn't seen since the Great Depression, of job loss that we hadn't seen in decades, and took other measures like what was considered political folly at the time to ensure that the American automobile industry was saved, as well as making sure that we didn't precipitate an even greater crisis by allowing the financial sector to collapse. 

I mean, these were not -- these were tough choices, but they were the right choices.  And the President is responsible for those decisions and he stands by them.  And he is obviously running on that record. 

Q    -- what we're facing now.

MR. CARNEY:  Look, he made -- this was part of the problem that we faced.  And I think you and others who are veterans around here understand the continuum that we're on here is that the President and -- not always with a great deal of alacrity -- his party has come along on these budget negotiations, on these debates about what the right course is on fiscal policy, and taken positions that represent real compromise.

Two trillion dollars in spending cuts -- that's a lot of spending cuts that this President signed into law.  He took positions on entitlement reforms that I’m sure there are members of his party would rather he did not take.  But he was willing to do that because he believed that the greater good would be served by a compromise with Republican leaders in the Senate and the House, and the economy would be served by a bargain -- a grand bargain last summer that would have locked in the kind of long-term deficit reduction that would be beneficial for the country. That's the position he continues to take.

And I take your point that there’s -- it’s frustrating that despite the overwhelming evidence that that's the right course of action, despite the demonstrated willingness of the President and Democrats to compromise and to come some distance towards Republicans, that there has yet to be in any significant numbers in Congress among Republicans a similar willingness to accept the principle that they're not going to get everything that they want, that they might reach a deal that could leave Grover Norquist unhappy.  But that is the only deal that's available that would protect the middle class, protect seniors, and ensure that our economy continues to grow.

Ann.

Q    Speaking of budget cuts, can you talk a little bit about why the President is going back to the same area of Akron, Ohio, tomorrow that he’s visited before?  And in Mansfield, the local paper is reporting if President Obama has his way his Air Force One arrival would be one of the final flights into the Mansfield airport because the President wants to do away with the mission for the 800 guardsmen at the Mansfield --

MR. CARNEY:  I’ll have to take the question.  I’m not aware of that particular issue.  And in terms of why is he going to Ohio, I think --

Q    No, to that area of Ohio -- Mansfield and Akron.  I mean, he was just there on a bus tour.

MR. CARNEY:  There’s not an inch of Ohio that the President does not love to visit.  (Laughter.)  It’s a great state -- my wife’s home state.

Q    In terms of Mansfield, can we get you to take that question?

MR. CARNEY:  Sure.  I’m not aware of even the policy implications or what issue you’re discussing.

Q    It is a base -- or is a National Guard operation, Air National Guard operation.

MR. CARNEY:  I’m not sure what this is in reference to, but if this is in reference to defense cuts that are related to the sequester, I think it's worth going back and looking at the vote on the Budget Control Act and all the Republicans, including those who are running around leading efforts to undo that vote, who voted for it because they said -- this was not -- the President didn’t say, let's have a sequester.  He pushed a deal, a balanced approach to deficit reduction that would have resulted in all the positive benefits that I just talked about with Chuck.

The Budget Control Act was the result of a failure by Congress to agree to a balanced approach to deficit reduction, and it was the result of Republicans willing to play chicken with the full faith and credit of the United States, willing to risk default, some of them even seemed to anticipate with glee the prospect of default.  And the President could not let that happen to the economy, to the American people.  And thus we got the Budget Control Act, which, in something that was designed by -- or with leaders in Congress, a sequester was written into law that included cuts that nobody wants -- not the President, not Democrats, not Republicans.  And the whole point of it was to create a forcing mechanism so that Congress would do its job.  Congress still needs to do its job.

Andrei.

Q    Thank you, Jay.  The PNTR, the Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Russia has passed through a couple of key committees on the Hill.  And Speaker Boehner said that if the administration wants it to pass through the House then the President needs to be out there and argue for it personally.  So my question is very simple.  Does the President think that it's worthwhile to personally interfere in the situation and then do something about it?

MR. CARNEY:  The President has worked very closely, his administration has, with Congress on this matter and will continue to do so.  I'm not sure that there's any dispute over that.  And the President will instruct the members of his Cabinet and administration to continue to do that, and we hope for congressional action.

Q    And if there is no PNTR for Russia in two or three weeks, and Russia enters the WTO without the PNTR, what specifically do the American companies lose by it?  Because everybody knows that the American business lose -- but what specifically does it mean for --

MR. CARNEY:  Well, it's a good question and I confess it's outside of my expertise, so I'll have to take it.  But you can be sure that we're working with Congress on this matter.

Q    Jay, at the start of the briefing you were asked if the Romney trip has had any detrimental effect on foreign policy.  You eventually wound your way around to the missile defense comments and things like that.  Would you say specifically that that was detrimental to --

MR. CARNEY:  No, no, no.  There’s nothing that I can say that’s detrimental -- at least not to the President.  (Laughter.) But my point was that there were certainly things said about the President’s foreign policy record that were inaccurate or that we would contest.  And part of my job in speaking for the President is to contest inaccurate representations of his policy positions. So that was all.

Brianna.

Q    Jay, the White House and the Obama campaign have made clear they feel that Bill Clinton is a very good messenger for President Obama on the economy.  There’s now this ad out from the Romney campaign and the RNC using Clinton’s words where he said that Romney had a sterling business career.  So they’re trying to use your messenger as their messenger.  What’s your reaction to that?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I would -- on a matter purely of campaign advertising, I think you should ask the campaign.  I can tell you that, as we’ve discussed here on several occasions, President Clinton’s experience in office, his economic record, and the fact that the marginal tax rates for the top earners in America that were in place under Bill Clinton are the ones that President Obama believes we should return to, because we cannot afford to give another tax cut to the wealthiest 2 percent.  Those rates were in place when we saw the greatest peacetime economic expansion in our history and we saw the creation of 24 million jobs. 

So it’s a useful piece of recent history to examine when we hear protests from Republicans about the calamity that would ensue if the wealthiest 2 percent in America were asked to pay marginal tax rates at the level that they paid in the 1990s -- because some of those very Republicans made the same predictions in 1993 and they could not have been more wrong.  The facts prove them utterly wrong.

Q    Is it detrimental to the President that this characterization of Romney’s career can be used, though, at a time when --

MR. CARNEY:  Again, that’s a pure -- I mean, you’re asking about a campaign ad that I confess I have not seen.  I think I know the comment you’re referring to and I know everything else that President Clinton has said about it, so I would refer you to him and to Chicago.

Q    Okay.  And then ancestry.com says that President Obama may be related to the first documented African slave in pre-revolutionary America -- a guy named John Punch, who was an indentured servant, who was sentenced to a life of slavery after an unsuccessful escape attempt in pre-revolutionary Virginia.  Is the President aware that ancestry.com has said this and does he have any reaction to it?

MR. CARNEY:  I think that sort of came out yesterday and, as you know, I was traveling with my son.  I haven't had that discussion with him.  I have no idea if it's accurate.  All I can tell you is it certainly reflects the remarkable nature of our country and the diversity within it.  But again, I can't vouch for the findings. 

Q    Can you ask him?

MR. CARNEY:  I might. 

Ari.

Q    In Romney's speech in Poland, he said, "When economists speak of Poland today, it's not to lament chronic problems but to describe how this nation empowered the individual, lifted the heavy hand of government and became the fastest-growing economy in all of Europe."  And I wondered what you think of that assessment of the connection between lifting the "heavy hand of government," "empowering the individual" and fast economic growth.

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I would simply say that Poland's success have indeed been impressive.  And this administration has stood by our close ally, Poland, throughout the past three and a half years and worked with the Poles on numerous fronts -- both national security matters and global economic matters. 

I'm not sure what your question is in terms of the broader themes. 

Q    Well, the suggestion being that regulation impedes economic growth -- the opposite -- empowering the individual promotes economic growth -- and that Poland is an example of the kind of economic proposals that Romney would put in place if he were President. 

MR. CARNEY:  Well, here's what I would say -- and it goes back to the answer I gave Briana about the Clinton years.  This President believes deeply in the power of business in America to create jobs; the importance of making sure that regulations that are in place do not hamper economic growth and job creation, even as they ensure the protection of the American people, of the air we breathe, the water we drink. 

And I would say this:  What we know -- this is the beauty of the recent past here, and the stark clarity of the debate that we're having -- the rules that were in place in the 1990s, the tax rates that were in place in the 1990s, the rules and tax rates that were decried by many Republican leaders at the time had something to do with the greatest economic expansion and peace time in our history, had something to do with the creation of 24 million jobs over the course of 8 years.

We then tried the opposite approach for eight years; we had the slowest economic growth of any expansion in 50 years.  We had anemic job creation.  We had a situation that -- and if that weren't bad enough, then we had the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression.

Everything that I have heard in this debate from the other side has been a call to return to the policies that we know from recent unhappy experience led to a very bad economic situation in this country -- particularly bad for the middle class.  Everything we know about some of the policies that are opposed by the Republicans is that they were in place in the 1990s when we saw significant economic growth and significant job creation, and a level of expansion for the middle class and expansion of middle-class incomes that we would very much like to see again and that this President is focused on every day.

So I think that’s the debate we’re having.  I think that's the debate that hangs over the kind of policy discussions that Chuck and I were talking about, and it is useful to have these two recent examples to compare.

There’s a record out there that exists, and it includes the last three and a half years.  Again, when this President took office, when he was sworn into office in January of 2009, the economy was in freefall, hemorrhaging jobs 750,000 to 800,000 a month, economic decline of nearly 9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008.  That's the situation that we faced in 2009.  And using a new metric put forward by a leading Republican, if we measure this President’s performance after the first six months in office and his policies began to take effect, we think it shows sustained economic growth, sustained job creation.  Nowhere near where we need to be, but certainly a far better circumstance than the one we found ourselves in.

Jared.

Q    Jay, now that it looks like the DNC will be adopting national gay marriage as part of their platform, will the embrace of that platform be a further evolution for the President on the issue of marriage equality?

MR. CARNEY:  I think you heard the President discuss his position and his personal view that it’s wrong to prevent couples who are in loving, committed relationships and want to marry from doing so.  With regards to the DNC platform, I think that issue is still being worked out, and I would refer you to the DNC.

Q    But when the President did discuss that issue, his focus was still on states dealing with it, and this would be something from a national perspective.  Would the President, based on what he said in those interviews at that time, would he embrace a national campaign to promote marriage equality?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, you're conflating a bunch of things about a discussion at the DNC about a party platform to a national campaign.  And I would simply refer you to what the President has said and what his personal views are, and then to the DNC for what I understand is a process that is still developing as regards to their platform.

Q    Can I jump in here?

MR. CARNEY:  Sure.

Q    Now that we have -- I broke the news yesterday on how platform committee on Sunday said to include the marriage equality plank in the platform.  I’m wondering if now that that establishes -- there are several Democrats down ticket who do not hold the view that they support same-sex marriage including Jon Tester in Montana, Tim Kaine in Virginia, and Claire McCaskill in Missouri.  Does the administration believe that the adoption of that language in the platform should prompt these Democrats to reconsider a position as they pursue office?

MR. CARNEY:  I would refer you to the DNC, Chris.  It’s, again, as I just said, an issue that's being developed in the usual fashion as they work on a platform, and I would send you there for that question.

Yes, Olivier.

Q    Jay, there’s a new debate -- a renewed debate on Capitol Hill about the targeted killings policy.  I'm wondering whether as a matter of principle, you think that the courts, the Congress, or the American people need to bless or endorse this policy, or what will they have in judging the policy and letting it go forward?

MR. CARNEY:  There are aspects of that question that make it difficult for me to respond.  I can tell you that the President takes the national security of this country very seriously and the fight against al Qaeda very seriously.  And he pursues policies that best -- that he believes are the right ones to protect the American people, to protect our interests and Americans abroad. 

But I can't -- I think, broadly speaking in terms of some of these issues, you've heard John Brennan and others discuss them. But without a more specific question, I can't really address that from here.

Q    What's your reaction then to the legislative proposals floating around the Hill --

MR. CARNEY:  I haven't seen them, so I'd have to have something more specific. 

Q    How does the President stand on polygamy?

MR. CARNEY:  Kristen.

Q    How does he stand on polygamy?  Could you answer that question?

MR. CARNEY:  Kristen.

Q    So you want to dodge that issue.

Q    Jay, last week I asked you if the President supported the amendment to the cyber security legislation that's being supported by Senator Schumer and other Democrats that would limit the purchase of high-capacity gun magazines.  Have you had a chance to talk to the President about this and whether or not he supports it?  Last week, you didn't know.

MR. CARNEY:  I haven't spoken to him about it.  But I do know and have talked to him generally about his approach to this, which is that he believes we ought to take action on common-sense measures that protect the Second Amendment rights of the American people while making it harder for criminals and others who should not have weapons under existing law -- harder for them to obtain them.  And I think that any legislation that might emerge from Congress would have to -- would be viewed with those principles in mind. 

Q    Given the fact that the President talked -- spoke at the Urban League about the importance of having a dialogue, about cracking down on gun violence, has he moved any closer to deciding whether to hold any sort of gun policy event to open a dialogue about this any further?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I have no announcements to make in terms of his schedule or speaking plans.  But I would point you to the fact that he gave that address and to the fact that he spoke about the issue of violence at a higher level, that this is not just an issue of specific horrific incidents like that one that took place in Aurora, but the fact that we have levels of violence that are too high in many cities across this country, and that we need to address the problem from a variety of directions -- not just through legislation that relates to guns but through action that we could take and are taking in assisting local law enforcement, local government; action that we can take to ensure that teenagers who might be prone to or vulnerable to falling into gangs are instead in school or have summer programs that keep them off the streets.  These are the kinds of things that are part of a broader approach to dealing with violence.

Q    Well, I guess, what's the next step?  In addition to speaking about it at the union [sic] league, what's he --

MR. CARNEY:  Well, I don't have -- the President has directed his Department of Justice to continue to take action, common-sense action that makes enforcement of our existing laws more effective, prevents criminals and others who should not have weapons from getting them.  And he will, I'm sure, continue to hold the position that he talked about at the Urban League and talked about in Tucson and talked about in the op-ed that he wrote about the broader issues of violence and how we should address it. 

Thank you.

Q    Is the President watching any of the Olympics?

MR. CARNEY:  I think whenever he gets a chance.

END  
1:31 P.M. EDT

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate

NOMINATIONS SENT TO THE SENATE:

Eric J. Jolly, of Minnesota, to be a Member of the National Museum and Library Services Board for a term expiring December 6, 2016, vice Karen Brosius, term expired.

Susana Torruella Leval, of New York, to be a Member of the National Museum and Library Services Board for a term expiring December 6, 2015, vice Katherine M. B. Berger, term expired.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Fact Sheet: Sanctions Related to Iran

“Because of our efforts, Iran is under greater pressure than ever before…Few thought that sanctions could have an immediate bite on the Iranian regime.  They have, slowing the Iranian nuclear program and virtually grinding the Iranian economy to a halt in 2011.  Many questioned whether we could hold our coalition together as we moved against Iran’s Central Bank and oil exports.  But our friends in Europe and Asia and elsewhere are joining us.  And in 2012, the Iranian government faces the prospect of even more crippling sanctions.”

President Barack Obama
March 4, 2012

In July 2012, the Obama Administration took two actions to further isolate and penalize Iran for its refusal to live up to its international obligations regarding its nuclear program, and to hold accountable financial institutions that knowingly provide financial services to Iranian banks that are under U.S. sanctions for their connection to illicit activities. These steps are part of President Obama’s commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons by raising the cost of Iran’s defiance of the international community.

Signing Executive Order “Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran”

  • The Executive Order signed on July 30, 2012 by President Obama expands upon sanctions in section 1245 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to make sanctionable knowingly conducting or facilitating significant transactions with a private or public foreign financial institution or other entity for the purchase or acquisition of Iranian oil.
  • This sanction is designed to deter Iran or any other country from establishing payment mechanisms for the purchase of Iranian oil to circumvent the NDAA sanctions. 
  • The existing exception rules under the NDAA apply to this new sanction.  Thus, countries that are determined to have significantly reduced their volume of purchases of Iranian crude oil will receive an exception from this new measure as well.  To date, all major purchasers of Iranian crude have significantly reduced their purchases and received exceptions, demonstrating the success of U.S. sanctions policy in reducing Iranian oil sales and revenues.
  • Additionally, existing sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical industry are expanded by making sanctionable significant transactions for the purchase or acquisition of Iranian petrochemical products.
  • Sanctions are also authorized for individuals and entities that provide material support to the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, or the Central Bank of Iran, or for the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious metals by the Government of Iran.

Imposing Sanctions Under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)

Today, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions under CISADA on Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq, for knowingly facilitating significant transactions or providing significant financial services to Iranian banks designated for their connection to Iran’s support for terrorism or proliferation.

This action exposes the involvement of Bank of Kunlun and Elaf Islamic Bank with designated Iranian banks, in an effort to further stymie Iran’s access to the international financial system.  This will also further protect the U.S. financial system from direct or indirect access by designated Iranian banks.

U.S. officials continue to engage with government and financial institutions around the world to inform the international financial community of the risks involved in doing business with Iran. 

Building a Comprehensive Sanctions Strategy

Since taking office, President Obama has presented a very clear choice to the Iranian regime:  comply with its international nuclear obligations and benefit from the greater economic, political, and security integration that come with being part of the international community, or face growing consequences for non-compliance.  Iran has chosen to proceed down the path of international isolation, and has therefore suffered from what President Ahmadinejad called in July 2012, “the most severe and strictest sanctions ever imposed on a country”. 

As part of his commitment to show the Iranian government that its actions have consequences, on July 30, 2012 President Obama signed his fifth Executive Order in 12 months targeting Iran for sanctions.  These actions have:

  • Combated Human Rights Abuses Using 21st Century Tools:  In an innovative approach to targeting human rights abuses perpetrated by the Iranian and Syrian regimes, President Obama in Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012 authorized sanctions and visa bans against those who commit or facilitate grave human rights abuses via information technology.  This creative tool also targets the companies that provide the technology these brutal regimes use for oppression, and the “digital guns for hire” who create or operate systems used to monitor, track, and target citizens for killing, torture, or other grave abuses.
  • Punished Sanctions Evasion:  To ensure that sanctions continue to have a tangible impact on Iran, the President in Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012 authorized new sanctions against those who engage in activities intended to evade U.S. sanctions. 
  • Blocked Iran’s Access to the International Financial Market:  To make it harder for the Iranian regime to work through international financial institutions to finance its nuclear weapons program, President Obama acted in Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012 to block all assets of the Government of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions that are within the jurisdiction of the United States.
  • Hindered Iran’s Oil and Gas Sector:  To make it more difficult for Iran to operate, maintain, and modernize its oil and gas sector, President Obama in Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011 imposed new sanctions targeting Iran’s petrochemical sector for the first time and expanding energy sanctions. 

Partnering with Congress

In addition to using Executive Orders and multilateral sanctions to intensify the consequences for Iran’s failure to comply with its international obligations, the Obama Administration has worked with Congress examining new sanctions legislation, and has made full use of existing legislative authorities.

The FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which was enacted in December 2011, contained new sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran that the Administration has used to great effect to undermine Iran’s ability to sell its oil internationally. 

In June 2010, President Obama worked with Congress to pass the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), which strengthened existing U.S. sanctions against Iran in the areas of refined petroleum sales, serious human rights abuses, and Iran’s access to the international financial system.

Rallying the International Community

With President Obama’s leadership, the United States gained the support of Russia, China, and other nations to pass United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 in June 2010, which created the most comprehensive and stinging international sanctions the Iranian regime has ever faced.  

The Obama Administration also worked with allies such as the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Canada, and others to adopt additional national measures to increase pressure on the Iranian regime, including in the financial, banking, insurance, transportation, and energy sectors.  Iran is now cut off from large parts of the international financial system and we are working aggressively to isolate Iran even further.  In one of the most recent actions, the European Union’s embargo on Iranian oil went into full effect on July 1.  This action, coupled with reductions from other countries, has cost Iran billions of dollars per month thanks to disrupted oil sales of up to 1 million barrels per day.

Targeting the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program Through Its Oil Revenues

  • The Administration has used sanctions to convince major oil companies to withdraw from Iran’s oil fields, leading the Iranian Oil Ministry to acknowledge publicly in 2011 that it is $100 billion short in the investment it needs to develop this sector. 
  • In 2010, Ali Salehi, the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, admitted that sanctions have delayed Iran’s enrichment program.
  • Iran has lost billions in oil revenue, and every major importer of Iranian oil has reduced significantly their purchases of Iranian oil, leading to at an estimated loss of 700,000 – 1,000,000 barrels per day of oil no longer being sold by Iran.
  • Iran’s currency has plummeted in value, complicating Iran’s ability to engage in international commerce.  We estimate that the Rial has lost almost 38 percent of its value in the past year.
  • Firms as diverse as Ernst & Young, Daimler AG, Caterpillar, ENI, Total, and hundreds more have divested themselves of their interests in Iran to avoid the reputational risks and, consequently, undermined further Iran’s access to the international economy. 

Even as we intensify our pressure on the Iranian government, we hold open the door to diplomacy.  Iran can choose to abide by its international obligations, honor its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and prove that its intentions are peaceful. The United States remains committed to a diplomatic solution, but the onus is on Iran. If the Iranian government continues it defiance, there should be no doubt that the United States and our partners will continue to hold Iran accountable.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Statement by the President on the Announcement of Additional Sanctions Related to Iran

Today, the United States is announcing two significant steps that strengthen our efforts to pressure and isolate the Iranian government for its continued failure to meet its international obligations.

First, I have approved a new Executive Order that imposes new sanctions against the Iranian energy and petrochemical sectors.  This action is designed to deter Iran from establishing payment mechanisms for the purchase of Iranian oil to circumvent existing sanctions, and utilizes the existing structure of our sanctions law, including exceptions for significant reductions in the purchase of Iranian oil.  Additionally, existing sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical industry are expanded by making sanctionable the purchase or acquisition of Iranian petrochemical products.  Sanctions are also authorized for those who may seek to avoid the impact of these sanctions, including against individuals and entities that provide material support to the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, or the Central Bank of Iran, or for the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious metals by the Government of Iran. 

Second, we have also taken a significant step to hold responsible institutions that knowingly enable financial transactions for designated Iranian banks.  The Department of the Treasury today imposed sanctions on Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA).  Bank of Kunlun and Elaf Islamic Bank have facilitated transactions worth millions of dollars on behalf of Iranian banks that are subject to sanctions for their links to Iran’s illicit proliferation activities.  By cutting off these financial institutions from the United States, today’s action makes it clear that we will expose any financial institution, no matter where they are located, that allows the increasingly desperate Iranian regime to retain access to the international financial system.

Since taking office, we have presented the Iranian government with a clear choice:  come in line with your international obligations and rejoin the community of nations, or face growing consequences.  With these actions, we are once again reaffirming our commitment to hold the Iranian government accountable for its actions.  The United States remains committed to a diplomatic solution, but the onus is on Iran to abide by its international obligations.  If the Iranian government continues its defiance, there should be no doubt that the United States and our partners will continue to impose increasing consequences.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Executive Order -- Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect To Iran

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - - - -

AUTHORIZING ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, as relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders, particularly in light of the Government of Iran's use of revenues from petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemicals for illicit purposes, Iran's continued attempts to evade international sanctions through deceptive practices, and the unacceptable risk posed to the international financial system by Iran's activities, hereby order:

Section 1. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that the foreign financial institution has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction:

(i) with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), except for a sale or provision to NIOC or NICO of the products described in section 5(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172), as amended, provided that the fair market value of such products is lower than the applicable dollar threshold specified in that provision;

(ii) for the purchase or acquisition of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran; or

(iii) for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran.

(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet the criteria set forth in subsection (a)(i), (a)(ii), or (a)(iii) of this section, the Secretary of the Treasury may prohibit the opening, and

prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by such foreign financial institution.

(c) Subsections (a)(i) and (ii) of this section shall apply with respect to a significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution only if:

(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of subsection 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) (NDAA) that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions; and

(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of that subsection does not apply with respect to the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution.

(d) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or when the underlying transaction has been authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(e) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative, and with the President of the Export-Import Bank, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and other agencies and officials as appropriate, is hereby authorized to impose on a person any of the sanctions described in section 3 or 4 of this order upon determining that the person:

(i) knowingly, on or after the effective date of this order, engaged in a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran;

(ii) knowingly, on or after the effective date of this order, engaged in a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran;

(iii) is a successor entity to a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with this subsection to meet the criteria in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section;

(iv) owns or controls a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with this subsection to meet the criteria in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section, and had knowledge that the person engaged in the activities referred to in that subsection; or

(v) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with this subsection to meet the criteria in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section, and knowingly participated in the activities referred to in that subsection.

(b) Subsection (a)(i) of this section shall apply with respect to a person only if:

(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of subsection 1245(d) of the NDAA that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions; and

(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of that subsection does not apply with respect to the country with primary jurisdiction over the person.

Sec. 3. When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section 2 of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the criteria described in section 2 and has selected any of the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person, the heads of relevant agencies, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of State:

(a) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank shall deny approval of the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in an extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person;

(b) agencies shall not issue any specific license or grant any other specific permission or authority under any statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or technology to the sanctioned person;

(c) with respect to a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:

(i) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall take such actions as they deem appropriate, including denying designation, or terminating the continuation of any prior designation of, the sanctioned person as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments; or

(ii) agencies shall prevent the sanctioned person from serving as an agent of the United States Government or serving as a repository for United States Government funds; or

(d) agencies shall not procure, or enter into a contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.

(e) The prohibitions in subsections (a)-(d) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 4. (a) When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section 2 of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the criteria described in section 2 and has selected any of the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of State:

(i) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities;

(ii) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest;

(iii) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;

(iv) block all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that come within the United States, or that are or come within the possession or control of any United States person, including any foreign branch, of the sanctioned person, and provide that such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in; or

(v) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person.

(b) The prohibitions in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(v) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 5. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the measures described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that the person has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC, NICO, or the Central Bank of Iran, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious metals by the Government of Iran.

(b) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with subsection (a) to meet the criteria set forth in subsection (a) of this section, all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person, including any foreign branch, of such person are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.

(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 6. Subsection 1(a), section 2, and subsection 5(a) of this order shall not apply with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction involving a natural gas development and pipeline project initiated prior to the effective date of this order to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey in furtherance of a production sharing agreement or license awarded by a sovereign government other than the Government of Iran before the effective date of this order.

Sec. 7. I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the type of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 or subsection (b) of section 5 of this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 and subsection (b) of section 5 of this order.

Sec. 8. The prohibitions in subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 and subsection (b) of section 5 of this order include, but are not limited to:

(i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and

(ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Sec. 9. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 10. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term "person" means an individual or entity;

(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;

(c) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States;

(d) the term "financial institution," as used in sections 3 and 4 of this order, includes (i) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(1)), including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978) (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)); (ii) a credit union; (iii) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer; (iv) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and (v) any other company that provides financial services;

(e) the term "foreign financial institution," as used in section 1 of this order, means any foreign entity that is engaged in the business of accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. It includes, but is not limited to, depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans, and holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing. The term does not include the international financial institutions

identified in 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2), the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the North American Development Bank, or any other international financial institution so notified by the Secretary of the Treasury;

(f) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution as defined in subsection (d) of this section (including its foreign branches) organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States or located in the United States;

(g) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of Iran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements;

(h) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Iran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Iran;

(i) the terms "knowledge" and "knowingly," with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, mean that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result;

(j) the term "sanctioned person" means a person on whom the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section 2 of this order, has determined to impose sanctions pursuant to section 2;

(k) the term "petroleum" (also known as crude oil) means a mixture of hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating facilities;

(l) the term "petroleum products" includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous products obtained from the processing of: crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and other hydrocarbon compounds. The term does not include natural gas, liquefied natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels;

(m) the term "petrochemical products" includes any aromatic, olefin, and synthesis gas, and any of their derivatives, including ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea;

(n) the terms "National Iranian Oil Company" and "NIOC" mean the National Iranian Oil Company and any entity owned or controlled by, or operating for or on behalf of, the National Iranian Oil Company; and

(o) the terms "Naftiran Intertrade Company" and "NICO" mean the Naftiran Intertrade Company and any entity owned or controlled by, or operating for or on behalf of, the Naftiran Intertrade Company.

Sec. 11. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 or subsection (b) of section 5 of this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be no prior notice of an action taken pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 or subsection (b) of section 5 of this order.

Sec. 12. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of sections 1, 4, and 5 of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 13. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Sec. 14. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those later actions.

Sec. 15. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on July 31, 2012.

BARACK OBAMA